detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory

name	detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory
description	Detect DCSync attacks where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes by monitoring for non-domain-controller accounts requesting directory replication via DsGetNCChanges. Use when detecting dcsync attacks where adversaries abuse active directory replication privileges.
domain	cybersecurity
tags	["threat-hunting","active-directory","dcsync","credential-theft","mitre-t1003-006","mimikatz","kerberos"]
subdomain	threat-hunting
version	1.0
author	oyi77
license	Apache-2.0
d3fend_techniques	["Application Protocol Command Analysis","Network Isolation","Network Traffic Analysis","Client-server Payload Profiling","Platform Monitoring"]
nist_csf	["DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05"]

Detecting Dcsync Attack In Active Directory

Overview

Cybersecurity skill for detecting dcsync attack in active directory. Follows industry best practices and security standards.

When to Use

Trigger phrases:

• "detecting dcsync attack in active directory"

• "Detect DCSync attacks where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privi"

• When hunting for credential theft in Active Directory environments

• After compromise of accounts with Replicating Directory Changes permissions

• When investigating suspected use of Mimikatz or Impacket secretsdump

• During incident response involving lateral movement with domain admin credentials

• When auditing AD replication permissions as part of security hardening

When NOT to Use

• When you lack proper authorization for testing
• For production systems without change management
• When the task requires legal or compliance expertise beyond technical scope

Prerequisites

• Windows Security Event Logs with Event ID 4662 (Object Access) enabled
• Advanced Audit Policy: Audit Directory Service Access enabled
• Domain Controller event forwarding to SIEM
• Knowledge of legitimate domain controller hostnames and IPs
• Directory Service Access auditing with SACL on domain object

Workflow

# Example: IOC detection
import re

IOC_PATTERNS = {
    "ip": r"\b(?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}\b",
    "domain": r"\b[a-z0-9-]+\.[a-z]{2,}\b",
    "hash_md5": r"\b[a-f0-9]{32}\b",
    "hash_sha256": r"\b[a-f0-9]{64}\b",
}

def extract_iocs(text: str) -> dict:
    return {k: re.findall(v, text) for k, v in IOC_PATTERNS.items()}

1. — Identify the specific dcsync attack in active directory techniques or indicators to hunt. Map to MITRE ATT&CK tactics/techniques where applicable.