analytic-philosophy

name

analytic-philosophy

description

Master Analytic philosophy methods, debates, and key figures. Use for: logical analysis, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology in the analytic tradition. Triggers: 'analytic', 'Frege', 'Russell', 'Wittgenstein', 'logical positivism', 'Vienna Circle', 'possible worlds', 'modal logic', 'qualia', 'functionalism', 'physicalism', 'Kripke', 'Putnam', 'Davidson', 'Quine', 'ordinary language', 'thought experiment', 'conceptual analysis', 'naturalism', 'supervenience'.

Analytic Philosophy Skill

Master the methods, debates, and key figures of the analytic tradition—the dominant approach in contemporary Anglophone philosophy characterized by argumentative rigor, logical analysis, and close attention to language.

Overview

Historical Development

FOUNDATIONAL PERIOD (1879-1930)
├── Frege: Logic, sense/reference
├── Russell: Logical atomism, definite descriptions
├── Early Wittgenstein: Tractatus, logical form
└── Moore: Common sense, analysis

LOGICAL POSITIVISM (1920-1950)
├── Vienna Circle: Schlick, Carnap, Neurath
├── Verification principle
├── Elimination of metaphysics
└── Unity of science

ORDINARY LANGUAGE (1940-1970)
├── Later Wittgenstein: Language games, family resemblance
├── Austin: Speech acts, How to Do Things with Words
├── Ryle: Category mistakes, The Concept of Mind
└── Strawson: Descriptive metaphysics

CONTEMPORARY PERIOD (1960-present)
├── Philosophy of Language: Kripke, Putnam, Davidson
├── Philosophy of Mind: Fodor, Dennett, Chalmers
├── Metaphysics Revival: Lewis, Armstrong, van Inwagen
├── Epistemology: Gettier, Goldman, Williamson
└── Ethics: Rawls, Parfit, Scanlon

---

Core Methods

Conceptual Analysis

Goal: Clarify concepts by providing necessary and sufficient conditions

Form:

X is F if and only if:
1. Condition C₁
2. Condition C₂
3. Condition C₃

Where these conditions are:
- Individually necessary (each required)
- Jointly sufficient (all together enough)

Example (traditional analysis of knowledge):

S knows that P if and only if:
1. S believes that P
2. P is true
3. S is justified in believing P

Method: Test against counterexamples (Gettier cases refuted the above)

Logical Analysis

Goal: Reveal the logical form underlying natural language

Russell's Theory of Descriptions:

Surface form: "The present King of France is bald"
Logical form: ∃x(Kx ∧ ∀y(Ky → y=x) ∧ Bx)
              "There exists exactly one King of France and he is bald"

Significance: Explains how meaningful sentences can be false
             (The existential claim is false)

Applications:

• Resolving paradoxes
• Clarifying ambiguity
• Making commitments explicit
• Analyzing modal and temporal claims

Thought Experiments

Purpose: Test philosophical claims by imagining scenarios

Structure:

1. Describe a hypothetical scenario
2. Elicit intuitive judgments
3. Draw conclusions about concepts/principles

Famous Examples:

• Trolley problems (ethics)
• Twin Earth (philosophy of language)
• Mary's Room (consciousness)
• Chinese Room (AI, understanding)
• Zombie argument (physicalism)

Reflective Equilibrium

Method: Balance principles and intuitions iteratively

REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM
══════════════════════

1. Start with intuitions about particular cases
   ↓
2. Formulate general principles that explain intuitions
   ↓
3. Test principles against new cases
   ↓
4. If conflict: revise principles OR revise intuitions
   ↓
5. Repeat until stable equilibrium

---

Philosophy of Language

Frege: Sense and Reference

The Problem: "Hesperus = Phosphorus" is informative; "Hesperus = Hesperus" is trivial. Why, if both refer to Venus?

Solution:

Concept	German	Definition	Example
Reference (Bedeutung)	Bedeutung	The object denoted	Venus
Sense (Sinn)	Sinn	Mode of presentation	"The evening star" vs. "The morning star"

Compositionality Principle: The meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its parts and how they are combined.

Russell: Definite Descriptions

The Puzzle: What does "The present King of France" refer to?

Russell's Analysis: Definite descriptions are not referring expressions but quantified expressions.

