security-stance

name	security-stance
description	Mini Diarium's opinionated security, encryption, and privacy stance. Load when touching crypto (crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/crypto/), auth (crates/mini-diarium-core/src/auth/, commands/auth/), IPC boundaries (src/lib/errors.ts, tauri.ts), auto-lock (screen_lock.rs, App.tsx idle timer), database schema/migrations (db/schema.rs), backups (backup.rs), config.json / JournalConfig, import/export, plugin sandbox (Rhai), search (intentionally stubbed), debug dump, Tauri capabilities (src-tauri/capabilities/) or CSP (tauri.conf.json), E2E isolation env vars, or anything involving passwords, keys, nonces, zeroization, or entry persistence. Also load when reviewing or proposing new features to judge against the six PHILOSOPHY.md principles and five non-negotiables.
compatibility	Designed for Claude Code. Applies to Mini Diarium only.

Mini Diarium — Security Stance

The opinionated, repo-specific security/privacy/encryption stance for Mini Diarium. Use this skill alongside (not instead of) /security-review. This document is passive context that loads whenever security-adjacent work appears; /security-review is a one-shot review command.

The authoritative sources are PHILOSOPHY.md and SECURITY.md. This skill distills the operational details: invariants, file:line anchors, footguns, and what-breaks-if-you-change-this. When this document and an authoritative source disagree, the source wins — file an update to this skill.

---

1. When to load this skill

Load when work touches any of:

• Crypto: crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/crypto/cipher.rs, crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/crypto/password.rs
• Auth: crates/mini-diarium-core/src/auth/mod.rs (composed slot ops + AuthMethodInfo), crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/auth/{password,keypair,auto_key}.rs (the pure wrapping methods), src-tauri/src/commands/auth/
• IPC contract: src/lib/tauri/, src/lib/errors.ts, any new #[tauri::command]
• Auto-lock paths: src/App.tsx idle timer, src-tauri/src/screen_lock.rs, src/lib/focus-lock.ts, src-tauri/src/window_focus.rs, src/lib/dialog.ts
• DB schema / migrations: crates/mini-diarium-core/src/db/schema/mod.rs (SCHEMA_VERSION at line 32), crates/mini-diarium-core/src/db/schema/migrations/
• Backups & rotation: crates/mini-diarium-core/src/backup.rs
• Journal config: crates/mini-diarium-core/src/config.rs (JournalConfig, auto_key, require_all_auth)
• Import / export: src-tauri/src/commands/import.rs, commands/export.rs, import/*.rs, export/*.rs
• Plugin sandbox: crates/mini-diarium-core/src/plugin/rhai_loader/ (runtime.rs = engine + limits, metadata.rs, mod.rs = loader), plugin/registry.rs, plugin/builtins.rs
• Search interface (preserved stub): src-tauri/src/commands/search.rs, src/state/search.ts, src/components/search/
• Debug dump: src-tauri/src/commands/debug.rs
• File-read commands & allowlists: src-tauri/src/commands/files.rs
• Tauri capabilities: src-tauri/capabilities/*.json
• CSP: src-tauri/tauri.conf.json (security.csp, dangerousDisableAssetCspModification)
• Network isolation: src-tauri/src/lib.rs (init script, on_navigation, on_new_window, Windows COM handler, macOS WKContentRuleList handler); src/lib/network-isolation-script.ts (TS copy — must stay in sync with Rust)
• E2E env-var isolation: src-tauri/src/lib.rs (MINI_DIARIUM_E2E*)
• Sanitization of imported HTML/Markdown: src/lib/markdown.ts (DOMPurify)
• Anything involving passwords, keys, nonces, zeroization, or persistence of entry content

Examples

• Adding a new Tauri command that touches entries / files / auth / plugins → load
• Pure CSS-only change, i18n string addition, README typo → do not load
• Reviewing/proposing new features → load to apply the six principles + five non-negotiables

---

2. The five non-negotiables (absolute invariants)

From PHILOSOPHY.md:165-169. These are not preferences — they are red lines.

