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Defensive security engineering judgment, distilled from a stronger model - invoke when THREAT MODELING a system or feature; making security-relevant design decisions (auth, crypto, trust boundaries, attack surface); reviewing code for vulnerabilities (injection, IDOR, secrets, the OWASP classes); hardening operations (secrets management, detection, patching, incident response); or judging whether a security control/program is real or theater. Also invoke BEFORE any offensive-flavored request (pentest, exploit, credential testing) to apply the authorization gate. Also invoke when designing, reviewing, or hardening an LLM/agent system that reads untrusted content or holds tool/MCP access (prompt injection, excessive agency, MCP supply chain).

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telagod/code-abyss
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5 de julio de 2026 a las 12:03
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SKILL.md
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security
description
Defensive security engineering judgment, distilled from a stronger model - invoke when THREAT MODELING a system or feature; making security-relevant design decisions (auth, crypto, trust boundaries, attack surface); reviewing code for vulnerabilities (injection, IDOR, secrets, the OWASP classes); hardening operations (secrets management, detection, patching, incident response); or judging whether a security control/program is real or theater. Also invoke BEFORE any offensive-flavored request (pentest, exploit, credential testing) to apply the authorization gate. Also invoke when designing, reviewing, or hardening an LLM/agent system that reads untrusted content or holds tool/MCP access (prompt injection, excessive agency, MCP supply chain).
# Security — scope gate, threat model, design, review, operations, traps, agentic AI Rule content lives in the seven files below; this SKILL.md only routes (`doctrine/04-maintenance.md` governs edits to this bundle too). **First, always:** `scope.md` §1 — the authorization gate. It fires on ANY request mentioning exploits, payloads, bypassing auth/WAF/filters, cracking, brute force, credential/password testing, scanning a target, or accessing a system the requester didn't build in this session — recognize the moment even when the ask is phrased as "just write a script." Defensive work proceeds; offensive-flavored work needs corroborated authorization context; some requests are refused regardless of framing. Pass the gate before applying anything else in this bundle. ## Route by moment | You are about to… | Read (in this folder) | |---|---| | Judge scope — fires on ANY mention of exploits, payloads, bypassing auth/WAF, cracking, brute force, credential testing, scanning a target, or reaching a system the requester didn't build here | `scope.md` §1 | | Decide what to protect, from whom, and where to spend | `threat-model.md` | | Design auth, trust boundaries, crypto use, or a system's security posture | `design.md` | | Review code for vulnerabilities, or report security findings | `review.md` | | Handle secrets, hardening, logging/detection, dependencies, incidents | `operate.md` | | Assess whether a control or security program is real; name why it smells | `traps.md` | | Design, review, or harden a system where an LLM/agent reads untrusted content or holds tool/MCP access (prompt injection, excessive agency, MCP supply chain) | `agentic.md` | A new system usually runs `threat-model.md` (four questions) → `design.md` → `review.md` before ship → `operate.md` in production. ## Scope and neighbors Security judgment for building and defending systems. The application-level security floor (input validation, per-object authz in `backend/operate.md` §5; rate limits in `backend/operate.md` §7) also lives in the backend bundle — this bundle is the deeper treatment. Agentic AI security (prompt injection, the lethal trifecta, tool-privilege boundaries, MCP supply chain) is `agentic.md` — it extends this bundle's design/review/ operate rules to agents, not a replacement for them. General verification discipline is `methods/verify.md`; whether to delegate → `doctrine`. ## The stance **Attackers take the cheapest path; defenders must be honest about which door is open.** Threat model before controls (`threat-model.md`), assume breach (`scope.md` §3), make the safe way the easy way (`design.md` §3) — and never confuse a control that exists with a control that works (`traps.md` meta-signal). A clean review means "nothing found where I looked," never "secure" (`scope.md` §5).
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