AgentFlocks/flocks - Seite 9

extracting-memory-artifacts-with-rekall

Uses Rekall memory forensics framework to analyze memory dumps for process hollowing, injected code via VAD anomalies, hidden processes, and rootkit detection. Applies plugins like pslist, psscan, vadinfo, malfind, and dlllist to extract forensic artifacts…

Quellsprache: Englisch

extracting-windows-event-logs-artifacts

Extract, parse, and analyze Windows Event Logs (EVTX) using Chainsaw, Hayabusa, and EvtxECmd to detect lateral movement, persistence, and privilege escalation.

Quellsprache: Englisch

generating-threat-intelligence-reports

Generates structured cyber threat intelligence reports at strategic, operational, and tactical levels tailored to specific audiences including executives, security operations teams, and technical analysts. Use when producing finished intelligence products…

Quellsprache: Englisch

hardening-docker-containers-for-production

Hardening Docker containers for production involves applying security best practices aligned with CIS Docker Benchmark v1.8.0 to minimize attack surface, prevent privilege escalation, and enforce leas

Quellsprache: Englisch

hardening-docker-daemon-configuration

Harden the Docker daemon by configuring daemon.json with user namespace remapping, TLS authentication, rootless mode, and CIS benchmark controls.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hardening-linux-endpoint-with-cis-benchmark

Hardens Linux endpoints using CIS Benchmark recommendations for Ubuntu, RHEL, and CentOS to reduce attack surface, enforce security baselines, and meet compliance requirements. Use when deploying new Linux servers, remediating audit findings, or establishing…

Quellsprache: Englisch

hardening-windows-endpoint-with-cis-benchmark

Hardens Windows endpoints using CIS (Center for Internet Security) Benchmark recommendations to reduce attack surface, enforce security baselines, and meet compliance requirements. Use when deploying new Windows workstations or servers, remediating audit…

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-advanced-persistent-threats

Proactively hunts for Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) activity within enterprise environments using hypothesis-driven searches across endpoint telemetry, network logs, and memory artifacts. Use when conducting scheduled threat hunting cycles, investigating…

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-credential-stuffing-attacks

Detects credential stuffing attacks by analyzing authentication logs for login velocity anomalies, ASN diversity, password spray patterns, and geographic distribution of failed logins. Uses statistical analysis on Splunk or raw log data. Use when…

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-beaconing-with-frequency-analysis

Identify command-and-control beaconing patterns in network traffic by applying statistical frequency analysis, jitter calculation, and coefficient of variation scoring to detect periodic callbacks from compromised endpoints.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-cobalt-strike-beacons

Detect Cobalt Strike beacon network activity using default TLS certificate signatures (serial 8BB00EE), JA3/JA3S/JARM fingerprints, HTTP C2 profile pattern matching, beacon jitter analysis, and named pipe detection via Zeek, Suricata, and Python PCAP analysis.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-command-and-control-beaconing

Detect C2 beaconing patterns in network traffic using frequency analysis, jitter detection, and domain reputation to identify compromised endpoints communicating with adversary infrastructure.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-data-exfiltration-indicators

Hunt for data exfiltration through network traffic analysis, detecting unusual data flows, DNS tunneling, cloud storage uploads, and encrypted channel abuse.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-data-staging-before-exfiltration

Detect data staging activity before exfiltration by monitoring for archive creation with 7-Zip/RAR, unusual temp folder access, large file consolidation, and staging directory patterns via EDR and process telemetry

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement

Hunt for DCOM-based lateral movement by detecting abuse of MMC20.Application, ShellBrowserWindow, and ShellWindows COM objects through Sysmon Event ID 1 (process creation) and Event ID 3 (network connection) correlation, WMI event analysis, RPC endpoint…

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-dcsync-attacks

Detect DCSync attacks by analyzing Windows Event ID 4662 for unauthorized DS-Replication-Get-Changes requests from non-domain-controller accounts.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-defense-evasion-via-timestomping

Detect NTFS timestamp manipulation (MITRE T1070.006) by comparing $STANDARD_INFORMATION vs $FILE_NAME timestamps in the MFT. Uses analyzeMFT and Python to identify files with anomalous temporal patterns indicating anti-forensic timestomping activity.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-dns-based-persistence