#	Rule	Enforcement / Where it shows up first
1	No network access. Mini Diarium never initiates any network connection. OS-opener links (About screen, Onboarding) hand a URL to the system browser — the app makes no network call itself.	None of the three crate manifests — src-tauri/Cargo.toml (app crate), crates/mini-diarium-core/Cargo.toml (business layer), or crates/mini-diarium-crypto/Cargo.toml (crypto crate) — contains reqwest, hyper, socket2, ureq, etc. (PHILOSOPHY.md:225). Capabilities allowlist (src-tauri/capabilities/default.json) has no http:*. CI static check scripts/check-no-network.ps1 (globs and scans all crate manifests) enforces this on every push. Adding a network crate or capability is the visible violation.
2	No custom cryptography. Standard algorithms and established libraries only.	Code review: any homegrown MAC, KDF, cipher mode, nonce scheme, or "encryption helper" is the violation. We use aes-gcm, argon2, x25519-dalek, hkdf, zeroize.
3	No password recovery. If credentials are lost, data is gone. Mitigation = register a second auth method.	Refusing to add a "reset password without old password" path. The only re-wrap is change_password (requires current creds). remove_auth_method refuses to delete the last slot.
4	No vendor lock-in. Users must be able to export and migrate freely.	JSON + Markdown exports remain plaintext, with documented schema (PHILOSOPHY.md:82-87). Removing or proprietizing an export format is the violation.
5	Honest threat documentation. Document what IS protected and what IS NOT. Never overstate.	SECURITY.md table is the contract. Adding sync, sharing, or "encrypted by your account" without updating the threat model is the violation.

If an agent proposes a change that visibly conflicts with any non-negotiable: STOP. Surface the conflict to the user. Do not implement, even partially.

---

3. Threat model at a glance

Compact form of SECURITY.md:30-43. This is the "what can I honestly promise?" cheat sheet.

Threat	Protected?	By what mechanism	Where documented
Offline file access (stolen device, dumped backup, raw diary.db)	YES	AES-256-GCM per field, fresh random 12-byte nonce from OsRng per write	SECURITY.md:32, crypto/cipher.rs:70-74
Password guessing at rest	YES	Argon2id m=64 MiB, t=3, p=4 (exceeds OWASP 2023 minimums)	SECURITY.md:33, crypto/password.rs:8-10
Weak-credential key-file attack	YES	X25519 ECDH + HKDF-SHA256 — strength = 256-bit curve regardless of file location/name	SECURITY.md:34, auth/keypair.rs:8
Multi-credential compromise (revoke one, others unaffected)	YES	Each auth method wraps its own copy of the master key in auth_slots	SECURITY.md:35
In-memory key leakage after lock	YES	Lock drops DB connection, clears keys; SecretBytes/Key use ZeroizeOnDrop; explicit .zeroize() on success and error paths	SECURITY.md:36, crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/auth/mod.rs:21-53, crypto/cipher.rs:14-22, crypto/password.rs:60,103
Running session on the device (unlocked)	NO	Out of scope — content lives in process memory; mitigated by locking	SECURITY.md:40
Malicious software on the device (keylogger, screen-cap, ptrace)	NO	Out of scope — protect the device first	SECURITY.md:41
Cloud-sync provider compromise of the DB file alone	PARTIAL	Sees only ciphertext. If the same provider also holds the key file or config.json with auto_key, the journal is compromised.	SECURITY.md:42, docs/decisions/2026-04-passwordless-journal.md
Coercion / credential theft from an unlocked device

---

4. Crypto invariants (concrete numbers, not principles)

Invariant	Value / shape	File:line	What breaks if changed
AES-GCM key size	32 bytes (AES-256)	crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/crypto/cipher.rs:9	Incompatible with all existing ciphertext
AES-GCM nonce size	12 bytes	crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/crypto/cipher.rs:12	AES-GCM spec violation; existing blobs unparseable
AES-GCM nonce generation	Random per encrypt via OsRng.fill_bytes	crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/crypto/cipher.rs:70-74	Nonce reuse → catastrophic keystream-XOR leak
Ciphertext blob layout	[nonce(12) ‖ ciphertext ‖ tag(16)]	crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/crypto/cipher.rs:83-104	All existing entries unrecoverable
Argon2id memory	65536 KiB (64 MB)	crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/crypto/password.rs:8	Weakening = faster offline crack; strengthening = slow unlock on older hardware. Either way: schema migration + CHANGELOG Security entry.
Argon2id iterations	3	crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/crypto/password.rs:9	Same — migration class change
Argon2id parallelism	4	crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/crypto/password.rs:10	Same — migration class change
X25519 HKDF info string	b"mini-diarium-v1" (constant)	crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/auth/keypair.rs:8	All existing keypair slots unrecoverable
Wrapped-key blob (keypair)	[eph_pub(32) ‖ nonce(12) ‖ ciphertext(32) ‖ tag(16)] = 92 bytes for a 32-byte master key	crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/auth/keypair.rs:12-14	Existing keypair slots unparseable
SecretBytes	#[derive(ZeroizeOnDrop)]; Debug shows SecretBytes([REDACTED; N])	crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/auth/mod.rs:21-53	Keys linger in heap; Debug would leak bytes

Rule for any change to a row in this table:

1. Schema migration with SCHEMA_VERSION bump in db/schema/mod.rs.
2. Explicit ### Security section in the next CHANGELOG entry, plus user-facing notes.
3. SECURITY.md update if the threat model shifts.
4. Stop and confirm with the user before silently "upgrading" parameters.

