Collect Active Directory data with SharpHound and Entra ID data with AzureHound, ingest into BloodHound Community Edition, and analyze on-prem, cloud, and hybrid attack paths with built-in queries and custom Cypher.
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Collect Active Directory data with SharpHound and Entra ID data with AzureHound, ingest into BloodHound Community Edition, and analyze on-prem, cloud, and hybrid attack paths with built-in queries and custom Cypher.
Legal Notice: This skill is for authorized security testing, red-team engagements, and educational purposes only. Active Directory and Entra ID reconnaissance reveals privilege-escalation chains that lead to full domain/tenant compromise. Use only against environments you own or have explicit written authorization (rules of engagement) to test. Unauthorized use violates the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and equivalent laws.
Overview
BloodHound Community Edition (CE) is SpecterOps's graph-based attack-path-management platform. It models security principals (users, computers, groups, OUs, GPOs, Entra ID users/groups/apps/roles) as nodes and the permissions, group memberships, sessions, trusts, and ACLs between them as edges. By framing Active Directory and Entra ID as a directed graph, BloodHound turns the question "can this low-privileged account reach Domain Admins / Global Administrator?" into a shortest-path query that finds escalation chains a human reviewer would miss.
BloodHound CE replaced the legacy Neo4j-only BloodHound with a containerized stack: a Go API server, a PostgreSQL relational store, and a Neo4j graph database, all behind a modern web UI and REST API. Data is gathered by two collectors maintained by SpecterOps:
SharpHound (the CE/.NET collector, run on or against a domain-joined Windows host) gathers on-prem AD: objects, group membership, ACLs, sessions, local-admin rights, trusts, GPOs, certificate services (ADCS), and LAPS readability. It emits a ZIP of JSON.
AzureHound (a cross-platform Go binary) gathers Entra ID and Azure Resource Manager data via the Microsoft Graph and Azure REST APIs: users, groups, app registrations, service principals, directory roles, subscription/role assignments, and key vaults. It emits a single JSON file.
As of recent CE releases, when both an AD domain and its synced Entra ID tenant are ingested, BloodHound automatically renders Hybrid Attack Paths — chains that cross the on-prem/cloud boundary (for example, an on-prem user synced to a cloud account that holds a privileged Entra role). Mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, the core activity is T1069 – Permission Groups Discovery, supported by T1087 (Account Discovery), T1482 (Domain Trust Discovery), and T1018 (Remote System Discovery).
When to Use
During an authorized internal penetration test or red-team engagement after obtaining any domain foothold or Entra credentials
When you need to prioritize escalation routes from owned principals to Tier-0 assets (Domain Admins, Global Administrator)
When assessing hybrid identity risk where on-prem AD is synced to Entra ID
During purple-team exercises to validate that detections fire on collection and on path-execution steps
When producing attack-path evidence and remediation guidance for a defensive client
Prerequisites
Authorized scope covering AD/Entra reconnaissance
A foothold: any valid domain user (for SharpHound) and/or valid Entra credentials or a token (for AzureHound)
Docker + Docker Compose on the analysis workstation
The collectors:
# Deploy BloodHound CE (pulls Postgres, Neo4j, and the BloodHound API)
curl -L https://ghst.ly/getbhce -o docker-compose.yml
docker compose pull
docker compose up -d
# Reveal the randomly generated initial admin password
docker compose logs bloodhound | grep -i "Initial Password"# AzureHound (download the release binary for your OS from the GitHub releases page)# https://github.com/SpecterOps/AzureHound/releaseschmod +x ./azurehound
# SharpHound CE collector: download SharpHound.zip from the BloodHound CE# web UI (Administration -> Download Collectors), transfer to a domain-joined host.
Objectives
Deploy BloodHound CE and authenticate to the web UI and API
Collect AD data with SharpHound and Entra data with AzureHound
Ingest both datasets and mark compromised principals as Owned
Run built-in analysis (Shortest Path to Domain Admins, Kerberoastable accounts, ADCS abuse)
Author custom Cypher queries for bespoke and hybrid attack paths
Prioritize and document escalation routes for the engagement report
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
ID
Technique
Application in this skill
T1069
Permission Groups Discovery
Enumerating AD/Entra group memberships and the permissions between principals to build the attack graph
T1087
Account Discovery
SharpHound/AzureHound enumeration of users, computers, and service principals
T1482
Domain Trust Discovery
Collecting and analyzing domain/forest trust relationships as graph edges
T1018
Remote System Discovery
Enumerating domain computers and their relationships (sessions, local admin)
Workflow
Step 1: Deploy BloodHound CE and log in
Bring up the stack, retrieve the generated password, and reset it on first login.
docker compose up -d
docker compose logs bloodhound 2>&1 | grep -i "Initial Password"# Browse to http://localhost:8080 (default user: admin)
Step 2: Collect on-prem AD data with SharpHound
On a domain-joined Windows host (or via runas/token of a domain user), run the CE collector. -c All gathers every collection method; --outputdirectory controls where the ZIP lands.
