darkweb-intel

name	darkweb-intel
description	Dark web intelligence gathering — Tor/onion service reconnaissance, marketplace monitoring, breach data markets, threat actor profiling, with strict OPSEC for investigators.
origin	openclaw
version	0.1.29
compatibility	["openclaw","claude-code","cursor","windsurf"]
allowed-tools	["Bash","Read","Write","Edit","WebSearch","WebFetch"]
metadata	{"domain":"osint","tool_count":10,"guide_count":2,"mitre":"TA0043-Reconnaissance","keywords":["tor","onion-crawl","onionscan","ahmia","hunchly","whonix","tails","breach-forum","opsec"]}

Skill: Dark Web Intelligence

Supplementary Files:

• payloads.md — Tor/Whonix/Tails setup, ahmia.fi/Torch/dark.fail/Onionland/Haystak search patterns, OnionScan enumeration, IntelX/DarkOwl/HIBP/DeHashed API usage, threat actor pivot (handles, PGP keys, XMR wallets), Recon-ng darkweb modules, async Python scraping pipeline, OPSEC detection, counter-OSINT cleanup, and a quick-reference cheat sheet
• test-cases.md — 12 structured test cases (Tor setup, .onion resolution, Ahmia query, IntelX query, marketplace enumeration, threat actor pivot, OPSEC verification, breach correlation, counter-OSINT audit) with severity levels and summary tables
• guides/dark-web-investigation-playbook.md — End-to-end investigation playbook (pre-flight, 5-phase workflow, persona management, investigator safety, marketplace reference table, integration with adjacent skills)

Summary

Darkweb Intel skill domain covering osint operations.

Tools: Tor, Tor Browser, Whonix, Tails, Ahmia, Torch, OnionScan, IntelX, HIBP, SpiderFoot

Domain: osint

MITRE ATT&CK: TA0043-Reconnaissance

Description

Dark web intelligence gathering across Tor .onion services, I2P eepsites, dark-net marketplaces, breach-data forums, and paste sites — with the OPSEC discipline that investigator-side work demands. The skill covers: hardened access setup (Tails/Whonix, obfs4 bridges, Snowflake), discovery (Ahmia, Torch, dark.fail, Onionland, Haystak), service enumeration (OnionScan, ahmia-cli), marketplace & forum monitoring, threat actor profiling (handle, PGP key, Monero wallet correlation), breach data correlation (HIBP, DeHashed, IntelX), and synthesis pipelines that funnel findings back into a defensible dossier.

This is the depth-first complement to clearnet OSINT. Where osint casts a wide passive net across clear-web domains, emails, and subdomains, darkweb-intel drills into .onion/.i2p services and the threat actor economy that lives there.

Difference from osint: OSINT orchestrates clearnet collection (domain, email, IP, breach data, Shodan). Darkweb-intel focuses specifically on .onion/.i2p services, dark-net marketplaces, and threat actor communities — it requires Tor/I2P routing, dedicated OPSEC (Tails/Whonix), and a different threat model (investigators are themselves targets).

Difference from username-profiling: Username profiling runs Maigret against 3,000+ clearnet sites. Darkweb-intel pivots a known handle into the darknet — searching paste sites, breach forums, marketplace vendor profiles, and threat actor communities that Maigret does not cover.

Difference from social-intelligence: Social intelligence mines mainstream discourse (Reddit, HN, X). Darkweb-intel mines discourse that has been deliberately pushed off the clearnet — threat actor forums, vendor reviews, leak announcements, and credentialed paste dumps.

Use Cases

• Brand / executive monitoring: Detect when a brand name, executive email, or proprietary codebase appears in a dark-net marketplace listing, leak forum, or ransomware gang blog — before the public disclosure.
• Breach impact triage: When a new breach drops on a leak site, correlate the dump against the client's email/domain/employee list via HIBP, DeHashed, and IntelX to scope impact.
• Threat actor profiling: From a single forum handle, recover associated PGP keys, Monero wallets, prior handles, marketplace vendor profiles, and clearnet identities (when actors slip) — building a dossier for attribution.
• Ransomware leak-site monitoring: Track which victim organizations appear on each major ransomware gang's leak site, with timestamps and download links, to inform client briefings.
• Investigative journalism / due diligence: Verify whether a company, individual, or product is mentioned in dark-net markets, counterfeiting listings, or fraud communities.
• Insider threat indicator gathering: Pivot from a suspected insider's clearnet identity into their dark-net persona — looking for credentials-for-sale listings, resentment posts, or criminal market participation.
• Counter-OSINT (defense): Audit your own organization's dark-net footprint — leaked credentials, insider PII, proprietary source code listings — and submit takedowns.
• Lawful marketplace takedown support: For a law-enforcement or platform-trust engagement, enumerate vendor accounts, listings, and transaction patterns for evidentiary use.