---

5. Auth architecture

A random 256-bit master key is generated at journal creation (db/schema/create.rs). It encrypts every entry field with AES-256-GCM. The master key itself is never stored in plaintext — it is wrapped per registered auth slot in the auth_slots table (schema v3+). See SECURITY.md:47-69.

Three wrap methods exist:

Method	File	Wrap mechanism	Stores
PasswordMethod	crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/auth/password.rs	Argon2id-derived key + AES-256-GCM	PHC hash + AES-GCM blob
KeypairMethod	crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/auth/keypair.rs	X25519 ECIES + HKDF-SHA256 + AES-256-GCM	X25519 public key + 92-byte ECIES blob
AutoKeyMethod	crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/auth/auto_key.rs	32-byte device-bound random key + AES-256-GCM (no KDF — already 32 bytes of entropy)	Wrapping key hex lives in config.json, not in the DB

Hard rules:

• change_password is O(1): re-wraps the master key only. Never re-encrypt entries on password change — that conversation always ends in a production bug. See SECURITY.md:61.
• remove_auth_method refuses to delete the last slot. That guard lives at src-tauri/src/commands/auth/auth_methods.rs:197+. Never remove or weaken it. Removing the only auth method = unrecoverable journal.
• require_all_auth (per journal) forces unlock_diary_all_methods. Single-method unlock paths must keep the guard. The guard lives in commands/auth/auth_core.rs:80-90 and again at :136-146 (one per single-method unlock path). When adding a new single-method unlock path, add the guard there too.
• Passwordless (AutoKeyMethod) is accepted per docs/decisions/2026-04-passwordless-journal.md. Trade-off: OS-account compromise = journal compromise. The UI surfaces this via an explicit acknowledgement checkbox in PasswordCreation.tsx. The auto_key hex must stay in config.json — moving it into the DB creates a decryption circularity (you would need the key to decrypt the key).
• Master-key returns travel as SecretBytes (crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/auth/mod.rs:21-53) so they zeroize on drop even if the caller forgets.
• Both success and error paths zeroize. Wrong-password code paths must also call .zeroize() on derived wrapping keys. See crypto/password.rs:60 (success) and :103 (error).

---

6. Auto-lock: all three paths must fire

Auto-lock is a triple-path mechanism. A change to one path is implicitly a change to all three — the agent must verify the other two still work.

Path A — Frontend idle timer (src/App.tsx:20-55)

• Tracks user activity events: mousemove, keydown, click, touchstart, scroll (App.tsx:22).
• After autoLockTimeout seconds of inactivity, calls lockJournal() (App.tsx:42).
• Cleanup in onCleanup removes listeners and clears the timer (App.tsx:48-54).
• Controlled by autoLockEnabled + autoLockTimeout preferences.

Path B — Backend OS events (src-tauri/src/screen_lock.rs)

• Windows: WM_WTSSESSION_CHANGE (lock/logoff) + WM_POWERBROADCAST (suspend) via Win32 subclass (screen_lock.rs:1-100).
• macOS: screen-sleep + com.apple.screenIsLocked notifications.
• Both call commands::auth::auto_lock_diary_if_unlocked(...) (screen_lock.rs:79, :208) and emit 'journal-locked'.
• Fires even when the app is in the background.

