hammer

name

hammer

description

Implementation loop. Use when a plan document exists (from forge or blueprint) and implementation should run — including when the user says "implement", "execute the plan", "구현해", "실행해", or approves a plan. Executes tasks through a worker → validator → implementation-critic loop, then a security/QA review gate; any failure loops back to rework. Hooks block turn completion until every task and review passes.

Hammer — Implementation Loop

Strikes until the metal holds. Every task runs a worker → validator → implementation-critic cycle; the whole run ends with an E2E gate and a security + QA review panel. Any FAIL at any layer sends the work back — the Stop hook will not let the turn end while the loop is open.

Core Principle

The main agent orchestrates; it never implements or judges inline. Workers build, validators judge the contract, critics hunt fakery, reviewers attack the result. Each role is a separate subagent with only the information its role requires.

All judges answer fixed binary checklists (YES/NO per question, verdict = AND) — never holistic impressions. If the runtime does not expose implementation-critic / security-reviewer / qa-reviewer as named agent types, read the definition from this plugin's agents/<name>.md and dispatch a general-purpose subagent with that file's body as its instructions.

Hard Gates (hook-enforced)

1. Read the plan first. Review the entire plan critically before executing. Missing Goals or non-decidable criteria → return to forge/blueprint.
2. Worker, validator, and critic are separate subagents. Never inline. Never share the worker's output with the validator or critic.
3. Criteria are binding; steps are the route. Workers adapt minimally when reality contradicts a step, and report the deviation. Weakening a criterion to pass is reward hacking — prohibited.
4. Parallelizable tasks run in parallel. No shared files, no dependencies → dispatch concurrently. Parallel workers never commit; the main agent commits per task after its gates pass.
5. Never skip verification. Per-task tests, the E2E gate, and the review panel are mandatory. Raw E2E output is evidence only; it does not attest Bash execution or close F11.
6. No verdict without metadata-v1 provenance. Before every validator, implementation critic, security reviewer, or QA reviewer invocation, preallocate a dispatch ID and include the exact run/generation/role/evidence/plan plus task ID or review kind in approved tool input and prompt. Every judge receipt starts with the ordered metadata-v1 header specified below, then CHECKS: and its verdict. The Stop hook grants credit only after a matching journaled CORE_DISPATCH_COMPLETED; self-written, legacy, stale, or projection-only evidence earns none.
   • validator → .glm-hammer/evidence/tasks/task-<i>/validator.md, role validator, TASK_ID: <i>, VERDICT: PASS
   • implementation critic → .glm-hammer/evidence/tasks/task-<i>/critic.md, role implementation-critic, TASK_ID: <i>, VERDICT: APPROVE
   • E2E gate → raw output at .glm-hammer/evidence/e2e.md (not a judge receipt and not F11 attestation)
   • reviewers → .glm-hammer/evidence/reviews/security.md / .glm-hammer/evidence/reviews/qa.md, roles security-reviewer / qa-reviewer, REVIEW_KIND: security / qa, VERDICT: PASS
7. Plan edits use Write/Edit only. A tracked edit creates a new sealed generation with a complete declared-path baseline and invalidates all task/review receipts. Bash edits, missing/broken seals, incomplete baselines, and live-workspace reinterpretation block.
8. The certified journal is authoritative. .glm-hammer/state.json is only a disposable projection. Request legal transitions through registered core hooks; never manufacture task totals, awaiting-user, review PASS, or done by editing it.

Metadata-v1 Receipt Header

Every judge writes these lines in this exact order before CHECKS::

RECEIPT_VERSION: 1
RUN_ID: <uuid>
ROLE: <validator|implementation-critic|security-reviewer|qa-reviewer>
EVIDENCE_PATH: <exact repository-relative receipt path>
PLAN_SHA256: <64 lowercase hex>
GENERATION: <canonical nonnegative decimal>
<TASK_ID: positive integer | REVIEW_KIND: security|qa>
DISPATCH_ID: <preallocated uuid>
SOURCE_SNAPSHOT_SHA256: <64 lowercase hex; security/qa only>

Task receipts omit the source-snapshot line. Review receipts require it. Unknown runtime identity, missing Agent observation, legacy core receipts, and tuple mismatches are fail-closed and never earn PASS.

