sponsio

name

sponsio

description

Install, observe, tune, and enforce Sponsio: a runtime contract layer for LLM agents that blocks unsafe tool calls and scores output quality against declared rules. Use when the user wants to set up / add / install Sponsio, add guardrails or runtime safety to an LLM agent, generate or refine a sponsio.yaml, audit tool configurations for risks (data leaks, unguarded writes, missing confirmations), explain or review existing contracts, check what Sponsio would have blocked (`sponsio report`), move from observe to enforce mode, or debug why a contract is (or isn't) firing. Triggers on phrases like "set up sponsio", "add sponsio", "install sponsio", "add guardrails", "monitor my agent", "harden my agent", "audit my agent", "generate contracts", "explain my sponsio.yaml", "sponsio report", "flip to enforce", "false positive", "why is this rule firing".

Sponsio — Agent Safety Lifecycle Companion

Sponsio is a Python/TypeScript runtime safety layer for LLM agents: it evaluates deterministic contracts against each tool call and can block (enforce) or just log (observe) violations. The engine is deterministic-only. This skill covers the full lifecycle — first-time setup, contract authoring/review, observe-mode tuning, and flipping to enforce — by orchestrating Sponsio's CLI and explaining its output in plain language.

This skill does NOT reimplement Sponsio's logic; it calls the CLI and interprets results.

When to use this skill

Dispatch by what the user is trying to do. Pick ONE workflow and follow it; do not run multiple workflows in one turn.

User is…	→ Workflow
Setting up Sponsio for the first time in a project ("add sponsio", "install sponsio", "add guardrails")	W1 — Initial setup (just dispatch sponsio init)
Handing you a codebase and asking "what could go wrong?" / wants a fresh contract file from scratch / has a policy doc to encode	W2 — Audit & refine
Authoring contracts for a Claude Code / OpenClaw plugin or a bare MCP server (input is a plugin manifest, not source code)	W2b — Plugin / MCP contracts
Tightening rules that apply to Task-spawned subagents (Cursor / Claude Code) — they lack user context and need stricter privileges than the main agent	W2c — Subagent privilege boundary
Tuning the IDE's OWN host-plugin library (Claude Code's Bash / Read / Write / MCP gating; Cursor likewise) — different from the user's project sponsio.yaml	hand off to the sponsio-claude-code:configure skill (or the cursor analog). Don't reimplement here.
Has Sponsio running in observe mode and wants to review violations, tune thresholds, silence false positives	W3 — Tune in observe
Ready to ship — wants to move from observe to enforce, needs regression confidence	W4 — Flip to enforce
Sponsio errored, a rule isn't firing when it should, a rule is firing when it shouldn't	W5 — Troubleshoot
Just ran their agent and asks "did anything slip through?" / wants NEW contracts proposed from a run's traces ("check my last run", self-evolving rulebook)	W6 — Discover missing contracts from traces

Do NOT trigger for: general LLM-safety discussions not tied to a specific codebase; non-agent code review (linting, correctness).

Prerequisites (run silently before any workflow)

sponsio --version

• Not found → install: pip install sponsio (or pip install -e ".[all]" from a local clone).
• For --llm inference, check: OPENAI_API_KEY / ANTHROPIC_API_KEY / GEMINI_API_KEY / GOOGLE_API_KEY. Absent → still proceed; AST-based extraction and all of W3/W4/W5 work with zero keys.

---

Editing contract YAML — write rules by file

Sponsio contract YAMLs split into two trust zones with different write rules. Pick the right zone before any edit; the runtime's self-modify pack enforces the host-zone rules, but cross-zone slips are still a config-correctness bug we'd rather avoid up-front.

Zone A — project YAML (you may add additively)

Path: <project>/sponsio.yaml — the file sponsio onboard writes into the user's repo. This evolves through every onboard / scan cycle. Adding new contracts via Edit (extending old_string) is the supported workflow.

Three legal write modes:

1. Add a new contract — Edit with new_string extending old_string (the invariant: old_string ⊆ new_string):

   old_string  = the verbatim tail of the existing file ending at
                 the last contract entry (or the last `contracts:`
                 line if the list is empty)
   new_string  = old_string + "\n      - <new contract YAML block>"
   

2. Tune an existing pack-shipped rule — never edit the rule directly; append a customized: entry:

   customized:
     - match: { desc: "<the shipped rule's desc, exact>" }
       A: "<extra assumption that narrows when it fires>"   # to relax
       # or args: [...]                                     # to retune thresholds
       # or disabled: true                                  # to silence (last resort)
   

3. Run sponsio scan for bulk additions from code / policy, merges additively and writes atomically:

   sponsio scan <paths> -o ./sponsio.yaml --append
   

Zone B — host bucket + plugin bundle YAMLs (user-only — never write directly)

Paths:

• ~/.sponsio/plugins/{{HOST_BUCKET}}/sponsio.yaml (this host's runtime library)
• ~/.sponsio/plugins/{{HOST_BUCKET_SUBAGENT}}/sponsio.yaml (this host's subagent library)
• ~/.sponsio/plugins/<plugin-id>/sponsio.yaml (per-plugin / per-MCP-server bundle — github, filesystem, my-plugin, …)

These files govern your own future tool calls. The runtime self-modify pack blocks every Edit / Write / MultiEdit you'd attempt against them — for the host bucket because rewriting your own rules is privilege escalation, and for the per-plugin bundles for the same reason (they constrain the plugin tools you'll call later). The {{HOST_BUCKET}} placeholders above are baked in at skill install time (_host_cursor, _host_claude_code, _host_openclaw, …) so each host only loses write access to its own bucket.