Path C — Frontend focus-loss lock (src/lib/focus-lock.ts + src-tauri/src/window_focus.rs, wired in App.tsx)

• Not DOM visibilitychange — the original design, disproven by manual testing (TODO-0068): WebView2 does not reliably update document.visibilityState on window minimize (confirmed with the CDP debugger fully detached, ruling out an automation-tooling confound).
• Detection lives in Rust (window_focus.rs): on_window_event on WindowEvent::Focused, emitting "window-unfocused" (false) / "window-focused" (true). A single push-based event pair covers minimize, Alt+Tab/Cmd+Tab away, clicking another app's window, and (on macOS) Cmd+H "Hide" — all of these resign/regain the window's key/active status at the OS level: WM_KILLFOCUS/WM_NCACTIVATE (Windows), windowDidResignKey (macOS — its own doc comment in tao explicitly calls out the Cmd+Tab case), GTK focus-out-event (Linux, forwarded as a genuine WindowEvent unlike minimize/iconify, which GTK only tracks internally). No polling needed — this superseded an earlier is_minimized()-polling design once source inspection confirmed Focused is reliably forwarded on all three platforms.
• Debounced, not immediate (FOCUS_LOSS_DEBOUNCE_MS, focus-lock.ts, default 3000ms, parametrized as an options.debounceMs field so it's overridable in tests and easy to retune): user feedback after shipping the immediate-lock version reported that a misclick outside the window locked the journal instantly, which was too aggressive. window-unfocused now starts a setTimeout instead of locking; window-focused clears it. isDialogOpen() and isUnlocked() are (re-)checked when the timer actually fires, not at the initial event, since either can change during the debounce window.
• Design iteration history: (1) frontend-only visibilitychange/blur — disproven, WebView2 doesn't fire it reliably on minimize; (2) Rust is_minimized() polling + a macOS-specific NSApplication.isHidden poll for Cmd+H — replaced because it missed alt-tab/click-away entirely, which the user confirmed was undesired (intent is "lock on any focus loss"); (3) WindowEvent::Focused(false)-only, immediate lock — replaced after the user reported it was too aggressive (locks on a misclick); (4) current: / pair + debounce.

Frontend listener (src/state/auth.ts:240-263)

• setupAuthEventListeners() listens for 'journal-locking' (pre-lock cleanup) and 'journal-locked' (post-lock state reset).
• Wired in App.tsx on mount.

Checklist for any change here:

• If you touched App.tsx, did backend OS lock (Path B) and the focus-loss lock (Path C) still result in a clean UI lock?
• If you touched screen_lock.rs, did the idle-timer path (Path A) and the focus-loss lock (Path C) still call lockJournal cleanly?
• If you touched focus-lock.ts, did the idle-timer path (Path A) and backend OS lock (Path B) still fire independently?
• Did the 'journal-locked' event still propagate?
• Were the platform-specific Win32 / macOS code paths preserved?
• If you added a new native dialog call site, does it import open/save/confirm from src/lib/dialog.ts (not @tauri-apps/plugin-dialog directly)? A direct import reopens the false-positive-lock gap Path C's dialog guard exists to close.

---

7. The IPC / error sanitization boundary

• Every Tauri invoke() failure that reaches user-visible UI must go through mapTauriError(err, t) from src/lib/errors.ts:13-51.
• What it strips: filesystem paths, OS error codes (os error N), rusqlite/sqlite/argon2 internals.
• What it passes through verbatim: already-user-friendly strings ("file is too large", wrong-password messages — see the regex matches at errors.ts:17-32).
• Call sites that may omit the translator argument t: module-level state (e.g., src/state/auth.ts) where no i18n context is available — mapTauriError falls back to defaultT (English) per the JSDoc at errors.ts:7-12. Those errors go to an error signal, not raw display.

Red flag patterns to grep for during review:

catch { setError(err.toString()) }
catch { setError(err.message) }
catch (err) { setError(String(err)) }

Any of these without mapTauriError is a bug. Fix at the call site.

Useful grep:

invoke\(|from '@tauri-apps/api'

For each match, confirm the surrounding catch block routes through mapTauriError. See src/CLAUDE.md "Error Handling" for the canonical pattern.

---

8. Data-at-rest rules

Surface	Encrypted?	Allowed contents	Forbidden contents
diary.db	YES — per-field AES-256-GCM	Encrypted entry title/body, auth_slots (wrapped master key copies), db_settings (schema v6: require_all_auth + HKDF-SHA256 MAC), schema metadata	Plaintext entry content; FTS index (removed in schema v4); plaintext title/body
config.json	NO — plaintext by design	Journal metadata (id, name, path), optional auto_key hex (32-byte random wrapping key), active_journal_id	Entry content; passwords; master key (plaintext); Argon2 PHC hashes; X25519 private keys; relative paths in journal entries (silently rejected — path-traversal guard); require_all_auth flag (moved to diary.db db_settings table in schema v6)
backups/	YES — direct file copies of diary.db	Up to 30 timestamped copies (backup.rs:6); inherit encryption	Anything not derived from a verbatim fs::copy of the live DB
Key files	N/A — owned by user	The X25519 private key (hex). Mode 0o600 on Unix; NTFS ACLs on Windows. App never keeps a copy.	App-side caching of the file or its contents. There is no "reveal key" UI — do not add one.
Exports (JSON / Markdown)	NO — intentionally plaintext	The portability contract from Principle 4 (PHILOSOPHY.md:67-88). UI must warn before write.	Encrypted-export formats. Don't add one without an explicit design review — conflicts with Easy In, Easy Out.
localStorage	NO	'preferences' (autoLockEnabled, autoLockTimeout, hideTitles, enableSpellcheck, etc.); 'theme-preference' (auto/light/dark); 'theme-overrides' (CSS token JSON). See src/CLAUDE.md Gotcha #6 for the three-key fan-out.