State Protocol

{
  "phase": "hammer",
  "status": "executing | review | awaiting-user | done",
  "plan": "docs/glm-hammer/plans/YYYY-MM-DD-<feature>.md",
  "tasks": { "total": 0, "completed": 0, "current": "" },
  "reviews": { "security": "pending", "qa": "pending" },
  "stopBlocks": 0
}

• Increment projected tasks.completed only after both task dispatches are journaled with matching metadata-v1 receipts. Obligations and task count come from strict parsing of the sealed whole plan, not from projection counters.
• Pause only after approved structural question proof. Raw transcript/context-pressure markers never release hammer. With current unconsumed proof, the exact whole trimmed request glm-hammer override-unverified RUNID GENERATION may atomically end that run as UNVERIFIED; it never records verified fields or PASS. Without structural proof there is no override.
• Project status: "done" only after journal authority records every derived task obligation, a current source snapshot, both snapshot-bound reviews, and run completion.

Process

Step 0: Load ⟨state: executing⟩

Read the sealed whole plan (including any ## Plan Amendment Log). Require strict contiguous task grammar, derive the task count and dependency DAG from it, and evaluate declared paths against the generation's sealed baseline plus virtual task order. Never trust state.tasks.total or later live path existence. Missing, malformed, raced, or mismatched seal/baseline data blocks.

Step 1: Per-Task Cycle

For each task (parallel groups dispatched concurrently):

1a. Compliance check — predecessor outputs exist, no in-flight task shares files. Mismatch → resolve before dispatching.

1b. Worker (subagent). Prompt = the task verbatim from the plan. The worker follows steps, adapts minimally when a step contradicts reality (stale anchor, renamed symbol), runs each step's verification, and reports deviations. It stops and reports instead of adapting when a fix would change an interface another task consumes, touch files outside its list, or alter a criterion.

1c. Validator (subagent, information-isolated). Use this fixed template, filling fields verbatim from the plan — never paraphrase, never mention what the worker did:

You are an independent validator with no knowledge of how this task was
implemented. Judge whether the codebase currently meets the goal below by
reading files and running tests yourself.

## Task Goal
{TASK_GOAL — verbatim from plan}
## Acceptance Criteria
{CRITERIA — verbatim from plan}
## Files To Inspect
{FILES — verbatim from plan}
## Test Commands
{COMMANDS — verbatim from plan}

Treat each criterion as an ISOLATED yes/no question: "is this criterion
met right now?" — answer PASS or FAIL per criterion from what you read
and ran, never a holistic impression. Verdict = AND of all criteria. No
partial credit. If FAIL, state exactly which criteria failed, with file
paths — describe, don't fix.

Write your full report to {EVIDENCE_PATH} (create parent directories), beginning with the exact metadata-v1 header populated from the approved dispatch:
RECEIPT_VERSION, RUN_ID, ROLE (`validator`), EVIDENCE_PATH, PLAN_SHA256,
GENERATION, TASK_ID (`<i>`), DISPATCH_ID. Follow it with a `CHECKS:`
block listing every criterion with PASS|FAIL and one-line evidence, then
`VERDICT: PASS` or `VERDICT: FAIL`. End your final message with:
EVIDENCE_RECORDED: {EVIDENCE_PATH}

Fill {EVIDENCE_PATH} with .glm-hammer/evidence/tasks/task-<i>/validator.md. Preallocate DISPATCH_ID before invocation and include the complete metadata tuple in approved tool input and this prompt.

