security-review

name	security-review
description	AI-powered security scanner — OWASP Top 10, CWE Top 25, KMIP authorization, FIPS gating, memory safety, side-channel, supply chain, and 20 vulnerability families. Use when asked to review code security, audit KMIP access control, or scan for vulnerabilities.

Security Review

An AI-powered security scanner that reasons about code the way a security researcher would — tracing data flows, understanding component interactions, and catching vulnerabilities that pattern-matching tools miss. Covers all major software vulnerability families relevant to a Rust + TypeScript KMS with FFI to OpenSSL and PKCS#11 HSMs.

When to use

• Scan a codebase or file for security vulnerabilities
• Check for SQL injection, command injection, secrets exposure, auth bypass
• Review KMIP operation authorization (missing is_allowed() calls, unauthorized key material access)
• Audit FIPS feature flag gating consistency
• Audit memory safety (FFI, unsafe blocks), side-channel resistance, supply chain integrity
• Any request like "is my code secure?", "audit this codebase", "review for vulnerabilities"

Execution

Follow these steps in order:

Step 0 — Load Anti-Hallucination Discipline

Read .github/skills/shared/anti-hallucination.md before any analysis. All rules in that file are mandatory for this skill. Do not proceed to Step 1 until you have read it.

Step 1 — Scope Resolution

If a path was provided (e.g. /security-review crate/server/src/core/), scan only that scope. If no path given, scan the entire project starting from the root.

Identify the primary language(s): Rust (main), TypeScript (UI), Bash (scripts).

Step 2 — Dependency Audit

• Rust: Check Cargo.toml and Cargo.lock for known vulnerable crates (CVEs in cargo audit watchlist).
  • Flag crates with known CVEs, deprecated crypto libs, or unpinned versions.
  • Special attention: openssl, ring, rustls, hyper, actix-web, serde.
• Node/pnpm: Check ui/pnpm-lock.yaml for vulnerable npm packages.
• Python (test scripts): Check .mise/scripts/ for insecure subprocess calls.

Step 3 — Secrets & Exposure Scan

Scan ALL files (config, CI, Dockerfiles, shell scripts, Rust source) for:

• Hardcoded API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys in source code or comments
• .env files accidentally committed
• Secrets in log statements (debug!, trace!, info! with sensitive variable names)
• Database connection strings with embedded credentials
• Hardcoded test credentials that may reach production paths

Flag any // TODO: debug — remove before shipping markers left in the codebase.

Step 4 — Vulnerability Deep Scan

Injection Flaws

• SQL / NoSQL injection in crate/server_database/src/ — raw query construction with user input
• Command injection in shell scripts under .mise/scripts/ — $variable without quoting
• LDAP / XPath injection (N/A for this stack)
• Log injection — user-controlled content passed to log macros without sanitization

Authentication & Access Control

• Missing authentication on sensitive Actix-web endpoints in crate/server/src/routes/
• Broken object-level authorization: KMIP operations in crate/server/src/core/operations/ that return or modify key material without calling the access-control check (typically db.is_allowed(...) or equivalent in crate/access/)
  • Every operation that reads a KmipObject (Get, Export, Decrypt, Sign, MAC, Derive) must verify the caller owns or has been granted access to the key UID
  • Locate operations must filter results to objects the caller can access — not return global object lists
  • Wrap/Unwrap operations must verify access to both the wrapping key and the wrapped key
• JWT weaknesses in crate/server/src/middlewares/ — alg:none, weak secrets, missing expiry validation
• Session or API token bypass: insecure feature flag code that disables auth must be strictly gated with #[cfg(feature = "insecure")]
• Privilege escalation via the crate/access/ module — check that grant/revoke operations require owner or admin privilege

KMIP Protocol Authorization (this repo-specific)

Review each file in crate/server/src/core/operations/:

• Does the operation check access before returning key material?
• Does the operation check access before performing a destructive action (Destroy, Revoke)?
• Does Locate scope results to the authenticated user's owned + granted objects?
• Are Create, Register, Import operations linking the new object to the authenticated user as owner?
• Are there any code paths that can be reached without the EnsureAuth middleware being enforced?