Core Tools

Access & Proxies

Tool	Purpose	Command / Setup Example
Tor	Routing daemon (SOCKS5 on 127.0.0.1:9050)	sudo apt install tor && sudo service tor start
Tor Browser	Hardened Firefox bundle for manual .onion browsing	Download from torproject.org; verify PGP signature
obfs4 bridges	Tor pluggable transport for censored networks	Bridge obfs4 IP:PORT FINGERPRINT cert=... iat-mode=0 in torrc
Snowflake	WebRTC-based Tor pluggable transport	UseBridges 1 + ClientTransportPlugin snowflake exec /usr/bin/snowflake-client in torrc
Whonix	Two-VM Tor gateway/workstation isolation	Whonix-Gateway routes all Whonix-Workstation traffic through Tor
Tails	Amnesic live OS — nothing is written to disk	Boot from USB; all traffic routes through Tor; memory wiped on shutdown

Search & Discovery

Tool	Purpose	Query / URL Pattern
Ahmia (ahmia.fi)	Clearnet-indexed .onion search engine	curl "https://ahmia.fi/search/?q=<term>"
Ahmia hidden-service	.onion-accessible Ahmia mirror	curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 "http://juhanurmihxlp77nkq76byazc4y2sphl4a5hfo3hxnlhkbgz7q6fqd.onion/search/?q=<term>"
Torch	Long-running .onion search engine	http://torchde7jygjnqjjp6lcyrch6gzflyol3c5zfsa6uejwnbq7qiiyfqd.onion/search?query=<term>
dark.fail	Monitors uptime of well-known .onion services (no listings)	https://dark.fail
Onionland	.onion search engine with category pages	http://onionland<random>.onion (verify current address via Tor Browser)
Haystak	Indexed .onion content (limited free tier)	https://haystak.com (clearnet entry, onion mirror available)
Recon-ng (darkweb modules)	Modular framework with .onion host modules	recon-ng > marketplace install recon/domains-hosts/hackertarget then onion modules

Marketplace & Forum Monitoring

Tool	Purpose	Notes
IntelX (intelligencex.com)	Searches leaks, paste sites, dark-net listings	curl "https://2.intelx.io/phonebook/search?k=<API_KEY>" -d '{"term":"<target>","maxresults":100}'
DarkOwl (commercial reference)	Dark-net index with API	Enterprise license; reference only for this skill
Ahmia marketplace crawler	Custom Python crawler over Ahmia results	See payloads.md section 4
Manual enumeration	Direct marketplace browse + scrape via Tor Browser	High-risk — see OPSEC rules

Breach & Leak

Tool	Purpose	Query Pattern
HaveIBeenPwned	Email/domain breach notification	curl -H "hibp-api-key: <KEY>" "https://haveibeenpwned.com/api/v3/breachedaccount/<EMAIL>"
DeHashed	Searchable breach data (email, username, password hash)	curl "https://api.dehashed.com/search?query=email:<target>" -u "<email>:<key>"
IntelX	Phonebook / leak / paste site search	See marketplace monitoring row above
Leaked-data-site enumeration	Manual review of major leak sites via Tor Browser	varies — sites rotate frequently

Profiling

Tool	Purpose	Command Example
Maltego (with dark-web transforms)	Visual link analysis with .onion transforms	GUI hub: Maltego CE + Transforms Marketplace
Lampyre	OSINT graphical analysis with dark-web sources	Commercial; reference only
SpiderFoot (with .onion modules)	Automated OSINT, optional Tor SOCKS routing	spiderfoot -s <target> -t DARK_WEB,DARK_WEB_SEARCH --socks5 127.0.0.1:9050

OPSEC

Tool	Purpose	Setup Notes
Tails	Amnesic live OS	Boot from USB on dedicated hardware
Whonix	Two-VM isolation	Whonix-Gateway + Whonix-Workstation in VirtManager
VirtManager / KVM	VM isolation for investigator work	virt-manager on a Linux host
Dedicated burner hardware	Physical isolation for sensitive investigations	No corporate device, no personal device

