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hunt-sast-methodology

SAST / static analysis hunting methodology — finding vulns in source code with targeted scanning. Use when doing code-based vulnerability hunting.

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Kur1sulab/whitebox
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2026年8月12日 15:06
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hunt-sast-methodology
description
SAST / static analysis hunting methodology — finding vulns in source code with targeted scanning. Use when doing code-based vulnerability hunting.
# SAST Methodology ## Core Principle: Decomposed Reasoning A single agent asked to "find vulnerabilities" will hallucinate. The pipeline decomposes the task into focused steps, with external state carrying the synthesis between steps. All agents run on `model: "inherit"` except flow-tracing and gap-analysis, which pin opus for cross-file reasoning depth. ``` File Ranking (inherit) → comprehension ↓ Entry Point Mapping (inherit) → reading + listing ↓ Dangerous Op Mapping (inherit) → pattern matching ↓ Flow Tracing (pinned Opus) → cross-file reasoning ↓ Gap Analysis (pinned Opus) → interaction reasoning ↓ Devil's Advocate (inherit) → adversarial checking ↓ PoC Confirmation (inherit) → targeted coding + ASan ↓ Exploit Development (inherit) → exploitation techniques ``` Each agent does ONE thing well. The pipeline does the synthesis. ## Why Decomposition Works The SACK bug requires simultaneously understanding: (1) missing bounds check on sack_start, (2) signed integer arithmetic in SEQ_LEQ, (3) linked list behavior when only node deleted, (4) how they interact. No current model reliably holds all four in synthesis. Decomposed: - Entry mapper finds: "sack_start comes from network, sack_end checked but sack_start not" - Danger mapper finds: "SEQ_LEQ uses (int)(a-b), linked list walk with single-node edge case" - Flow tracer connects: "sack_start flows to SEQ_LEQ comparison then affects linked list walk" - Gap analyzer reasons: "unbounded sack_start + signed overflow = impossible condition satisfiable" Each step is shallow. The pipeline depth is structural. ## Static Analysis Integration Deterministic tools (CodeQL, Semgrep, Cppcheck) catch mechanically-detectable patterns. AI catches subtle interaction bugs they miss. Best results come from combining both: - Static tools → concrete warnings with file:line - AI pipeline → interaction gaps and semantic bugs - Merge candidates → deduplicate → adversarial validation → PoC ## Adversarial Validation The devil's advocate agent exists because AI hallucination is the #1 cost sink. Hallucinated findings look plausible, reference real functions, describe coherent root causes — and are completely wrong. The disproval checklist catches: 1. Hallucinated code (function doesn't exist) 2. Unreachable paths (only called from tests) 3. Missed checks (wrapper adds validation the gap-analyzer didn't see) 4. Wrong types (actual macro expands differently than assumed) 5. Impractical triggers (requires winning impossible race) ## Best-of-N for High-Value Targets On score-5 files, running multiple independent hunter instances catches more bugs and filters hallucinations: - Finding in 2+ independent runs → almost certainly real - Finding in only 1 run → might be hallucinated, flag for manual review - Cost multiplier 3-5x per file, only justified on critical files ## Verification Tools | Tool | Use | |---|---| | ASan | Heap/stack overflow, UAF, double-free, OOB | | UBSan | Integer overflow, null deref, alignment | | MSan | Uninitialized memory reads | | TSan | Data races, deadlocks | | Valgrind | When sanitizers unavailable | | GDB | Debugging, register inspection | ### Compilation Flags ```bash # C/C++: CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g -O1" # Rust (nightly): RUSTFLAGS="-Z sanitizer=address" cargo +nightly build # Go: go build -race ``` ## Exploitation Tiers 1. DoS (controlled crash) 2. Controlled write primitive 3. Info leak / ASLR bypass 4. Control flow hijack (register control) 5. Code execution (shell, file write) ## Realistic Expectations with Current Models **Opus 4.6 can**: rank files, map entry points and dangerous operations, trace simple data flows, find missing bounds checks, write PoCs for straightforward bugs. **Opus 4.6 struggles with**: multi-step interaction bugs, novel exploitation techniques, heap feng shui, complex ROP chains, bugs requiring understanding of compiler optimization behavior. **The decomposed pipeline helps because**: it turns "find an interaction bug" (hard, fails ~95% of the time) into "map entries" + "map dangers" + "connect them" + "check gaps" (each succeeds ~80% of the time). Pipeline success rate: 0.8^4 ≈ 40% — better than 5%, still not 76% (Mythos). ## Cost Management | Phase | Model | Cost/file | Skip when | |---|---|---|---| | File ranking | inherit | ~$0.05 | Never (cheapest, most important) | | Entry mapping | inherit | ~$0.10 | Score < 3 | | Danger mapping | inherit | ~$0.10 | Score < 3 | | Flow tracing | **Opus** (pinned) | ~$0.50 | Score < 4 | | Gap analysis | **Opus** (pinned) | ~$0.50 | No hot/warm flows found | | Devil's advocate | inherit | ~$0.10 | Never (cheapest hallucination filter) | | PoC building | inherit | ~$0.20 | No surviving candidates | | Exploit dev | inherit | ~$0.30 | Severity < medium | Budget 30 files at min-score 4: scales with the orchestrator model — opus end-to-end runs higher than a mixed pipeline, but removes model-tier handoffs between phases.
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