security-audit

name	security-audit
description	Formal full-codebase security audit producing a written report with prioritized findings: SAST, OWASP (incl. LLM Top 10), SCA, supply chain, Zero Trust. Trigger ONLY on explicit requests like "security audit", "OWASP audit", "Sicherheitsaudit", "dependency audit". NOT for PR-level checks, one-off questions, or generic "security" mentions.
disable-model-invocation	false

Security Auditor

You perform a comprehensive security audit covering dependency analysis through code review. Output is a prioritized security report with a concrete remediation plan.

Input: Codebase (src/), dependencies, configuration. Output: _devprocess/analysis/AUDIT-{PROJECT}-{YYYY-MM-DD}.md.

See skills/project-conventions/SKILL.md#canonical-specs (Writing style) and (Frontmatter spec). Both apply to every artifact this skill produces.

Pre-Phase 0: Branch and item check

Two modes:

• Per-item audit (inside /coding or before merging a feature): runs on the item's branch. sec-done tag goes on the same branch.
• Periodic full-codebase audit: runs on feature/audit-<YYYY-MM-DD>, produces a standalone AUDIT report, queues FIX/IMP follow-ups. No draft PR for the audit branch; follow-ups get their own branches via /coding.

Per-item audit: identify the active item, verify branch matches, then run flow.py create-issue and flow.py open-draft-pr (idempotent). At the Handoff Ritual end, run flow.py tag-phase --item <ID> --phase sec.

Full rules: skills/project-conventions/references/team-workflow.md.

Scope

In scope: SAST (CWE-based), OWASP Top 10, OWASP LLM Top 10 (when AI/LLM is present), SCA (dependencies, licenses), Zero Trust (trust boundaries, input validation), code quality security patterns. Desktop/Electron runtime when detected. Safe local PoC verification (isolated).

Out of scope: penetration testing against systems you do not own, compliance certification, architecture design (done by /architecture).

Ask the scope first (before any scan)

Before running, ask the user WHAT to audit (AskUserQuestion). The scan scripts take a matching --scope:

Scope	What	Use when
full	whole codebase	first audit, release gate, periodic (recommended default when no prior baseline)
branch	branch vs merge-base with --base	before a PR / merge (common gate)
commit	last commit	quick post-commit check
working	uncommitted + untracked	mid-development
staged	staged only	pre-commit
range	free A..B	targeted investigation

A diff scope narrows WHERE findings are reported, never the reachability context: trace source->sink through the full tree even for a diff scan. Only full advances the delta baseline.

For a release-gate or full audit, additionally offer the opt-in supply-chain stages via AskUserQuestion: the clean-room rebuild executes the project's build command in a scratch clone (needs [audit.supply_chain] config or --build-cmd/--artifact), and the release verify needs the gh CLI plus network. Both degrade to honest not-run ledger entries when declined or unavailable.

The scan layer (deterministic)

Phases 1-6 are driven by tools/ (see tools/README.md), not manual grep. Resolve tools/... against $DIA_PLUGIN_ROOT. The scripts are offline-graceful and never log secret plaintext; you TRIAGE their JSON (source->sink, false-positive review) into findings.

python3 skills/security-audit/tools/audit_scan.py all --scope <S> [--base main] \
    --taxonomy '{"owasp":"...","owasp-llm":"...","cwe-top-25":"..."}'

Phase 0: Live threat currency (always)

The bundled references/*.md are the OFFLINE BASELINE. Before scanning, fetch the CURRENT editions and reconcile:

1. WebSearch/WebFetch the current OWASP Top 10, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps, and MITRE CWE Top 25 (official domains: owasp.org, genai.owasp.org, cwe.mitre.org). Note new categories vs the baseline.
2. SCA CVEs come live from npm audit / osv-scanner in Phase 5.
3. SNAPSHOT the taxonomy set you used (editions + date) and pass it to --taxonomy; it lands in the report and the delta baseline. The Fix-Loop and re-audit run against this snapshot so a fix is verifiable against the SAME list; the next fresh audit re-fetches.
4. If offline: fall back to the bundled baseline and record currency: offline in the report. Never silently claim currency.
5. If CodeQL is installed, refresh the query packs before scanning: codeql pack upgrade codeql/javascript-queries (plus python-queries, go-queries, rust-queries as the project's runtimes demand). A stale pack means missing detection rules; the report's Coverage section flags packs older than 90 days as a blindspot.

Audit Phases

Feed each from audit_scan.py output; triage into findings.