Methodology

Dark Web Investigation Five-Phase Process

Phase 1              Phase 2              Phase 3              Phase 4              Phase 5
Access Setup     →   Discovery &       →  Marketplace &     →  Threat Actor       →  OPSEC-Hardened
                       Search               Forum Monitoring    Profiling              Synthesis
   │                    │                    │                    │                    │
   ▼                    ▼                    ▼                    ▼                    ▼
Tails/Whonix,        Ahmia, Torch,        IntelX, DarkOwl,    Handle → PGP key     Merge findings,
bridges, SOCKS,      dark.fail, Onion-    manual enumeration  → XMR wallet →      encrypt at rest,
egress verified      land, OnionScan      of markets &        prior handles,      produce dossier,
                                          forums              clearnet pivots     schedule monitoring

Phase 1: Access Setup

Never investigate the dark web from a corporate or personal device with bare Tor. Provision an isolated environment first.

# Option A: Tails (amnesic, recommended for high-risk investigations)
# Boot from USB; everything is in RAM; shutdown wipes everything

# Option B: Whonix in VirtManager (more flexible, persists between sessions)
# Download Whonix-Gateway and Whonix-Workstation KVM images
# Import both into VirtManager; the Gateway forces all Workstation traffic through Tor

# Option C: Tor on a dedicated VM (lowest isolation, only for low-risk triage)
sudo apt install tor
sudo service tor start
# Verify egress before any work
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://api.ipify.org
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://ifconfig.me/json | jq '{ip, country, city}'

Add bridges if Tor is blocked on your network (/etc/tor/torrc):

UseBridges 1
Bridge obfs4 <IP>:<PORT> <FINGERPRINT> cert=<CERT> iat-mode=0
ClientTransportPlugin obfs4 exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy

Phase 2: Discovery & Search

Use clearnet-indexed search engines first (faster, lower-risk), then pivot to direct .onion access for results that require it.

# Ahmia via clearnet (indexed onion URLs)
curl -s "https://ahmia.fi/search/?q=<target>" \
  | grep -oE 'http[s]?://[a-z2-7]{56}\.onion[^" ]*' | sort -u

# Ahmia via its own onion service (full anonymity)
curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 \
  "http://juhanurmihxlp77nkq76byazc4y2sphl4a5hfo3hxnlhkbgz7q6fqd.onion/search/?q=<target>" \
  | grep -oE 'http[s]?://[a-z2-7]{56}\.onion[^" ]*' | sort -u

# dark.fail (uptime status of well-known services, no listings)
curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://dark.fail

# OnionScan a discovered .onion for service fingerprinting, linked services, artifacts
onionscan --verbose --tor-proxy-address 127.0.0.1:9050 \
  http://<56-char-onion>.onion

Phase 3: Marketplace & Forum Monitoring

Mix automated commercial APIs (IntelX, DarkOwl) with manual Tor Browser enumeration. Marketplaces rotate addresses frequently — track current addresses via dark.fail and Ahmia, never trust a static list.

# IntelX phonebook search (credential/breach context for an identifier)
curl -s "https://2.intelx.io/phonebook/search?k=<API_KEY>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"term":"<target_email_or_handle>","maxresults":100,"media":0}' \
  | jq '.selectors[]?.selectorvalue // empty'

# Manual enumeration via Tor Browser:
# 1. Navigate to current marketplace .onion (verified via dark.fail)
# 2. Search vendor name, brand string, or product identifier
# 3. Capture screenshots, listing URLs, vendor profile URLs into an encrypted evidence vault
# 4. NEVER purchase anything — observer role only

Phase 4: Threat Actor Profiling

From a forum handle, correlate every identifier the actor exposes — PGP keys, Monero wallets, prior handles, signed messages, marketplace vendor profiles.

# PGP key lookup (many actors publish a fingerprint in forum signatures)
gpg --keyserver hkps://keys.openpgp.org --search-keys "<handle>@<forum_domain>"

# Cross-reference the PGP fingerprint across other forums:
#   - Many actors reuse the same key across communities
#   - sks-keyservers mirror at keys.openpgp.org, keyserver.ubuntu.com

# Monero (XMR) wallet tracing is intentionally limited — but wallet addresses
# appear in marketplace vendor profiles, donation posts, and escrow pages.
# Correlate the same address across sites; note that XMR is privacy-preserving
# and on-chain tracing is far weaker than Bitcoin.