FIPS Feature Flag Consistency

• Scan for #[cfg(feature = "non-fips")] usage — verify it is at function/module level, never inline inside function bodies
• Scan for non-FIPS algorithms (MD5, SHA1, DES, RC4, Blowfish) used outside #[cfg(feature = "non-fips")] gates
• Verify crate/server/src/start_kms_server.rs scope registrations for non-FIPS routes are wrapped in #[cfg(feature = "non-fips")] { ... }
• Check that insecure feature does not bypass FIPS algorithm enforcement

Data Handling

• Sensitive data (private key bytes, plaintext, passwords) in error messages or Display impls
• Missing zeroization of sensitive buffers (look for zeroize crate usage on key material)
• Path traversal in file-based operations (SQLite path, cert file paths from config)
• SSRF: outbound HTTP calls in cloud provider routes (crate/server/src/routes/aws_xks/, etc.) — verify URL validation

Cryptography

• Use of deprecated algorithms: MD5, SHA1 for security-sensitive purposes
• Hardcoded IVs or salts in crate/crypto/src/
• Weak RNG: rand::thread_rng() used for key generation instead of rand::rngs::OsRng
• OpenSSL provider init: verify apply_openssl_dir_env_if_needed() is called before any Provider::try_load()

UI / TypeScript

• XSS: dangerouslySetInnerHTML, unescaped user content in React components
• Insecure WASM call error handling — errors containing sensitive server info surfaced to UI
• Hard-coded CSE/EKM keys in ui/src/

Memory & Type Safety (CWE-119, CWE-125, CWE-416, CWE-843)

Critical for Rust unsafe blocks and FFI to OpenSSL / PKCS#11 / HSM libraries:

• Buffer overflow / underflow in FFI call sites (crate/hsm/*/src/, crate/crypto/src/)
• Integer overflow / underflow / truncation in key-size arithmetic, TTLV length fields (crate/kmip/src/)
• Use-after-free, double-free in unsafe blocks — require // SAFETY: comment; flag every unsafe without one
• Type confusion in TTLV deserialization — mismatched tag/type casting
• Uninitialized memory reads that could leak secrets via FFI return buffers

Deserialization & Protocol Parsing (CWE-502, CWE-400)

• TTLV parsing: unbounded length fields that trigger OOM, malformed tag handling, integer overflow in length math
• JSON deserialization (serde): missing field validation, type coercion attacks, missing #[serde(deny_unknown_fields)] on security-critical structs
• HTTP request smuggling (Actix-web) — Transfer-Encoding / Content-Length conflict handling
• Prototype pollution in TypeScript (ui/src/) — Object.assign or spread with user-controlled keys

Race Conditions & TOCTOU (CWE-362, CWE-367)

• TOCTOU in key lifecycle state transitions — gap between is_allowed() check and state mutation
• Database access patterns without serializable isolation for key ownership changes or grant/revoke operations
• Shared state in OnceLock / Mutex / RwLock — deadlock potential or poisoned lock propagation in error paths
• Concurrent Create + Destroy on the same UID — race to key existence

Denial of Service (CWE-400, CWE-1333, CWE-770)

• ReDoS: scan all regex patterns in Rust (regex::Regex::new(...)) and TypeScript for catastrophic backtracking
• Algorithmic complexity attacks — unbounded loops or quadratic operations triggered by user-controlled input size
• Resource exhaustion: unbounded memory allocation from KMIP request fields, unlimited DB query result sets, no cap on concurrent HSM sessions
• Amplification: single KMIP request triggering many sub-operations (e.g., ReKey across large object sets)

Side-Channel Attacks (CWE-208, CWE-385)

