Skip to main content

security

Defensive security engineering judgment, distilled from a stronger model - invoke when THREAT MODELING a system or feature; making security-relevant design decisions (auth, crypto, trust boundaries, attack surface); reviewing code for vulnerabilities (injection, IDOR, secrets, the OWASP classes); hardening operations (secrets management, detection, patching, incident response); or judging whether a security control/program is real or theater. Also invoke BEFORE any offensive-flavored request (pentest, exploit, credential testing) to apply the authorization gate. Also invoke when designing, reviewing, or hardening an LLM/agent system that reads untrusted content or holds tool/MCP access (prompt injection, excessive agency, MCP supply chain).

معلومات المصدر

المستودع
telagod/code-abyss
آخر نشاط في المصدر
٥ يوليو ٢٠٢٦ في ١٢:٠٣
لغة SKILL.md المكتشفة
الإنجليزية
النجوم
٢٤٣
التفرعات
٣٣

خيارات التثبيت

يُحدَّد Prompt الذي يراجع المصدر أولًا بشكل افتراضي. يمكنك التبديل إلى أمر مباشر أو تنزيل نسخة محلية.

مراجعة ملفات المصدر

اقرأ SKILL.md وأي ملفات مرافقة يعرضها SkillsMP قبل أن تقرر التثبيت.

مستكشف الملفات
8 ملفات

عرض SKILL.md

SKILL.md
تعليمات المصدر · معاينة للقراءة فقط
user-invocable
false
name
security
description
Defensive security engineering judgment, distilled from a stronger model - invoke when THREAT MODELING a system or feature; making security-relevant design decisions (auth, crypto, trust boundaries, attack surface); reviewing code for vulnerabilities (injection, IDOR, secrets, the OWASP classes); hardening operations (secrets management, detection, patching, incident response); or judging whether a security control/program is real or theater. Also invoke BEFORE any offensive-flavored request (pentest, exploit, credential testing) to apply the authorization gate. Also invoke when designing, reviewing, or hardening an LLM/agent system that reads untrusted content or holds tool/MCP access (prompt injection, excessive agency, MCP supply chain).
# Security — scope gate, threat model, design, review, operations, traps, agentic AI Rule content lives in the seven files below; this SKILL.md only routes (`doctrine/04-maintenance.md` governs edits to this bundle too). **First, always:** `scope.md` §1 — the authorization gate. It fires on ANY request mentioning exploits, payloads, bypassing auth/WAF/filters, cracking, brute force, credential/password testing, scanning a target, or accessing a system the requester didn't build in this session — recognize the moment even when the ask is phrased as "just write a script." Defensive work proceeds; offensive-flavored work needs corroborated authorization context; some requests are refused regardless of framing. Pass the gate before applying anything else in this bundle. ## Route by moment | You are about to… | Read (in this folder) | |---|---| | Judge scope — fires on ANY mention of exploits, payloads, bypassing auth/WAF, cracking, brute force, credential testing, scanning a target, or reaching a system the requester didn't build here | `scope.md` §1 | | Decide what to protect, from whom, and where to spend | `threat-model.md` | | Design auth, trust boundaries, crypto use, or a system's security posture | `design.md` | | Review code for vulnerabilities, or report security findings | `review.md` | | Handle secrets, hardening, logging/detection, dependencies, incidents | `operate.md` | | Assess whether a control or security program is real; name why it smells | `traps.md` | | Design, review, or harden a system where an LLM/agent reads untrusted content or holds tool/MCP access (prompt injection, excessive agency, MCP supply chain) | `agentic.md` | A new system usually runs `threat-model.md` (four questions) → `design.md` → `review.md` before ship → `operate.md` in production. ## Scope and neighbors Security judgment for building and defending systems. The application-level security floor (input validation, per-object authz in `backend/operate.md` §5; rate limits in `backend/operate.md` §7) also lives in the backend bundle — this bundle is the deeper treatment. Agentic AI security (prompt injection, the lethal trifecta, tool-privilege boundaries, MCP supply chain) is `agentic.md` — it extends this bundle's design/review/ operate rules to agents, not a replacement for them. General verification discipline is `methods/verify.md`; whether to delegate → `doctrine`. ## The stance **Attackers take the cheapest path; defenders must be honest about which door is open.** Threat model before controls (`threat-model.md`), assume breach (`scope.md` §3), make the safe way the easy way (`design.md` §3) — and never confuse a control that exists with a control that works (`traps.md` meta-signal). A clean review means "nothing found where I looked," never "secure" (`scope.md` §5).
عرض على GitHub