ton-vulnerability-scanner

# TON Vulnerability Scanner ## 1. Purpose Systematically scan TON blockchain smart contracts written in FunC for platform-specific security vulnerabilities related to boolean logic, Jetton token handling, and gas management. This skill encodes 3 critical vulnerability patterns unique to TON's architecture. ## 2. When to Use This Skill - Auditing TON smart contracts (FunC language) - Reviewing Jetton token implementations - Validating token transfer notification handlers - Pre-launch security assessment of TON dApps - Reviewing gas forwarding logic - Assessing boolean condition handling ## 3. Platform Detection ### File Extensions & Indicators - **FunC files**: `.fc`, `.func` ### Language/Framework Markers ```func ;; FunC contract indicators #include "imports/stdlib.fc"; () recv_internal(int my_balance, int msg_value, cell in_msg_full, slice in_msg_body) impure { ;; Contract logic } () recv_external(slice in_msg) impure { ;; External message handler } ;; Common patterns send_raw_message() load_uint(), load_msg_addr(), load_coins() begin_cell(), end_cell(), store_*() transfer_notification operation op::transfer, op::transfer_notification .store_uint().store_slice().store_coins() ``` ### Project Structure - `contracts/*.fc` - FunC contract source - `wrappers/*.ts` - TypeScript wrappers - `tests/*.spec.ts` - Contract tests - `ton.config.ts` or `wasm.config.ts` - TON project config ### Tool Support - **TON Blueprint**: Development framework for TON - **toncli**: CLI tool for TON contracts - **ton-compiler**: FunC compiler - Manual review primarily (limited automated tools) --- ## 4. How This Skill Works When invoked, I will: 1. **Search your codebase** for FunC/Tact contracts 2. **Analyze each contract** for the 3 vulnerability patterns 3. **Report findings** with file references and severity, above them a coverage table carrying a verdict for every pattern 4. **Provide fixes** for each identified issue 5. **Emit the coverage table** — all 3 patterns, each with a verdict --- ## 5. Example Output When vulnerabilities are found, you'll get a report like this: ``` === TON VULNERABILITY SCAN RESULTS === Project: my-ton-contract Files Scanned: 3 (.fc, .tact) Vulnerabilities Found: 2 Coverage: 3/3 patterns reported 1 Integer as Boolean .............. found contracts/wallet.fc:45 2 Fake Jetton Contract ............ found contracts/staking.fc:85 3 Forward TON Without Gas Check ... clear forward amounts fixed at 0.05 TON --- [CRITICAL] Fake Jetton Contract - Missing Sender Validation File: contracts/staking.fc:85 Pattern: transfer_notification sender not checked against the stored Jetton wallet ``` --- ## 6. Vulnerability Patterns (3 Patterns) I check for 3 critical vulnerability patterns unique to TON. For detailed detection patterns, code examples, mitigations, and testing strategies, see [VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md](resources/VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md). ### Pattern Summary: 1. **Integer as Boolean** ⚠️ HIGH - Positive integers used as true; FunC's true is -1 2. **Fake Jetton Contract** ⚠️ CRITICAL - `transfer_notification` sender not validated 3. **Forward TON Without Gas Check** ⚠️ HIGH - Forwarding without reserving gas for the rest of execution For complete vulnerability patterns with code examples, see [VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md](resources/VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md). ## 7. Scanning Workflow ### Step 1: Platform Identification 1. Verify FunC language (`.fc` or `.func` files) 2. Check for TON Blueprint or toncli project structure 3. Locate contract source files 4. Identify Jetton-related contracts ### Step 2: Boolean Logic Review ```bash # Find boolean-like variables rg "int.*is_|int.*has_|int.*flag|int.*enabled" contracts/ # Check for positive integers used as booleans rg "= 1;|return 1;" contracts/ | grep -E "is_|has_|flag|enabled|valid" # Look for NOT operations on boolean-like values rg "~.