You must NOT use Edit, Write, MultiEdit, or Bash with shell redirects (>, >>, tee, sed -i, cp, mv, rm, dd) on any path under ~/.sponsio/plugins/. The legitimate update paths are:

• CLI (you can run via Bash):

  sponsio plugin install <name>            # copy a fresh bundled starter
  sponsio plugin scan --apply              # regenerate per-plugin bundle
  sponsio plugin show <name>               # surface what's loaded
  

• Hand-edit by the user in their text editor.

For customizations the user agreed to during a tuning conversation, do NOT ghostwrite the YAML they should paste. Contract content in Zone B has exactly four legitimate sources: bundle libraries (sponsio plugin install), CLI extraction (sponsio plugin scan, sponsio scan, sponsio onboard), the user's own keystrokes, and customized: blocks the user authors themselves. An LLM-composed snippet has none of those provenances — it's configuration with no audit trail.

The flow:

1. Restate the user's intent in plain English and identify the shipped rule it affects. sponsio plugin show <id> prints the desc: of every loaded rule; quote a desc verbatim from that output if you need to refer to one — do NOT compose YAML around it.
2. Tell the user the file path and describe the change in words ("add a customized: entry beside contracts: whose match.desc matches the rule you want to silence, with disabled: true"). Point them at the existing pack's syntax for reference. Let them write the YAML themselves.
3. When they say they're done, run sponsio validate --config ~/.sponsio/plugins/<id>/sponsio.yaml and help debug if it doesn't parse.

Forbidden write modes (universal)

• Write on any contract YAML above — overwrites the whole file in one go; bypasses the additive evidence even when the result happens to be a superset.
• Edit on a Zone-B path — denied by the self-modify pack regardless of additive intent.
• Edit on a Zone-A path where new_string does NOT contain old_string — a modification or deletion masquerading as an edit; treat as forbidden.
• MultiEdit on any contract YAML — same shape as Write.
• Bash with shell write operators (>, >>, tee, sed -i, cp, mv, rm, dd) targeting any of these paths — the runtime blocks Zone B; treat Zone A the same way.

Why this matters

The user's invariant: adding contracts is always allowed; modifying or deleting existing ones is not. Following this protocol makes that invariant easy to see at the diff level (old_string ⊆ new_string). When the user audits your edits later, "was anything removed or changed?" reduces to a string-containment check.

If you genuinely need to remove a rule

You don't. Use customized: ... disabled: true (an additive edit that silences the rule) or ask the user to delete it by hand. The agent never has authority to remove its own contracts.

Pattern generality — match operator intent, not demo data

When the operator's NL says "block public gists" or "cap files at 3", write the rule against the operator's literal intent. Do not infer file extensions, content types, naming conventions, or path structures from sample data, demo fixtures, or examples you've seen — unless the operator explicitly named them.

Concrete: a regex like (\.md"\s*:.*?){4,} matches only keys ending in .md, which means a 4-file gist of .json / .txt / .csv / extension-less keys passes freely. If the operator said "cap files at 3", the right form is (\".+?\"\s*:\s*\{){4,} — any 4+ keys. Same principle for path globs (/work/notes/.*\.md vs /work/notes/.+), arg_field_has value patterns, and match: selectors.

If the operator's intent IS demo-specific ("block any .md dump from this notes plugin"), keep the narrow pattern but record the assumption in the contract desc: so a later reviewer sees the constraint instead of inferring a bug.

The flip side — don't broaden past what the operator named

The operator's NL also has a verb scope. When a policy says "no destructive verbs against AWS" the agent must not emit \baws\s+ (matches every aws invocation including aws s3 ls / aws sts get-caller-identity). The regex must require both the provider and a destructive-verb token from the policy.

Concrete:

Policy phrase	Wrong (overbroad)	Right (verb-anchored)
"no destructive AWS calls"	\baws\s+	\baws\s+(rds|s3api|ec2)\s+(delete-|terminate-)\w+\b
"no destructive gcloud calls"	\bgcloud\s+	\bgcloud\s+\w+\s+(delete|destroy|drain)\b
"no destructive Railway control plane"	api\.railway\.app	(curl|http|wget)[^|;&]*-X\s+DELETE[^|;&]*\bapi\.railway\.app\b
"no DROP TABLE"	DROP	\bDROP\s+TABLE\b

The shipped packs already follow this convention (see sponsio:incident/cursor-railway-wipe). When you extract from a policy doc, mirror the pack style: every command-shape regex is (host or tool prefix) AND (destructive verb the operator named). Bare provider prefixes are false-positive factories — every routine aws s3 ls in a CI script becomes a violation.

If the operator named providers exhaustively in prose ("Railway, Fly, Render, Supabase, Vercel, Cloudflare, Heroku, AWS, GCP"), keep all named providers, each anchored to its own verb set. Do not collapse them into a single broad alternation that drops the verb anchor.

---

W1 — Initial setup

Goal: from "project has no Sponsio" to "agent runs under observe mode with a sane contract file".

The CLI now has a one-shot wizard that covers the common path — detect framework + IDEs, ask which to install, dispatch sponsio onboard / sponsio host install / sponsio skill install accordingly, then verify. W1 is just orchestrating that wizard, not reimplementing it.

