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supabase-extract-service-key
CRITICAL - Detect if the Supabase service_role key is leaked in client-side code. This is a P0 severity issue.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
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CRITICAL - Detect if the Supabase service_role key is leaked in client-side code. This is a P0 severity issue.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
基于 SOC 职业分类
Orchestrate a complete Supabase security audit with guided step-by-step execution and ownership confirmation.
Test Row Level Security (RLS) policies for common bypass vulnerabilities and misconfigurations.
List and test exposed PostgreSQL RPC functions for security issues and potential RLS bypass.
List all tables exposed via the Supabase PostgREST API to identify the attack surface.
Attempt to read data from exposed tables to verify actual data exposure and RLS effectiveness.
Analyze Supabase authentication configuration for security weaknesses and misconfigurations.
| name | supabase-extract-service-key |
| description | CRITICAL - Detect if the Supabase service_role key is leaked in client-side code. This is a P0 severity issue. |
🔴 CRITICAL: PROGRESSIVE FILE UPDATES REQUIRED
You MUST write to context files AS YOU GO, not just at the end.
- Write to
.sb-pentest-context.jsonIMMEDIATELY after each discovery- Log to
.sb-pentest-audit.logBEFORE and AFTER each action- DO NOT wait until the skill completes to update files
- If the skill crashes or is interrupted, all prior findings must already be saved
This is not optional. Failure to write progressively is a critical error.
This skill detects if the service_role key (admin key) is accidentally exposed in client-side code.
The service_role key bypasses ALL Row Level Security (RLS) policies. If exposed:
| Impact | Description |
|---|---|
| 🔴 Full DB Access | Read/write/delete all data in all tables |
| 🔴 Auth Bypass | Access all user data without authentication |
| 🔴 Storage Access | Read/write all files in all buckets |
| 🔴 User Impersonation | Generate tokens for any user |
This is a P0 (Critical) finding that requires immediate action.
| Aspect | Anon Key | Service Key |
|---|---|---|
| Role claim | "role": "anon" | "role": "service_role" |
| RLS | ✅ Respects RLS | ❌ Bypasses RLS |
| Client-side | ✅ Expected | ❌ NEVER |
| Server-side | ✅ Can use | ✅ Should use |
The skill searches for:
// Decoded JWT payload contains:
{
"role": "service_role", // ❌ CRITICAL if in client code
"iss": "supabase",
"ref": "abc123def"
}
// Common naming patterns
SUPABASE_SERVICE_KEY
SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY
SUPABASE_ADMIN_KEY
SUPABASE_SECRET_KEY
SERVICE_ROLE_KEY
// Sometimes exposed alongside anon key
const keys = {
anon: 'eyJ...',
service: 'eyJ...' // ❌ Should not be here
}
Check for service key leak on https://myapp.example.com
Deep scan for service key exposure on https://myapp.example.com
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
SERVICE KEY CHECK
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Status: ✅ No service_role key detected in client code
Scanned:
├── HTML source: Clean
├── JavaScript bundles: 5 files, 2.3MB analyzed
├── Inline scripts: 12 blocks checked
└── Source maps: Not exposed (good)
JWT Analysis:
└── 1 key found, confirmed role=anon (safe)
Result: PASS - No critical key exposure
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
🔴 CRITICAL: SERVICE KEY EXPOSED
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Severity: P0 - CRITICAL
Status: ❌ service_role key found in client-side code!
⚠️ IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED ⚠️
Exposed Key:
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJzdXBh
YmFzZSIsInJlZiI6ImFiYzEyM2RlZiIsInJvbGUiOiJzZXJ2aWNlX3
JvbGUiLCJpYXQiOjE2NDAwMDAwMDAsImV4cCI6MTk1NTM2MDAwMH0
.xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Location:
└── /static/js/admin.chunk.js (line 89)
const SUPABASE_KEY = 'eyJhbG...' // Used in createClient()
Decoded Payload:
├── role: service_role ← CRITICAL
├── ref: abc123def
└── exp: 2031-12-20
Impact Assessment:
├── 🔴 Full database access possible
├── 🔴 All RLS policies bypassed
├── 🔴 All user data exposed
└── 🔴 All storage buckets accessible
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
IMMEDIATE REMEDIATION STEPS
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
1. ROTATE THE KEY NOW
→ Supabase Dashboard > Settings > API > Regenerate service_role key
2. REMOVE FROM CLIENT CODE
→ Delete the key from your source code
→ Redeploy your application
3. AUDIT FOR ABUSE
→ Check Supabase logs for unauthorized access
→ Review database for unexpected changes
4. USE EDGE FUNCTIONS
→ Move privileged operations to Edge Functions
→ Client calls Edge Function, which uses service key server-side
Documentation:
→ https://supabase.com/docs/guides/api/api-keys
→ https://supabase.com/docs/guides/functions
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Saved to .sb-pentest-context.json:
