performing-kerberoasting-attack

name	performing-kerberoasting-attack
description	Kerberoasting is a post-exploitation technique that targets service accounts in Active Directory by requesting Kerberos TGS (Ticket Granting Service) tickets for accounts with Service Principal Names
domain	cybersecurity
subdomain	red-teaming
tags	["red-team","adversary-simulation","mitre-attack","exploitation","post-exploitation","kerberoasting","active-directory","credential-access"]
version	1.0
author	mahipal
license	Apache-2.0
d3fend_techniques	["Application Protocol Command Analysis","Network Isolation","Network Traffic Analysis","Client-server Payload Profiling","Network Traffic Community Deviation"]
nist_csf	["ID.RA-01","GV.OV-02","DE.AE-07"]

Performing Kerberoasting Attack

Legal Notice: This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal and may violate computer fraud laws.

Overview

Kerberoasting is a post-exploitation technique that targets service accounts in Active Directory by requesting Kerberos TGS (Ticket Granting Service) tickets for accounts with Service Principal Names (SPNs) set. These tickets are encrypted with the service account's NTLM hash, allowing offline brute-force cracking without generating failed login events. It is one of the most common privilege escalation paths in AD environments because any domain user can request TGS tickets.

When to Use

• When conducting security assessments that involve performing kerberoasting attack
• When following incident response procedures for related security events
• When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
• When validating security controls through hands-on testing

Most Often Missed & How to Confirm

• Force RC4 (etype 23, 0x17) when possible — Rubeus.exe kerberoast /tgtdeleg or GetUserSPNs.py -request yields $krb5tgs$23$ hashes (hashcat 13100) that crack far faster than AES. If accounts are AES-only you'll see $krb5tgs$18$/$17$ (modes 19800/19700); don't skip those, just expect slower cracking.
• Targeted/high-value roasting is missed when operators bulk-roast everything: prioritize adminCount=1 SPN accounts and known high-priv SPNs (MSSQLSvc, HTTP, CIFS) — Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:svc_sql /nowrap or GetUserSPNs -request-user.
• AS-REP roasting is the companion technique constantly forgotten: enumerate DONT_REQ_PREAUTH accounts and roast them — Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:hashcat ($krb5asrep$23$, hashcat 18200). A "no kerberoastable accounts" result doesn't mean no offline-crackable hashes exist.
• /tgtdeleg avoids requesting RC4 downgrade noise on hardened domains; default roasts can trip Event 4769 RC4 alerts.
• Positive signal: a $krb5tgs$ (or $krb5asrep$) hash extracted AND hashcat returns a plaintext (Status: Cracked), which then authenticates — crackmapexec smb <dc> -u <svc> -p '<cracked>'.
• Don't conclude "not kerberoastable" until: (1) SPN enumeration ran authenticated (any domain user can, but a failed bind returns empty), (2) both RC4 and AES tickets were requested, (3) AS-REP roast was also attempted, (4) honeypot/decoy SPNs were filtered out, and (5) extracted hashes ran against a real wordlist+rules (rockyou + best64) before calling it uncrackable.