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detecting-anomalous-authentication-patterns

Detects anomalous authentication patterns using UEBA analytics, statistical baselines, and machine learning models to identify impossible travel, credential stuffing, brute force, password spraying, and compromised account behaviors across authentication logs. Activates for requests involving authentication anomaly detection, login behavior analysis, UEBA implementation, or suspicious sign-in investigation.

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Repository
AgentFlocks/flocks
Letzte Quellaktivität
5. Mai 2026 um 05:45
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Englisch
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481
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90

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SKILL.md
Quellanweisungen · Schreibgeschützte Vorschau
name
detecting-anomalous-authentication-patterns
description
Detects anomalous authentication patterns using UEBA analytics, statistical baselines, and machine learning models to identify impossible travel, credential stuffing, brute force, password spraying, and compromised account behaviors across authentication logs. Activates for requests involving authentication anomaly detection, login behavior analysis, UEBA implementation, or suspicious sign-in investigation.
domain
cybersecurity
subdomain
identity-access-management
tags
["UEBA","authentication-anomaly","impossible-travel","brute-force","credential-stuffing","behavioral-analytics"]
version
1.0
author
mahipal
license
Apache-2.0
atlas_techniques
["AML.T0043","AML.T0018"]
nist_ai_rmf
["MEASURE-2.7","MEASURE-2.5","MAP-5.1"]
nist_csf
["PR.AA-01","PR.AA-02","PR.AA-05","PR.AA-06"]
# Detecting Anomalous Authentication Patterns ## When to Use - Security operations needs to identify compromised accounts from authentication log analysis - Implementing impossible travel detection to flag geographically inconsistent logins - Detecting brute force, password spraying, and credential stuffing attacks in real time - Building behavioral baselines for users to identify deviations indicating account compromise - Correlating authentication anomalies with threat intelligence for lateral movement detection - Investigating alerts from SIEM or IdP for suspicious sign-in activity **Do not use** for static rule-based alerting on single failed logins; anomaly detection requires statistical baselines across time and entity dimensions to reduce false positives. ## Prerequisites - Authentication log sources (Azure AD/Entra ID sign-in logs, Okta system logs, Active Directory event logs 4624/4625/4648/4768/4771) - SIEM platform (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic SIEM) with at least 90 days of baseline data - GeoIP database for location-based anomaly detection (MaxMind GeoLite2 or IP2Location) - Python 3.9+ with pandas, scikit-learn, and scipy for custom analytics - User identity context (department, role, typical work hours, location) ## Workflow ### Step 1: Collect and Normalize Authentication Logs Aggregate authentication events from all identity sources: ```python import pandas as pd import json from datetime import datetime, timedelta from collections import defaultdict # Parse authentication logs from multiple sources def normalize_auth_logs(log_source, raw_logs): """Normalize authentication events to a common schema.""" normalized = [] for event in raw_logs: if log_source == "azure_ad": normalized.append({ "timestamp": event["createdDateTime"], "user": event["userPrincipalName"], "source_ip": event["ipAddress"], "location": { "city": event.get("location", {}).get("city"), "state": event.get("location", {}).get("state"), "country": event.get("location", {}).get("countryOrRegion"), "lat": event.get("location", {}).get("geoCoordinates", {}).get("latitude"), "lon": event.get("location", {}).get("geoCoordinates", {}).get("longitude") }, "result": "success" if event["status"]["errorCode"] == 0 else "failure", "failure_reason": event["status"].get("failureReason", ""), "app": event.get("appDisplayName", "Unknown"), "device": event.get("deviceDetail", {}).get("operatingSystem", "Unknown"), "browser": event.get("deviceDetail", {}).get("browser", "Unknown"), "mfa_result": event.get("authenticationDetails", [{}])[0].get("succeeded", None), "risk_level": event.get("riskLevelDuringSignIn", "none"), "client_app": event.get("clientAppUsed", "Unknown"), "source": "azure_ad" }) elif log_source == "okta": normalized.append({ "timestamp": event["published"], "user": event["actor"]["alternateId"], "source_ip": event["client"]["ipAddress"], "location": { "city": event["client"].get("geographicalContext", {}).get("city"), "state": event["client"].get("geographicalContext", {}).get("state"), "country": event["client"].get("geographicalContext", {}).get("country"), "lat": event["client"].get("geographicalContext", {}).get("geolocation", {}).get("lat"), "lon": event["client"].get("geographicalContext", {}).get("geolocation", {}).get("lon") }, "result": "success" if event["outcome"]["result"] == "SUCCESS" else "failure", "failure_reason": event["outcome"].get("reason", ""), "app": event.get("target", [{}])[0].get("displayName", "Unknown"), "device": event["client"].get("device", "Unknown"), "browser": event["client"].get("userAgent", {}).get("browser", "Unknown"), "source": "okta" }) elif log_source == "windows_ad": normalized.append({ "timestamp": event["TimeCreated"], "user": event["TargetUserName"], "source_ip": event.get("IpAddress", ""), "location": None, # Requires GeoIP enrichment "result": "success" if