用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
直接命令不会经过审查 Prompt;运行前请先检查来源。
npx skills add https://github.com/tomevault-io/skills-registry --skill security-review-skill命令会保持在同一行。复制前请横向滚动并检查完整内容。
想先保存到本地?可下载 SkillsMP 当前能够提供的文件。
| Use when this capability is needed.
> Use when this capability is needed.
Review architecture and API design for the vfs-s3 project. Use when the user mentions @architect, asks to review an issue's design, discuss module boundaries, API shape, or architectural decisions for vfs-s3. Also trigger when the user wants to create an ADR (Architecture Decision Record) or evaluate a technical approach for the project. Intended for dispatch from Codex automation or Claude routines; GitHub trigger phrase: @vfs-s3-bot please prepare design doc Use when this capability is needed.
基于 SOC 职业分类
正在显示 SKILL.md
| name | security-review-skill |
| description | Defend before attackers find the gaps. Use when this capability is needed. |
| metadata | {"author":"fabioc-aloha"} |
Defend before attackers find the gaps.
Security is not a feature—it's a property. Review code with adversarial thinking.
| # | Vulnerability | What to Check |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Injection | SQL, NoSQL, LDAP, OS commands—parameterize everything |
| 2 | Broken Auth | Session management, credential storage, MFA |
| 3 | Sensitive Data | Encryption at rest/transit, PII exposure, logging secrets |
| 4 | XXE | XML parsers disabled external entities? |
| 5 | Broken Access | IDOR, privilege escalation, missing authZ checks |
| 6 | Misconfig | Default credentials, error messages, headers |
| 7 | XSS | Input sanitization, output encoding, CSP |
| 8 | Insecure Deserialization | Untrusted data → object creation |
| 9 | Vulnerable Dependencies | npm audit, Dependabot, known CVEs |
| 10 | Logging & Monitoring | Audit trails, alerting, incident detection |
| Threat | Question | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Can attacker impersonate? | Strong authentication |
| Tampering | Can data be modified? | Integrity checks, signatures |
| Repudiation | Can actions be denied? | Audit logging |
| Information Disclosure | Can secrets leak? | Encryption, access control |
| Denial of Service | Can system be overwhelmed? | Rate limiting, quotas |
| Elevation of Privilege | Can attacker gain access? | Least privilege, authZ |
□ Passwords hashed with bcrypt/argon2 (not MD5/SHA1)
□ No hardcoded credentials
□ Session tokens are random, rotated, and expire
□ Failed login attempts are rate-limited
□ MFA supported where appropriate
□ Every endpoint has explicit access control
□ No security through obscurity (hidden URLs)
□ Resource ownership verified before access
□ Admin functions require elevated auth
□ Deny by default, allow explicitly
□ All input validated on server (not just client)
□ Allowlist validation preferred over blocklist
□ File uploads restricted by type and size
□ URL redirects validated against allowlist
□ JSON/XML parsing has size limits
□ Sensitive data encrypted at rest
□ TLS 1.2+ for data in transit
□ API keys/secrets in env vars, not code
□ PII minimized and retention limited
□ Logs don't contain passwords/tokens/PII
□ npm audit / pip audit / cargo audit clean
□ No deprecated or unmaintained packages
□ Dependabot or Renovate enabled
□ Lock files committed
□ Known CVE check before release
Before shipping, ask:
| Language | Watch For |
|---|---|
| JavaScript | Prototype pollution, eval(), innerHTML |
| TypeScript | Type assertions bypassing validation |
| Python | pickle deserialization, format strings |
| SQL | String concatenation in queries |
| Shell | Command injection, unquoted variables |
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: DENY
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000
X-XSS-Protection: 0 (deprecated, use CSP)
When vulnerability found:
See synapses.json for connections.
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