| name | darkweb-intel |
| description | Dark web intelligence gathering — Tor/onion service reconnaissance, marketplace monitoring, breach data markets, threat actor profiling, with strict OPSEC for investigators. |
| origin | openclaw |
| version | 0.1.29 |
| compatibility | ["openclaw","claude-code","cursor","windsurf"] |
| allowed-tools | ["Bash","Read","Write","Edit","WebSearch","WebFetch"] |
| metadata | {"domain":"osint","tool_count":10,"guide_count":2,"mitre":"TA0043-Reconnaissance","keywords":["tor","onion-crawl","onionscan","ahmia","hunchly","whonix","tails","breach-forum","opsec"]} |
Skill: Dark Web Intelligence
Supplementary Files:
payloads.md — Tor/Whonix/Tails setup, ahmia.fi/Torch/dark.fail/Onionland/Haystak search patterns, OnionScan enumeration, IntelX/DarkOwl/HIBP/DeHashed API usage, threat actor pivot (handles, PGP keys, XMR wallets), Recon-ng darkweb modules, async Python scraping pipeline, OPSEC detection, counter-OSINT cleanup, and a quick-reference cheat sheettest-cases.md — 12 structured test cases (Tor setup, .onion resolution, Ahmia query, IntelX query, marketplace enumeration, threat actor pivot, OPSEC verification, breach correlation, counter-OSINT audit) with severity levels and summary tablesguides/dark-web-investigation-playbook.md — End-to-end investigation playbook (pre-flight, 5-phase workflow, persona management, investigator safety, marketplace reference table, integration with adjacent skills)
Summary
Darkweb Intel skill domain covering osint operations.
Tools: Tor, Tor Browser, Whonix, Tails, Ahmia, Torch, OnionScan, IntelX, HIBP, SpiderFoot
Domain: osint
MITRE ATT&CK: TA0043-Reconnaissance
Description
Dark web intelligence gathering across Tor .onion services, I2P eepsites, dark-net marketplaces, breach-data forums, and paste sites — with the OPSEC discipline that investigator-side work demands. The skill covers: hardened access setup (Tails/Whonix, obfs4 bridges, Snowflake), discovery (Ahmia, Torch, dark.fail, Onionland, Haystak), service enumeration (OnionScan, ahmia-cli), marketplace & forum monitoring, threat actor profiling (handle, PGP key, Monero wallet correlation), breach data correlation (HIBP, DeHashed, IntelX), and synthesis pipelines that funnel findings back into a defensible dossier.
This is the depth-first complement to clearnet OSINT. Where osint casts a wide passive net across clear-web domains, emails, and subdomains, darkweb-intel drills into .onion/.i2p services and the threat actor economy that lives there.
Difference from osint: OSINT orchestrates clearnet collection (domain, email, IP, breach data, Shodan). Darkweb-intel focuses specifically on .onion/.i2p services, dark-net marketplaces, and threat actor communities — it requires Tor/I2P routing, dedicated OPSEC (Tails/Whonix), and a different threat model (investigators are themselves targets).
Difference from username-profiling: Username profiling runs Maigret against 3,000+ clearnet sites. Darkweb-intel pivots a known handle into the darknet — searching paste sites, breach forums, marketplace vendor profiles, and threat actor communities that Maigret does not cover.
Difference from social-intelligence: Social intelligence mines mainstream discourse (Reddit, HN, X). Darkweb-intel mines discourse that has been deliberately pushed off the clearnet — threat actor forums, vendor reviews, leak announcements, and credentialed paste dumps.
Use Cases
- Brand / executive monitoring: Detect when a brand name, executive email, or proprietary codebase appears in a dark-net marketplace listing, leak forum, or ransomware gang blog — before the public disclosure.
- Breach impact triage: When a new breach drops on a leak site, correlate the dump against the client's email/domain/employee list via HIBP, DeHashed, and IntelX to scope impact.
- Threat actor profiling: From a single forum handle, recover associated PGP keys, Monero wallets, prior handles, marketplace vendor profiles, and clearnet identities (when actors slip) — building a dossier for attribution.
- Ransomware leak-site monitoring: Track which victim organizations appear on each major ransomware gang's leak site, with timestamps and download links, to inform client briefings.