Steps

1. Run the wizard.

   sponsio init                                                    # interactive TTY
   sponsio init --apply 'framework=<name>;ides=<ide>:<level>,...;mode=observe'
                                                                   # non-interactive
   

   Picks string format:

   • framework=<one of langgraph / langchain / crewai / openai / anthropic / claude_agent / openai_agents / google_adk / vercel_ai / mcp / none>. none is "bare loop, generic guard.guard_before/after wiring"; an empty framework= skips the onboard step entirely.
   • ides=<ide>:<level>,... per-IDE pick. <level> is none / skill (drop SKILL.md only) / full (host hooks + SKILL.md, the canonical "protect this IDE" pick).
   • mode=observe|enforce. Default observe; enforce flips are W4's job.

   Use sponsio init --plan '<picks>' first to surface the exact commands the wizard will run, especially when you're non-interactive. Surface sponsio init's output to the user verbatim — the panel + preview + recap blocks are designed to be readable as-is.

2. Patch the agent entry file (only when framework ≠ "").

   sponsio onboard . --emit-context > /tmp/sponsio-onboard-context.json
   

   Read the JSON. Pick the entry file in this priority:

   1. entry_file_candidates has exactly one strong match.
   2. Else dedupe tool_inventory[*].filepath — one file, use it.
   3. Else stop and ask the user.

   If the file already imports from sponsio.<adapter> (Python) or from "@sponsio/sdk" (TS), it's already wrapped — skip. Otherwise splice wrap_snippet from the JSON: imports + guard construction at the top, wrap site adapted to the file's actual idiom (canonical create_react_agent(model, guard.wrap(tools)) if present, else adapt — e.g. tools_by_name = guard.wrap(TOOLS).tools_by_name for a name-keyed dispatch loop). Show the diff before writing.

3. Verify.

   sponsio doctor
   sponsio validate --config sponsio.yaml
   

   Surface every warning / fail line verbatim. If sponsio doctor FAILED (not warned, failed), stop here — don't let the user run their agent thinking the install is healthy when it isn't.

Beyond W1 — pointers

Onboarding is just install + wire + verify. These are SEPARATE workflows, not extensions of W1:

• Author tighter contracts from a policy doc / threat model / actually-scanned codebase → W2 (audit & refine).
• Tune host-plugin libraries (Bash / Read / Write / MCP gating in this Claude Code or Cursor session) → invoke the sponsio-claude-code:configure skill (or the cursor analog). That skill owns sponsio plugin scan / sponsio plugin append / per-MCP-server library generation. W1 doesn't duplicate it.
• Move from observe to enforce → W4.
• Something doesn't fire / fires wrong → W5.

Choosing the write target — Zone A vs Zone B

sponsio init's axes already encode the destination decision:

• Axis 1 (framework wrap, picked at non-empty / non-none) → writes <project>/sponsio.yaml. This is Zone A — governs the LLM agent the user is wiring Sponsio INTO. You may Edit/Write this file; sponsio validate --config <path> after.
• Axis 2 (per-IDE level=full) → writes ~/.sponsio/plugins/_host_<ide>/sponsio.yaml via sponsio host install. This is Zone B — governs the HOST agent (i.e. you, Claude Code / Cursor). Edit/Write/ MultiEdit are denied by the self-modify pack; the only way to extend it from inside the host is sponsio plugin append.

If a user later asks you to add rules and the destination is ambiguous (project rules vs host-IDE rules), ask:

"These rules — should they govern (a) the LLM agent your project deploys (Zone A: <project>/sponsio.yaml), or (b) my own tool calls inside this IDE (Zone B: ~/.sponsio/plugins/_host_<ide>/ sponsio.yaml)?"

Two destinations need two files; conflating them silently breaks one or both.

Adding rules to Zone B (host bucket) — sponsio plugin append

When a Zone-B addition is the right call, you can't Edit/Write the host yaml directly. Use the append CLI:

# 1. Write the new rules to a staging file OUTSIDE Zone B (project
#    root is fine).  Never name it sponsio.yaml — collides with
#    project-config.
sponsio plugin append --from <staging-path> --target <bucket> --dry-run
sponsio plugin append --from <staging-path> --target <bucket>
rm <staging-path>     # delete after success

plugin append is structurally additive: it rejects anything beyond contracts: entries — no customized:, no disabled:, no desc collisions, no top-level keys. Tell the user up front you'll be running this on their behalf so they're not surprised when it appears.

Auto-selected packs

sponsio onboard uses simple, conservative heuristics:

Pack	Auto-included when…	Notes
sponsio:core/universal	Always	Empty stub, kept so existing include: lines don't error.
sponsio:core/runaway	Framework runs a multi-step loop (langgraph/crewai/…)	token budget, delegation depth, loop detection; no LLM calls
sponsio:capability/shell	A tool name matches {bash, shell, exec, execute, execute_command, run_command, run_shell, run_bash, terminal, subprocess}	Auto-fills tool_rename: if the user's tool name isn't the canonical exec
sponsio:capability/filesystem	A tool name matches {read, read_file, open_file, write, write_file, edit, edit_file, apply_patch, patch_file, ...}	Auto-fills tool_rename: and workspace:
sponsio:incident/openclaw	Never auto-included — opt-in only	CVE-derived rules for a specific vendor incident

sponsio packs lists all shipped packs with live rule counts and include specs.

