| name | rfc-review-security |
| description | Deep-dive security review of a technical RFC or design document — threat model, trust boundaries, attack surface, input validation, crypto, authN/authZ, secrets, supply chain, privacy, and audit. Use when reviewing an RFC and security warrants its own focused pass, or as a follow-up from /rfc-review. NOT for reviewing implementation diffs — use /security-review for that. |
| argument-hint | [<path-or-pr>] |
| allowed-tools | Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, WebFetch |
RFC Security Review Skill
Deep-dive security review of an RFC. This is the focused, opinionated sibling of the umbrella /rfc-review skill — same locate/read/walk/deliver workflow, but the entire review is the security lens. Aim for the review a security-minded engineer with codebase context would give: catch the realistic threats, name the unstated trust assumptions, and ask the questions that surface hidden exposure.
This skill reviews design proposals. For review of pending code changes on the current branch, use /security-review instead.
Usage
/rfc-review-security # Find the RFC on the current branch and security-review it
/rfc-review-security docs/rfcs/my-rfc.md # Security-review a specific RFC file
When to invoke this skill
- The user explicitly asks for a security review of an RFC, design doc, ADR, or proposal.
/rfc-review flagged security as needing a deeper pass and the user wants it now.- The RFC introduces any of: a new parser/deserializer, a new network or IPC endpoint, a new file-load path, a loadable plugin, a new dependency, a new daemon/service, a credential/secret, a change to a privilege boundary, telemetry that leaves the host.
Do NOT invoke for:
- Review of implementation diffs on the current branch →
/security-review.
- General RFC review where security is one of many concerns →
/rfc-review (it covers security at one-paragraph depth).
Workflow
Step 1 — Locate the RFC
In order of preference:
- Argument path, if provided.
- PR/branch context:
git log -1 --name-only and look for added/modified .md files under docs/, rfcs/, design/, or paths matching *rfc*.
- If still ambiguous, ask the user. Do not guess across multiple candidates.
Step 2 — Read the RFC and its context
- Read the full RFC end-to-end before forming opinions.
- Follow links to referenced specs, prior RFCs, and code paths it claims to touch. If a path is named, confirm it exists with Glob/Grep — a "security boundary" in code that doesn't exist is a red flag.
- Note the author, status, and any prior security comments visible on the PR.
- Identify the domain. The realistic threat model differs sharply between, say, a numerical GPU library (most-likely attacker = a malicious model file or a co-tenant on shared hardware) and a network service (most-likely attacker = anyone on the internet). Calibrate accordingly — see the domain hooks in
prompt.md.
Step 3 — Walk the security checklist
See prompt.md for the full per-area checklist. The areas:
- Threat model — who is the realistic attacker, what asset, what capability. Most important section; an RFC with no threat model is the most common defect.
- Trust boundaries — where untrusted input becomes trusted; process / network / user / privilege boundaries crossed.
- Attack surface — new inputs, endpoints, parsers, deserializers, file reads, IPC, env-var consumers.
- Input validation & injection — every parser is a vuln; every concatenation into a command/query/path is an injection vector.
- Cryptography — algorithm choice, key management, RNG sources, rolling-your-own.
- Authentication & authorization — who can do what, how it is enforced, failure modes.
- Secrets handling — how secrets enter, are stored, are logged, are rotated.
- Supply chain — new direct and transitive deps, build provenance, update policy, binary trust.
- Privacy — what data flows where, what is retained, what leaks via logs / telemetry / errors.
- Audit & forensics — can you tell after the fact who did what.
For each area, produce: strengths, concerns (graded blocking vs non-blocking), and questions for the author. A sub-area with nothing to say is one line, not invented filler.
Step 4 — Ask the user how to deliver the report
Before writing, ask the user how they want the report delivered. Offer these options:
- On disk next to the RFC — saved as
<rfc-dir>/review-security-<YYYY-MM-DD>-<reviewer>.md. Best for sharing or attaching to a PR.
- Inline in chat only — printed in the conversation, nothing written to disk. Best for quick iteration.
- Both — written to disk and printed inline.
Skip this prompt only if the user already stated a preference in this turn (e.g. "just print it" or "save the review to ..."), in which case respect that and note the choice in your reply.
Step 5 — Synthesize the report
Use assets/templates/review-report.md as the structure. Order:
- Verdict + one-sentence justification.
- Threat model summary at the top — this is the lens of the whole review; the rest of the report makes sense only in its context.
- Blocking concerns (if any).
- Per-area concerns and questions.
- Strengths.
- Recommended deeper passes.
If writing to disk, use the git user name (git config user.name) as <reviewer> and tell the user the path when done.
Step 6 — Recommend deeper passes
If you find concerns that need expertise beyond an RFC review — formal threat modeling session, dedicated crypto review, fuzzing strategy, third-party pen test — name them at the end. Don't over-recommend; only call them out if the RFC actually justifies it.
Output rules
- Verdict at the top. One of:
approve, approve-with-comments, needs-revision, block.
- Threat model first. A security review without a stated threat model is just vibes. If the RFC doesn't state one, infer the most realistic one yourself and label it as inferred — then judge the design against it.
- No padding. A sub-area with nothing to say is one line: "Crypto — N/A, no crypto in scope." Do not invent threats. Resist "what if the attacker had quantum capability" energy.
- Cite the RFC. Every concern references the specific section or line.
- Severity, calibrated.
blocking = "I would not approve without this resolved." Use sparingly. If everything is blocking, nothing is.
- Ask, don't assert. When a section is ambiguous on a security property, ask. Don't critique a guess.
- Domain-aware. A GPU numerical library has a different realistic threat surface than a web service. Spend your words where the real risk is, not where a generic OWASP checklist would tell you to.
Examples
/rfc-review-security
# → finds RFC on current branch, produces a security-focused review
/rfc-review-security docs/rfcs/0042-plugin-loader.md
# → deep security review of plugin-loader RFC (plugin trust model, ABI, supply chain)