- Investigative journalism / due diligence: Verify whether a company, individual, or product is mentioned in dark-net markets, counterfeiting listings, or fraud communities.
- Insider threat indicator gathering: Pivot from a suspected insider's clearnet identity into their dark-net persona — looking for credentials-for-sale listings, resentment posts, or criminal market participation.
- Counter-OSINT (defense): Audit your own organization's dark-net footprint — leaked credentials, insider PII, proprietary source code listings — and submit takedowns.
- Lawful marketplace takedown support: For a law-enforcement or platform-trust engagement, enumerate vendor accounts, listings, and transaction patterns for evidentiary use.
Core Tools
Access & Proxies
| Tool | Purpose | Command / Setup Example |
|---|
| Tor | Routing daemon (SOCKS5 on 127.0.0.1:9050) | sudo apt install tor && sudo service tor start |
| Tor Browser | Hardened Firefox bundle for manual .onion browsing | Download from torproject.org; verify PGP signature |
| obfs4 bridges | Tor pluggable transport for censored networks | Bridge obfs4 IP:PORT FINGERPRINT cert=... iat-mode=0 in torrc |
| Snowflake | WebRTC-based Tor pluggable transport | UseBridges 1 + ClientTransportPlugin snowflake exec /usr/bin/snowflake-client in torrc |
| Whonix | Two-VM Tor gateway/workstation isolation | Whonix-Gateway routes all Whonix-Workstation traffic through Tor |
| Tails | Amnesic live OS — nothing is written to disk | Boot from USB; all traffic routes through Tor; memory wiped on shutdown |
Search & Discovery
| Tool | Purpose | Query / URL Pattern |
|---|
| Ahmia (ahmia.fi) | Clearnet-indexed .onion search engine | curl "https://ahmia.fi/search/?q=<term>" |
| Ahmia hidden-service | .onion-accessible Ahmia mirror | curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 "http://juhanurmihxlp77nkq76byazc4y2sphl4a5hfo3hxnlhkbgz7q6fqd.onion/search/?q=<term>" |
| Torch | Long-running .onion search engine | http://torchde7jygjnqjjp6lcyrch6gzflyol3c5zfsa6uejwnbq7qiiyfqd.onion/search?query=<term> |
| dark.fail | Monitors uptime of well-known .onion services (no listings) | https://dark.fail |
| Onionland | .onion search engine with category pages | http://onionland<random>.onion (verify current address via Tor Browser) |
| Haystak | Indexed .onion content (limited free tier) | https://haystak.com (clearnet entry, onion mirror available) |
| Recon-ng (darkweb modules) | Modular framework with .onion host modules | recon-ng > marketplace install recon/domains-hosts/hackertarget then onion modules |
Marketplace & Forum Monitoring
| Tool | Purpose | Notes |
|---|
| IntelX (intelligencex.com) | Searches leaks, paste sites, dark-net listings | curl "https://2.intelx.io/phonebook/search?k=<API_KEY>" -d '{"term":"<target>","maxresults":100}' |
| DarkOwl (commercial reference) | Dark-net index with API | Enterprise license; reference only for this skill |
| Ahmia marketplace crawler | Custom Python crawler over Ahmia results | See payloads.md section 4 |
| Manual enumeration | Direct marketplace browse + scrape via Tor Browser | High-risk — see OPSEC rules |
Breach & Leak
| Tool | Purpose | Query Pattern |
|---|
| HaveIBeenPwned | Email/domain breach notification | curl -H "hibp-api-key: <KEY>" "https://haveibeenpwned.com/api/v3/breachedaccount/<EMAIL>" |
| DeHashed | Searchable breach data (email, username, password hash) | curl "https://api.dehashed.com/search?query=email:<target>" -u "<email>:<key>" |
| IntelX | Phonebook / leak / paste site search | See marketplace monitoring row above |
| Leaked-data-site enumeration | Manual review of major leak sites via Tor Browser | varies — sites rotate frequently |