• Timing attacks: non-constant-time comparisons of secrets, MACs, or password hashes — search for == on &[u8] secrets instead of constant_time_eq
• Marvin Attack / ROBOT Attack: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption with observable error differences (see RUSTSEC-2023-0071 in SECURITY.md)
• Lucky13 / CBC padding oracle: any CBC-mode decryption path where error messages distinguish "bad padding" from "bad MAC"
• Cache-timing: AES table-lookup implementations (should use OpenSSL/AES-NI, not pure-Rust table-based AES)
• Speculative execution: sensitive operations in FFI-boundary code without speculation barriers

OAuth / OIDC & Token-Based Auth Attacks (CWE-287, CWE-346)

• JWT alg:none / algorithm substitution — alg header not validated against server-side expected algorithm list
• JWT kid injection — path traversal or SQL injection via the kid header field
• JWT jku / x5u injection — SSRF via header-specified key URL (server fetches attacker-controlled URL)
• Missing JWT expiry (exp) validation — check insecure feature gate does not disable it in production builds
• OAuth redirect URI manipulation — wildcard or open redirector patterns in callback validation
• PKCE bypass — if PKCE flow is used, verify code_verifier is actually validated server-side
• mTLS certificate validation bypass — missing hostname verification or incomplete CA chain validation

HTTP-Level & Web Security (CWE-352, CWE-1021, CWE-601)

• CSRF: missing SameSite cookie attribute, absent CSRF tokens on state-changing endpoints
• Clickjacking: missing X-Frame-Options or frame-ancestors CSP directive
• Open redirect: unvalidated return_url, redirect, next parameters in auth flows
• HTTP parameter pollution: duplicate parameter handling in Actix-web query/form parsing
• Rate limiting: no throttling on authentication endpoints, no per-IP or per-user limits
• Security response headers: missing Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy
• CORS misconfiguration: wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin combined with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true

Supply Chain & Dependency Integrity (CWE-1104, CWE-829)

• Dependencies with known CVEs — extend current Cargo.toml audit with cargo deny check advisories
• Dependency confusion / typosquatting — private crate names (e.g., cosmian_*) potentially claimable on crates.io
• Unpinned / wildcard version ranges (*, >=) that could admit malicious patch releases
• Git submodule integrity — verify test_data submodule points to the expected Cosmian repo and branch
• Lockfile tampering — Cargo.lock and ui/pnpm-lock.yaml integrity (unexpected changes without corresponding Cargo.toml / package.json changes)

Security Logging, Monitoring & Forensics (CWE-778, CWE-532)

• Missing audit events: failed authentication, key destruction (Destroy), privilege grants/revokes, key export — all must be logged
• Insufficient log detail: security events missing principal identity, source IP, object UID, or operation result
• Sensitive data in logs: key material, plaintext, tokens, or passwords in debug! / trace! / info! calls
• Log injection: user-controlled content passed to log macros without sanitization (newline injection to forge log entries)
• No audit trail for irrecoverable operations: Destroy operations are irrecoverable — must produce a durable audit log entry

Business Logic & KMIP-Specific (CWE-840, CWE-863)

• Key lifecycle state machine bypass: can Destroy be called on an Active key without first calling Revoke/Deactivate?
• Wrap/Unwrap dual authorization: both the wrapping key UID and the wrapped key UID must be access-checked independently — missing either is a privilege escalation
• Attribute manipulation without ownership: can a non-owner set Activation Date, Deactivation Date, Sensitive, or Extractable attributes?
• Non-exportable key export: keys with the Non-Exportable attribute must be blocked in Export / Get operations
• Locate information disclosure: Locate returning objects owned by other principals (even metadata without key material is information leakage)
• Re-registration attacks: can a Register / Import overwrite an existing object UID owned by a different user?

Step 5 — Cross-File Data Flow Analysis

Trace user-controlled input from entry points (HTTP params, KMIP request fields, TTLV-deserialized bytes) to sinks (DB queries, exec calls, key material output, file writes).

