runtime-verification-for-agents

license	Apache-2.0
name	runtime-verification-for-agents
description	Compiling formal invariants (TLA+, Alloy, temporal logic) into runtime monitors that continuously audit agent coordination daemons. The Arbiter pattern: a verification agent that smoke-tests live sessions against proven properties and triggers salvage on violation. NOT FOR application performance monitoring (use observability skills), log aggregation, static analysis, or unit testing.
metadata	{"category":"Formal Methods & Verification","tags":["runtime-verification","formal-methods","arbiter","agent-coordination","monitors","invariants"]}

Runtime Verification for Agents

Version: 1.0 Domain: Formal Methods, Agent Coordination, Runtime Monitoring Lineage: Port Daddy FORMAL_VERIFICATION_PLAN.md, Section 3 (The Arbiter)

When to Use This Skill

Load this skill when:

• You have formal invariants (TLA+, Alloy, temporal logic) and need to enforce them at runtime
• You are building an agent coordination daemon and need continuous audit
• You are implementing the Arbiter pattern: an independent agent that monitors others
• You need to decide between synchronous checking and sampled checking
• You are debugging false positive cascades in your monitoring layer
• You need to handle the "who watches the watchman" recursion

Do NOT load this skill for:

• Application performance monitoring -- use observability/APM skills
• Log aggregation -- use ELK/Loki/Datadog skills
• Static analysis -- use linting/type-checking skills
• Unit testing -- use TDD skills; runtime verification is complementary, not a substitute

Core Concept: The Arbiter

The Arbiter is an independent agent that continuously audits a coordination daemon's state transitions against formal invariants. On violation, it triggers remediation (salvage, flag, or halt).

              Formal Spec (TLA+)
                    |
               [Compilation]
                    |
              Runtime Monitor
               /          \
      Synchronous       Sampled
      (per-call)      (periodic)
          |               |
     PASS / VIOLATE   PASS / VIOLATE
          |               |
          +-------+-------+
                  |
           [Decision Tree]
          /       |       \
      Alert  Auto-Remediate  Halt

Decision Tree 1: Choosing Your Checking Strategy

Is the invariant safety-critical (data loss, security breach)?
|
+-- YES --> Is the operation latency-sensitive (<5ms budget)?
|           |
|           +-- YES --> Can you check a weaker precondition synchronously?
|           |           |
|           |           +-- YES --> HYBRID: sync precondition + async full check
|           |           +-- NO  --> SYNCHRONOUS (accept the latency hit)
|           |
|           +-- NO  --> SYNCHRONOUS: check on every state transition
|
+-- NO  --> Is the state space small enough to snapshot cheaply?
            |
            +-- YES --> SAMPLED: poll every 1-5 seconds
            +-- NO  --> EVENT-DRIVEN: subscribe to state-change events

Synchronous: Runs in the hot path. Budget 0.1-2ms per check. Use for safety-critical invariants where a single violation is unacceptable.

Sampled: Runs on a timer. Violations may persist for one interval before detection. Use for liveness properties or when sync overhead is unacceptable.

Hybrid: Cheap precondition sync, full check async. Use when the full invariant is expensive but a necessary precondition is cheap.

Decision Tree 2: Alert vs Auto-Remediate vs Halt

Violation detected. What is the blast radius?
|
+-- SINGLE SESSION (one agent affected)
|   |
|   +-- Self-healing? (e.g., stale heartbeat -> reaper fixes it)
|   |   +-- YES --> LOG + ALERT (info). Let existing machinery fix it.
|   |   +-- NO  --> AUTO-REMEDIATE: trigger salvage for affected session.
|   |
+-- MULTI-SESSION (systemic violation)
|   |
|   +-- Could this be a false positive from clock skew or snapshot lag?
|       +-- YES --> RETRY with fresh snapshot. If still violated --> escalate.
|       +-- NO  --> HALT new session creation. Alert operator.
|
+-- DAEMON INTEGRITY (monitor detected corruption)
    --> HALT EVERYTHING. Write to append-only audit log.
        Signal operator via out-of-band channel.

Decision Tree 3: Clock Skew False Positives

Monitor reports a temporal ordering violation.
|
+-- Using wall-clock time?
|   +-- YES --> Delta within NTP skew tolerance (<100ms)?
|   |           +-- YES --> FALSE POSITIVE. Suppress. Debug log.
|   |           +-- NO  --> Check for NTP step adjustment.
|   |                       NTP step? Suppress + warn. Else: REAL VIOLATION.
|   +-- NO (HLC / Lamport clocks)
|       +-- Logical component monotonic even if physical is not?
|           +-- YES --> FALSE POSITIVE. Suppress.
|           +-- NO  --> REAL VIOLATION. HLC is broken. HALT.