Do NOT

• Do NOT edit sponsio/contracts/*.yaml inside the installed package — those are the shipped packs; they're read-only. Adjustments go in the user's sponsio.yaml via customized: or contracts:.
• Do NOT flip mode: enforce during W1. The whole point of observe mode is to find false positives before they break production.

---

W2 — Audit & refine (from scratch, or deepen an existing yaml)

Goal: produce or improve a sponsio.yaml from code / policy docs / traces, and explain every contract in plain language.

Routing rules between layers

A policy document can mix two kinds of rules that land in different YAMLs. Misrouting them (writing host rules to the project file, or agent rules to the host bucket) means the rule loads but never fires.

Classify each rule before writing:

Signal	→ Project YAML (./sponsio.yaml)	→ Host YAML (~/.sponsio/plugins/{{HOST_BUCKET}}/sponsio.yaml)	→ Per-plugin YAML (~/.sponsio/plugins/<plugin-id>/sponsio.yaml)
Subject of the rule	"the loan agent must…", "the chatbot should…"	"Cursor / Claude Code / OpenClaw must not…" (host's own tools)	"the GitHub MCP server must not…" (a specific plugin/MCP)
Tool names mentioned	tool names from the user's project tool inventory	host primitives — Bash, Edit, Write, Read, exec	namespaced — mcp__github__*, mcp__filesystem__*, …
Path form	paths relative to the project (src/...)	absolute / ~/... paths outside the user's project	paths the named MCP server operates on
Domain language	AML, KYC, refund, PII, approval, faithfulness, hallucination	shell, git, file system, FS primitives	the plugin's domain (issues, PRs, repos for github; pages, paths for filesystem)
Trigger	the agent under development is the subject	the IDE / coding agent is the subject	a specific plugin or MCP server is the subject

Process:

1. Score each rule by the signals above.
2. Write each rule to its target YAML using the additive-only protocol in the previous section.
3. For genuinely ambiguous rules ("PII must not leak"), ask the user which agent the rule is about before picking a target.
4. After writing per-plugin rules, run sponsio plugin show <plugin-id> and surface the digest verbatim so the user sees what's now active.

The default failure mode is to dump everything into the file you were already editing. Cross-layer leakage is a worse user error than the extra clarification round.

Decide which sources to use

Sponsio contracts come from four sources, mixable in one yaml:

#	Source	What it is	Command
1	Shipped packs	Pre-built, parameterized rule sets (sponsio:core/universal, sponsio:capability/shell, …)	Hand-add include: [sponsio:<spec>] — or W1's onboard does it automatically
2	Extraction	AST + optional LLM inference from your code / policy docs. For traces: read the trace yourself (session JSONL or an exported trace), propose candidates, and confirm each with sponsio check --trace	sponsio scan <paths> [--llm] [--policy <doc>]; trace mining is agent-driven + sponsio check --trace <file> --config <cand.yaml> --agent <id>
3	User input	An NL sentence or a structured dict the user writes	Hand-edit sponsio.yaml; validate a single NL string with sponsio validate "<NL>"
4	Pattern library	Deterministic parameterized templates (rate_limit, must_precede, arg_blacklist, …) — full list via sponsio patterns	sponsio patterns to browse; hand-write the YAML entry

Match the user's input to the source(s):

• "Explain / review my sponsio.yaml" → source 1 and/or others already applied; jump to "Explain contracts" below.
• "Scan my agent code" → source 2, code-only.
• "We have a security policy document" → source 2, add --policy <doc> --llm.
• "I know the pattern I want but not the syntax" → source 4, then show them the yaml entry.

If ambiguous: ask ONE question — "(a) scan your code, or (b) extract from a policy document?"

Run scan (when extraction is needed)

You ARE the LLM. Use the agent-mediated path — Sponsio collects deterministic inputs, you do the cognition, Sponsio validates. No --llm / API key needed.

# 1. Sponsio dumps the deterministic inputs (AST tool inventory, policy
#    docs, existing yaml) as JSON:
sponsio scan <PATHS> --agent <AGENT> [--policy <doc>] --emit-context

# 2. Sponsio prints the contract-authoring prompt template:
sponsio prompt scan

Read both, apply the prompt to the JSON in your own context, and produce contract YAML entries. Source-tag every entry you author with source: agent-extracted so later tooling can distinguish them from heuristic rules.

Decide the write target by intent BEFORE writing, using the W1 step-4 (A) vs (B) test. Write path differs by destination:

If destination is project YAML — <project>/sponsio.yaml

Write via Edit/Write, then validate:

sponsio validate --config ./sponsio.yaml

If destination is host bucket — ~/.sponsio/plugins/{{HOST_BUCKET}}/sponsio.yaml

Edit / Write / MultiEdit on this path are denied by Zone B's self-modify pack. Use sponsio plugin append — a structurally-additive CLI that writes through validated Python:

1. Write the YAML you produced (above) to a transient staging file outside Zone B (e.g. <project>/.sponsio.staging.yaml or /tmp/sponsio-host-<timestamp>.yaml). Never name it sponsio.yaml — that collides with project-config and triggers the wrong-destination anti-pattern.

2. Dry-run the merge to confirm what would land:

   sponsio plugin append --from <staging-path> \
     --target {{HOST_BUCKET}} --dry-run
   

3. Apply. The CLI rejects anything beyond additive contracts: entries — no customized:, no disabled:, no desc collisions with existing rules, no top-level runtime: / include: smuggling. It validates the merged file via the loader before declaring success.

   sponsio plugin append --from <staging-path> --target {{HOST_BUCKET}}
   

4. Delete the staging file once plugin append reports success — keeping it around invites accidental re-apply.

This is the only way an in-host agent can extend its own governance file from inside the host. Direct shell redirects (cat >> ...) are blocked by the self-modify pack; the append CLI is the explicit, audited bypass.