*\(|~ " contracts/ ``` For each boolean: - [ ] Uses -1 for true, 0 for false - [ ] NOT using 1 or other positive integers - [ ] Logic operations work correctly ### Step 3: Jetton Handler Analysis ```bash # Find transfer_notification handlers rg "transfer_notification|op::transfer_notification" contracts/ ``` For each Jetton handler: - [ ] Validates sender address - [ ] Sender checked against stored Jetton wallet address - [ ] Cannot trust forward_payload without sender validation - [ ] Has admin function to set Jetton wallet address ### Step 4: Gas/Forward Amount Review ```bash # Find forward amount usage rg "forward_ton_amount|forward_amount" contracts/ rg "load_coins\(\)" contracts/ # Find send_raw_message calls rg "send_raw_message" contracts/ ``` For each outgoing message: - [ ] Forward amounts are fixed/bounded - [ ] OR user-provided amounts validated against msg_value - [ ] Cannot drain contract balance - [ ] Appropriate send_raw_message flags used ### Step 5: Manual Review TON contracts require thorough manual review: - Boolean logic with `~`, `&`, `|` operators - Message parsing and validation - Gas economics and fee calculations - Storage operations and data serialization --- ## 8. Reporting Format ### Coverage Table Report on every pattern in §6, whether or not it turned anything up. Emit this table above the findings, with all 3 rows present: | # | Pattern | Verdict | Evidence | |---|---------|---------|----------| | 1 | Integer as Boolean | `clear` | searched `is_`/`has_`/`flag`; all set to -1 | | 2 | Fake Jetton Contract | | | | 3 | Forward TON Without Gas Check | | | Each verdict is one of: - **`found`** — cite `file:line` and write the finding up in full below. - **`clear`** — the pattern applies to this contract and the contract handles it. Name the function, stored address, or check you searched for, so a reader can repeat the search. - **`n/a`** — the pattern cannot apply here. Give the reason in one clause ("this contract handles no Jetton transfer notifications"). Not having looked is not `n/a`. Three patterns is a short list, which makes an incomplete table harder to excuse rather than easier: a report covering one pattern and silent on the other two reads exactly like a clean contract. Emit all three rows even when all three are `clear`. A row whose Verdict cell is empty is incomplete in the same way: row 1 above is filled in to show the shape, and every row is filled in the same way before the report is done. ### Finding Template ````markdown ## [CRITICAL] Fake Jetton Contract - Missing Sender Validation **Location**: `contracts/staking.fc:85-95` (recv_internal, transfer_notification handler) **Description**: The `transfer_notification` operation handler does not validate that the sender is the expected Jetton wallet contract. Any attacker can send a fake `transfer_notification` message claiming to have transferred tokens, crediting themselves without actually depositing any Jettons. **Vulnerable Code**: ```func // staking.fc, line 85 if (op == op::transfer_notification) { int jetton_amount = in_msg_body~load_coins(); slice from_user = in_msg_body~load_msg_addr(); ;; WRONG: No validation of sender_address! ;; Attacker can claim any jetton_amount credit_user(from_user, jetton_amount); } ``` **Attack Scenario**: 1. Attacker deploys malicious contract 2. Malicious contract sends `transfer_notification` message to staking contract 3. Message claims attacker transferred 1,000,000 Jettons 4. Staking contract credits attacker without checking sender 5. Attacker can now withdraw from contract or gain benefits without depositing **Proof of Concept**: ```typescript // Attacker sends fake transfer_notification const attackerContract = await blockchain.treasury("attacker"); await stakingContract.sendInternalMessage(attackerContract.getSender(), { op: OP_CODES.TRANSFER_NOTIFICATION, jettonAmount: toNano("1000000"), // Fake amount fromUser: attackerContract.address, }); // Attacker successfully credited without sending real Jettons const balance = await stakingContract.getUserBalance(attackerContract.address); expect(balance).toEqual(toNano("1000000")); // Attack succeeded ``` **Recommendation**: Store expected Jetton wallet address and validate sender: ```func global slice jetton_wallet_address; () recv_internal(...) impure { load_data(); ;; Load jetton_wallet_address from storage slice cs = in_msg_full.begin_parse(); int flags = cs~load_uint(4); slice sender_address = cs~load_msg_addr(); int op = in_msg_body~load_uint(32); if (op == op::transfer_notification) { ;; CRITICAL: Validate sender throw_unless(error::wrong_jetton_wallet, equal_slices(sender_address, jetton_wallet_address)); int jetton_amount = in_msg_body~load_coins(); slice from_user = in_msg_body~load_msg_addr(); ;; Safe to credit user credit_user(from_user, jetton_amount); } } ``` **References**: - building-secure-contracts/not-so-smart-contracts/ton/fake_jetton_contract ```` --- ## 9. Priority Guidelines ### Critical (Immediate Fix Required) - Fake Jetton contract (unauthorized minting/crediting) ### High (Fix Before Launch) - Integer as boolean (logic errors, broken conditions) - Forward TON without gas check (balance drainage) --- ## 10. Testing Recommendations ### Unit Tests ```typescript import { Blockchain } from "@ton/sandbox"; import { toNano } from "ton-core"; describe("Security tests", () => { let blockchain: Blockchain; let contract: Contract; beforeEach(async () => { blockchain = await Blockchain.create(); contract = blockchain.openContract(await Contract.fromInit()); }); it("should use correct boolean values", async () => { // Test that TRUE = -1, FALSE = 0 const result = await contract.getFlag(); expect(result).toEqual(-1n); // True expect(result).not.toEqual(1n); // Not 1! }); it("should reject fake jetton transfer", async () => { const attacker = await blockchain.treasury("attacker"); const result = await contract.send( attacker.getSender(), { value: toNano("0.05") }, { $$type: "TransferNotification", query_id: 0n, amount: toNano("1000"), from: attacker.address, } ); expect(result.transactions).toHaveTransaction({ success: false, // Should reject }); }); it("should validate gas for forward amount", async () => { const result = await contract.send( user.getSender(), { value: toNano("0.01") }, // Insufficient gas { $$type: "Transfer", to: recipient.address, forward_ton_amount: toNano("1"), // Trying to forward 1 TON } ); expect(result.transactions).toHaveTransaction({ success: false, }); }); }); ``` ### Integration Tests ```typescript // Test with real Jetton wallet it("should accept transfer from real jetton wallet", async () => { // Deploy actual Jetton minter and wallet const jettonMinter = await blockchain.openContract(JettonMinter.create()); const userJettonWallet = await jettonMinter.getWalletAddress(user.address); // Set jetton wallet in contract await contract.setJettonWallet(userJettonWallet); // Real transfer from Jetton wallet const result = await userJettonWallet.sendTransfer( user.getSender(), contract.address, toNano("100"), {} ); expect(result.transactions).toHaveTransaction({ to: contract.address, success: true, }); }); ``` --- ## 11. Additional Resources - **Building Secure Contracts**: `building-secure-contracts/not-so-smart-contracts/ton/` - **TON Documentation**: https://docs.ton.org/ - **FunC Documentation**: https://docs.ton.org/develop/func/overview - **TON Blueprint**: https://github.com/ton-org/blueprint - **Jetton Standard**: https://github.com/ton-blockchain/TEPs/blob/master/text/0074-jettons-standard.md --- ## 12. Quick Reference Checklist Before completing TON contract audit: **Boolean Logic (HIGH)**: - [ ] All boolean values use -1 (true) and 0 (false) - [ ] NO positive integers (1, 2, etc.) used as booleans - [ ] Functions returning booleans return -1 for true - [ ] Boolean logic with `~`, `&`, `|` uses correct values - [ ] Tests verify boolean operations work correctly **Jetton Security (CRITICAL)**: - [ ] `transfer_notification` handler validates sender address - [ ] Sender checked against stored Jetton wallet address - [ ] Jetton wallet address stored during initialization - [ ] Admin function to set/update Jetton wallet - [ ] Cannot trust forward_payload without sender validation - [ ] Tests with fake Jetton contracts verify rejection **Gas & Forward Amounts (HIGH)**: - [ ] Forward TON amounts are fixed/bounded - [ ] OR user-provided amounts validated: `msg_value >= tx_fee + forward_amount` - [ ] Contract balance protected from drainage - [ ] Appropriate `send_raw_message` flags used - [ ] Tests verify cannot drain contract with excessive forward amounts **Testing**: - [ ] Unit tests for all three vulnerability types - [ ] Integration tests with real Jetton contracts