菜单
Abuse Active Directory object ACLs/DACLs for lateral movement and escalation — GenericAll, WriteDACL, GenericWrite, WriteOwner, AddMember, ForceChangePassword, and DCSync rights. Load with domain creds + BloodHound showing an ACL edge, on "GenericAll", "WriteDACL", "DCSync", "abuse this edge".
默认使用会先检查来源的 Prompt；你也可以切换为直接命令，或下载本地副本。
决定是否安装前，请先阅读 SKILL.md，以及 SkillsMP 当前展示的配套文件。
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt，粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里，让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
直接命令不会经过审查 Prompt；运行前请先检查来源。
npx skills add https://github.com/NoorQureshi/SploitAgent --skill ad-dacl-abuse命令会保持在同一行。复制前请横向滚动并检查完整内容。
想先保存到本地？可下载 SkillsMP 当前能够提供的文件。
Attack Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) — ESC1–ESC8 template/CA misconfigurations to escalate to Domain Admin. Load with a domain foothold/creds where ADCS is present, on "certipy", "ESC1", "certificate template", or a CA server. Signals: Cert Publishers, pKIEnrollmentService, ports 443/135 on a CA, certipy find output.
Kerberoasting & AS-REP roasting — request/crack Kerberos tickets to recover service/user passwords offline. Load with any domain foothold or valid domain creds, on "kerberoast", "AS-REP", SPNs, service accounts, ports 88/389. Signals: domain creds in hand, SPNs set, accounts with pre-auth disabled.
One line: Active Directory, pivoting/tunneling, and password-cracking arsenal for authorized engagements. Trigger signals: "Active Directory", "domain", "kerberos", "kerberoast", "AS-REP", "BloodHound", "DCSync", "AD/.local domain", holding domain creds or a foothold. Authorized, in-scope targets only.
正在显示 SKILL.md
| name | ad-dacl-abuse |
| description | Abuse Active Directory object ACLs/DACLs for lateral movement and escalation — GenericAll, WriteDACL, GenericWrite, WriteOwner, AddMember, ForceChangePassword, and DCSync rights. Load with domain creds + BloodHound showing an ACL edge, on "GenericAll", "WriteDACL", "DCSync", "abuse this edge". |
| domain | ad |
| type | technique |
| stability | learning |
| modes | ["pentest"] |
| severity | high |
| mitre | ["T1222","T1098","T1003.006"] |
| cwe | ["CWE-284","CWE-269"] |
| tools | ["bloodhound","netexec","impacket","powerview"] |
| schema_version | 1 |
You have domain creds and BloodHound shows your principal (or one you control) has a dangerous ACL edge over another object — a user, group, computer, GPO, or the domain. These edges chain into a path to Domain Admin without any CVE.
AD access control is a web of object permissions. Over-permissive ACLs let you modify other principals: reset a password, add yourself to a privileged group, take ownership then rewrite the DACL, or grant yourself DCSync — each turning a small right into control.
net rpc password / bloodyAD set password.msDS-KeyCredentialLink
(shadow credentials, certipy shadow/pywhisker) → auth as them.net group ... /add.impacket-secretsdump -just-dc to
dump all hashes incl. krbtgt (→ golden ticket).Control of the target principal (password/hash/TGT), membership in a privileged group, or a hash dump via DCSync — advancing the path toward DA.
SpecterOps BloodHound docs (edge abuse); harmj0y "ACL attacks"; impacket/bloodyAD.