# Handle pivot: search the handle across every forum and paste site
for forum in forum1.onion forum2.onion forum3.onion; do
  curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 \
    "http://$forum/search?q=<handle>" \
    >> handle_corpus.html
done

Phase 5: OPSEC-Hardened Synthesis

Aggregate findings, encrypt the deliverable, and define a monitoring cadence — dark-net evidence goes stale quickly.

# Encrypt the dossier before storage
gpg --symmetric --cipher-algo AES256 darkweb_dossier.md
shred -uvz darkweb_dossier.md   # remove plaintext

# Set up recurring Ahmia + IntelX monitoring for the target term
echo "0 8 * * * curl -s 'https://ahmia.fi/search/?q=<target>' >> /var/log/dw-monitor.log" | crontab -

# Hand to a non-technical client? Use Maltego or a PDF export — never raw .onion URLs
# without context (clients will click them from a clearnet browser and burn themselves).

Quick Selection Guide

Scenario	Primary Approach	Alternative
First-time dark-net triage	Tails boot + Tor Browser + Ahmia clearnet search	Whonix VM + Ahmia onion service
Censored network (Tor blocked)	obfs4 bridges or Snowflake in torrc	Snowflake via Tor Browser config
Find onion services mentioning a term	ahmia.fi/search/?q=<term> (clearnet entry)	Torch .onion direct
Verify a well-known onion's uptime	curl https://dark.fail	Manual Tor Browser visit
Enumerate a discovered .onion for leaks	onionscan --tor-proxy-address 127.0.0.1:9050 <URL>	Manual Tor Browser inspection
Search breach data for an email	HIBP API + DeHashed + IntelX	h8mail local aggregator
Marketplace vendor pivot	IntelX + manual Tor Browser enum (read-only)	DarkOwl commercial API
Threat actor PGP correlation	gpg --search-keys <handle>@<domain> + openpgp keyserver	Manual signature scraping
Investigator OPSEC verification	Egress check via curl --socks5-hostname + browser fingerprint audit	Tails reboot + DNS leak test
Continuous brand monitoring	cron job hitting Ahmia + IntelX daily	Commercial dark-web monitoring service
Python pipeline for bulk analysis	Async aiohttp via Tor SOCKS (see payloads.md §12)	SpiderFoot + dark-web modules

Defense Perspective

Defense Measure	Description
Brand / executive dark-net monitoring	Run weekly Ahmia + IntelX sweeps on brand names, executive emails, and proprietary product identifiers — catch leaks before they hit the clearnet.
Breach subscription + dark-net correlation	Subscribe to HIBP domain notifications; when an alert fires, immediately check IntelX for dark-net listings referencing the same data.
Credential hygiene response	When dark-net listings surface employee credentials, force password rotation + MFA enrollment for affected accounts. Do not assume "the password is old."
Source code leak monitoring	Index proprietary code identifiers (unusual function names, internal module names) and sweep dark-net paste sites and source markets weekly.
Insider threat indicator gathering	For lawfully authorized insider-threat programs, monitor known insider handles and PGP keys for distress signals, resentment posts, or for-cred sale listings.
Investigator OPSEC training	Anyone running dark-net collection must understand: Tails/Whonix isolation, persona contamination, behavioral fingerprinting, and physical safety. Tooling alone is not sufficient.
Persona separation	Never use a corporate email, corporate device, or personal handle when registering a dark-net monitoring account. Maintain a dedicated persona per investigation.
Counter-OSINT for investigators	Periodically audit your own monitoring persona's footprint — has the persona been linked back to the org via reused PGP keys, wallets, or browser fingerprints?

Practical Steps

Detailed payloads in payloads.md, complete test checklist in test-cases.md.

Exercise 1: Hardened Tor Access Setup

Goal: provision a Tor-routed investigation environment with verified egress and DNS leak protection.

# Install Tor + verification tooling
sudo apt update
sudo apt install -y tor curl jq dnsutils

# Start Tor and verify
sudo service tor start
sleep 3

# Verify egress IP — must NOT be your real IP
echo "Real IP:    $(curl -s https://api.ipify.org)"
echo "Tor IP:     $(curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://api.ipify.org)"

# Verify DNS doesn't leak (must show Tor exit location)
curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://ifconfig.me/json | \
  jq '{ip, country, city}

# Optional: configure obfs4 bridge if Tor direct is blocked
# Add to /etc/tor/torrc:
#   UseBridges 1
#   Bridge obfs4 <IP>:<PORT> <FINGERPRINT> cert=<CERT> iat-mode=0
#   ClientTransportPlugin obfs4 exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy
sudo service tor restart

Exercise 2: Ahmia Clearnet + Onion Search

Goal: discover onion services mentioning a target term, using both clearnet Ahmia (fast) and the onion Ahmia mirror (full anonymity).