Trace-Checking Algorithms

Approach	Latency	Memory	Use Case
Online (streaming)	Per-event	O(formula size)	Synchronous monitors
Offline (batch)	Post-hoc	O(trace length)	Audit, forensics
Bounded online	Per-event	O(window size)	Sliding-window properties

For agent coordination, use bounded online:

• Safety invariants (NoteMonotonicity): O(1) per session, check every transition
• Liveness invariants (CrashRecovery): O(active dead agents), bounded window
• Temporal ordering: Ring buffer of last N events, O(N)

Complexity budget (100 req/s daemon, 10ms p99 target):

• Per-request monitor: 0.5ms (5% of latency budget)
• Background sweep: 10ms every 1s (1% CPU)
• Total overhead target: < 2%

Worked Example: Compiling NoteMonotonicity

The Formal Invariant (TLA+)

From the Port Daddy whitepaper:

\* SAFETY: Notes never shrink for active sessions
NoteMonotonicity ==
  \A a \in registered :
    sessions[a] # NULL /\ sessions[a].status = "active"
    => Len(sessions'[a].notes) >= Len(sessions[a].notes)

For every registered agent with an active session, the note count in the next state must be >= the current state. Notes are append-only.

Step 1: Identify Violating Transitions

• addNote() -- safe by construction (only increases count)
• deleteSession() -- CASCADE destroys notes (violates if session active)
• Direct SQL DELETE/UPDATE FROM session_notes -- bypasses API (corruption)

Step 2: Choose Strategy

Safety-critical + cheap check (integer comparison) = synchronous.

Step 3: Compile to Runtime Monitor

function createNoteMonotonicityMonitor(db: Database) {
  const noteCounts = new Map<string, number>();

  function checkAfterAddNote(sessionId: string): Violation | null {
    const row = db.prepare(
      'SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM session_notes WHERE sessionId = ?'
    ).get(sessionId) as { count: number };
    const previous = noteCounts.get(sessionId) ?? 0;
    noteCounts.set(sessionId, row.count);
    if (row.count < previous) {
      return { invariant: 'NoteMonotonicity', sessionId,
               previousCount: previous, currentCount: row.count,
               timestamp: Date.now(), trigger: 'addNote' };
    }
    return null;
  }

  function sweep(): Violation[] {
    const violations: [] = [];
     rows = db.().()  <{ : ; :  }>;
     ( row  rows) {
       previous = noteCounts.(row.) ?? ;
       (row. < previous)
        violations.({ : , : row.,
          : previous, : row.,
          : .(), :  });
      noteCounts.(row., row.);
    }
     violations;
  }

   () { noteCounts.(sessionId); }
   { checkAfterAddNote, sweep, forget };
}

Step 4: Wire Into the Daemon

// In sessions.ts -- after INSERT, before return:
const violation = monitor.checkAfterAddNote(sessionId);
if (violation) arbiter.onViolation(violation);

// In server.ts -- background sweep every 5s:
setInterval(() => {
  for (const v of monitor.sweep()) arbiter.onViolation(v);
}, 5000);

Step 5: Remediation Handler

function onViolation(v: Violation) {
  auditLog.append({ type: 'INVARIANT_VIOLATION', ...v });
  const session = sessions.get(v.sessionId);
  if (session?.session?.agentId)
    resurrection.enqueue(session.session.agentId, {
      reason: `Arbiter: ${v.invariant} violated`, evidence: v });
  messaging.publish('arbiter-violations', JSON.stringify(v));
  webhooks.fire('arbiter.violation', v);
}

Step 6: Verify the Monitor

Quality gate: 100% of injected violations caught, < 2% CPU overhead.

// Injection test: direct DELETE bypassing API
db.prepare('DELETE FROM session_notes WHERE sessionId = ?').run(sessionId);
const violations = monitor.sweep();
expect(violations).toHaveLength(1);
expect(violations[0].currentCount).toBeLessThan(violations[0].previousCount);

// Overhead test: <0.5ms per check
const start = performance.now();
for (let i = 0; i < 10_000; i++) monitor.checkAfterAddNote(sessionId);
expect((performance.now() - start) / 10_000).toBeLessThan(0.5);

Failure Modes

Failure Mode 1: Monitoring Overhead Kills Throughput

Symptom: p99 latency spikes after enabling synchronous monitors.

Root cause: Checks too expensive for the hot path -- multi-table JOINs, full table scans, or checking all-session invariants per single-session op.

Detection: Track check_duration_ms per invariant. Alert if >1ms average.

Remediation:

Is the slow check safety-critical?
+-- YES --> Cache/precompute state (e.g., in-memory count map, not COUNT(*))
|           If still slow --> HYBRID: cheap sync + expensive async
+-- NO  --> Move to SAMPLED. Accept detection delay.

