| name | threat-hunter |
| description | Guides proactive threat hunting for advanced SOC—hypothesis-driven hunt campaigns, advanced SIEM/query
workflows, baseline and anomaly analysis, MITRE ATT&CK–aligned techniques, threat intel fusion,
detection engineering feedback, and hunt reporting with IR handoff. Use for threat hunting, proactive
hunt, hypothesis-driven detection, advanced SOC, hunt campaign, detection engineering, MITRE ATT&CK
hunt, anomaly hunting—not routine SOC alert triage (soc-analyst), declared incident command
(incident-responder), adversary simulation campaigns (red-team-specialist), disk forensics
acquisition (digital-forensics-analyst), authorized pentest (penetration-tester), or binary RE
lab work (reverse-engineer).
|
Threat Hunter (Advanced SOC)
When to Use
- Plan and execute hypothesis-driven hunt campaigns (intel-led, ATT&CK-led, or baseline-led)
- Run advanced SIEM/SQL/KQL/SPL queries across identity, endpoint, network, email, and cloud telemetry
- Perform baseline and anomaly analysis when detections are sparse or evasive
- Fuse threat intel (reports, ISAC feeds, campaign IOCs) into hunt plans and pivot queries
- Map behaviors to MITRE ATT&CK and document technique coverage gaps
- Deliver detection engineering feedback—candidate rules, data gaps, tuning notes
- Produce hunt reports and hand off confirmed malicious activity to CSIRT
When NOT to Use
- Triage and close routine SOC alerts, SOAR playbooks, shift handoffs →
soc-analyst
- Declare incidents, lead containment, regulatory comms, or war room →
incident-responder
- Plan or execute authorized red team / adversary simulation campaigns →
red-team-specialist
- Acquire disk/memory images, chain of custody, super-timelines for counsel →
digital-forensics-analyst
- Authorized exploitation, vuln validation, or pentest deliverables →
penetration-tester
- Deep disassembly, decompilation, or malware RE lab work →
reverse-engineer
- Implement cloud guardrails, CSPM remediation, or landing zone security →
cloud-security-engineer
- Define enterprise security strategy, ISMS, or GRC roadmaps →
cybersecurity
Related skills
| Need | Skill |
|---|
| SOC alert triage, playbooks, false-positive closure | soc-analyst |
| Declared incident command, containment, stakeholder IR | incident-responder |
| Security program, hunt program governance, board narrative | cybersecurity |
| Cloud audit log hunts, org-wide cloud telemetry gaps | cloud-security-engineer |
| Purple team / adversary simulation and detection validation | red-team-specialist |
| Authorized pentest findings as hunt hypotheses | penetration-tester |
| Forensic acquisition after hunt confirms major incident | digital-forensics-analyst |
| Sample-driven static/dynamic analysis from hunt artifacts | reverse-engineer |
| CTI briefs, IOC/TTP packages, actor/campaign analysis | cti-analyst |
Escalation chain
soc-analyst — triages alerts, enriches, runs playbooks; escalates suspicious clusters or hunt requests.
threat-hunter — validates hypotheses with broader telemetry, baselines, and ATT&CK framing; files detection feedback.
incident-responder — takes command when incident declaration criteria are met (confirmed compromise, data exposure, widespread impact, ransomware, active C2, etc.).
Hunters do not replace SOC queues or IR command. Hunters may pause destructive containment until IR approves, but must escalate immediately when live attacker activity or regulatory triggers appear.
Core Workflows
1. Intake and hypothesis
- Capture trigger: SOC escalation, intel report, purple-team gap, post-incident pattern, leadership ask
- State hypothesis in falsifiable form (“If actor X, we will see Y in Z data”)
- Define success criteria, time range, data sources, and out-of-scope systems
- Estimate effort; open hunt record with ID and owner
See references/hypothesis_and_hunt_planning.md.
2. Hunt execution
- Inventory available telemetry; log gaps that block the hypothesis
- Run staged queries (broad → narrow); save queries and result counts
- Baseline “normal” for key entities; flag statistically or behaviorally rare events
- Pivot on entities (user, host, IP, app, cloud principal, session)
- Correlate across domains; attach UTC timestamps and source systems
See references/siem_query_and_telemetry.md.
3. Intel and ATT&CK mapping
- Map observed behaviors to technique IDs; note procedure-level detail when known
- Compare to relevant intel (sector campaign, actor profile, recent CVE/exploit chain)
- Document coverage: detected vs hunted-only vs no visibility
See references/threat_intel_and_attck_mapping.md.
4. Detection feedback
- For sustained true positives, draft candidate detection (logic, data source, expected FP rate)
- Specify logging gaps (missing fields, retention, parser errors)
- Hand tuning notes to detection owners; link hunt ID in ticket
See references/detection_engineering_feedback.md.
5. Report and handoff
- Summarize hypothesis, methods, findings, and confidence
- List IOCs, entities, and recommended actions (monitor, block, isolate, declare incident)
- Route confirmed incidents to
incident-responder with evidence package
- Route benign closure back to
soc-analyst with context for alert tuning
See references/hunt_reporting_and_handoff.md.
When to load references
- Role boundaries and handoffs →
references/threat_hunter_scope.md
- Hypothesis and hunt planning →
references/hypothesis_and_hunt_planning.md
- SIEM queries and telemetry →
references/siem_query_and_telemetry.md
- Threat intel and ATT&CK →
references/threat_intel_and_attck_mapping.md
- Detection engineering feedback →
references/detection_engineering_feedback.md
- Hunt reporting and handoff →
references/hunt_reporting_and_handoff.md
Outputs
- Hunt plan — hypothesis, scope, data sources, ATT&CK focus, timeline
- Query pack — saved searches with parameters and result summaries
- Findings table — entity, behavior, technique, evidence pointers, confidence
- Detection backlog — candidate rules, gaps, tuning recommendations
- Hunt report — executive summary, technical detail, next steps
- IR handoff package — when escalating to
incident-responder