hunting-for-dns-based-persistence

Hunts for DNS-based persistence mechanisms such as DNS hijacking, dangling CNAME records enabling subdomain takeover, wildcard DNS abuse, and unauthorized zone or NS delegation changes, using passive DNS history (SecurityTrails API), Route53/Azure DNS/Cloudflare audit logs, and zone transfer analysis. Use when investigating suspected DNS hijacking or subdomain takeover, or when threat hunting for DNS record tampering that persists across credential rotations and endpoint reimaging.

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仓库: mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
最近来源活动: 2026年8月2日 16:32
检测到的 SKILL.md 语言: 英语
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分支: 3,909

安装方式

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SKILL.md

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name	hunting-for-dns-based-persistence
description	Hunts for DNS-based persistence mechanisms such as DNS hijacking, dangling CNAME records enabling subdomain takeover, wildcard DNS abuse, and unauthorized zone or NS delegation changes, using passive DNS history (SecurityTrails API), Route53/Azure DNS/Cloudflare audit logs, and zone transfer analysis. Use when investigating suspected DNS hijacking or subdomain takeover, or when threat hunting for DNS record tampering that persists across credential rotations and endpoint reimaging.
domain	cybersecurity
subdomain	threat-hunting
tags	["dns","persistence","threat-hunting","passive-dns","dns-hijacking","subdomain-takeover","securitytrails"]
version	1.0
author	mahipal
license	Apache-2.0
nist_csf	["DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05"]
mitre_attack	["T1046","T1057","T1082","T1083","T1547"]

Hunting for DNS-based Persistence

Overview

Attackers establish DNS-based persistence by hijacking DNS records, creating unauthorized subdomains, abusing wildcard DNS entries, or modifying NS delegations to redirect traffic through attacker-controlled infrastructure. These techniques survive credential rotations, endpoint reimaging, and traditional remediation because DNS changes persist independently of compromised hosts. Detection requires passive DNS historical analysis, zone file auditing, and monitoring for unauthorized record modifications. This skill covers hunting methodologies using SecurityTrails passive DNS API, DNS audit logs from Route53/Azure DNS/Cloudflare, and zone transfer analysis.

When to Use

When investigating security incidents that require hunting for dns based persistence
When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

Prerequisites

SecurityTrails API key (free tier provides 50 queries/month)
Access to DNS provider audit logs (Route53, Azure DNS, Cloudflare, or on-premises DNS)
Python 3.9+ with requests library
DNS zone file access or AXFR capability for internal zones
Historical DNS baseline for comparison

Steps

Step 1: Baseline DNS Records

Export current DNS zone records and establish baseline for all authorized A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, and TXT records.

Step 2: Query Passive DNS History

Use SecurityTrails API to retrieve historical DNS records and identify unauthorized changes, new subdomains, and CNAME records pointing to decommissioned services (dangling CNAMEs).

Step 3: Detect Anomalies

Compare current records against baseline to identify unauthorized modifications, wildcard records that resolve all subdomains, NS delegation changes, and MX record hijacking.

Step 4: Investigate Findings

Correlate DNS anomalies with threat intelligence feeds, check resolution targets against known malicious infrastructure, and validate record ownership.

Expected Output

JSON report listing DNS anomalies with record type, historical changes, risk severity, and remediation recommendations for each finding.

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conducting-gdpr-compliance-assessment

Conduct comprehensive GDPR compliance assessments by evaluating data processing activities against EU Regulation 2016/679, including Article 30 records of processing, lawful basis validation, data subject rights implementation, Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) under Article 35, breach notification procedures, international transfer safeguards (SCCs, adequacy decisions), and technical/organizational measures under Article 32. Use when processing personal data of EU residents, preparing for supervisory authority audits, implementing privacy-by-design for new systems, scoping compliance gaps for M&A due diligence, assessing third-party processors, or responding to data subject access requests at scale. Incorporates 2026 guidance from ICO, EDPB, and post-Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 UK-GDPR considerations. Do not use for implementing specific Article 32 controls — use implementing-gdpr-data-protection-controls; or for DSAR automation — use implementing-gdpr-data-subject-access-request.