"The F is G" =def
∃x(Fx ∧ ∀y(Fy → y=x) ∧ Gx)

"There is exactly one F, and it is G"

Wittgenstein: Meaning as Use

Early Wittgenstein (Tractatus):

• Language pictures reality
• Logical form shared by language and world
• "What can be said can be said clearly"
• The mystical: shows itself, cannot be said

Later Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations):

• Meaning is use in a language game
• Family resemblance (no common essence)
• Private language argument: no purely private meanings
• Rule-following considerations

Kripke: Names and Necessity

Direct Reference Theory:

• Names refer directly, not via descriptions
• Names are rigid designators (refer to same thing in all possible worlds)
• Descriptions are non-rigid

Kripke's Arguments:

MODAL ARGUMENT
══════════════
"Aristotle" could have failed to be:
- The teacher of Alexander
- The author of the Nicomachean Ethics
- (any description)

But "Aristotle" could not have failed to be Aristotle.
Therefore, names ≠ descriptions.

EPISTEMIC ARGUMENT
══════════════════
We can discover that Hesperus = Phosphorus.
This is an a posteriori necessary truth.
Identity statements with rigid designators are necessary if true.

Putnam: Natural Kinds and Twin Earth

Twin Earth Thought Experiment:

• Imagine a planet exactly like Earth except:
• "Water" refers to XYZ (not H₂O)
• XYZ is phenomenally identical to water
• Question: Does "water" mean the same on both planets?

Conclusion: "Meanings ain't in the head"

• Natural kind terms determined by causal-historical connections
• External factors partly constitute meaning
• Semantic externalism

---

Philosophy of Mind

The Mind-Body Problem

Positions:

MIND-BODY POSITIONS
═══════════════════

DUALISM
├── Substance Dualism (Descartes)
│   └── Mind and body are distinct substances
└── Property Dualism
    └── Mental properties distinct from physical

PHYSICALISM
├── Type Identity (Smart, Place)
│   └── Mental types = brain types
├── Functionalism (Putnam, Fodor)
│   └── Mental states = functional roles
├── Eliminativism (Churchland)
│   └── Folk psychology will be eliminated
└── Non-Reductive (Davidson)
    └── Mental supervenes on physical but isn't reducible

NEUTRAL MONISM
└── Mental and physical are aspects of neutral stuff

Functionalism

Core Idea: Mental states defined by causal/functional roles, not intrinsic properties

FUNCTIONALIST ANALYSIS
══════════════════════

Pain =def the state that:
- Is typically caused by tissue damage
- Typically causes withdrawal behavior
- Typically causes distress
- Is typically avoided
- ...

Multiple Realizability: Pain could be realized in:
- C-fibers (humans)
- Silicon circuits (robots)
- Whatever plays the right role

Objections:

• Absent qualia (Chinese nation thought experiment)
• Inverted qualia (same function, different experience)
• Mary's Room (knowledge argument)

Qualia and Consciousness

The Hard Problem (Chalmers):

• Easy problems: Explain cognitive functions
• Hard problem: Explain why there is subjective experience

Mary's Room (Jackson):

MARY'S ROOM ARGUMENT
════════════════════

1. Mary knows all physical facts about color vision
2. Mary has never seen color (black/white room)
3. When Mary sees red for the first time, she learns something
4. Therefore, there are non-physical facts (qualia)

Responses:
- Ability hypothesis: She gains an ability, not knowledge
- Phenomenal concept strategy: Same facts, new concept
- Deny premise 3: She doesn't really learn new facts

Chinese Room (Searle):

CHINESE ROOM ARGUMENT
═════════════════════

1. Imagine someone in a room following rules to respond to Chinese
2. The person doesn't understand Chinese
3. But the system passes the Turing test
4. Therefore, syntax is not sufficient for semantics
5. Strong AI is false: computation ≠ understanding

Responses:
- Systems reply: The whole system understands
- Robot reply: Needs embodiment and interaction
- Brain simulator reply: What if it simulates neurons?

---

Metaphysics

Possible Worlds

Modal Logic: Logic of possibility and necessity

Symbol	Meaning
◊P	Possibly P
□P	Necessarily P
◊P ↔ ¬□¬P	Possibly P iff not necessarily not-P

Possible Worlds Semantics:

• ◊P: P is true in some possible world
• □P: P is true in all possible worlds

Lewis's Modal Realism:

• Possible worlds are concrete, existing realities
• "Actual" is indexical (like "here")
• Counterpart theory: No trans-world identity

Personal Identity

Positions:

PERSONAL IDENTITY THEORIES
══════════════════════════

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY (Locke, Parfit)
├── Memory connections
├── Psychological continuity
└── Problem: Reduplication, branching

BIOLOGICAL CRITERION (Olson)
├── Same biological organism
└── Animalism: we are fundamentally animals

NO-SELF (Parfit)
├── Personal identity is not what matters
├── What matters: psychological continuity/connectedness
└── Relation R can hold without identity

Parfit's Teletransporter:

• Destroys original, creates perfect copy
• Is this death or transportation?
• If identity doesn't matter, why care?