TARGET="<brand_or_term>"

# Clearnet Ahmia (faster, but exposes your IP to ahmia.fi)
curl -s "https://ahmia.fi/search/?q=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse,sys; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))" "$TARGET")" \
  | grep -oE 'http[s]?://[a-z2-7]{56}\.onion' | sort -u > onions_clearnet.txt

# Onion Ahmia (full anonymity, slower)
curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 \
  "http://juhanurmihxlp77nkq76byazc4y2sphl4a5hfo3hxnlhkbgz7q6fqd.onion/search/?q=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse,sys; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))" "$TARGET")" \
  | grep -oE 'http[s]?://[a-z2-7]{56}\.onion' | sort -u > onions_hidden.txt

# Diff — onion-Ahmia often surfaces results the clearnet indexer skips
sort -u onions_clearnet.txt onions_hidden.txt | uniq -c | sort -rn

Exercise 3: OnionScan a Discovered Service

Goal: fingerprint a discovered .onion — find linked services, open ports, server banners, and exposed artifacts.

# Install OnionScan
go install github.com/s-rah/onionscan@latest
# Or: sudo apt install onionscan  (older but functional)

# Scan via Tor
onionscan --verbose \
  --tor-proxy-address 127.0.0.1:9050 \
  --timeout 120 \
  http://<56-char-onion>.onion

# OnionScan reports: Apache mod_status, exposed directories, PGP keys,
# linked .onion services (which become Phase 4 pivots), server software,
# and known dangerous configurations

Exercise 4: Marketplace Enumeration (Read-Only)

Goal: identify whether a target brand or product appears in a dark-net marketplace — strictly as an observer.

# Step 1: Verify the marketplace's current .onion via dark.fail (NEVER trust a static list)
curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://dark.fail | \
  grep -iE 'market|forum' | head -20

# Step 2: In Tor Browser (manual), navigate to the verified .onion
# Step 3: Search for the target brand/product term
# Step 4: For each match, capture:
#   - Listing URL (.onion + path)
#   - Vendor profile URL
#   - Vendor PGP key (often published on profile)
#   - Screenshot (Tor Browser's built-in screenshot tool)
# Step 5: Store artifacts in an encrypted vault
gpg --symmetric --cipher-algo AES256 market_evidence.tar.gz

# CRITICAL OPSEC RULES:
# - Never register an account unless authorized
# - Never purchase anything
# - Never message a vendor
# - Limit session length; rotate personas between marketplaces

Exercise 5: Threat Actor Pivot (Handle → PGP → Wallet)

Goal: from a single forum handle, build the threat actor's identifier graph.

HANDLE="<forum_handle>"

# Step 1: PGP key lookup (many actors publish a key with a forum-domain uid)
gpg --keyserver hkps://keys.openpgp.org --search-keys "$HANDLE"
gpg --keyserver hkps://keyserver.ubuntu.com --search-keys "$HANDLE"

# Step 2: Scrape the actor's forum profile (via Tor) for:
#   - Monero wallet address (donation / vendor escrow page)
#   - Prior handles ("formerly known as ...")
#   - Other communities ("also on ...")
curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 \
  "http://<forum>.onion/profile/$HANDLE" > profile.html

# Step 3: Extract wallet addresses
grep -oE '4[0-9AB][1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{93}' profile.html | sort -u  # Monero
grep -oE '[13][a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{25,34}' profile.html | sort -u   # Bitcoin (legacy)
grep -oE 'bc1[a-z0-9]{39,59}' profile.html | sort -u                 # Bitcoin (bech32)

# Step 4: Pivot the PGP fingerprint and wallet address to other forums
# Re-run this exercise with each new identifier as the seed

Exercise 6: Breach Data Correlation

Goal: when a breach is announced, scope impact against the client's email/domain/employee list.

