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Automate network traffic analysis using tshark and pyshark for protocol statistics, suspicious flow detection, DNS anomaly identification, and IOC extraction from PCAP files
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用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt，粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里，让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
直接命令不会经过审查 Prompt；运行前请先检查来源。
npx skills add https://github.com/xalgord/xalgorix --skill performing-network-traffic-analysis-with-tshark命令会保持在同一行。复制前请横向滚动并检查完整内容。
想先保存到本地？可下载 SkillsMP 当前能够提供的文件。
Detecting and exploiting HTTP request smuggling vulnerabilities caused by Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding parsing discrepancies between front-end and back-end servers.
Identifying and exploiting OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect misconfigurations including redirect URI manipulation, token leakage, and authorization code theft during security assessments.
Identifying and exploiting dangling DNS records pointing to unclaimed cloud services, enabling subdomain takeover for phishing, cookie stealing, and authentication bypass during authorized penetration tests.
基于 SOC 职业分类
正在显示 SKILL.md
| name | performing-network-traffic-analysis-with-tshark |
| description | Automate network traffic analysis using tshark and pyshark for protocol statistics, suspicious flow detection, DNS anomaly identification, and IOC extraction from PCAP files |
| domain | cybersecurity |
| subdomain | network-security |
| tags | ["tshark","pyshark","pcap","packet-analysis","network-forensics","wireshark","traffic-analysis"] |
| version | 1.0 |
| author | mahipal |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| nist_csf | ["PR.IR-01","DE.CM-01","ID.AM-03","PR.DS-02"] |
This skill automates packet capture analysis using tshark (Wireshark CLI) and pyshark (Python wrapper). It extracts protocol distribution statistics, identifies suspicious network flows (port scans, beaconing, data exfiltration), extracts IOCs (IPs, domains, URLs), and detects DNS tunneling patterns from PCAP files.
-s (snaplen) cuts payloads and breaks reassembly. Capture full frames (-s 0) or you'll miss DNS answers, HTTP bodies, and IOC strings.-f "port 53") drops packets permanently; a display filter (-Y "dns") only hides them. Using -f when you meant -Y silently discards evidence — capture broadly, filter with -Y.-Y "tls.handshake.extensions_server_name"), JA3, cert CN, and conn duration/bytes — instead of assuming "nothing malicious."if_drop; a saturated link or ring buffer (-b) silently loses the beacon you're hunting. Sampled NetFlow (1:1000) misses low-volume C2 entirely.ip.addr != x and !(ip.addr == x) are not equivalent, and http.request misses HTTP/2-over-TLS. Validate the filter returns the expected baseline count before trusting a zero result.-z io,stat,0 and -z conv,ip, and confirm against a known-good PCAP that your detection actually fires before reporting "clean."