# Full collection
.\SharpHound.exe -c All --outputdirectory C:\Temp
# Stealthier LDAP-only collection (no host touch for sessions/local-admin)
.\SharpHound.exe -c DCOnly --outputdirectory C:\Temp
# Looped session collection to map logged-on Tier-0 users over time
.\SharpHound.exe -c Session --loop --loopduration 02:00:00 --outputdirectory C:\Temp
From Linux, the Python collector (bloodhound-ce-python) is an alternative when you only have credentials and network access:
Step 3: Collect Entra ID / Azure data with AzureHound
Run AzureHound list with credentials, a JWT, or a refresh token, writing a single JSON file.
# Username/password (where allowed by CA/MFA policy)
./azurehound list -u "user@corp.com" -p "$PASSWORD" -t "corp.com" -o entra.json
# Using a previously acquired JWT (e.g., from roadtx / device-code phishing)
./azurehound list --jwt "$JWT" -o entra.json
# Using a refresh token
./azurehound list --refresh-token "$REFRESH_TOKEN" -t "<tenant-id>" -o entra.json
Step 4: Ingest data into BloodHound CE
Upload the SharpHound ZIP and the AzureHound JSON through Administration -> File Ingest, or POST to the API.
# API ingest (after obtaining a JWT from /api/v2/login)
TOKEN=$(curl -s http://localhost:8080/api/v2/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"login_method":"secret","username":"admin","secret":"<password>"}' \
| python -c "import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['session_token'])")
# Start a file-upload job, then PUT the collector ZIP/JSON to it
JOB=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v2/file-upload/start \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | python -c "import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['id'])")
curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:8080/api/v2/file-upload/$JOB" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/zip' \
--data-binary @C:/Temp/BloodHound.zip
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8080/api/v2/file-upload/$JOB/end" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
Step 5: Mark owned principals
In the UI, search for each compromised account/computer, open the node, and toggle Mark as Owned. Owned principals seed pathfinding queries ({owned:true}).
Step 6: Run built-in analysis queries
Open the Cypher tab or use the pre-built queries in the search panel:
Shortest Path to Domain Admins
Kerberoastable accounts with a path to high value
AS-REP roastable users
Principals with DCSync rights
ADCS misconfigurations (ESC1-ESC8 edges in CE)
Computers with unconstrained delegation
Step 7: Author custom Cypher for bespoke paths
Use Cypher for paths the built-ins do not cover, including hybrid AD-to-Entra chains.
// Shortest path from any owned principal to Domain Admins
MATCH p=shortestPath((n {owned:true})-[*1..]->(g:Group))
WHERE g.objectid ENDS WITH "-512"
RETURN p
// Kerberoastable users (SPN set) with a path to Domain Admins
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})
MATCH p=shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(g:Group))
WHERE g.objectid ENDS WITH "-512"
RETURN p
// Principals who can DCSync the domain
MATCH (n)-[:MemberOf*0..]->()-[:DCSync|GetChanges|GetChangesAll*1..]->(d:Domain)
RETURN n.name, d.name
// ACL abuse from owned principals (GenericAll/WriteDacl/WriteOwner/ForceChangePassword)
MATCH p=(n {owned:true})-[:GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|ForceChangePassword*1..]->(t)
RETURN p
// Hybrid: on-prem user synced to an Entra account holding a privileged directory role
MATCH p=(u:User)-[:SyncedToEntraUser]->(:AZUser)-[:AZHasRole|AZGlobalAdmin*1..]->(r)
RETURN p
Step 8: Prioritize and document
Rank paths by hop count, stealth (avoid noisy edges like HasSession requiring host touch), and tooling availability. Record each path with the principals, edges, required actions, and a remediation note (e.g., remove the abusable ACL, tier the account).
