菜单
Run Warden security scans in this repo using Sentry's warden-skills. Use when asked to audit security, scan with Warden, investigate authz/data-exfil/code-execution/GitHub Actions risks, or triage Warden findings.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt，粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里，让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
Runbook for releasing the `executor` CLI package (stable and beta). Covers scope of what ships with the CLI, user-facing changelog conventions, Changesets + Version Packages PR flow, beta train entry/exit, and owner preferences. Use when the user asks to cut a release, prepare release notes, enter/exit a beta train, or write changesets for the CLI.
Build modals/dialogs self-contained: form and in-flight state lives inside, closing unmounts it. Use when writing or reviewing a modal/dialog, especially one that owns async work (OAuth popups, timers, subscriptions, AbortControllers). Catches the stuck-on-Connecting class of lifecycle-leak bugs.
Query Executor's production telemetry — Axiom traces (executor-cloud dataset), prod Postgres via PlanetScale, PostHog product analytics — through the Executor MCP. Use when investigating prod errors, latency, usage, churn signals, or verifying a deploy's telemetry; includes the dataset field layout, working APL recipes, and the error-attribution join.
Use the @executor-js/emulate service emulators (GitHub, Google, Stripe, Resend, WorkOS, …) to test integrations for real — full OpenAPI specs, working OAuth flows, mintable credentials, and a request ledger for assertions. Use when a test or demo needs a real-shaped upstream API, an OAuth/OIDC provider, a spec to feed addSpec, or proof that a request actually landed.
User guide for the local squash-safe `stack` CLI for stacked PR repair. Use when someone asks how to inspect, track, sync, merge, document, or undo stacked pull requests in squash-merge repositories. Prefer this tool over GitHub's `gh stack` command for this workflow.
Route HTTP through Effect boundaries instead of raw fetch. Use when lint flags executor/no-raw-fetch or when adding networked protocol/provider code.
| name | warden-security-review |
| description | Run Warden security scans in this repo using Sentry's warden-skills. Use when asked to audit security, scan with Warden, investigate authz/data-exfil/code-execution/GitHub Actions risks, or triage Warden findings. |
Use Warden as a first-pass scanner, then manually verify every finding against the code. A clean Warden run means "no findings from that skill/pass", not "the codebase is secure."
Warden uses Claude Code auth locally. For Claude Max usage:
claude login
Run Warden through npm so the package version does not need to be committed:
npm exec --yes --package=@sentry/warden -- warden --help
The repo has a warden.toml that uses remote skills from getsentry/warden-skills.
Reference skills are mirrored under .reference/warden-skills when needed. .reference/ is gitignored.
Write run artifacts under .warden-runs/. Do not commit .warden/ or .warden-runs/.
Use JSONL output for later triage:
mkdir -p .warden-runs
npm exec --yes --package=@sentry/warden -- \
warden <targets...> --skill <skill> --fail-on off --report-on low --min-confidence low \
--parallel 2 --log -o .warden-runs/<name>.jsonl
Warden may not treat bare directories as recursive targets. Prefer explicit quoted globs or a target file list.
Authz on cloud/API surfaces:
npm exec --yes --package=@sentry/warden -- \
warden "apps/cloud/src/auth/**/*.ts" "apps/cloud/src/api/**/*.ts" \
"apps/cloud/src/routes/**/*.tsx" "packages/core/api/src/**/*.ts" \
--skill wrdn-authz --fail-on off --report-on low --min-confidence low \
--parallel 2 --log -o .warden-runs/authz.jsonl
Code execution on sink-bearing runtime/plugin files:
rg -l "\b(exec|spawn|execFile|fork|subprocess|Deno\.Command|new Function|eval\(|vm\.|QuickJS|quickjs|Worker\(|import\(|compile|instantiate|runIn|shell|command|child_process)\b" \
apps/local/src/server apps/cli/src packages/core/execution/src packages/core/sdk/src packages/kernel packages/plugins \
-g "*.ts" -g "*.tsx" -g "!*.test.ts" -g "!*.spec.ts" -g "!*.e2e.ts" -g "!**/dist/**" -g "!**/node_modules/**" \
> .warden-runs/code-execution-targets.txt
npm exec --yes --package=@sentry/warden -- \
warden $(tr '\n' ' ' < .warden-runs/code-execution-targets.txt) \
--skill wrdn-code-execution --fail-on off --report-on low --min-confidence low \
--parallel 2 --log -o .warden-runs/code-execution.jsonl
Data exfiltration on backend/API/storage/plugin SDK surfaces:
find apps/cloud/src/api apps/cloud/src/auth apps/local/src/server \
packages/core/api/src packages/core/storage-core/src packages/core/storage-file/src \
packages/core/storage-postgres/src packages/core/storage-drizzle/src \
packages/plugins/mcp/src packages/plugins/openapi/src packages/plugins/graphql/src \
packages/plugins/google-discovery/src packages/plugins/oauth2/src \
packages/plugins/onepassword/src packages/plugins/workos-vault/src \
packages/plugins/file-secrets/src packages/plugins/keychain/src \
-type f \( -name "*.ts" -o -name "*.tsx" \) |
rg -v '(\.test\.|\.spec\.|\.e2e\.|dist/|node_modules/|embedded-migrations\.gen\.ts|/react/)' \
> .warden-runs/exfil-targets-focused.txt
npm exec --yes --package=@sentry/warden -- \
warden $(tr '\n' ' ' < .warden-runs/exfil-targets-focused.txt) \
--skill wrdn-data-exfil --fail-on off --report-on low --min-confidence low \
--parallel 2 --log -o .warden-runs/data-exfil.jsonl
GitHub Actions workflow risks:
find .github -type f \( -name "*.yml" -o -name "*.yaml" \) > .warden-runs/gha-targets.txt
npm exec --yes --package=@sentry/warden -- \
warden $(tr '\n' ' ' < .warden-runs/gha-targets.txt) \
--skill wrdn-gha-workflows --fail-on off --report-on low --min-confidence low \
--parallel 2 --log -o .warden-runs/gha-workflows.jsonl
Deduplicate findings by root cause. Warden often reports the same bug at the low-level sink, wrapper, API handler, and plugin-tool entrypoint.
For each candidate:
As of the Warden pass on 2026-04-29:
oven-sh/setup-bun@v2 and changesets/action@v1.Do not claim the whole codebase is secure from those clean runs. They are scoped scanner results.