Causation

Counterfactual Theory (Lewis):

• C causes E iff: If C had not occurred, E would not have occurred
• Analyzed using possible worlds

Problems:

• Overdetermination
• Pre-emption
• Effects of absences

---

Epistemology

The Gettier Problem

Traditional Analysis: Knowledge = Justified True Belief

Gettier Cases:

GETTIER CASE
════════════

Scenario:
1. Smith believes "Jones owns a Ford" (based on seeing Jones drive one)
2. Smith infers "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona"
3. Unknown to Smith: Jones doesn't own the Ford (borrowed)
4. But Brown happens to be in Barcelona

Result:
- Smith's belief is true
- Smith's belief is justified
- But Smith doesn't know!

Moral: JTB is not sufficient for knowledge

Responses:

• Add fourth condition (no false lemmas, tracking, safety)
• Reliabilism: knowledge requires reliable process
• Virtue epistemology: knowledge requires intellectual virtue
• Knowledge-first: knowledge is primitive (Williamson)

Skepticism

The External World:

SKEPTICAL ARGUMENT
══════════════════

1. I cannot know that I am not a brain in a vat
2. If I cannot know I'm not a BIV, I cannot know I have hands
3. Therefore, I cannot know I have hands

Responses:
- Contextualism: Standards vary by context
- Relevant alternatives: BIV not relevant
- Externalism: Knowledge doesn't require ruling out skepticism
- Moorean shift: I know I have hands, therefore I'm not a BIV

---

Ethics

Metaethics

Positions:

METAETHICAL LANDSCAPE
═════════════════════

COGNITIVISM (Moral claims are truth-apt)
├── Moral Realism
│   ├── Naturalism: moral facts = natural facts
│   └── Non-naturalism: sui generis moral properties
└── Error Theory: moral claims are systematically false

NON-COGNITIVISM (Moral claims are not truth-apt)
├── Emotivism: express attitudes
├── Prescriptivism: issue commands
└── Expressivism: express non-cognitive states

Normative Ethics

Trolley Problem (Foot, Thomson):

TROLLEY CASES
═════════════

SWITCH: Trolley heading toward 5 people.
        You can flip switch to divert to 1 person.
        Most say: permissible to flip switch.

FOOTBRIDGE: Trolley heading toward 5 people.
            You can push large man off bridge to stop trolley.
            Most say: impermissible to push.

Puzzle: Why the different intuitions if consequences are same?

Theories:
- Doctrine of Double Effect
- Act/Omission distinction
- Using vs. merely affecting

Political Philosophy

Rawls's Theory of Justice:

RAWLSIAN FRAMEWORK
══════════════════

ORIGINAL POSITION
├── Hypothetical contract
├── Veil of ignorance: don't know your place in society
└── Rational choice behind the veil

TWO PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
1. Liberty Principle: Equal basic liberties
2. Difference Principle: Inequalities only if they benefit worst-off
   (With fair equality of opportunity)

Lexical priority: Liberty > Fair opportunity > Difference

---

Key Vocabulary

Term	Meaning
A priori	Knowable independent of experience
A posteriori	Knowable only through experience
Necessary	True in all possible worlds
Contingent	True but could have been false
Analytic	True by virtue of meaning
Synthetic	True by virtue of the world
Supervenience	A-properties supervene on B-properties iff no A-difference without B-difference
Rigid designator	Expression that refers to same thing in all possible worlds
De re / de dicto	About the thing / about the saying
Token / Type	Instance / Kind
Qualia	Subjective, qualitative aspects of experience
Intentionality	Aboutness; mental states are about things

---

Integration with Repository

Related Thinkers

• thinkers/wittgenstein/, thinkers/frege/
• Connect to contemporary figures if profiled

Related Themes

• thoughts/consciousness/: Philosophy of mind debates
• thoughts/knowledge/: Epistemology, skepticism
• thoughts/free_will/: Compatibilism debates

---

Reference Files

• methods.md: Conceptual analysis, logical analysis protocols
• vocabulary.md: Technical terms glossary
• figures.md: Key philosophers with contributions
• debates.md: Central controversies
• sources.md: Primary texts and secondary literature