Profiling
| Tool | Purpose | Command Example |
|---|
| Maltego (with dark-web transforms) | Visual link analysis with .onion transforms | GUI hub: Maltego CE + Transforms Marketplace |
| Lampyre | OSINT graphical analysis with dark-web sources | Commercial; reference only |
SpiderFoot (with .onion modules) | Automated OSINT, optional Tor SOCKS routing | spiderfoot -s <target> -t DARK_WEB,DARK_WEB_SEARCH --socks5 127.0.0.1:9050 |
OPSEC
| Tool | Purpose | Setup Notes |
|---|
| Tails | Amnesic live OS | Boot from USB on dedicated hardware |
| Whonix | Two-VM isolation | Whonix-Gateway + Whonix-Workstation in VirtManager |
| VirtManager / KVM | VM isolation for investigator work | virt-manager on a Linux host |
| Dedicated burner hardware | Physical isolation for sensitive investigations | No corporate device, no personal device |
Methodology
Dark Web Investigation Five-Phase Process
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5
Access Setup → Discovery & → Marketplace & → Threat Actor → OPSEC-Hardened
Search Forum Monitoring Profiling Synthesis
│ │ │ │ │
▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼
Tails/Whonix, Ahmia, Torch, IntelX, DarkOwl, Handle → PGP key Merge findings,
bridges, SOCKS, dark.fail, Onion- manual enumeration → XMR wallet → encrypt at rest,
egress verified land, OnionScan of markets & prior handles, produce dossier,
forums clearnet pivots schedule monitoring
Phase 1: Access Setup
Never investigate the dark web from a corporate or personal device with bare Tor. Provision an isolated environment first.
sudo apt install tor
sudo service tor start
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://api.ipify.org
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://ifconfig.me/json | jq '{ip, country, city}'
Add bridges if Tor is blocked on your network (/etc/tor/torrc):
UseBridges 1
Bridge obfs4 <IP>:<PORT> <FINGERPRINT> cert=<CERT> iat-mode=0
ClientTransportPlugin obfs4 exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy
Phase 2: Discovery & Search
Use clearnet-indexed search engines first (faster, lower-risk), then pivot to direct .onion access for results that require it.
curl -s "https://ahmia.fi/search/?q=<target>" \
| grep -oE 'http[s]?://[a-z2-7]{56}\.onion[^" ]*' | sort -u
curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 \
"http://juhanurmihxlp77nkq76byazc4y2sphl4a5hfo3hxnlhkbgz7q6fqd.onion/search/?q=<target>" \
| grep -oE 'http[s]?://[a-z2-7]{56}\.onion[^" ]*' | sort -u
curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://dark.fail
onionscan --verbose --tor-proxy-address 127.0.0.1:9050 \
http://<56-char-onion>.onion
Phase 3: Marketplace & Forum Monitoring
Mix automated commercial APIs (IntelX, DarkOwl) with manual Tor Browser enumeration. Marketplaces rotate addresses frequently — track current addresses via dark.fail and Ahmia, never trust a static list.
curl -s "https://2.intelx.io/phonebook/search?k=<API_KEY>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"term":"<target_email_or_handle>","maxresults":100,"media":0}' \
| jq '.selectors[]?.selectorvalue // empty'
Phase 4: Threat Actor Profiling
From a forum handle, correlate every identifier the actor exposes — PGP keys, Monero wallets, prior handles, signed messages, marketplace vendor profiles.
gpg --keyserver hkps://keys.openpgp.org --search-keys "<handle>@<forum_domain>"
for forum in forum1.onion forum2.onion forum3.onion; do
curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 \
"http://$forum/search?q=<handle>" \
>> handle_corpus.html
done
Phase 5: OPSEC-Hardened Synthesis
Aggregate findings, encrypt the deliverable, and define a monitoring cadence — dark-net evidence goes stale quickly.