{
"findings": [
{
"id": "SERVICE_KEY_EXPOSED",
"severity": "P0",
"title": "Service Role Key Exposed in Client Code",
"description": "The service_role key was found in client-side JavaScript",
"location": {
"file": "/static/js/admin.chunk.js",
"line": 89
},
"evidence": {
"key_prefix": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiI...",
"role": "service_role",
"project_ref": "abc123def"
},
"remediation": {
"immediate": "Rotate key in Supabase Dashboard",
"long_term": "Move to Edge Functions",
"docs": "https://supabase.com/docs/guides/api/api-keys"
}
}
],
"supabase": {
"service_key_exposed": true,
"service_key_location": "/static/js/admin.chunk.js:89"
}
}
The skill also checks for exposed source maps that might reveal keys:
Source Maps Analysis:
├── main.js.map: ❌ Exposed (may contain secrets)
├── vendor.js.map: ❌ Exposed
└── Recommendation: Disable source maps in production
To check source maps content:
→ Add .map to JS URLs: /static/js/main.js.map
| Cause | Solution |
|---|---|
| Wrong env variable | Use NEXT_PUBLIC_ only for anon key |
| Copy-paste error | Double-check which key you're using |
| Debug code left in | Remove before production build |
| Misconfigured bundler | Ensure service key env vars are not included |
// ❌ WRONG - Service key in client
import { createClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
const supabase = createClient(
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL,
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_SERVICE_KEY // ❌ NEVER DO THIS
)
// ✅ CORRECT - Only anon key in client
import { createClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
const supabase = createClient(
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL,
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY // ✅ Safe for client
)
// For privileged operations, call an Edge Function:
const { data } = await supabase.functions.invoke('admin-action', {
body: { action: 'delete-user', userId: '123' }
})
// supabase/functions/admin-action/index.ts
import { createClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
Deno.serve(async (req) => {
// ✅ Service key only on server
const supabase = createClient(
Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_URL'),
Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY') // ✅ Safe on server
)
// Perform privileged operation
// ...
})
⚠️ This skill MUST update tracking files PROGRESSIVELY during execution, NOT just at the end.
DO NOT batch all writes at the end. Instead:
.sb-pentest-audit.log.sb-pentest-context.json.sb-pentest-audit.logThis ensures that if the skill is interrupted, crashes, or times out, all findings up to that point are preserved.
Update .sb-pentest-context.json with findings:
{
"supabase": {
"service_key_exposed": true/false,
"service_key_location": "path:line"
},
"findings": [
{
"id": "SERVICE_KEY_EXPOSED",
"severity": "P0",
"title": "Service Role Key Exposed",
...
}
]
}
Log to .sb-pentest-audit.log:
[TIMESTAMP] [supabase-extract-service-key] [START] Checking for service key exposure
[TIMESTAMP] [supabase-extract-service-key] [CRITICAL] Service key EXPOSED at path:line
[TIMESTAMP] [supabase-extract-service-key] [CONTEXT_UPDATED] .sb-pentest-context.json updated
If files don't exist, create them before writing.
FAILURE TO UPDATE CONTEXT FILES IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.
📁 Evidence Directory: .sb-pentest-evidence/02-extraction/service-key-exposure/
| File | Content |
|---|---|
service-key-exposure/location.txt | File path and line number |
service-key-exposure/decoded-payload.json | Decoded JWT proving it's service_role |
service-key-exposure/code-snippet.txt | Code context (redacted) |
{
"evidence_id": "EXT-SVC-001",
"timestamp": "2025-01-31T10:10:00Z",
"category": "extraction",
"type": "service_key_exposure",
"severity": "P0",
"finding_id": "P0-001",
"key_data": {
"key_prefix": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiI...",
"key_suffix": "...xxxx",
"role": "service_role"
},
"decoded_payload": {
"iss": "supabase",
"ref": "abc123def",
"role": "service_role",
"iat": "2021-12-20T00:00:00Z",
"exp": "2031-12-20T00:00:00Z"
},
"location": {
"file": "/static/js/admin.chunk.js",
"line": 89,
"context": "const SUPABASE_KEY = 'eyJhbG...' // [REDACTED]"
},
"impact": {
"rls_bypass": true,
"full_db_access": true,
"auth_users_access": true,
"storage_access": true
},
"curl_command": "curl -X GET 'https://abc123def.supabase.co/rest/v1/users' -H 'apikey: [SERVICE_KEY]' -H 'Authorization: Bearer [SERVICE_KEY]'"
}
## [TIMESTAMP] - 🔴 P0 CRITICAL: Service Role Key Exposed
- Service role key found in client-side code
- Location: [file]:[line]
- Impact: Full database access, RLS bypass
- Evidence: `02-extraction/service-key-exposure/`
- **IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED**
supabase-extract-anon-key — Extract the (expected) anon keysupabase-audit-tables-read — Test what data is accessiblesupabase-report — Generate full report including this finding