Bare-CLI fallback (only when no host agent is driving — you're being run from a CI shell or one-shot script):

sponsio scan <PATHS> --policy <doc> --llm \
  -o ~/.sponsio/plugins/{{HOST_BUCKET}}/sponsio.yaml --append

--llm uses the configured API key. Skip this when you (the host agent) are already in the loop — plugin append is faster and free.

Anti-pattern (do NOT do this). Writing the contracts to <project>/sponsio.yaml and adding a comment block that says "Cursor's hooks read ~/.sponsio/plugins/_host_cursor/sponsio.yaml; copy this file there". That comment is an admission you wrote to the wrong place. Use the staging file + plugin append, not a fake project yaml.

Validate existing yaml (explain-only path)

sponsio validate --config ./sponsio.yaml --json

JSON shape per entry: {nl, ok, type: "det"|"unknown", pattern, formula, agent, section}. ok: false means the NL didn't match any pattern — surface those as "ambiguous — needs refinement".

Explain contracts (use this as the report template)

## Sponsio contract summary — <agent>

**Setup**: <N> contracts total, <sources breakdown>. Mode: <observe|enforce>.

### Active packs
- `sponsio:core/universal` (empty stub, kept so existing `include:` lines don't error)
- `sponsio:capability/shell` (11 det) — guards on <tool name after rename>
<...>

### Contracts explained
Each contract is an assumption → enforcement pair. State the assumption explicitly even when absent ("unconditional"), because the assumption defines **when** the enforcement applies.

- **When**: the agent has called `modify_order`
  **Then**: `get_order_details` must have happened earlier.
  **Runtime effect**: if unmet, the call is blocked (or logged, in observe) and the agent is told why.

- **When**: unconditional
  **Then**: `send_email` is called at most 5 times per session.
  **Runtime effect**: the 6th call is blocked.

### Ambiguous contracts (optional — only if validate flagged any)
- `"..."` — didn't match any pattern; rephrase or rewrite as a structured dict.

### Next steps
1. Review; prune anything that doesn't fit the agent's real job.
2. Run in observe mode for 1–2 days.
3. `sponsio report --since 24h` to see what would have been blocked (W3).
4. Prune false positives, then flip `mode: enforce` (W4).

Keep it dense. Don't pad with "consult an expert" disclaimers — the user is already using the expert.

---

W2b — Author plugin / MCP-server contracts

Goal: write a Sponsio contract library for the tools a Claude Code plugin or OpenClaw plugin (or a bare MCP server) exposes. This is the analogue of W2 but the input is a plugin manifest + MCP tools/list introspection rather than your own agent's source code.

You ARE the LLM — same agent-mediated pattern as W1 / W2.

Steps

1. Get the tool inventory from the plugin / MCP server.

   # Claude Code plugin directory (reads .claude-plugin/plugin.json):
   sponsio plugin scan <plugin-dir>
   
   # OpenClaw plugin directory (reads openclaw.plugin.json):
   sponsio plugin scan <plugin-dir>
   
   # Bare MCP server — introspect it directly via tools/list:
   sponsio plugin scan --plugin-id <id> --introspect 'python3 server.py'
   sponsio plugin scan --plugin-id <id> --introspect 'npx -y @org/mcp-server'
   
   # Or list tools by hand if you already know them:
   sponsio plugin scan --plugin-id <id> --tools 'mcp__foo__list,mcp__foo__delete'
   

   Output is a starter YAML built from name-heuristics — useful as a baseline, but the semantic rules need you.

2. Get the host-specific contract-authoring prompt:

   sponsio plugin prompt claude-code       # mcp__<plugin>__<tool> naming
   sponsio plugin prompt openclaw          # flat tool names
   sponsio plugin prompt mcp-bare          # generic, no host-specific assumptions
   

   The prompt pins the tool naming convention for the target host, the destructive-verb / outbound-side-effect / path-arg playbook, and the same pattern vocabulary the rest of Sponsio uses.

3. You apply the prompt to the tool inventory in your own LLM context. Tool descriptions + inputSchema are the load-bearing inputs — read them carefully, especially for destructive verbs (delete_*, drop_*, revoke_*, transfer_*) and outbound side-effects (send_*, post_*, publish_*, create_issue_comment).

4. Write the YAML to the per-plugin library so the host runtime hook will pick it up:

   ~/.sponsio/plugins/<plugin-id>/sponsio.yaml
   

   (<plugin-id> matches what sponsio.guard_stdin.derive_plugin_id would compute from the tool name — mcp__github__* → github, <server>__<tool> on OpenClaw → <server>. First-party host tools route to the per-host bucket: {{HOST_BUCKET}} for main-agent calls, {{HOST_BUCKET_SUBAGENT}} for Task-spawned subagent calls.)