# HIBP single-account check (needs API key)
curl -s -H "hibp-api-key: <KEY>" -H "User-Agent: <app-name>" \
  "https://haveibeenpwned.com/api/v3/breachedaccount/<EMAIL>?truncateResponse=false" \
  | jq '.[] | {Name, BreachDate, DataClasses}'

# HIBP domain-wide (enterprise subscription)
curl -s -H "hibp-api-key: <KEY>" \
  "https://haveibeenpwned.com/api/v3/breacheddomain/<DOMAIN>" | jq '.'

# DeHashed search (returns full record including hashes)
curl -s "https://api.dehashed.com/search?query=email:<target_email>" \
  -u "<account_email>:<API_KEY>" | jq '.entries[] | {email, username, password, hashed_password}'

# IntelX phonebook search (find related identifiers)
curl -s "https://2.intelx.io/phonebook/search?k=<INTELX_KEY>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"term":"<target_email>","maxresults":100,"media":0}' \
  | jq '.selectors[]?.selectorvalue' | sort -u

Exercise 7: Investigator OPSEC Verification

Goal: verify your dark-web investigation environment leaks no real identity.

# 1. Egress IP — must NOT be your real IP
REAL_IP=$(curl -s https://api.ipify.org)
TOR_IP=$(curl -s --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://api.ipify.org)
echo "Real IP: $REAL_IP"
echo "Tor IP:  $TOR_IP"
[ "$REAL_IP" = "$TOR_IP" ] && echo "FAIL: Tor not routing" || echo "PASS: Tor egress differs"

# 2. DNS leak — DNS queries must NOT go to your ISP resolver
# Check /etc/resolv.conf in Tails/Whonix — should be 127.0.0.1 (local Tor DNS)
cat /etc/resolv.conf | grep -v '^#'

# 3. WebRTC leak (in Tor Browser) — visit https://browserleaks.com/webrtc via Tor Browser
#    Tor Browser disables WebRTC by default; verify it stays disabled

# 4. Browser fingerprint — Tor Browser is designed to make all users look identical
#    Visit https://check.torproject.org via Tor Browser — should show green "Congratulations"
#    Visit https://www.amiunique.org — should NOT show a unique fingerprint

# 5. Persona contamination audit
#    Have you ever logged into this dark-net monitoring persona from a clearnet
#    identity? From your real IP? If yes, the persona is compromised — burn it.

Exercise 8: Python Async Pipeline via Tor

Goal: orchestrate Ahmia + IntelX + manual .onion fetches in a single async pipeline.

"""
Async dark-web intelligence pipeline routed through Tor SOCKS5.
"""
import asyncio
import re
from urllib.parse import quote

import aiohttp
from aiohttp_socks import ProxyConnector

TOR_SOCKS = "socks5://127.0.0.1:9050"
ONION_RE = re.compile(r"https?://[a-z2-7]{56}\.onion", re.IGNORECASE)


async def fetch(session: aiohttp.ClientSession, url: str, *, via_tor: bool = True) -> str:
    timeout = aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=120)
    try:
        async with session.get(url, timeout=timeout) as resp:
            return await resp.text()
    except Exception as exc:
        return f"ERROR: {exc}"


async def ahmia_search(term: str) -> set[str]:
    connector = ProxyConnector.from_url(TOR_SOCKS) if True else None
    async with aiohttp.ClientSession(connector=connector) as session:
        url = f"http://juhanurmihxlp77nkq76byazc4y2sphl4a5hfo3hxnlhkbgz7q6fqd.onion/search/?q={quote(term)}"
        html = await fetch(session, url)
        return set(ONION_RE.findall(html))


async def main(term: str) -> None:
    onions = await ahmia_search(term)
    print(f"Discovered {len(onions)} onion services for term: {term}")
    for o in sorted(onions):
        print(f"  {o}")


if __name__ == "__main__":
    asyncio.run(main("example target term"))

Exercise 9: Counter-OSINT Audit (Investigator Self-Defense)

Goal: periodically verify your dark-net monitoring persona has not been linked back to the organization.

# 1. Search the persona's handle across clearnet + dark-net for doxing
curl -s "https://ahmia.fi/search/?q=<persona_handle>" | grep -i <persona_handle>
maigret <persona_handle> --tags us   # is the handle used on clearnet?

# 2. Verify PGP key attached to persona has no clearnet uid
gpg --list-keys <persona_pgp_fingerprint>
# Any uid matching your real name/email = persona burned

# 3. Verify Monero wallet used by persona appears nowhere else
# Search the wallet address on the major block explorers (xmrchain.net etc.) —
# only transactions YOU initiated should appear

# 4. Audit Tor Browser profile for accidental bookmark/history leakage
# In Tails: nothing persists (amnesic). In Whonix: snapshots must be discarded.