gpg --symmetric --cipher-algo AES256 darkweb_dossier.md
shred -uvz darkweb_dossier.md
echo "0 8 * * * curl -s 'https://ahmia.fi/search/?q=<target>' >> /var/log/dw-monitor.log" | crontab -
Quick Selection Guide
| Scenario | Primary Approach | Alternative |
|---|
| First-time dark-net triage | Tails boot + Tor Browser + Ahmia clearnet search | Whonix VM + Ahmia onion service |
| Censored network (Tor blocked) | obfs4 bridges or Snowflake in torrc | Snowflake via Tor Browser config |
| Find onion services mentioning a term | ahmia.fi/search/?q=<term> (clearnet entry) | Torch .onion direct |
| Verify a well-known onion's uptime | curl https://dark.fail | Manual Tor Browser visit |
Enumerate a discovered .onion for leaks | onionscan --tor-proxy-address 127.0.0.1:9050 <URL> | Manual Tor Browser inspection |
| Search breach data for an email | HIBP API + DeHashed + IntelX | h8mail local aggregator |
| Marketplace vendor pivot | IntelX + manual Tor Browser enum (read-only) | DarkOwl commercial API |
| Threat actor PGP correlation | gpg --search-keys <handle>@<domain> + openpgp keyserver | Manual signature scraping |
| Investigator OPSEC verification | Egress check via curl --socks5-hostname + browser fingerprint audit | Tails reboot + DNS leak test |
| Continuous brand monitoring | cron job hitting Ahmia + IntelX daily | Commercial dark-web monitoring service |
| Python pipeline for bulk analysis | Async aiohttp via Tor SOCKS (see payloads.md §12) | SpiderFoot + dark-web modules |
Defense Perspective
| Defense Measure | Description |
|---|
| Brand / executive dark-net monitoring | Run weekly Ahmia + IntelX sweeps on brand names, executive emails, and proprietary product identifiers — catch leaks before they hit the clearnet. |
| Breach subscription + dark-net correlation | Subscribe to HIBP domain notifications; when an alert fires, immediately check IntelX for dark-net listings referencing the same data. |
| Credential hygiene response | When dark-net listings surface employee credentials, force password rotation + MFA enrollment for affected accounts. Do not assume "the password is old." |
| Source code leak monitoring | Index proprietary code identifiers (unusual function names, internal module names) and sweep dark-net paste sites and source markets weekly. |
| Insider threat indicator gathering | For lawfully authorized insider-threat programs, monitor known insider handles and PGP keys for distress signals, resentment posts, or for-cred sale listings. |
| Investigator OPSEC training | Anyone running dark-net collection must understand: Tails/Whonix isolation, persona contamination, behavioral fingerprinting, and physical safety. Tooling alone is not sufficient. |
| Persona separation | Never use a corporate email, corporate device, or personal handle when registering a dark-net monitoring account. Maintain a dedicated persona per investigation. |
| Counter-OSINT for investigators | Periodically audit your own monitoring persona's footprint — has the persona been linked back to the org via reused PGP keys, wallets, or browser fingerprints? |
Practical Steps
Detailed payloads in payloads.md, complete test checklist in test-cases.md.
Exercise 1: Hardened Tor Access Setup
Goal: provision a Tor-routed investigation environment with verified egress and DNS leak protection.
sudo apt update
sudo apt install -y tor curl jq dnsutils
sudo service tor start
sleep 3
echo "Real IP: $(curl -s https://api.ipify.org)"
echo "Tor IP: $(curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://api.ipify.org)"
curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://ifconfig.me/json | \
jq '{ip, country, city}
# Optional: configure obfs4 bridge if Tor direct is blocked
# Add to /etc/tor/torrc:
# UseBridges 1
# Bridge obfs4 <IP>:<PORT> <FINGERPRINT> cert=<CERT> iat-mode=0
# ClientTransportPlugin obfs4 exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy
sudo service tor restart
Exercise 2: Ahmia Clearnet + Onion Search
Goal: discover onion services mentioning a target term, using both clearnet Ahmia (fast) and the onion Ahmia mirror (full anonymity).