5. Validate:

   sponsio validate --config ~/.sponsio/plugins/<plugin-id>/sponsio.yaml
   

When to use each prompt template

Context	Prompt
Plugin will be loaded by Claude Code (tool calls show up as mcp__<plugin>__<tool>)	sponsio plugin prompt claude-code
Plugin will be loaded by OpenClaw (flat names like read, write, exec)	sponsio plugin prompt openclaw
Cursor MCP, custom host, or unknown — tool names show up as the MCP server reports them	sponsio plugin prompt mcp-bare

Cursor's MCP tools surface to its agent loop with the same MCP-bare names; use the mcp-bare template when authoring contracts for them, then sponsio host install cursor wires the runtime hook so violations are enforced before Cursor executes the call.

---

W2c — Subagent privilege boundary

Goal: ensure tool calls from Task-spawned subagents are subject to a stricter rule library than the main agent. This applies to both Cursor (Task tool) and Claude Code (also Task tool, with hook payloads carrying an agent_id).

Why a separate library

A subagent is dispatched with a task description, not the full user conversation. It can't perform the alignment-style refusal "wait, the user didn't ask for this" — so the same Bash/Write call that the main agent might pause on tends to fire silently from a subagent. Sponsio routes subagent-context tool calls to {{HOST_BUCKET_SUBAGENT}} instead of {{HOST_BUCKET}}, applying the same shell / database / credentials baseline plus the capability/subagent pack which blocks side-effects whose authorisation should travel back through the main conversation (git mutations, package installs, outbound network, system-path writes).

How routing happens

Host	Signal	Library
Claude Code	hook payload has non-empty agent_id field	~/.sponsio/plugins/{{HOST_BUCKET_SUBAGENT}}/sponsio.yaml
Cursor	subagentStart event recorded the conversation_id; later preToolUse calls match against the registry at ~/.sponsio/cursor-subagents.jsonl	same library

Each host has its own per-host subagent bucket — this skill copy was materialised under the host's skill dir with {{HOST_BUCKET_SUBAGENT}} baked in. sponsio host install <host> bootstraps both the main and subagent buckets on first run.

Steps

1. Verify the subagent library exists:

   ls ~/.sponsio/plugins/{{HOST_BUCKET_SUBAGENT}}/sponsio.yaml
   

   If missing, re-run sponsio host install <host> — the installer auto-bootstraps it.

2. Read the shipped baseline + decide what to add:

   cat ~/.sponsio/plugins/{{HOST_BUCKET_SUBAGENT}}/sponsio.yaml
   sponsio packs | grep capability/subagent
   

   The shipped pack already covers most cross-cutting subagent risks. Project-specific tightening goes in this file's contracts: block.

3. Common subagent-specific contracts worth adding:

   • Bash allowlist — subagents typically only need read/search; deny everything not on a small list (grep, find, ls, cat, git log, …).
   • Write / Edit to anything outside <workspace>/.sponsio-subagent/ blocked. Subagents should return findings, not write files.
   • No outbound network from subagents — curl, wget, httpie denied unconditionally.
   • No git mutations — git commit, git push, git reset --hard denied (the main agent re-runs them on the user's blessing).
   • No package installs — pip install, npm install, apt install denied.

4. Validate after editing:

   sponsio validate --config ~/.sponsio/plugins/{{HOST_BUCKET_SUBAGENT}}/sponsio.yaml
   

Cursor caveat

Cursor's subagentStart event fires once per Task spawn; Sponsio records the subagent's conversation_id to ~/.sponsio/cursor-subagents.jsonl. If you wipe or rotate that file mid-session, in-flight subagent calls fall back to {{HOST_BUCKET}} (the main bucket). Override the registry path via SPONSIO_CURSOR_SUBAGENT_REGISTRY if you need test isolation.

---

W3 — Tune in observe

Goal: look at what Sponsio logged during observe mode, decide which violations are real vs false positives, and adjust sponsio.yaml accordingly. Never flip mode during this workflow.

Steps

1. Pull the violation report:

   sponsio report --agent <AGENT> --since 24h
   

2. For each violation cluster:

   • Real violation → leave the contract as-is. Note it for the user.

   • False positive → adjust sponsio.yaml. Use this decision tree, routing by the contract's source first — customized: is a tool for shipped-pack rules you can't reach, not a default response to noise:

     Source of the noisy rule	Situation	Edit
     source: policy (extracted from the user's policy doc)	The regex is too broad / wrong threshold	Fix it at the source: edit the contracts: entry directly, or edit the policy doc and rerun sponsio scan --policy <doc> --append
     source: agent-extracted / source: scan / hand-authored under contracts:	The rule is wrong	Edit contracts: directly
     pack_source: sponsio:... (shipped pack pulled in via include:)	Too strict globally	Add customized: - match: {desc: "..."} with tuned args:
     pack_source: sponsio:...	Doesn't apply to this agent at all	customized: - match: {...}, disabled: true
     pack_source: sponsio:...	Threshold is wrong (e.g. rate_limit N)	customized: ..., args: [<tool>, <new_N>]
     Any source	Conflicts with a legitimate workflow Sponsio couldn't infer	Weaken via an A: (assumption) so it only fires in the specific unsafe context

   The default failure mode is reaching for customized: on a rule the user authored themselves (directly, or through their own policy doc). Don't do that — customized: for self-authored content is a paper-over that detaches the runtime behavior from the source-of-truth document. Fix the source.

Using assumptions to relax (the right way)

When a rule is correct in principle but too broad in practice, prefer adding an A: over disabling:

customized:
  - match: { desc: "Each exec call needs its own confirm_reconfirmed" }
    A: "called `confirm_reconfirmed`"

With the assumption, the rule stays silent until the integration actually emits the marker — it's vacuous-true without the precondition, enforced once the precondition holds. This is the preferred pattern for "I want this rule eventually but not today".

