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audit-gitbook-integration

Audit GitBook integrations for script injection, sensitive-data access, unsafe requests, authorization gaps, and manifest or dependency risk. Use for a requested integration security review, not routine feature work.

Quellinformationen

Repository
GitbookIO/integrations
Letzte Quellaktivität
5. Oktober 2026 um 15:51
Erkannte Sprache von SKILL.md
Englisch
Sterne
131
Forks
96

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SKILL.md
Quellanweisungen · Schreibgeschützte Vorschau
name
audit-gitbook-integration
description
Audit GitBook integrations for script injection, sensitive-data access, unsafe requests, authorization gaps, and manifest or dependency risk. Use for a requested integration security review, not routine feature work.
# Audit GitBook integrations ## Context GitBook is a platform for creating and publishing documentation sites. Integrations are installable extensions to a customer's documentation site and run in the Cloudflare Workers for Platform service. Integrations extend docs sites with outside tools, custom UI, and automated workflows. They do three main things: - Connect GitBook to other products — analytics, support, auth, Git, and more. - Add custom experiences — blocks, components, and embedded tools in your docs. - React to events — for example, page views, content updates, or Git sync activity. Users can install them at the organization, site, or space level. Some integrations are built-in, while others are developer-built. For more information, see: - https://gitbook.com/docs/manage-your-site/install-an-integration - https://gitbook.com/docs/developers/integrations/development/runtime Keep in mind that some integrations inject scripts into the users' page by design. That's not necessarily always malicious or a security concern. ## Goal of this skill The goal of this skill is to run a static code audit on the security of a given GitBook integration. There's no need to set up a plan, or ask the user to validate the plan. Just do the audit and output a report and a score. ## Step 1: Ask the user which integration to audit Immediately prompt the user to provide an integration to audit. That can be: - an integration in the https://github.com/gitbookio/integrations repository. - these are usually trusted code snippets from the GitBook team - an integration from a different repository - these are usually untrusted code snippets submitted by users - the code of an integration, directly pulled from Cloudflare. - these are usually untrusted code snippets submitted by users - Advise the user that to pull the code from Cloudflare, they'll need to run this curl command: - `curl \ "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/4401d86825a13bf607936cc3a9f3897a/workers/dispatch/namespaces/gitbook-x-prod-integrations/scripts/INTEGRATION_NAME/content" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN"` ## Step 2: Inspect the Integration Check for: - Data theft: leaking cookies, tokens, request bodies, secrets, or database contents through requests, responses, logs, or storage. - Unexpected network calls: unexplained destinations, credential forwarding, arbitrary URL fetching, open proxies. - Permission abuse: using bindings or platform RPC capabilities for unauthorized reads, writes, deletes, or actions. - Backdoors: hidden endpoints, magic headers, hardcoded credentials, authentication bypasses. - Hidden triggers: behavior activated by dates, specific users, counters, or remote commands. - Response tampering: phishing redirects, altered payments, unauthorized tracking. - Tenant leaks: accessing another tenant’s records or sharing sensitive data through caches or global state. - Background behavior: side effects in waitUntil(), streams, WebSockets, or delegated work. - Resource abuse: request floods, recursive calls, unbounded retries, expensive queries or API calls. - Concealed code: suspicious dependencies, encoded payloads, opaque WASM, or behavior absent from the readable source DO NOT: - attempt to fix issues - attempt to run the code - attempt to contact external services (eg. cloudflare API, other third party services) to test the security of the integration - you may contact github to fetch the integration code however (ideally, git clone a repo in a temporary directory) ## Step 3: Provide a report For each finding provide: - severity (levels. `critical`, `high`, `medium`, `low`), - confidence (levels. `high`, `medium`, `low`), - the source of the finding where applicable (what line of code or configuration triggered the finding) - an explanation of the risk associated with the finding - Make sure the explanation is clear, concise, and understandable to junior developers. Only show Critical & High severity findings to the user. Verify counts, links, and claims before handing it off; do not publish or update an external tracker unless the user requested that action. Do not include fix suggestions unless specifically intructed to. ## Step 4: Provide an overall security score and maliciousness rating - Provide a security score from (not secure) 1 to 10 (very secure) or a range if you're unsure. - Tell the user whether what you reviewed points to an intentionally malicious artifact, provide a score from (not malicious) 1 to 10 (very malicious), or a range if you're unsure.
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