TARGET="<brand_or_term>"
curl -s "https://ahmia.fi/search/?q=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse,sys; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))" "$TARGET")" \
| grep -oE 'http[s]?://[a-z2-7]{56}\.onion' | sort -u > onions_clearnet.txt
curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 \
"http://juhanurmihxlp77nkq76byazc4y2sphl4a5hfo3hxnlhkbgz7q6fqd.onion/search/?q=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse,sys; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))" "$TARGET")" \
| grep -oE 'http[s]?://[a-z2-7]{56}\.onion' | sort -u > onions_hidden.txt
sort -u onions_clearnet.txt onions_hidden.txt | uniq -c | sort -rn
Exercise 3: OnionScan a Discovered Service
Goal: fingerprint a discovered .onion — find linked services, open ports, server banners, and exposed artifacts.
go install github.com/s-rah/onionscan@latest
onionscan --verbose \
--tor-proxy-address 127.0.0.1:9050 \
--timeout 120 \
http://<56-char-onion>.onion
Exercise 4: Marketplace Enumeration (Read-Only)
Goal: identify whether a target brand or product appears in a dark-net marketplace — strictly as an observer.
curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://dark.fail | \
grep -iE 'market|forum' | head -20
gpg --symmetric --cipher-algo AES256 market_evidence.tar.gz
Exercise 5: Threat Actor Pivot (Handle → PGP → Wallet)
Goal: from a single forum handle, build the threat actor's identifier graph.
HANDLE="<forum_handle>"
gpg --keyserver hkps://keys.openpgp.org --search-keys "$HANDLE"
gpg --keyserver hkps://keyserver.ubuntu.com --search-keys "$HANDLE"
curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 \
"http://<forum>.onion/profile/$HANDLE" > profile.html
grep -oE '4[0-9AB][1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{93}' profile.html | sort -u
grep -oE '[13][a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{25,34}' profile.html | sort -u
grep -oE 'bc1[a-z0-9]{39,59}' profile.html | sort -u
Exercise 6: Breach Data Correlation
Goal: when a breach is announced, scope impact against the client's email/domain/employee list.
curl -s -H "hibp-api-key: <KEY>" -H "User-Agent: <app-name>" \
"https://haveibeenpwned.com/api/v3/breachedaccount/<EMAIL>?truncateResponse=false" \
| jq '.[] | {Name, BreachDate, DataClasses}'
curl -s -H "hibp-api-key: <KEY>" \
"https://haveibeenpwned.com/api/v3/breacheddomain/<DOMAIN>" | jq '.'
curl -s "https://api.dehashed.com/search?query=email:<target_email>" \
-u "<account_email>:<API_KEY>" | jq '.entries[] | {email, username, password, hashed_password}'
curl -s "https://2.intelx.io/phonebook/search?k=<INTELX_KEY>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"term":"<target_email>","maxresults":100,"media":0}' \
| jq '.selectors[]?.selectorvalue' | sort -u
Exercise 7: Investigator OPSEC Verification
Goal: verify your dark-web investigation environment leaks no real identity.
REAL_IP=$(curl -s https://api.ipify.org)
TOR_IP=$(curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://api.ipify.org)
echo "Real IP: $REAL_IP"
echo "Tor IP: $TOR_IP"
[ "$REAL_IP" = "$TOR_IP" ] && echo "FAIL: Tor not routing" || echo "PASS: Tor egress differs"
cat /etc/resolv.conf | grep -v '^#'
Exercise 8: Python Async Pipeline via Tor
Goal: orchestrate Ahmia + IntelX + manual .onion fetches in a single async pipeline.
"""
Async dark-web intelligence pipeline routed through Tor SOCKS5.
"""
import asyncio
import re
from urllib.parse import quote
import aiohttp
from aiohttp_socks import ProxyConnector
TOR_SOCKS = "socks5://127.0.0.1:9050"
ONION_RE = re.compile(r"https?://[a-z2-7]{56}\.onion", re.IGNORECASE)
async def fetch(session: aiohttp.ClientSession, url: str, *, via_tor: bool = True) -> str:
timeout = aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=120)
try:
async with session.get(url, timeout=timeout) as resp:
return await resp.text()
except Exception as exc:
return f"ERROR: {exc}"
async def ahmia_search(term: str) -> set[str]:
connector = ProxyConnector.from_url(TOR_SOCKS) if True else None
async with aiohttp.ClientSession(connector=connector) as session:
url = f"http://juhanurmihxlp77nkq76byazc4y2sphl4a5hfo3hxnlhkbgz7q6fqd.onion/search/?q={quote(term)}"
html = await fetch(session, url)
return set(ONION_RE.findall(html))
async def main(term: str) -> None:
onions = await ahmia_search(term)
print(f"Discovered {len(onions)} onion services for term: {term}")
for o in sorted(onions):
print(f" {o}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
asyncio.run(main("example target term"))
Exercise 9: Counter-OSINT Audit (Investigator Self-Defense)
Goal: periodically verify your dark-net monitoring persona has not been linked back to the organization.