Phase	Activity	Reference
1. Reconnaissance	audit_scan.py detect + surface. Map entry points, data flows, trust boundaries. Read the project's own threat doc if present (REVIEWER_NOTES.md, SECURITY.md); its declared boundaries become mandatory audit targets + regression checks. Internal analysis only.	references/attack-surface.md, references/threat-modeling.md
2. SAST	audit_scan.py sast. Three-layer cascade: CodeQL (taint analysis, when installed and pack cached) + semgrep (AST rules, when installed) + grep (bundled fallback, always). Layers are additive and deduped by fingerprint; a missing tool is documented, never a failure. Triage source->sink.	references/cwe-patterns.md, tools/README.md#codeql-setup-optional-recommended
3. OWASP Top 10	Check the Phase-0 current edition (baseline A01-A10).	references/owasp-checklist.md
4. OWASP LLM Top 10	Only if detect reports LLM APIs. Deepen with the agent/injection refs.	references/owasp-llm-checklist.md, references/agent-approval-gate.md, references/prompt-injection-boundaries.md
4b. Desktop runtime	Only if detect reports electron.	references/desktop-runtime.md
5. SCA	audit_scan.py sca (npm/pip audit + osv-scanner; license). Classify Runtime / Dev / Transitive. Bundle-reachability check; note that a minified grep can false-negative.	--
5b. Supply chain	audit_scan.py supply-chain (static: lockfile provenance, action pinning, install-script inventory; always part of all). Opt-in stages: --rebuild (clean-room rebuild, executes the project build) and --release-verify (gh attestation of release assets). Stages that did not run appear as not-run in the ledger.	references/supply-chain.md, tools/README.md#supply-chain-checks
6. Zero Trust + Quality	Input validation, least privilege, defense in depth, fail-closed defaults, audit trail, error handling, resource management, race conditions (CWE-362/367), hardcoded credentials, debug code. Optional isolated PoC.

Finding format (binding)

Code diff only when the fix is not obvious from the remediation sentence.

H-N: <title>
- Severity: Critical | High | Medium | Low | Info
- CWE-ID:   CWE-XXX
- CVSS:     <v3.1 vector>=<score>   (mandatory for High+; omit for Low/Info)
- Location: <file:line>
- FP:       <fingerprint from audit_scan.py>
- Evidence: <snippet / source->sink trace / PoC result>
- Risk:     <one sentence>
- Remediation: <one sentence with concrete action>

Status values: Confirmed, Unverified, Mitigated, False Positive, Resolved. State the status, never leave a false positive silent. Consider context (DevDependency vs. Runtime).

Verification before Confirmed (binding). A grep/semgrep hit is Unverified until you trace it: is the input attacker/user-controlled, and does it reach the sink? Record the source->sink path in Evidence, then set Confirmed. A hit you cannot trace stays Unverified and drops to P3; never promote an untraced hit to Confirmed. This is what keeps the report honest (the recurring failure is a plausible-but-unreachable hit reported as real).

Positive findings: up to 3 entries, skip entirely when overall risk is High or Critical. The team needs the negative list, not encouragement.

Severity schema: Critical (immediately exploitable, data loss / RCE), High (exploitable with low effort, significant impact), Medium (exploitable under specific conditions), Low (best-practice improvement), Info (note, no direct threat).

Audit summary block (canonical, define once)

Defined here. Do not restate the block in re-audit output or in the Handoff Ritual entry; reference the report instead.

=== Security Audit Result ===

Overall risk: {Critical / High / Medium / Low}

P1 (Must Fix, Critical + High): {N} findings
- {H-1}: {title}, {file:line}, effort {S/M/L}

P2 (Should Fix, Medium): {N} findings
- {M-1}: {title}, {file:line}, effort {S/M/L}

P3 (Consider, Low + Info): {N} findings
- {L-1}: {title}, effort {S/M/L}

Positive findings: {up to 3, omitted when overall risk High or Critical}

When to run

Before every release, after significant security-relevant changes, periodically (monthly for active projects), after dependency updates (SCA phase).

Create the report

Pre-fill the template deterministically from the scan JSON, then write the narrative (Risk/Remediation prose, executive summary) on top:

python3 skills/security-audit/tools/report_assembler.py fill \
    --findings <scan.json> --project {PROJECT} --date {YYYY-MM-DD} \
    > _devprocess/analysis/AUDIT-{PROJECT}-{YYYY-MM-DD}.md

fill produces the count matrix, P1/P2/P3 buckets, an HONEST tools ledger (only tools that ran; kills the semgrep-overclaim), and the mandatory "Coverage and limitations" section. Keep the report within the audit artefact cap; move detail to child FIX/IMP rows if it grows.

---

Fix-Loop

After the audit, the user picks scope.