Reconciliation: auto_key in config.json vs. "no plaintext on disk"

The non-negotiable from PHILOSOPHY.md:166 is about diary content, not wrapping keys. auto_key is a 32-byte random AES wrapping key; the entries it wraps remain AES-256-GCM ciphertext on disk. The ADR (docs/decisions/2026-04-passwordless-journal.md:38-40) makes this explicit. Do not "fix" this by moving plaintext entries somewhere else, or by removing auto_key. The trade-off is documented and acknowledged in the UI.

WAL-mode caveat: SQLite is in default journal mode (DELETE), not WAL. fs::copy is therefore safe (backup.rs:22-28). A backup taken mid-write could theoretically capture a partial transaction; documented in SECURITY.md:87-88. Switching to WAL requires switching backups to the SQLite Online Backup API at the same time.

---

9. Search: in-memory scan (no plaintext on disk)

FTS was removed in v0.2.0 (schema v4) because the plaintext entries_fts table defeated encryption at rest. Search was reintroduced as an in-memory scan: each query decrypts entries (same decrypt path as export/stats), matches case- and accent-folded terms, builds HTML-escaped <mark> snippets, and discards everything. Nothing searchable is written to disk. Do not delete any of these:

Layer	Path	Purpose
Rust command	src-tauri/src/commands/search.rs	SearchResult struct + search_entries (in-memory decrypt + scan)
TS wrapper	src/lib/tauri/search.ts	SearchResult interface + searchEntries(query)
State	src/state/search.ts	searchQuery, searchResults, isSearching signals
UI	src/components/search/SearchOverlay.tsx (+ SearchBar.tsx, SearchResults.tsx)	Palette-style dialog mounted in MainLayout
Reindex anchors	// Search index hook: comments in crates/mini-diarium-core/src/db/queries/entries.rs (insert/update/delete) and src-tauri/src/commands/import.rs (bulk)	Unused today (in-memory scan needs no index); mark where a future encrypted index would plug in

Constraints for any future implementation (non-negotiable):

1. No plaintext on disk. Encrypted index, or in-memory rebuilt at unlock, or SQLCipher-style encrypted FTS. Do not reintroduce a plaintext FTS5 table.
2. Schema migration required. Bump SCHEMA_VERSION in db/schema/mod.rs:32 and add a migration step.
3. All reindex hooks wired. Every // Search index hook: site must call into the new module.
4. UI placement is undecided. Wire SearchBar/SearchResults into Sidebar.tsx or a new component; do not assume the old layout. See src-tauri/CLAUDE.md "Implementing Search" for the design constraints.

---

10. Plugin / Rhai sandbox

• User scripts live in {diary_dir}/plugins/*.rhai. No filesystem access, no network access, Rhai set_max_operations and other safety limits applied (plugin/rhai_loader/runtime.rs:13-15, inside create_sandboxed_engine).
• Built-ins and Rhai plugins share the same ImportPlugin/ExportPlugin traits (plugin/mod.rs). There is no privileged built-in path — built-ins implement the same interface as user-provided extensions (see PHILOSOPHY.md:204).
• The unsafe impl Send for RhaiImportPlugin {} / unsafe impl Sync (and the matching pair on RhaiExportPlugin) at plugin/rhai_loader/runtime.rs:126-127,150-151 is justified because the AST is immutable after compilation and the Engine is created fresh per invocation. Adding cached mutable engines, plugin state, or shared mutable AST invalidates the justification — flag for redesign and update or remove the unsafe blocks accordingly. See src-tauri/CLAUDE.md Gotcha #7.
• Rhai's export is a reserved keyword → export scripts must define fn format_entries(entries) (not fn export). The RhaiExportPlugin wrapper calls "format_entries" internally. See src-tauri/CLAUDE.md Gotcha #6.
• The plugin registry is built once at startup; diary-directory changes require app restart. Do not add hot-reload without threat modelling — it opens a path for the plugin dir to swap underneath a running unlock. See src-tauri/CLAUDE.md Gotcha #5.
• unsafe impl Send + Sync should only ever appear on Rhai wrappers. Any new unsafe impl on a plugin type requires explicit review.