1d. Implementation critic (subagent). After the validator passes, preallocate a new dispatch ID and dispatch implementation-critic with the task's Goal, Files, and Criteria verbatim plus runId, generation, role implementation-critic, evidence path .glm-hammer/evidence/tasks/task-<i>/critic.md, planSha256, positive taskId: <i>, and dispatchId. Do not include worker output. Its metadata-v1 receipt must match the dispatch and end in APPROVE or REJECT.

1e. Verdict handling:

• Validator PASS + critic APPROVE → after both matching completion events exist, let journal replay project that task complete; then the main agent commits the task's files (parallel tasks) or confirms the worker's commit (sequential).
• Any FAIL/REJECT → triage first:
  • Worker defect (plan right, code wrong): re-dispatch the worker with ALL accumulated verdict feedback, verbatim.
  • Plan defect (code cannot meet the plan as written): amend the plan file itself — affected tasks only, within the plan's Goal; append to ## Plan Amendment Log. A criterion may be corrected only if factually stale and only to verify the SAME outcome. Then fresh worker.
• 3 strikes (retries + amendments combined) on one task → escalate to the user with the full history. ⟨state: awaiting-user⟩

Step 2: E2E Gate

After all tasks, run the plan's Verification Strategy command, then the full test suite. Save the raw output to .glm-hammer/evidence/e2e.md. Failure loops through targeted worker repair and a fresh run; two failed fix attempts escalate through structural question proof. This raw receipt does not prove that Bash was observed and does not close F11.

Step 3: Source Snapshot and Review Panel ⟨state: review⟩

After E2E passes, record a canonical source-review snapshot for the current run and generation. Preallocate one dispatch ID per reviewer only after SOURCE_REVIEW_SNAPSHOT_RECORDED. Each approved tool input and prompt receives only the plan path, diff scope, evidence path, and exact metadata tuple: runId, generation, reviewer role, evidencePath, planSha256, reviewKind (security or qa), dispatchId, sourceSnapshotSha256, and invocationMs. The invocation time must not predate the snapshot event.

Dispatch in parallel:

Agent	Attack surface
security-reviewer	Injection, authz/authn gaps, secrets, unsafe deserialization, path traversal, dependency risk in the changed code
qa-reviewer	Behavior vs plan's success criteria, edge cases, error paths, regression risk, test adequacy

Each receipt repeats the same snapshot hash in the required SOURCE_SNAPSHOT_SHA256 header. Missing binding, mismatch, or pre-snapshot invocation blocks. Both matching PASS receipts are only provisional until completion recomputes the source snapshot and proves byte equality.

• Both PASS and unchanged recomputation → project done only after the journal records run completion.
• Any FAIL or post-snapshot mutation → append strict fix tasks to a newly sealed plan generation, run the full task/E2E flow, record a fresh snapshot, and redispatch the FULL panel. Old review receipts never carry forward.
• A reviewer failing the same finding 3 times escalates only through approved structural question proof; otherwise the run remains blocked or terminal UNVERIFIED.

Anti-Patterns

Anti-Pattern	Why It Fails
Main agent writing code or judging inline	Confirmation bias; defeats independent verification
Passing worker output/diff to validator or critic	Anchors the judge on the builder's framing
Paraphrasing plan content into the validator prompt	Leaks post-worker understanding; verbatim only
Weakening a criterion so a failing implementation passes	Reward hacking — the binary verdict exists to catch this
Retrying a worker against a plan defect	Burns strikes on an impossible task; triage first
Validator running the full suite per task	N redundant runs; regressions belong to the E2E gate, once
Re-running only the failed reviewer after fixes	A security fix can break behavior and vice versa; full panel
Marking done in state while a review is fail	Falsified state; the hooks cross-check and the loop reopens
Advancing state on a verdict with no evidence receipt	A PASS you cannot show a receipt for did not happen; the Stop hook blocks it
Writing a judge's receipt file yourself	The receipt proves the judge ran; forging it defeats the audit trail
Stopping mid-loop without awaiting-user escalation	The Stop hook bounces you back; escalate properly instead