Check for vulnerabilities that only appear when examining multiple files together:

• Insecure trust boundaries between Actix middleware layers
• Auth middleware applied at scope level but bypassed via direct handler registration
• KMIP operation implementations that call sub-operations without re-checking access

Step 6 — Self-Verification Pass

For each finding:

1. Re-read the relevant code with fresh eyes
2. Ask: "Is this actually exploitable, or is there sanitization I missed?"
3. Check if a framework or middleware already handles this upstream
4. Downgrade or discard findings that aren't genuine vulnerabilities
5. Assign final severity: 🔴 CRITICAL / 🟠 HIGH / 🟡 MEDIUM / 🔵 LOW / ⚪ INFO

Step 7 — Generate Security Report

Output the report in this format:

## Security Review: [scope]

### Summary
| Severity | Count |
|----------|-------|
| 🔴 CRITICAL | N |
| 🟠 HIGH     | N |
| 🟡 MEDIUM   | N |
| 🔵 LOW      | N |
| ⚪ INFO      | N |

### Findings

#### [SEVERITY] [Category]: [Title]
- **File**: `path/to/file.rs:line`
- **Vulnerable code**: `<snippet>`
- **Risk**: What can an attacker do with this?
- **Confidence**: High / Medium / Low
- **Fix**: See patch below

### Dependency Audit
[CVEs or clean]

### Secrets Scan
[Findings or clean]

### KMIP Authorization Audit
[Missing access checks or clean]

### FIPS Gating Audit
[Inconsistent gating or clean]

Step 8 — Propose Patches

For every 🔴 CRITICAL and 🟠 HIGH finding, generate a concrete patch:

• Show the vulnerable code (before)
• Show the fixed code (after)
• Explain what changed and why
• Preserve code style and variable names

State explicitly: "Review each patch before applying. Nothing has been changed yet."

Step 9 — Update SECURITY.md for confirmed fixed vulnerabilities

For every 🔴 CRITICAL and 🟠 HIGH finding where the fix is already present in the codebase (i.e., the vulnerability existed before and is now resolved), add a new entry to SECURITY.md under the current year using this format:

#### COSMIAN-<YYYY>-<NNN> — <Short title matching the finding title>

| Field      | Value |
| ---------- | ----- |
| Severity   | <Critical / High / Moderate / Low> |
| Published  | <DD Month YYYY> |
| Affected   | from <first affected version> before <fix version> |
| Fixed in   | <version or "next release"> |
| Found by   | <source, e.g. "Copilot security-review"> |
| References | <PR or issue link if available, else —> |

**Summary:** <Two-to-four sentences: what the vulnerability was, how it could be >

 

 

Numbering: read the highest existing COSMIAN-<YYYY>-NNN in SECURITY.md for the current year and increment by 1. If no entry exists for the current year, start at 001.

Also add the entry to the table of contents and the summary table at the bottom of SECURITY.md.

If the finding is not yet fixed (i.e., it is a new finding requiring a patch), do not add it to SECURITY.md yet — it will be added after the fix is merged and verified.

Architectural findings — when to recommend /threat-model

If any finding involves a trust boundary change — a new authentication method, a new unauthenticated endpoint, a new outbound call, a new inter-service trust, or a new HSM/cloud integration — append this note to the report:

⚠️ Architectural review recommended: this finding affects a trust boundary. Run /threat-model (incremental mode) to update the STRIDE-A threat inventory before merging. /security-review covers tactical code vulnerabilities; /threat-model covers system-level threats that may not be visible at the code level.

Severity Guide

Severity	Meaning	Example
🔴 CRITICAL	Immediate exploitation risk, data breach likely	Key material returned without auth check, RCE
🟠 HIGH	Serious vulnerability, exploit path exists	BOLA/IDOR on KMIP objects, hardcoded secrets
🟡 MEDIUM	Exploitable with conditions or chaining	Missing rate limit, SSRF with partial control
🔵 LOW	Best practice violation, low direct risk	Verbose errors, missing security header
⚪ INFO	Observation worth noting, not a vulnerability	insecure feature left enabled in a config file

Output rules

• Always produce a findings summary table first
• Never auto-apply any patch — present for human review only
• Always include confidence rating (High / Medium / Low) per finding
• Group findings by category, not by file
• Be specific — include file path, line number, and exact vulnerable snippet
• If the codebase is clean, say so clearly with what was scanned