Hunt for DNS-based persistence mechanisms including DNS hijacking, dangling CNAME records, wildcard DNS abuse, and unauthorized zone modifications using passive DNS databases, SecurityTrails API, and DNS audit log analysis.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-dns-tunneling-with-zeek

Detect DNS tunneling and data exfiltration by analyzing Zeek dns.log for high-entropy subdomain queries, excessive query volume, long query lengths, and unusual DNS record types indicating covert channel communication.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-domain-fronting-c2-traffic

Detect domain fronting C2 traffic by analyzing SNI vs HTTP Host header mismatches in proxy logs and TLS certificate discrepancies using pyOpenSSL for certificate inspection

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi

Detect WMI-based lateral movement by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688 process creation and Sysmon Event ID 1 for WmiPrvSE.exe child process patterns, remote process execution, and WMI event subscription persistence.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-living-off-the-cloud-techniques

Hunt for adversary abuse of legitimate cloud services for C2, data staging, and exfiltration including abuse of Azure, AWS, GCP services, and SaaS platforms.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-living-off-the-land-binaries

Proactively hunt for adversary abuse of legitimate system binaries (LOLBins) to execute malicious payloads while evading detection.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs

Hunt for adversary abuse of Living Off the Land Binaries (LOLBins) by analyzing endpoint process creation logs for suspicious execution patterns of legitimate Windows system binaries used for malicious purposes.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-ntlm-relay-attacks

Detect NTLM relay attacks by analyzing Windows Event 4624 logon type 3 with NTLMSSP authentication, identifying IP-to-hostname mismatches, Responder traffic signatures, SMB signing status, and suspicious authentication patterns across the domain.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-persistence-mechanisms-in-windows

Systematically hunt for adversary persistence mechanisms across Windows endpoints including registry, services, startup folders, and WMI subscriptions.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions

Hunt for adversary persistence through Windows Management Instrumentation event subscriptions by monitoring WMI consumer, filter, and binding creation events that execute malicious code triggered by system events.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-process-injection-techniques

Detect process injection techniques (T1055) including CreateRemoteThread, process hollowing, and DLL injection via Sysmon Event IDs 8 and 10 and EDR process telemetry

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-registry-persistence-mechanisms

Hunt for registry-based persistence mechanisms including Run keys, Winlogon modifications, IFEO injection, and COM hijacking in Windows environments.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-registry-run-key-persistence

Detect MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 registry Run key persistence by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 13 logs and registry queries to identify malicious auto-start entries.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-scheduled-task-persistence

Hunt for adversary persistence via Windows Scheduled Tasks by analyzing task creation events, suspicious task actions, and unusual scheduling patterns.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-shadow-copy-deletion

Hunt for Volume Shadow Copy deletion activity that indicates ransomware preparation or anti-forensics by monitoring vssadmin, wmic, and PowerShell shadow copy commands.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-spearphishing-indicators

Hunt for spearphishing campaign indicators across email logs, endpoint telemetry, and network data to detect targeted email attacks.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-startup-folder-persistence

Detect T1547.001 startup folder persistence by monitoring Windows startup directories for suspicious file creation, analyzing autoruns entries, and using Python watchdog for real-time filesystem monitoring.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-supply-chain-compromise

Hunt for supply chain compromise indicators including trojanized software updates, compromised dependencies, unauthorized code modifications, and tampered build artifacts.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks

Hunt for adversary persistence and execution via Windows scheduled tasks by analyzing task creation events, suspicious task properties, and unusual execution patterns that indicate T1053.005 abuse.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-t1098-account-manipulation

Hunt for MITRE ATT&CK T1098 account manipulation including shadow admin creation, SID history injection, group membership changes, and credential modifications using Windows Security Event Logs.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-unusual-network-connections

Hunt for unusual network connections by analyzing outbound traffic patterns, rare destinations, non-standard ports, and anomalous connection frequencies from endpoints.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-unusual-service-installations

Detect suspicious Windows service installations (MITRE ATT&CK T1543.003) by parsing System event logs for Event ID 7045, analyzing service binary paths, and identifying indicators of persistence mechanisms.

Quellsprache: Englisch

hunting-for-webshell-activity

Hunt for web shell deployments on internet-facing servers by analyzing file creation in web directories, suspicious process spawning from web servers, and anomalous HTTP patterns.

Quellsprache: Englisch