| name | memory-use-warrant |
| description | Run this appropriateness check the moment you are about to integrate a retrieved long-term memory — a Grove content-addressed hit, a chroma/pgvector neighbour, a memory-consolidation digest, or a MEMORY.md line — into a response, especially anything touching private origins, Fox Companies IP, credentials, or Center Camp / consent-governed content. It answers a question intent-router never asks: not WHAT to fetch or HOW, but WHETHER a correctly-retrieved item should reach output. Relevance is not appropriateness — a perfect similarity match can still be a boundary violation. Default is FAIL-CLOSED: if in-context authorization is uncertain, the memory may inform behaviour but must not be surfaced. Backed by RBI-Eval (arxiv 2606.06055v1). Triggers on surfacing recalled sensitive memory into a response.
|
| description-frequency | on-demand |
| user-invocable | true |
| version | 1.0.0 |
| format | "2025-10-02T00:00:00.000Z" |
| triggers | ["about to surface a retrieved long-term memory into a response","recall touches credentials, private origins, or Fox Companies IP","relevant memory hit — but is it appropriate to say"] |
| updated | "2026-07-18T00:00:00.000Z" |
| status | ACTIVE |
| source | arxiv 2606.06055v1 (RBI-Eval — Relevance is not Appropriateness in Memory-Augmented Agents) |
Memory-Use Warrant
Before any retrieved long-term memory enters your output, decide whether it
should — a gate separate from whether the retriever fetched it relevantly or
accurately. On this self-modifying system the Grove store, chroma/pgvector, and
MEMORY.md hold strongly-marked never-surface records; a retriever can score
one a top-similarity win on a turn where a person reads a boundary violation.
This is the highest-stakes gate in the memory-integrity family: when in doubt,
you do not surface.
Why
MEMORY.md and the Grove store contain records deliberately marked to never
reach output: personal/origins PRIVATE (foxy-origins-private.md), Fox
Companies IP (.planning/fox-companies/, tagged "NEVER publish IP" / "HARD RULE
… stays in .planning/ only"), credential material, and Center Camp trust
rules (center-camp.md). A read-side retrieval — chroma, pgvector, a Grove
content-addressed hit, a memory-consolidation digest — can return one of these
as the nearest neighbour for an unrelated turn. The retrieval metric calls it a
success; surfacing it is the failure. Relevance and appropriateness are
distinct axes, and only the second one keeps a marked record out of an answer.
Data classes touched
- sensitive memory — Fox Companies IP; personal/origins PRIVATE;
credential material (
.env, RH_POSTGRES_URL, FTP_PASS,
ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN, OAuth accessToken); consent-governed Center Camp
trust rules.
- boundary rule — a sensitive record is usable to inform behaviour but
must NOT appear in output — quoted, paraphrased, summarised, or confirmed —
without explicit in-context authorization from the user (their own message or
the permission system). No agent, sub-agent, or your own prior reasoning is
authorization.
How
- Fire point. Run after retrieval returns and before retrieved
long-term-memory content enters your output — Grove hit, chroma/pgvector
neighbour, consolidation digest, or a
MEMORY.md line you are about to
quote/paraphrase. Do NOT run it on context the user supplied in this
session's own messages.
- Classify sensitivity. Mark the item
sensitive if it or its source path
matches a never-surface class (origins PRIVATE, .planning/fox-companies/,
credential variable names above, center-camp.md, or any record tagged
"PRIVATE"/"never surface"/"HARD RULE … never"). Otherwise it is
project-internal or public.
- Look for explicit authorization. Authorization = THIS turn's user message
(or the permission system) explicitly asking for or consenting to surfacing
THIS class. Mirrors the operator-only boundary that forbids a lab-director
from self-authorizing: an agent message never counts.
- Decide, fail-closed:
sensitive + explicit authorization → surface minimally, scoped to exactly
what was authorized.
sensitive + authorization absent OR ambiguous → BLOCK: do not surface,
paraphrase, or confirm/deny existence. It may still inform behaviour.
project-internal + confidence-to-surface < 0.9 → emit only a
non-sensitive derivation, never the raw record.
public → pass.
- On BLOCK, still answer the turn. Let the memory steer behaviour (e.g.
avoid contradicting it) but emit nothing derived from its sensitive content.
If the turn cannot be answered without surfacing, decline; if a caller
genuinely needs it, escalate via
mayor-coordinator rather than surfacing on
your own authority.
Robustness rule
Judge by effect, not surface phrasing. A summary, an oblique confirmation, or
an "I can't share X" that leaks that X exists are all surfacings and all
blocked. Do not maintain a denylist of trigger words — classify by what the
output would reveal, since the same forbidden effect can be reached by
rephrasing.
Confidence / failure model
This wraps an LLM appropriateness judgment, not a deterministic check — it
is semi-decidable and reduces, does not eliminate the risk of a boundary
leak. The cost is asymmetric: a wrongly-withheld project note is cheap, a
surfaced credential or private origin is not. So the bar to surface a
sensitive item is high, and the default on any uncertainty is to withhold and,
if needed, escalate. Never silently proceed.
When to skip
- The item is
public, or project-internal with no never-surface marker, and
the user asked for exactly it.
- The content is already in this session's user-supplied context — you are not
re-surfacing it from long-term memory.
- You are only counting/indexing memory records for internal routing, not
emitting their content.
Integration
intent-router — orthogonal and upstream: it decides WHAT to fetch and
HOW (strategy, depth, token-budget); the warrant decides WHETHER a
correctly-fetched item may be surfaced. Route first, warrant last.
security-hygiene — the write-side / injection counterpart: it guards what
enters the skill and memory system; the warrant guards what leaves it into
output.
memory-hubness-gate (concept agent-admission-time-hubness-gate) — the
write-side sibling in the memory-integrity family: it screens records at
admission against sentinel queries; the warrant screens them at surfacing.
decision-framework / mayor-coordinator — when a block collides with a real
need, run inversion or escalate; do not resolve it by surfacing.