---

11. Import / export safety

• Imports always create new entries. There is no date-conflict merge (PHILOSOPHY.md:73). Re-import = duplicates; that is the correct behaviour.
• File-size caps:
  • Imports: 100 MB (MAX_IMPORT_FILE_SIZE at src-tauri/src/commands/import.rs:5).
  • Markdown single-file read: 1 MiB (MAX_TEXT_FILE_BYTES at src-tauri/src/commands/files.rs:19).
• File-read allowlists (no wildcards):
  • read_file_bytes accepts only jpg, jpeg, png, gif, webp, bmp (commands/files.rs:7).
  • read_text_file accepts only .md (commands/files.rs:27).
  • Any new file-read command must add an explicit extension allowlist and a size cap. No exceptions.
• HTML/Markdown sanitization on import: Markdown imports go through DOMPurify in src/lib/markdown.ts:18-21 before TipTap. Do not bypass. TipTap's own sanitization is not sufficient for untrusted markdown.
• Export side: JSON and Markdown are intentionally plaintext (Principle 4). Adding an "encrypted export" format requires explicit design review — it conflicts with Easy In, Easy Out (Principle 4 in PHILOSOPHY.md:67-88).
• The reindex hook in commands/import.rs::import_entries (// Search index hook:) must be preserved when refactoring imports — see Section 9.

---

12. Runtime boundaries (Tauri capabilities, CSP, E2E isolation)

CSP (src-tauri/tauri.conf.json:24)

Current CSP:

default-src 'self' data:; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' ipc: http://ipc.localhost; worker-src 'none'; child-src 'none'; frame-src 'none'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'none'; manifest-src 'none'

Any broadening — external script-src, wildcard origins, 'unsafe-eval', remote connect-src — is a breaking security change. Requires non-negotiable review and a ### Security CHANGELOG entry.

dangerousDisableAssetCspModification: ["style-src"] (tauri.conf.json:25)

This flag is intentional. Do not remove because the name looks scary.

Reason: Tauri injects a runtime nonce into every CSP directive. When a nonce is present in style-src, browsers ignore 'unsafe-inline' per the CSP spec. This silently breaks TipTap's inline style="text-align: X" node-attribute rendering — alignment looks broken in production builds with no console error in dev. The flag disables nonce injection only for style-src; script-src remains nonce-protected.

See src/CLAUDE.md Gotcha #7 (issue #63). Do not remove or restructure without testing alignment in a production build (dev mode masks the bug).

Tauri capabilities (src-tauri/capabilities/default.json)

Current allowlist:

core:default
core:window:allow-close
opener:default
dialog:default
window-state:default

No network, no unrestricted fs, no shell, no updater. Adding any of:

• http:*
• fs:allow-* without a tight scope
• shell:*
• updater:*

…is a security decision. Justify in the PR description and add to SECURITY.md Operational Security.

E2E isolation env vars

MINI_DIARIUM_E2E, MINI_DIARIUM_APP_DIR, MINI_DIARIUM_DATA_DIR are read only in src-tauri/src/lib.rs (lines 40, 54, 92, 113) at setup time. Verified by grep -rn 'MINI_DIARIUM_E2E\|MINI_DIARIUM_APP_DIR\|MINI_DIARIUM_DATA_DIR' src-tauri/src/ returning matches in lib.rs only.

Never read these env vars in commands or business logic. Doing so leaks test-only escape hatches into production builds (anyone setting the env var bypasses the protection). Any new reference outside lib.rs is a bug — move it back to lib.rs setup and pass the result through State<> if needed.