curl -s "https://ahmia.fi/search/?q=<persona_handle>" | grep -i <persona_handle>
maigret <persona_handle> --tags us
gpg --list-keys <persona_pgp_fingerprint>
Safety Notes
- Lawful use only: Dark-net investigation is heavily regulated in most jurisdictions. Accessing
.onion services is generally legal; purchasing controlled substances, stolen data, or attack tools is not. Many marketplaces operate as honeypots. Confirm engagement scope and lawful basis before any collection.
- Jurisdictional complexity: Servers you contact may be in jurisdictions where the content you're viewing is criminal to even view (CSAM, certain political content). Investigators must know their home jurisdiction's strict-liability rules.
- Investigator OPSEC is non-negotiable: Dark-net actors actively deanonymize investigators. Real-IP leaks, persona contamination, and behavioral fingerprinting have led to investigators being doxxed, swatted, and physically threatened. Use Tails/Whonix, dedicated hardware, and rotate personas.
- Investigator safety: If during an investigation you encounter credible threats of physical harm, or content that triggers mandatory reporting (CSAM), stop, document, and contact the appropriate authorities. Do not attempt to handle in-channel.
- Authorization scope: A pentest engagement authorizes the target organization's systems. It does not authorize purchasing stolen data about the client from a marketplace, even with the client's nominal consent — that can be trafficking in stolen property.
- Data minimization: Dark-net artifacts (screenshots, PGP keys, wallet addresses) are sensitive. Encrypt at rest (
gpg --symmetric --cipher-algo AES256), restrict access, and securely delete (shred -uvz) when the engagement closes.
Hacker Laws
- Information Wants to Be Free — Breach data, leaked credentials, and internal documents on the dark-net are already free; they exist outside the control of their original owners. Darkweb-intel makes them findable. Defense cannot recall them; it can only detect exposure earlier and rotate affected credentials.
- Obscurity Is Not Security — A
.onion address is only obscure, not secure. Indexers (Ahmia, Torch), crawlers (IntelX, DarkOwl), and law-enforcement sweeps map the dark-net continuously. Treat any dark-net service as potentially indexed and act accordingly.
- Trust but Verify — Marketplace listings can be fraud; breach data can be repackaged or fabricated; threat actor claims of responsibility can be false-flag. Cross-verify every dark-net finding against at least one independent source (second marketplace, second breach corpus, second forum) before treating it as fact.
- Weakest Link Is Human — Investigators are the weakest link. Real-IP leaks, persona reuse, and careless browser fingerprinting have deanonymized more investigators than any technical vulnerability. Tails and Whonix are necessary but not sufficient — training and discipline are the actual control.
- Divergent Thinking First — A single dark-net source has blind spots. Run Ahmia (clearnet-indexed) AND Torch (direct
.onion); run IntelX AND manual Tor Browser enumeration; cross-reference PGP keys across keyservers AND forum signatures. Overlapping collection catches what any single source misses.
Learning Resources
- This skill's supplementary files:
payloads.md, test-cases.md
- Deep-dive guide:
guides/dark-web-investigation-playbook.md — end-to-end investigation workflow with persona management, OPSEC hardening, and integration with adjacent OSINT skills
- Related skills:
skills/osint/SKILL.md — broader clearnet OSINT (email, domain, breach, Shodan)skills/username-profiling/SKILL.md — clearnet username enumeration via Maigret; pivot input for dark-net handle correlationskills/social-intelligence/SKILL.md — mainstream discourse mining; complementary signal for threat actor sentimentskills/deep-research/SKILL.md — synthesis and report writing for the final dossierskills/social-engineering/SKILL.md — turning threat actor dossiers into defensive priorities (NOT into pretext for offense)
- External resources:
- Core system files:
SOUL.md, TOOLS.md, IDENTITY.md