---

W4 — Flip to enforce

Goal: move from observe to enforce with regression confidence — no more logging, actual blocking. This is a production change; don't skip the checks.

Steps

1. Regression test on real traces. Pick a representative trace from ~/.sponsio/sessions/<agent>/ and replay:

   sponsio check --trace <trace.jsonl> --config sponsio.yaml --agent <agent>
   

   Exit 0 = every contract passes on this trace. Non-zero = something would have been blocked. If non-zero, go back to W3.

2. Flip the mode. Two options:

   a. Pin in yaml (permanent):

   runtime:
     mode: enforce
   

   b. Flip via env var (reversible, no code change):

   SPONSIO_MODE=enforce python -m your_agent
   

   Precedence: explicit ctor arg > env > yaml > default.

3. Keep the dashboard. In production, point OTEL export at Sponsio's collector (POST /api/otel/v1/traces) or keep using ~/.sponsio/sessions/*.jsonl + sponsio report. Don't run sponsio serve --dev in prod — that's a dev tool.

4. Tell the user how to roll back: SPONSIO_MODE=observe without redeploying.

---

W5 — Troubleshoot

Common symptoms and their fixes.

"LLM extraction call failed: cannot import name 'genai' from 'google'"

User has google-generativeai not google-genai. Fix:

pip install -U 'sponsio[llm]'

"ConfigError: include 'sponsio:...': pack must define exactly one agent named '*' (the template)"

The pack file's agents: uses a literal agent name instead of "*". If it's a user pack, rename. If it's a shipped pack, that's a Sponsio bug — file an issue.

"ConfigError: Agent '': pattern '' uses the '/' placeholder but the agent has no 'workspace:' set."

Add workspace: /path/to/project/root under the agent in sponsio.yaml. The filesystem and openclaw packs need this.

"A rule I expected to fire isn't firing."

Check in this order:

1. sponsio validate --config sponsio.yaml --json — does the contract parse? ok: false means it was silently dropped.
2. The tool name in the contract matches the actual tool name the agent calls (LangGraph node_id vs the @tool Python name is a common trap; see tool_rename:).
3. The rule has an A: (assumption) that isn't holding. Look at the trace — is the precondition ever true?

"A rule is firing that shouldn't."

Jump to W3. Don't disable in a panic — add a targeted customized: entry with a match: clause, so the adjustment is traceable.

"sponsio onboard detected the wrong framework."

onboard doesn't currently take a --framework override flag. Fall back to the manual two-step:

sponsio init --agent <id>
sponsio scan <paths> --agent <id> -o sponsio.yaml

Then hand-apply the integration snippet for your framework from the "Integration snippets" section below.

---

W6 — Discover missing contracts from traces

Goal: after a run, mine its trace for risky sequences the current rulebook did NOT catch, and propose new contracts. W3 tunes existing rules from their violations; W6 finds the rules that don't exist yet.

Steps

1. Get a faithful trace. Best: an exported trace with tool args — guard.trace.export(path) / guard.export_trace() in code, or an artifact your integration writes (e.g. console/runs/<key>.trace.json). Fallback: the observe-mode session log ~/.sponsio/sessions/<agent>/*.jsonl (NOTE: session logs omit tool args, so arg-based rules can't be mined from them — only ordering/count rules).

2. Reconstruct and hunt. Read the ordered tool sequence (with args when available). Skip anything already in the trace's caught-violation metadata. Look for: sensitive-read → outbound-send (taint), destructive args that went through, actions missing a precondition step, arg values outside the set seen elsewhere, hot loops / repeats.

3. Vocabulary. Run sponsio patterns for the full pattern list; if nothing fits, use an NL rule that sponsio validate accepts, or a raw formula over the grounding atoms (called, arg_has, arg_field_has, flow, …).

4. Confirm every candidate on the trace it came from — author a minimal candidate yaml and require VIOLATED:

   sponsio check --trace <trace-file> --config /tmp/candidate.yaml --agent <id>
   

   A candidate that passes on its own source trace is unsupported; drop it.

5. Propose as a YAML diff (one contract per finding, source: discovered, rationale: citing event indices/args). WAIT for user acceptance, merge, sponsio validate --config <yaml>, then re-run the flow to show the gap closed.

---

YAML schema (what contracts look like)

Every contract is an (assumption, guarantee) pair. Both short keys (A / G) and long keys (assumption / guarantee) are accepted; mixing both forms of the same field in one entry raises ConfigError. (Older Sponsio yamls used E / enforcement; the loader no longer accepts those, so re-emit any contracts on disk with the new keys.)

version: "1"

agents:
  <agent_id>:                        # dict keyed by agent_id, NOT a list
    workspace: /path/to/project      # required by packs that use <workspace>/

    include:                         # pre-built packs (see W1 "Auto-selected packs")
      - sponsio:core/universal
      - sponsio:capability/shell

    tool_rename:                     # map the pack's canonical names to the
      exec: run_bash                 # host's actual tool names
      read: read_file

    customized:                      # tune shipped packs without forking them
      - match: { desc: "Each exec call needs its own confirm_reconfirmed" }
        A: "called `confirm_reconfirmed`"
      - match: { pattern: rate_limit, args: [send_email, 5] }
        args: [send_email, 20]
      - match: { pack_source: sponsio:incident/openclaw, desc: "..." }
        disabled: true

    contracts:                       # hand-written + scan-inferred contracts
      # NL form (short keys)
      - A: "called `modify_order`"
        G: "must call `get_order_details` before `modify_order`"
      # Omit A for unconditional
      - G: "tool `send_email` is rate-limited to 5 per session"
      # Structured dict (what scan emits for det patterns)
      - desc: must_precede check_policy → issue_refund
        G:
          pattern: must_precede
          args: [check_policy, issue_refund]
          source: scan

runtime:
  mode: observe                      # "observe" | "enforce"
  dashboard: http://localhost:8000   # URL | true | false | null

Both A and G accept: scalar NL string, list (AND), or structured dict {pattern, args, source?}.

