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SkillsMP has collected 771 skills from AgentFlocks/flocks. Open a skill to review its source and details.
AgentFlocks/flocksShowing 40 of 771 collected skills.
Uses Rekall memory forensics framework to analyze memory dumps for process hollowing, injected code via VAD anomalies, hidden processes, and rootkit detection. Applies plugins like pslist, psscan, vadinfo, malfind, and dlllist to extract forensic artifacts…
Extract, parse, and analyze Windows Event Logs (EVTX) using Chainsaw, Hayabusa, and EvtxECmd to detect lateral movement, persistence, and privilege escalation.
Generates structured cyber threat intelligence reports at strategic, operational, and tactical levels tailored to specific audiences including executives, security operations teams, and technical analysts. Use when producing finished intelligence products…
Hardening Docker containers for production involves applying security best practices aligned with CIS Docker Benchmark v1.8.0 to minimize attack surface, prevent privilege escalation, and enforce leas
Harden the Docker daemon by configuring daemon.json with user namespace remapping, TLS authentication, rootless mode, and CIS benchmark controls.
Hardens Linux endpoints using CIS Benchmark recommendations for Ubuntu, RHEL, and CentOS to reduce attack surface, enforce security baselines, and meet compliance requirements. Use when deploying new Linux servers, remediating audit findings, or establishing…
Hardens Windows endpoints using CIS (Center for Internet Security) Benchmark recommendations to reduce attack surface, enforce security baselines, and meet compliance requirements. Use when deploying new Windows workstations or servers, remediating audit…
Proactively hunts for Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) activity within enterprise environments using hypothesis-driven searches across endpoint telemetry, network logs, and memory artifacts. Use when conducting scheduled threat hunting cycles, investigating…
Detects credential stuffing attacks by analyzing authentication logs for login velocity anomalies, ASN diversity, password spray patterns, and geographic distribution of failed logins. Uses statistical analysis on Splunk or raw log data. Use when…
Identify command-and-control beaconing patterns in network traffic by applying statistical frequency analysis, jitter calculation, and coefficient of variation scoring to detect periodic callbacks from compromised endpoints.
Detect Cobalt Strike beacon network activity using default TLS certificate signatures (serial 8BB00EE), JA3/JA3S/JARM fingerprints, HTTP C2 profile pattern matching, beacon jitter analysis, and named pipe detection via Zeek, Suricata, and Python PCAP analysis.
Detect C2 beaconing patterns in network traffic using frequency analysis, jitter detection, and domain reputation to identify compromised endpoints communicating with adversary infrastructure.
Hunt for data exfiltration through network traffic analysis, detecting unusual data flows, DNS tunneling, cloud storage uploads, and encrypted channel abuse.
Detect data staging activity before exfiltration by monitoring for archive creation with 7-Zip/RAR, unusual temp folder access, large file consolidation, and staging directory patterns via EDR and process telemetry
Hunt for DCOM-based lateral movement by detecting abuse of MMC20.Application, ShellBrowserWindow, and ShellWindows COM objects through Sysmon Event ID 1 (process creation) and Event ID 3 (network connection) correlation, WMI event analysis, RPC endpoint…
Detect DCSync attacks by analyzing Windows Event ID 4662 for unauthorized DS-Replication-Get-Changes requests from non-domain-controller accounts.
Detect NTFS timestamp manipulation (MITRE T1070.006) by comparing $STANDARD_INFORMATION vs $FILE_NAME timestamps in the MFT. Uses analyzeMFT and Python to identify files with anomalous temporal patterns indicating anti-forensic timestomping activity.
Hunt for DNS-based persistence mechanisms including DNS hijacking, dangling CNAME records, wildcard DNS abuse, and unauthorized zone modifications using passive DNS databases, SecurityTrails API, and DNS audit log analysis.
Detect DNS tunneling and data exfiltration by analyzing Zeek dns.log for high-entropy subdomain queries, excessive query volume, long query lengths, and unusual DNS record types indicating covert channel communication.
Detect domain fronting C2 traffic by analyzing SNI vs HTTP Host header mismatches in proxy logs and TLS certificate discrepancies using pyOpenSSL for certificate inspection
Detect WMI-based lateral movement by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688 process creation and Sysmon Event ID 1 for WmiPrvSE.exe child process patterns, remote process execution, and WMI event subscription persistence.
Hunt for adversary abuse of legitimate cloud services for C2, data staging, and exfiltration including abuse of Azure, AWS, GCP services, and SaaS platforms.
Proactively hunt for adversary abuse of legitimate system binaries (LOLBins) to execute malicious payloads while evading detection.
Hunt for adversary abuse of Living Off the Land Binaries (LOLBins) by analyzing endpoint process creation logs for suspicious execution patterns of legitimate Windows system binaries used for malicious purposes.
Detect NTLM relay attacks by analyzing Windows Event 4624 logon type 3 with NTLMSSP authentication, identifying IP-to-hostname mismatches, Responder traffic signatures, SMB signing status, and suspicious authentication patterns across the domain.
Systematically hunt for adversary persistence mechanisms across Windows endpoints including registry, services, startup folders, and WMI subscriptions.
Hunt for adversary persistence through Windows Management Instrumentation event subscriptions by monitoring WMI consumer, filter, and binding creation events that execute malicious code triggered by system events.
Detect process injection techniques (T1055) including CreateRemoteThread, process hollowing, and DLL injection via Sysmon Event IDs 8 and 10 and EDR process telemetry
Hunt for registry-based persistence mechanisms including Run keys, Winlogon modifications, IFEO injection, and COM hijacking in Windows environments.
Detect MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 registry Run key persistence by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 13 logs and registry queries to identify malicious auto-start entries.
Hunt for adversary persistence via Windows Scheduled Tasks by analyzing task creation events, suspicious task actions, and unusual scheduling patterns.
Hunt for Volume Shadow Copy deletion activity that indicates ransomware preparation or anti-forensics by monitoring vssadmin, wmic, and PowerShell shadow copy commands.
Hunt for spearphishing campaign indicators across email logs, endpoint telemetry, and network data to detect targeted email attacks.
Detect T1547.001 startup folder persistence by monitoring Windows startup directories for suspicious file creation, analyzing autoruns entries, and using Python watchdog for real-time filesystem monitoring.
Hunt for supply chain compromise indicators including trojanized software updates, compromised dependencies, unauthorized code modifications, and tampered build artifacts.
Hunt for adversary persistence and execution via Windows scheduled tasks by analyzing task creation events, suspicious task properties, and unusual execution patterns that indicate T1053.005 abuse.
Hunt for MITRE ATT&CK T1098 account manipulation including shadow admin creation, SID history injection, group membership changes, and credential modifications using Windows Security Event Logs.
Hunt for unusual network connections by analyzing outbound traffic patterns, rare destinations, non-standard ports, and anomalous connection frequencies from endpoints.
Detect suspicious Windows service installations (MITRE ATT&CK T1543.003) by parsing System event logs for Event ID 7045, analyzing service binary paths, and identifying indicators of persistence mechanisms.
Hunt for web shell deployments on internet-facing servers by analyzing file creation in web directories, suspicious process spawning from web servers, and anomalous HTTP patterns.