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Parses Kubernetes API server audit logs (JSON lines) to detect exec-into-pod, secret access, RBAC modifications, privileged pod creation, and anonymous API access, and builds SIEM detection rules from the event patterns. Use when investigating a suspected cluster compromise, reconstructing what an attacker did through the API server, or writing Kubernetes-specific detection content. Keywords: audit policy, audit log, kube-apiserver, exec into pod, RBAC change, anonymous access, detection rules. Do not use for syscall-level detection inside a running container - use detecting-container-runtime-threats-with-falco. '

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Finds over-permissive RBAC roles and service-account token abuse paths in a Kubernetes cluster using kubectl auth can-i, rbac-police, kubectl-who-can, and rakkess, tracing which subjects can escalate toward cluster-admin. Use when reviewing who can escalate privileges in a cluster, hunting exploitable RoleBindings during an authorized review, or validating least privilege after an RBAC change. Keywords: RBAC, ClusterRoleBinding, service account token, auth can-i, rbac-police, escalate, bind, impersonate. Do not use for designing and applying hardened RBAC - use implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes.

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查看这个仓库的全部 Skills

name	hunting-for-dns-based-persistence
description	Hunts for DNS-based persistence mechanisms such as DNS hijacking, dangling CNAME records enabling subdomain takeover, wildcard DNS abuse, and unauthorized zone or NS delegation changes, using passive DNS history (SecurityTrails API), Route53/Azure DNS/Cloudflare audit logs, and zone transfer analysis. Use when investigating suspected DNS hijacking or subdomain takeover, or when threat hunting for DNS record tampering that persists across credential rotations and endpoint reimaging.
domain	cybersecurity
subdomain	threat-hunting
tags	["dns","persistence","threat-hunting","passive-dns","dns-hijacking","subdomain-takeover","securitytrails"]
version	1.0
author	mahipal
license	Apache-2.0
nist_csf	["DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05"]
mitre_attack	["T1046","T1057","T1082","T1083","T1547"]

Hunting for DNS-based Persistence

Overview

When to Use

When investigating security incidents that require hunting for dns based persistence
When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

Prerequisites

SecurityTrails API key (free tier provides 50 queries/month)
Access to DNS provider audit logs (Route53, Azure DNS, Cloudflare, or on-premises DNS)
Python 3.9+ with requests library
DNS zone file access or AXFR capability for internal zones
Historical DNS baseline for comparison

Steps

Step 1: Baseline DNS Records

Export current DNS zone records and establish baseline for all authorized A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, and TXT records.

Step 2: Query Passive DNS History

Use SecurityTrails API to retrieve historical DNS records and identify unauthorized changes, new subdomains, and CNAME records pointing to decommissioned services (dangling CNAMEs).

Step 3: Detect Anomalies

Compare current records against baseline to identify unauthorized modifications, wildcard records that resolve all subdomains, NS delegation changes, and MX record hijacking.

Step 4: Investigate Findings

Correlate DNS anomalies with threat intelligence feeds, check resolution targets against known malicious infrastructure, and validate record ownership.

Expected Output

JSON report listing DNS anomalies with record type, historical changes, risk severity, and remediation recommendations for each finding.

hunting-for-dns-based-persistence

来源信息

安装方式

检查来源文件

Hunting for DNS-based Persistence

Overview

When to Use

Prerequisites

Steps

Step 1: Baseline DNS Records

Step 2: Query Passive DNS History

Step 3: Detect Anomalies

Step 4: Investigate Findings

Expected Output

同仓库更多 Skills

Hunting for DNS-based Persistence

Overview

When to Use

Prerequisites

Steps

Step 1: Baseline DNS Records

Step 2: Query Passive DNS History

Step 3: Detect Anomalies

Step 4: Investigate Findings

Expected Output

同仓库更多 Skills