---

13. Concurrency & state-handling rules

• DiaryState = Mutex<Option<DatabaseConnection>>. None = locked, Some(db) = unlocked. See src-tauri/CLAUDE.md "Security Rules".
• Every entry-accessing command must check unlocked state:

  let db = db_state.as_ref().ok_or("Diary not unlocked")?;
  

  (This exact string — or one matched by errors.ts:23 journal (must be|is not) unlocked — so mapTauriError can route it to errors.journalNotUnlocked.)
• Mutex poisoning must not panic. Commands must propagate a string error rather than letting a panic escape the Tauri boundary (a panic in a command aborts the process). For DB-only commands, use with_unlocked_db (canonical errors: "Journal state lock failed" / "Journal must be unlocked"). For commands that must open-code the preamble, use .map_err(|_| "Journal state lock failed".to_string()). Do not use .unwrap() on a Mutex — that converts a poisoned lock into a process abort.
• Schema migrations (db/schema/migrations/) must be idempotent and wrapped in a transaction. Historical v3→v4 and v4→v5 followed this; new migrations must too. Bump SCHEMA_VERSION (db/schema/mod.rs:32) and document the migration step inline.
• New commands must be registered in two places: src-tauri/src/commands/mod.rs (module) and lib.rs generate_handler![]. Missing either causes silent failure or compile error. Add the typed wrapper in the matching command-category sub-file under src/lib/tauri/. See src-tauri/CLAUDE.md "Adding a New Tauri Command".
• unsafe blocks outside crypto crates appear in four places: screen_lock.rs (Win32 subclass / WTS APIs), the two Rhai wrapper Send + Sync impls in rhai_loader/runtime.rs:126-151, and the two network-isolation platform handlers in lib.rs — install_webresource_requested_handler (Windows COM, lib.rs:373+) and install_content_rule_list (macOS ObjC2, lib.rs:448+). Each unsafe block has a comment justifying it.

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Useful greps (canary searches for review)

Run these before merging anything that touched a Section 1 surface. A surprising result is usually a bug.

Goal	Command
Network crates snuck into Cargo.toml	grep -nE 'reqwest|hyper|socket2|ureq' src-tauri/Cargo.toml crates/mini-diarium-core/Cargo.toml
Raw error display without sanitization (frontend)	grep -rnE "setError\((err\.toString\(\)|err\.message|String\(err\))" src/
invoke() call sites that may need mapTauriError review	grep -rn "invoke(" src/lib/tauri/ and audit downstream callers
MINI_DIARIUM_E2E* env vars leaking outside lib.rs	grep -rn "MINI_DIARIUM_E2E|MINI_DIARIUM_APP_DIR|MINI_DIARIUM_DATA_DIR" src-tauri/src/ (must show lib.rs only)
unwrap() on the diary mutex (Mutex-poison panic risk)	grep -rn "state.db.lock().unwrap" src-tauri/src/
New unsafe impl blocks	git grep -n "unsafe impl" -- src-tauri/src crates (expect: 4 in plugin/rhai_loader/runtime.rs — Send/Sync for RhaiImportPlugin and RhaiExportPlugin; zero in lib.rs — the platform handlers use unsafe {} blocks, not unsafe impl)
New file-read commands without allowlist	grep -rn "std::fs::read" src-tauri/src/commands/ and confirm extension/size guards
Plaintext logging of secret material	grep -rnE "info!|debug!|println!|eprintln!" crates/mini-diarium-core/src/auth/ crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/auth/ crates/mini-diarium-crypto/src/crypto/ and confirm no secrets in format args
FTS reintroduction	grep -rn "fts5|entries_fts" src-tauri/src/ (must return empty)

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A. Change-review checklist (use before proposing a diff)

Run through this list when modifying anything in Section 1's load-trigger surfaces.

• Does this introduce a network dependency (crate, capability, fetch)? STOP if yes. Violates non-negotiable #1.
• Does this introduce custom crypto (homegrown MAC, KDF, nonce scheme, cipher mode)? STOP if yes. Violates non-negotiable #2.
• Does this add a code path where passwords / master key / SecretBytes are logged, printed, serialized into telemetry, or copied into an unzeroized buffer? Fix before merging.
• Does this add a new invoke() call? Is its error piped through mapTauriError(err, t)?
• Does this change crypto parameters (Argon2id m/t/p, AES key size, nonce length, HKDF info)? Schema migration + CHANGELOG ### Security + SECURITY.md review.
• Does this persist anything new to disk? Is it ciphertext, or explicitly non-sensitive (prefs, paths, public keys)? Does it stay out of localStorage if it's sensitive?
• Does this touch auto-lock (App.tsx timer or screen_lock.rs)? Did I verify the other path still fires on Windows + macOS + Linux?
• Does this add/remove a Tauri command? Does it call db_state.as_ref().ok_or("Diary not unlocked")? where applicable? Does it handle Mutex poisoning without panicking? Is it registered in both commands/mod.rs and generate_handler![]?
• Does this touch search? Did I preserve the stub interface contract (Section 9)?
• Does this add a schema migration? Is it idempotent, transactional, and does it bump SCHEMA_VERSION?
• Does this change CSP or dangerousDisableAssetCspModification? Did I test text alignment in a production build (not dev)?
• Does this add a Tauri capability? Is it strictly necessary, scoped, and documented in ?

