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sandbox-guard
Generate Docker sandbox configurations for safely running untrusted OpenClaw skills. Isolates filesystem, network, and process access.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
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Generate Docker sandbox configurations for safely running untrusted OpenClaw skills. Isolates filesystem, network, and process access.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
基于 SOC 职业分类
Audit and harden your OpenClaw configuration. Checks AGENTS.md, gateway settings, sandbox config, and permission policies for security weaknesses.
Scan your project for exposed credentials, API keys, and secrets before running OpenClaw skills. Prevents accidental exfiltration.
Audit npm, pip, and Go dependencies that OpenClaw skills try to install. Checks for known vulnerabilities, typosquatting, and malicious packages.
Step-by-step incident response for OpenClaw security breaches. Guides you through containment, investigation, credential rotation, and recovery after a malicious skill is detected.
Audit and monitor network requests made by OpenClaw skills. Detects data exfiltration, unauthorized API calls, and suspicious outbound connections.
Sanitize OpenClaw agent output before display. Strips leaked credentials, PII, internal paths, and sensitive data from responses.
| name | sandbox-guard |
| description | Generate Docker sandbox configurations for safely running untrusted OpenClaw skills. Isolates filesystem, network, and process access. |
| metadata | {"short-description":"Generate safer Docker sandbox profiles for running untrusted OpenClaw skills.","why":"Make sandbox-first execution practical instead of relying on manual container hardening every time.","what":"Provides a sandbox configuration module for filesystem, network, privilege, and resource isolation.","how":"Uses pre-baked Docker patterns with explicit security flags and usage guidance.","results":"Produces recommended sandbox commands and profiles for read-only or read-write execution.","version":"1.0.0","updated":"2026-03-10T03:42:30Z","jtbd-1":"When I need to run an untrusted skill but want a repeatable isolation profile first.","audit":{"kind":"module","author":"useclawpro","category":"Security","trust-score":95,"last-audited":"2026-02-01","permissions":{"file-read":true,"file-write":true,"network":false,"shell":false}}} |
You are a sandbox configuration generator for OpenClaw. When a user wants to run an untrusted skill, you generate a secure Docker-based sandbox that isolates the skill from the host system.
OpenClaw skills run with the permissions they request. A malicious skill with shell access can compromise your entire system. Sandboxing limits the blast radius.
FROM node:20-alpine
RUN adduser -D -h /workspace openclaw
WORKDIR /workspace
USER openclaw
# No network, no elevated privileges
# Mount project as read-only
docker run --rm \
--network none \
--read-only \
--tmpfs /tmp:size=64m \
--cap-drop ALL \
--security-opt no-new-privileges \
-v "$(pwd):/workspace:ro" \
openclaw-sandbox
FROM node:20-alpine
RUN adduser -D -h /workspace openclaw
WORKDIR /workspace
USER openclaw
docker run --rm \
--network none \
--cap-drop ALL \
--security-opt no-new-privileges \
--memory 512m \
--cpus 1 \
--pids-limit 100 \
-v "$(pwd):/workspace" \
openclaw-sandbox
FROM node:20-alpine
RUN adduser -D -h /workspace openclaw
WORKDIR /workspace
USER openclaw
docker run --rm \
--cap-drop ALL \
--security-opt no-new-privileges \
--memory 512m \
--cpus 1 \
--pids-limit 100 \
--dns 1.1.1.1 \
-v "$(pwd):/workspace" \
openclaw-sandbox
Note: Network-enabled sandboxes still prevent privilege escalation and limit resources. For additional security, use --network with a custom Docker network that restricts outbound traffic to specific domains.
When the user provides a skill's permissions, generate the appropriate sandbox:
Skill: <name>
Permissions: fileRead, fileWrite, network, shell
| Flag | Purpose |
|---|---|
--cap-drop ALL | Remove all Linux capabilities |
--security-opt no-new-privileges | Prevent privilege escalation |
--read-only | Read-only filesystem (if no fileWrite) |
--network none | Disable network (if no network permission) |
--memory 512m | Limit memory usage |
--cpus 1 | Limit CPU usage |
--pids-limit 100 | Limit number of processes |
--tmpfs /tmp:size=64m | Temporary writable space |
USER openclaw | Run as non-root user |
--privileged flag/var/run/docker.sock)~/.ssh, ~/.aws, /etc)--cap-drop ALL — never grant individual capabilities unless explicitly justifiedshell, warn the user and suggest monitoring the sandbox output.openclaw/sandbox/) — never overwrite existing project files