Prevention: Budget 0.5ms/sync check. Precompute state. No full scans in sync path.

Failure Mode 2: False Positive Cascades

Symptom: Arbiter triggers salvage on healthy sessions. Death spiral where remediation triggers further false violations.

Root causes:

1. Clock skew: Wall-clock goes backward after NTP adjustment
2. Snapshot inconsistency: Monitor reads mid-transaction
3. Stale monitor state: Cache diverges from DB after crash recovery

Detection: Track false positive rate. If >5% of violations not reproducible on re-check, your monitor has a consistency bug.

Remediation:

+-- Clock skew     --> Use HLC. Suppress violations where delta < NTP_TOLERANCE.
+-- Snapshot       --> Check after transaction commits, not during.
+-- Stale state    --> Resync from DB on startup, after crashes, and every 60s.

Prevention: Always double-check before remediating. Single-check triggers re-check; only double-confirmed triggers salvage.

Failure Mode 3: The Watchman Crashes (Quis Custodiet)

Symptom: Arbiter dies/hangs. No invariants checked. Violations accumulate silently. System believes it is monitored when it is not.

Root causes:

1. Unhandled exception in monitor code (malformed input -> SQL error)
2. Unbounded state growth (tracking every session ever, not just active)
3. Deadlock (monitor lock conflicts with daemon write path)

Detection:

• Heartbeat canary: Arbiter publishes heartbeat every N seconds; daemon alerts if no heartbeat within 2N seconds
• Self-check invariant: "I am running" is always the first check

Remediation:

Heartbeat missed.
+-- PID alive?
|   +-- YES --> Hung. SIGTERM, wait 5s, SIGKILL. Restart + resync.
|   +-- NO  --> Crashed. Restart immediately. Check crash log.
+-- After restart: full sweep immediately.
+-- 3+ crashes in 10 min: HALT new sessions. Alert operator.
    Do NOT keep restarting -- fix the bug first.

Prevention: try/catch every check. Bound state with LRU. Separate DB connection (WAL mode). Meta-monitor must be trivially simple -- just a setInterval checking a timestamp. Complex meta-monitors create infinite regression.

Anti-Patterns

1. Checking Everything Synchronously. Partition by criticality: safety-critical gets sync, liveness gets sampled, statistical gets offline batch.

2. Monitors That Mutate State. Monitors observe and report. Remediation is separate. A monitor that "fixes" violations is a participant, not an observer -- it introduces its own bugs and triggers other monitors.

3. Unbounded Monitor State. Track only active sessions. forget() on end. Hard cap with LRU eviction. Cold-start from DB if needed.

4. Alert Fatigue. Severity tiers + suppression policies. Low-severity accumulates into hourly digests. Only high-severity triggers immediate alerts.

5. Happy-Path-Only Testing. Every monitor needs injection tests: direct SQL bypassing API, concurrent races, clock manipulation, simulated crash recovery.

Quality Gates

Gate	Criterion	Verification
Correctness	100% of injected violations caught	>= 10 injection scenarios
No false positives	Zero on 24h clean run	Load test against healthy daemon
Overhead	< 2% CPU, < 0.5ms/sync check	Benchmark with/without monitor
Crash resilience	Recovers from own crash	Kill mid-sweep, verify resync
State bounded	Memory O(active sessions)	24h churn test, measure RSS
Watchman health	Canary detects death within 2x interval	Kill monitor, verify alert

Compiling Any TLA+ Safety Invariant

1. Identify state variables referenced by the invariant
2. Identify actions that can modify those variables
3. Per action, determine if sync check is feasible (< 0.5ms)
4. Compile into (previous, current) -> Violation | null
5. Wire into action path (sync) or background sweep (sampled)
6. Define remediation: log, alert, salvage, or halt
7. Write injection tests that bypass the API
8. Measure overhead against quality gates

Port Daddy Invariant Reference

Invariant	Strategy	State	Remediation
NoteMonotonicity	Sync + sweep	noteCount/session	Salvage
EscrowInvariant	Sync (per Begin)	escrow/session	Reject Begin
CrashRecovery	Sampled (5s)	dead agent times	Trigger reaper
HeartbeatFreshness	Sampled (10s)	heartbeat/agent	Mark stale/dead
FileClaimConsistency	Sync (per claim)	claims/file	Alert on conflict

The Arbiter as a Port Daddy Agent

The Arbiter registers as an agent, sends heartbeats, and writes violation notes. If it crashes, the reaper detects it and enqueues it for salvage:

pd agent register --agent arbiter-001 \
  --identity myproject:arbiter:main --purpose "Invariant monitoring"
pd begin --agent arbiter-001 --purpose "Monitoring against formal invariants"

The recursion terminates because the reaper is a simple timer with no invariant checks of its own -- the ground truth that must be correct by inspection, not by monitoring.