B. New-feature decision framework (from PHILOSOPHY.md:146-157)

Six principle questions, plus two Mini-Diarium-specific ones. Answer all eight honestly.

1. Core or extension? (Principle 1 — PHILOSOPHY.md:11-26)
2. Security impact / new crypto assumption? (Principle 2 — PHILOSOPHY.md:28-44)
3. Test coverage possible, fast, deterministic, offline? (Principle 3 — PHILOSOPHY.md:47-64)
4. Does it affect import/export or create lock-in? (Principle 4 — PHILOSOPHY.md:67-88)
5. Scope creep vs. focused journaling? (Principle 5 — PHILOSOPHY.md:92-117)
6. Simplicity cost vs. benefit? (Principle 6 — PHILOSOPHY.md:121-142)
7. Does this require a schema migration? Plan it up-front; bump SCHEMA_VERSION; write the migration step.
8. Does this expose anything to the frontend that was previously backend-only? Audit mapTauriError coverage at every new call site.

If any principle is violated without strong justification → reconsider.

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C. Tests that must stay green for security-critical changes

Security-critical changes to the listed surfaces must keep these test suites green. If a test fails, do not delete or weaken the test — it is asserting an invariant. Fix the code instead.

Suite	Command	What it asserts
Cipher round-trip + tamper	cargo test --workspace crypto::cipher	Encrypt/decrypt round-trip, ciphertext-uniqueness (per-call random nonce), tag-mismatch on tampered ciphertext, tag-mismatch on tampered nonce, wrong-key rejection (crypto/cipher.rs:148-296).
Password hash + verify	cargo test --workspace crypto::password	Argon2id parameter shape (m=65536, t=3, p=4 literal in PHC string), hash determinism for same salt, salt uniqueness, unicode + empty-string passwords, wrong-password rejection (crypto/password.rs:108-232).
Auth slots round-trip	cargo test --workspace auth	Wrap/unwrap of master key for password, keypair, and auto-key methods; last-slot guard; change_password re-wraps without entry re-encryption.
File-read allowlists	cargo test --workspace files	read_file_bytes rejects non-image extensions; read_text_file rejects non-.md and oversized files (commands/files.rs:44-110).
Schema + migration	cargo test --workspace db::schema	Schema creation; v3→v4→v5→v6 migrations idempotent.
Frontend error mapping	bun run test:run -- errors	mapTauriError strips paths and OS codes; passes through user-friendly "file is too large" (see errors.ts:30-32).
E2E unlock + lock + re-unlock	bun run test:e2e:local	Critical user flow: create journal, lock, unlock again. End-to-end against the real binary.

If a security change makes one of these assertions impossible to keep, that is a signal to stop and discuss with the user — not to delete the test. The benchmarks in src-tauri/benches/cipher_bench.rs are also a useful sanity check that performance hasn't degraded after a crypto-parameter change.

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References (deep-read map)

Compact pointers — do not duplicate content from these.

• PHILOSOPHY.md — six principles + non-negotiables (authoritative)
• SECURITY.md — threat model, crypto architecture, known limitations (authoritative)
• docs/decisions/2026-04-passwordless-journal.md — Option B-prime rationale; threat-model shift; future migration to OS keychain
• CLAUDE.md (root) — command registry, cross-cutting conventions, dual-path auto-lock note (Gotcha #3)
• src-tauri/CLAUDE.md — backend security rules; Tauri command pattern; FTS removal (Gotcha #1); auth slots (Gotcha #4); plugin registry init (Gotcha #5); Rhai reserved keyword (Gotcha #6); unsafe impl Send + Sync justification (Gotcha #7); search-implementation constraints
• src/CLAUDE.md — frontend error handling; mapTauriError pattern; base64 images in encrypted text field (Gotcha #5); three localStorage keys (Gotcha #6); dangerousDisableAssetCspModification (Gotcha #7)
• docs/diagrams/unlock.mmd, docs/diagrams/architecture.svg — visual walkthroughs of unlock flow and layered architecture
• CHANGELOG.md — ### Security sections per release (v0.2.0 FTS removal; v0.3.0 zeroization; v0.4.19 mandatory multi-auth; etc.)