# 5. If persona is burned: rotate name, PGP key, wallet, and never reuse on the
# same forum. The forum's admins now have your old persona flagged.

Safety Notes

• Lawful use only: Dark-net investigation is heavily regulated in most jurisdictions. Accessing .onion services is generally legal; purchasing controlled substances, stolen data, or attack tools is not. Many marketplaces operate as honeypots. Confirm engagement scope and lawful basis before any collection.
• Jurisdictional complexity: Servers you contact may be in jurisdictions where the content you're viewing is criminal to even view (CSAM, certain political content). Investigators must know their home jurisdiction's strict-liability rules.
• Investigator OPSEC is non-negotiable: Dark-net actors actively deanonymize investigators. Real-IP leaks, persona contamination, and behavioral fingerprinting have led to investigators being doxxed, swatted, and physically threatened. Use Tails/Whonix, dedicated hardware, and rotate personas.
• Investigator safety: If during an investigation you encounter credible threats of physical harm, or content that triggers mandatory reporting (CSAM), stop, document, and contact the appropriate authorities. Do not attempt to handle in-channel.
• Authorization scope: A pentest engagement authorizes the target organization's systems. It does not authorize purchasing stolen data about the client from a marketplace, even with the client's nominal consent — that can be trafficking in stolen property.
• Data minimization: Dark-net artifacts (screenshots, PGP keys, wallet addresses) are sensitive. Encrypt at rest (gpg --symmetric --cipher-algo AES256), restrict access, and securely delete (shred -uvz) when the engagement closes.

Hacker Laws

• Information Wants to Be Free — Breach data, leaked credentials, and internal documents on the dark-net are already free; they exist outside the control of their original owners. Darkweb-intel makes them findable. Defense cannot recall them; it can only detect exposure earlier and rotate affected credentials.
• Obscurity Is Not Security — A .onion address is only obscure, not secure. Indexers (Ahmia, Torch), crawlers (IntelX, DarkOwl), and law-enforcement sweeps map the dark-net continuously. Treat any dark-net service as potentially indexed and act accordingly.
• Trust but Verify — Marketplace listings can be fraud; breach data can be repackaged or fabricated; threat actor claims of responsibility can be false-flag. Cross-verify every dark-net finding against at least one independent source (second marketplace, second breach corpus, second forum) before treating it as fact.
• Weakest Link Is Human — Investigators are the weakest link. Real-IP leaks, persona reuse, and careless browser fingerprinting have deanonymized more investigators than any technical vulnerability. Tails and Whonix are necessary but not sufficient — training and discipline are the actual control.
• Divergent Thinking First — A single dark-net source has blind spots. Run Ahmia (clearnet-indexed) AND Torch (direct .onion); run IntelX AND manual Tor Browser enumeration; cross-reference PGP keys across keyservers AND forum signatures. Overlapping collection catches what any single source misses.

Learning Resources

• This skill's supplementary files: payloads.md, test-cases.md
• Deep-dive guide: guides/dark-web-investigation-playbook.md — end-to-end investigation workflow with persona management, OPSEC hardening, and integration with adjacent OSINT skills
• Related skills:
  • skills/osint/SKILL.md — broader clearnet OSINT (email, domain, breach, Shodan)
  • skills/username-profiling/SKILL.md — clearnet username enumeration via Maigret; pivot input for dark-net handle correlation
  • skills/social-intelligence/SKILL.md — mainstream discourse mining; complementary signal for threat actor sentiment
  • skills/deep-research/SKILL.md — synthesis and report writing for the final dossier
  • skills/social-engineering/SKILL.md — turning threat actor dossiers into defensive priorities (NOT into pretext for offense)
• External resources:
  • Tor Project: torproject.org
  • Ahmia: ahmia.fi
  • dark.fail: dark.fail
  • OnionScan: github.com/s-rah/onionscan
  • IntelX: intelx.io
  • HaveIBeenPwned: haveibeenpwned.com
  • DeHashed: dehashed.com
  • Whonix: whonix.org
  • Tails: tails.net
  • EFF OPSEC guides: eff.org/issues/anonymity
  • Bellingcat Online Investigation Toolkit: bellingcat.gitbook.io/toolkit
• Core system files: SOUL.md, TOOLS.md, IDENTITY.md