oracle

name	oracle
description	Auto-loaded by oracle-auditor agent during Phase 2. Provides detection patterns for: stale prices, deprecated Chainlink functions, L2 sequencer downtime, decimal mismatches, spot price manipulation, oracle DoS. Core artifact: Oracle Integration Matrix.
user-invocable	false

Oracle Vulnerability Patterns

This skill provides comprehensive knowledge for identifying oracle-related vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

Overview

Oracles bridge off-chain data to on-chain contracts. Every oracle integration is a trust assumption that can be exploited if not properly validated.

Detection Patterns

1. Stale Price Data

Vulnerable Pattern:

// DANGEROUS: No freshness check
(, int256 price,,,) = priceFeed.latestRoundData();
return uint256(price);

Secure Pattern:

(uint80 roundId, int256 price,, uint256 updatedAt, uint80 answeredInRound) =
    priceFeed.latestRoundData();
require(updatedAt > block.timestamp - HEARTBEAT, "Stale price");
require(answeredInRound >= roundId, "Stale round");
require(price > 0, "Invalid price");

Search Pattern:

Grep("latestRoundData", glob="**/*.sol")

Then verify each usage checks updatedAt timestamp.

---

2. Deprecated Chainlink Functions

Vulnerable Pattern:

// DEPRECATED: Can return stale data
int256 price = priceFeed.latestAnswer();

Detection:

Grep("latestAnswer|latestTimestamp|latestRound\\(\\)", glob="**/*.sol")

---

3. L2 Sequencer Downtime (Arbitrum/Optimism)

Vulnerable Pattern:

// DANGEROUS on L2: No sequencer check
(, int256 price,,,) = priceFeed.latestRoundData();

Secure Pattern:

// Check sequencer uptime feed first
(, int256 answer,, uint256 updatedAt,) = sequencerFeed.latestRoundData();
bool isSequencerUp = answer == 0;
require(isSequencerUp, "Sequencer down");
require(block.timestamp - updatedAt > GRACE_PERIOD, "Grace period");

// Then get price
(, int256 price,,,) = priceFeed.latestRoundData();

Detection:

• Check if deployed on L2 (Arbitrum, Optimism, Base)
• Search for sequencer uptime feed integration

Grep("sequencer|SEQUENCER|isSequencerUp", glob="**/*.sol")

---

4. Decimal Precision Mismatch

Vulnerable Pattern:

// DANGEROUS: Assumes 8 decimals
uint256 priceInUsd = uint256(price) * 1e10; // Scale to 18 decimals

Secure Pattern:

uint8 decimals = priceFeed.decimals();
uint256 scaledPrice = uint256(price) * (10 ** (18 - decimals));

Detection:

Grep("decimals\\(\\)|1e10|1e8|\\* 10", glob="**/*.sol")

---

5. Spot Price Manipulation (Flash Loan Vulnerable)

Vulnerable Pattern:

// DANGEROUS: Manipulable in single tx
(uint112 reserve0, uint112 reserve1,) = pair.getReserves();
uint256 price = reserve1 * 1e18 / reserve0;

Secure Pattern:

• Use TWAP (Time-Weighted Average Price)
• Use Chainlink or other manipulation-resistant oracle
• Add minimum TWAP period (>= 30 minutes)

Detection:

Grep("getReserves|slot0|observe", glob="**/*.sol")

---

6. Oracle Revert DoS

Vulnerable Pattern:

// DANGEROUS: Revert blocks entire function
function getPrice() external view returns (uint256) {
    (, int256 price,,,) = priceFeed.latestRoundData();
    return uint256(price);
}

Secure Pattern:

function getPrice() external view returns (uint256, bool) {
    try priceFeed.latestRoundData() returns (
        uint80, int256 price, uint256, uint256 updatedAt, uint80
    ) {
        if (price <= 0 || block.timestamp - updatedAt > HEARTBEAT) {
            return (0, false);
        }
        return (uint256(price), true);
    } catch {
        return (0, false);
    }
}

---

7. Heartbeat Mismatch

Different price feeds have different update frequencies:

Feed	Heartbeat	Deviation
ETH/USD	1 hour	0.5%
BTC/USD	1 hour	0.5%
Stablecoin	24 hours	0.25%
Low-cap	24 hours	1%

Detection:

• Check staleness threshold matches the feed's heartbeat
• Verify threshold is not hardcoded for all feeds

---

Oracle Audit Checklist

• Price freshness validated (updatedAt check)
• Zero/negative price rejected
• Round completeness verified (answeredInRound >= roundId)
• L2 sequencer uptime checked (if applicable)
• Decimal precision handled dynamically
• Heartbeat matches price feed specification
• No deprecated functions used
• Oracle revert handled gracefully
• No spot price from AMM (flash loan vulnerable)
• TWAP period sufficient (if using Uniswap)

Common Oracle Vulnerabilities by Severity

Critical

• Missing price freshness validation
• L2 sequencer check missing
• Spot price manipulation

High

• Decimal precision hardcoded
• Heartbeat threshold too long
• No zero price check

Medium

• Deprecated function usage
• Oracle revert not handled
• Single oracle dependency

References

For detailed Chainlink integration patterns, see:

• integration-patterns/chainlink/SKILL.md