Step 1: Show the summary

Render the audit summary block defined above. Once.

Step 2: Ask the user

How should I handle the findings?

A) Fix all findings (P1 + P2 + P3), then re-audit.
B) Fix only P1, defer P2/P3 to backlog.
C) Approve fixes one by one.
D) Nothing to fix, report only. All findings go to backlog.

Step 3: Fix implementation

For each finding to be fixed: implement the concrete remediation, run affected tests (no regressions). Then proof-of-closure: re-run the SAME detection that surfaced it (the grep/semgrep rule, or the PoC probe for a CWE-400) and confirm zero hits; record "Closure evidence: {command} -> 0" before flipping Confirmed -> Resolved. A fix without a re-detection that comes back clean stays Confirmed. On Option C: show each fix before continuing.

Step 4: Re-audit (automatic, script-driven delta)

Re-run affected phases against the SAME taxonomy snapshot, then compute the delta by fingerprint (not by eye):

python3 skills/security-audit/tools/report_assembler.py delta \
    --before .git/security-audit/prev-run.json \
    --after  .git/security-audit/last-run.json

=== Re-Audit Delta ===

Before: {N} P1, {N} P2, {N} P3
After:  {N} P1, {N} P2, {N} P3
Resolved: {fingerprints}
New: {if a fix introduced new findings}

Adversarial check on any NEW finding a fix introduced: try to refute it (is it reachable?) before reporting it, so a fix-bypass is caught. Loop until all in-scope findings resolve or the user aborts. Do not re-render the full summary block.

Step 5: Deferred findings -> Backlog

Each open finding becomes a row in _devprocess/context/BACKLOG.md per skills/requirements-engineering/templates/BACKLOG-TEMPLATE.md. Place under Standalone Items with: Typ = Security, Source = SEC, priority from severity (H -> P1, M -> P2, L -> P3), Status = Ready, Evidence = path:line, Notes = <H/M/L-ID> + short risk. Refresh dashboard counts. Audit report keeps status Confirmed with note "Deferred to backlog".

Step 6: Update artifacts

Audit report (final version), feature specs (security-relevant changes), ADRs (when fixes affect decisions), backlog (open findings).

Step 7: Pre-release consistency check

The audit is the release gate, so the full graph check runs HERE (the one mandatory run per cycle): python3 tools/consistency-check.py --check (resolve against $DIA_PLUGIN_ROOT). Catches deferred findings without backlog rows, FIX rows missing feature:/epic: frontmatter, drifted dashboard counts, dead links.

---

Handoff Ritual

Part 1: Artifact report

Produced / updated:
- _devprocess/analysis/AUDIT-{PROJECT}-{DATE}.md
- Findings resolved: {N}
- Findings deferred: {N}
- _devprocess/context/BACKLOG.md: deferred rows added

Part 2: Handoff context

Goes into the phase-end commit BODY (reference the audit summary block by file path; do not restate it):

• Unresolved P0/P1: open high-severity findings and why.
• Architectural concerns: patterns for a future /architecture cycle (trust-boundary issues that need redesign, not patching).
• Release recommendation: green / yellow / red verdict.

Part 3: Phase-end commit

Per skills/project-conventions/references/team-workflow.md section "Phase-end commit (binding)". Canonical message:

chore(audit): <ITEM-ID> audit complete

<one-line: risk verdict, N findings (P1/P2/P3), release recommendation>
<unresolved P0/P1 and architectural concerns as short bullets>

Refs: <ITEM-ID>[, FIX-..., FIX-...]
DIA-Phase: sec-done
DIA-Handoff: <ITEM-ID> -> release

After the commit:

python3 tools/github-integration/flow.py tag-phase --item <ID> --phase sec
python3 tools/github-integration/flow.py sync-status --item <ID>

sync-status mirrors BACKLOG Status to the GitHub issue and project (and Assignee back into Claim). No-op outside mode = "github-sync". Skip the commit silently if the working tree has no changes.

Part 4: Transition

"Security audit complete. Report: _devprocess/analysis/AUDIT-{PROJECT}-{DATE}.md. Release readiness: {green/yellow/red}. Recommended next: /consistency-check mode B finalises the artifact graph and returns a Release-Ready verdict (user command; the skill is explicit-only). Run /consistency-check mode B now, or review the audit first?"

On agreement: ask the user to invoke /consistency-check (mode B); on Release-Ready: yes the /dia-guide Closing Handoff fires. On rejection: pause.

Keywords

Security Audit, Security Review, OWASP, SAST, SCA, Vulnerability, CVE, Threat Model, Dependency Audit, Code Review Security, Fix-Loop, Handoff