event["EventId"] in [4624, 4648] else "failure", "failure_reason": event.get("FailureReason", ""), "logon_type": event.get("LogonType", ""), "source": "windows_ad" }) return pd.DataFrame(normalized) # Enrich with GeoIP data for Windows AD logs missing location import geoip2.database def enrich_geoip(df, geoip_db_path="/opt/geoip/GeoLite2-City.mmdb"): """Add geolocation data to events missing location information.""" reader = geoip2.database.Reader(geoip_db_path) for idx, row in df.iterrows(): if row["location"] is None and row["source_ip"]: try: response = reader.city(row["source_ip"]) df.at[idx, "location"] = { "city": response.city.name, "country": response.country.iso_code, "lat": response.location.latitude, "lon": response.location.longitude } except Exception: pass reader.close() return df ``` ### Step 2: Detect Impossible Travel Anomalies Identify logins from geographically impossible locations: ```python from math import radians, sin, cos, sqrt, atan2 from datetime import datetime def haversine_distance(lat1, lon1, lat2, lon2): """Calculate great-circle distance between two points in km.""" R = 6371 # Earth's radius in kilometers lat1, lon1, lat2, lon2 = map(radians, [lat1, lon1, lat2, lon2]) dlat = lat2 - lat1 dlon = lon2 - lon1 a = sin(dlat/2)**2 + cos(lat1) * cos(lat2) * sin(dlon/2)**2 c = 2 * atan2(sqrt(a), sqrt(1-a)) return R * c def detect_impossible_travel(df, max_speed_kmh=900): """ Detect impossible travel events where a user authenticates from two locations faster than physically possible. max_speed_kmh: Maximum realistic travel speed (900 km/h ~= commercial flight) """ alerts = [] # Sort by user and timestamp df_sorted = df.sort_values(["user", "timestamp"]) for user, user_events in df_sorted.groupby("user"): successful_events = user_events[user_events["result"] == "success"] for i in range(1, len(successful_events)): prev = successful_events.iloc[i-1] curr = successful_events.iloc[i] # Skip if location data is missing if not prev.get("location") or not curr.get("location"): continue if not prev["location"].get("lat") or not curr["location"].get("lat"): continue # Calculate distance and time delta distance_km = haversine_distance( prev["location"]["lat"], prev["location"]["lon"], curr["location"]["lat"], curr["location"]["lon"] ) time_diff = (pd.Timestamp(curr["timestamp"]) - pd.Timestamp(prev["timestamp"])).total_seconds() / 3600 if time_diff <= 0: continue required_speed = distance_km / time_diff # Flag if required speed exceeds maximum realistic travel if required_speed > max_speed_kmh and distance_km > 100: alerts.append({ "alert_type": "IMPOSSIBLE_TRAVEL", "severity": "HIGH", "user": user, "timestamp": curr["timestamp"], "details": { "location_1": f"{prev['location']['city']}, {prev['location']['country']}", "location_2": f"{curr['location']['city']}, {curr['location']['country']}", "time_1": prev["timestamp"], "time_2": curr["timestamp"], "distance_km": round(distance_km, 1), "time_hours": round(time_diff, 2), "required_speed_kmh": round(required_speed, 1), "source_ip_1": prev["source_ip"], "source_ip_2": curr["source_ip"] } }) return alerts # Run impossible travel detection travel_alerts = detect_impossible_travel(auth_df) print(f"Impossible travel alerts: {len(travel_alerts)}") for alert in travel_alerts: print(f" [{alert['severity']}] {alert['user']}: " f"{alert['details']['location_1']} -> {alert['details']['location_2']} " f"({alert['details']['distance_km']} km in {alert['details']['time_hours']}h)") ``` ### Step 3: Detect Brute Force and Password Spraying Identify credential attack patterns across authentication logs: ```python from collections import Counter def detect_brute_force(df, threshold_failures=10, window_minutes=10): """ Detect brute force attacks: many failed attempts against a single account in a short time window. """ alerts = [] failed = df[df["result"] == "failure"].copy() failed["timestamp"] = pd.to_datetime(failed["timestamp"]) for user, user_fails in failed.groupby("user"): user_fails_sorted = user_fails.sort_values("timestamp") # Sliding window analysis for i, row in user_fails_sorted.iterrows(): window_start = row["timestamp"] window_end = window_start + timedelta(minutes=window_minutes) window_events = user_fails_sorted[ (user_fails_sorted["timestamp"] >= window_start) & (user_fails_sorted["timestamp"] <= window_end) ] if len(window_events) >= threshold_failures: source_ips = window_events["source_ip"].unique() alerts.append({ "alert_type": "BRUTE_FORCE", "severity": "HIGH", "user": user, "timestamp": str(window_start), "details": { "failed_attempts": len(window_events), "window_minutes": window_minutes, "source_ips": list(source_ips), "distributed": len(source_ips) > 1, "failure_reasons": dict(Counter(window_events["failure_reason"])) } }) break # One alert per user per detection pass return alerts def detect_password_spray(df, threshold_users=10, window_minutes=30): """ Detect password spraying: failed logins against many different accounts from the same source in a short window (1-2 attempts per user). """ alerts = [] failed = df[df["result"] == "failure"].copy() failed["timestamp"] = pd.to_datetime(failed["timestamp"]) for source_ip, ip_events in failed.groupby("source_ip"): ip_events_sorted = ip_events.sort_values("timestamp") for i, row in ip_events_sorted.iterrows(): window_start = row["timestamp"] window_end = window_start + timedelta(minutes=window_minutes) window_events = ip_events_sorted[ (ip_events_sorted["timestamp"] >= window_start) & (ip_events_sorted["timestamp"] <= window_end) ] unique_users = window_events["user"].nunique()
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