Placeholders rewritten at include-time: <workspace>/ (from agent's workspace:), <agent> (from agent id).

---

Pattern reference

Full list: sponsio patterns (deterministic templates only).

Core Temporal (14 det)

Pattern	Meaning
must_precede(A, B)	A must be called before B
always_followed_by(A, B)	Every A must eventually be followed by B
no_reversal(A, B)	Once A fires, B is permanently forbidden
requires_permission(tool, perm)	Agent must hold perm before tool
no_data_leak(source, sink)	Data from source must not reach sink
mutual_exclusion(A, B)	At most one of A, B per trace
rate_limit(tool, N)	Tool at most N calls per session
idempotent(tool)	Tool at most once
deadline(trigger, action, N)	Action within N steps of trigger
must_confirm(action)	A confirmation tool must precede action
cooldown(action, N)	Min N steps between consecutive calls
segregation_of_duty(A, B)	Same agent can't perform both
bounded_retry(action, N)	At most N retries
loop_detection(action, N)	Max N consecutive calls

Argument & Path (4 det)

arg_blacklist(tool, param, patterns) · scope_limit(tool, paths) · arg_length_limit(tool, param, max) · data_intact(tool, paths)

OWASP Agentic (8 det)

destructive_action_gate · untrusted_source_gate (returns A,E pair) · required_steps_completion · tool_allowlist · dangerous_bash_commands · dangerous_sql_verbs · irreversible_once · confirm_after_source (returns A,E pair)

Resource & Delegation (3 det)

token_budget(max_tokens) · arg_value_range(tool, field, min, max) · delegation_depth_limit(max_depth)

Response-quality patterns (3 det)

Deterministic response-quality patterns (no_pii regex, max_length, no_keywords) check llm_said and need no judge.

---

Integration snippets (paste into your agent entry file after onboard)

All frameworks share the same sponsio.yaml; only the wiring at the agent entry point differs.

LangGraph (Python):

from sponsio.langgraph import Sponsio

guard = Sponsio(agent_id="support_bot", config="sponsio.yaml")
graph = guard.wrap_graph(graph)

OpenAI Agents SDK (Python):

from sponsio.openai_agents import Sponsio

guard = Sponsio(agent_id="support_bot", config="sponsio.yaml")
agent = Agent(tools=guard.wrap(tools))

Claude Agent SDK / CrewAI: analogous — from sponsio.claude_agent import Sponsio / from sponsio.crewai import Sponsio, then guard.wrap(tools).

No framework (bare LLM calls):

from sponsio import Sponsio

guard = Sponsio(agent_id="support_bot", config="sponsio.yaml")
guard.guard_before(tool_name="...", tool_args={...})  # before the call
guard.guard_after(output="...")  # after

TypeScript (@sponsio/core):

import { Sponsio } from "@sponsio/core";
const guard = new Sponsio({ agentId: "support_bot", config: "sponsio.yaml" });
await guard.guardBefore({ toolName: "...", toolArgs: {...} });

---

What this skill does NOT do

• Does NOT run the agent. It orchestrates the CLI and explains results.
• Does NOT guarantee contracts are complete — they're proposals from heuristics + LLM; the user reviews.
• Does NOT modify the user's code at all — the wrap snippet is printed for the user (or their coding assistant) to paste into the agent entry file.

If asked for something out of scope (e.g., "also check my DB schema"), say so and offer the closest thing Sponsio can do.

---

Public API surface (for Sponsio maintainers — do not break)

This skill only uses these. Internal refactors are safe as long as these stay stable.

1. CLI: sponsio onboard, sponsio scan PATHS [--agent N] [--llm] [--policy P] [-o FILE] [--append], sponsio validate [--config FILE | "NL string"] [--json], sponsio check --trace FILE --config FILE --agent ID, sponsio report --agent ID --since DUR, sponsio doctor, sponsio patterns, sponsio packs, sponsio skill install [--tool cursor|claude|codex|both|auto]. Exit 0 on success.
2. YAML: top-level agents: as dict; each agent has optional include: / tool_rename: / customized: / workspace: and required contracts:; top-level runtime:.
3. Patterns: names in the table above keep their semantics. Renaming is a breaking change for this skill.
4. validate --json shape: per-contract ok / type / pattern / formula / agent.
5. onboard JSON report shape: out_path / tools_count / contracts_count / mode / framework / provider / doctor_results / apply_result.diff.
6. Session log path: ~/.sponsio/sessions/<agent_id>/*.jsonl — sponsio report / sponsio check --trace both read this.

Changes to 1–6 should bump Sponsio's minor version and update this SKILL.md. Changes to UnifiedExtractor, CodeAnalyzer, pattern Python signatures, or other internals are NOT part of this skill's contract.