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kill-chain-analysis

Kill chain analysis and attack path decision-making — findings analysis, attack vector selection, target prioritization, phase transitions.

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Repository
BitterSecurity/Decepticon
Letzte Quellaktivität
2. Juni 2026 um 17:36
Erkannte Sprache von SKILL.md
Englisch
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5.565
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1.053

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SKILL.md
Quellanweisungen · Schreibgeschützte Vorschau
name
kill-chain-analysis
description
Kill chain analysis and attack path decision-making — findings analysis, attack vector selection, target prioritization, phase transitions.
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metadata
{"subdomain":"orchestration","kind":"analytic","when_to_use":"analyze findings, select attack vector, prioritize targets, which technique, attack path, next attack, choose approach, alternative vector, blocked what next","tags":"kill-chain, decision-making, attack-path, target-prioritization, technique-selection","upstream_ref":"Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain + Decepticon attack-path planner — analytic decision support, no direct attack technique"}
# Kill Chain Analysis & Attack Path Decision-Making ## Decision Framework When selecting the next action, evaluate in order: 1. **What does the OPPLAN say?** — Prioritized objectives drive decisions 2. **What do findings tell us?** — Previous phase results constrain options 3. **What's the risk/reward?** — Lower noise approaches first 4. **What's the OPSEC impact?** — Consult `opsec` skill before noisy actions ## Findings Analysis ### After Recon Phase — Selecting Attack Vectors Read `recon/` outputs and categorize: | Finding Type | Indicates | Next Action | |-------------|-----------|-------------| | Web apps with known CVEs | Web exploitation path | `exploit` → web techniques | | AD services (88/389/636) | AD attack surface | `exploit` → AD techniques (after initial access) | | Exposed credentials (OSINT) | Credential-based access | `exploit` → credential stuffing/spray | | Cloud misconfigs (S3/blob) | Cloud attack path | `exploit` → cloud-specific techniques | | VPN/remote access services | Network perimeter entry | `exploit` → VPN/RDP exploitation | | Employee emails + breach data | Social engineering path | `exploit` → phishing (if in scope) | ### Attack Vector Prioritization Rank available vectors by: ``` Score = (Success Probability × Impact) / Detection Risk 1. Valid credentials from OSINT → High prob, High impact, Low noise 2. Known web CVE (public exploit) → High prob, Med impact, Med noise 3. AD misconfiguration (no patch) → Med prob, High impact, Med noise 4. Password spray against O365 → Med prob, High impact, High noise 5. Zero-day or custom exploit → Low prob, High impact, Low noise ``` Always prefer: **credentials > misconfigurations > known CVEs > brute force** ### After Exploitation — Deciding Post-Exploit Strategy Once a foothold is established, analyze: | Context | Decision | |---------|----------| | Low-privilege user on workstation | Prioritize: privesc → cred dump → lateral to server | | Service account on server | Prioritize: cred dump (may have cached admin creds) → lateral | | Domain user credentials | Prioritize: AD enumeration → Kerberoasting → DCSync path | | Local admin on single host | Prioritize: cred dump → check for cached domain creds → lateral | | Already domain admin | Prioritize: objective completion → evidence collection → reporting | ## Handling Blocked Objectives ### Failure Analysis Decision Tree ``` Objective BLOCKED │ ├── WHY did it fail? │ ├── Defense mechanism (WAF/EDR/IDS) │ │ → Consult defense-evasion skill → retry with evasion │ │ │ ├── Missing prerequisite (need creds/access/info) │ │ → Identify which prior phase provides it → re-order objectives │ │ │ ├── Target hardened / not vulnerable │ │ → Check findings for alternative target → redirect attack │ │ │ └── Tool failure / environment issue │ → Retry with different tool or approach │ ├── Is there an ALTERNATIVE path? │ ├── YES → Craft new delegation with adjusted approach │ └── NO → Mark BLOCKED, document reason, proceed to next objective │ └── Should we REVISIT later? ├── YES (new intel may help) → Keep status BLOCKED, note in lessons_learned.md └── NO (dead end) → Mark BLOCKED permanently ``` ### Common Pivots | Original Approach | Alternative When Blocked | |-------------------|-------------------------| | SQLi on web app | SSTI, deserialization, SSRF, or move to different web app | | Kerberoasting | AS-REP roasting, ADCS abuse, password spray | | LSASS dump blocked by EDR | nanodump, comsvcs.dll, MiniDumpWriteDump via syscall | | WinRM blocked | PsExec, WMI, DCOM, RDP, SMB exec | | Password spray lockout | Low-and-slow spray, single-password-multiple-users | ## MITRE ATT&CK Phase Mapping Use this to map OPPLAN objective phases to ATT&CK tactics: | OPPLAN Phase | ATT&CK Tactic | Sub-Agent | |-------------|---------------|-----------| | Recon | TA0043 Reconnaissance | `recon` | | Initial Access | TA0001 Initial Access | `exploit` | | Execution | TA0002 Execution | `exploit` | | Persistence | TA0003 Persistence | `postexploit` | | Privilege Escalation | TA0004 Privilege Escalation | `postexploit` | | Defense Evasion | TA0005 Defense Evasion | `exploit` / `postexploit` | | Credential Access | TA0006 Credential Access | `postexploit` | | Discovery | TA0007 Discovery | `recon` / `postexploit` | | Lateral Movement | TA0008 Lateral Movement | `postexploit` | | Collection | TA0009 Collection | `postexploit` | | Exfiltration | TA0010 Exfiltration | `postexploit` | ## Target Prioritization When multiple targets are available, prioritize: 1. **Crown jewels** — Targets explicitly named in OPPLAN objectives 2. **Domain controllers** — Access = domain-wide compromise 3. **File servers** — Likely contain sensitive data for objectives 4. **Admin workstations** — Cached credentials for further access 5. **Application servers** — May contain database credentials, API keys 6. **Standard workstations** — Lower value, but may provide stepping stones
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