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threat-modeling
Perform STRIDE threat modeling for each component and trust boundary and produce a threat register. Use when reviewing a feature for security.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
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Perform STRIDE threat modeling for each component and trust boundary and produce a threat register. Use when reviewing a feature for security.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
基于 SOC 职业分类
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| name | threat-modeling |
| description | Perform STRIDE threat modeling for each component and trust boundary and produce a threat register. Use when reviewing a feature for security. |
docs/specs/{feature-slug}/threat-model.md
For each component and trust boundary, evaluate all 6 threat categories:
| Letter | Threat | Question |
|---|---|---|
| S | Spoofing | Can an attacker impersonate a user, service, or system? |
| T | Tampering | Can data be modified in transit or at rest without detection? |
| R | Repudiation | Can a user deny performing an action? |
| I | Information Disclosure | Can sensitive data leak to unauthorized parties? |
| D | Denial of Service | Can an attacker prevent legitimate users from accessing the service? |
| E | Elevation of Privilege | Can an attacker gain capabilities beyond what is authorized? |
# Threat Model: {Feature Name}
## Assets
| Asset | Sensitivity | Owner |
|-------|-------------|-------|
| User PII | High | {team} |
| Payment data | Critical | {team} |
| API keys | Critical | {team} |
## Trust Boundaries
- Internet <-> Load Balancer
- Load Balancer <-> Application
- Application <-> Database
- Application <-> Third-party APIs
## STRIDE Analysis
### {Component Name}
**S — Spoofing**
- Risk: {description}
- Likelihood: High/Medium/Low
- Impact: High/Medium/Low
- Mitigation: {control}
**T — Tampering**
...
**R — Repudiation**
...
**I — Information Disclosure**
...
**D — Denial of Service**
...
**E — Elevation of Privilege**
...
## Risk Register
| Threat | Component | Likelihood | Impact | Risk Level | Mitigation | Status |
|--------|-----------|------------|--------|------------|------------|--------|
| SQL Injection | API | High | Critical | Critical | Parameterized queries | Mitigated |
## Mitigations Required Before Launch
- [ ] {Critical mitigation 1}
- [ ] {Critical mitigation 2}