Use when an Axum app must authenticate users with server-side sessions instead of self-contained tokens: a server-rendered web app with a login form, a flow that needs instant logout or revocation, mutable per-user state like a cart, HTTP Basic auth for an internal admin endpoint, or an OAuth2 social-login (Google, GitHub, corporate SSO) callback. Prevents shipping MemoryStore to production where sessions vanish on restart, prevents the with_secure(false) cookie leak over plain HTTP, prevents the session-fixation hole from not rotating the session id on login, prevents Basic auth credentials traveling in cleartext, prevents the OAuth2 login-CSRF hole from skipping the state check, and prevents login_required! applied with .layer() turning a 404 into an auth redirect. Covers the four-way auth decision tree (JWT vs session vs Basic vs OAuth2), tower-sessions SessionManagerLayer and the Session API, axum-login AuthSession with the AuthUser and AuthnBackend traits and the login_required! guard, axum-extra TypedHe
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Use when an Axum app must authenticate users with server-side sessions instead of self-contained tokens: a server-rendered web app with a login form, a flow that needs instant logout or revocation, mutable per-user state like a cart, HTTP Basic auth for an internal admin endpoint, or an OAuth2 social-login (Google, GitHub, corporate SSO) callback. Prevents shipping MemoryStore to production where sessions vanish on restart, prevents the with_secure(false) cookie leak over plain HTTP, prevents the session-fixation hole from not rotating the session id on login, prevents Basic auth credentials traveling in cleartext, prevents the OAuth2 login-CSRF hole from skipping the state check, and prevents login_required! applied with .layer() turning a 404 into an auth redirect. Covers the four-way auth decision tree (JWT vs session vs Basic vs OAuth2), tower-sessions SessionManagerLayer and the Session API, axum-login AuthSession with the AuthUser and AuthnBackend traits and the login_required! guard, axum-extra TypedHeader Authorization Basic, and the oauth2 crate authorization-code flow with PKCE. Keywords: axum session auth, tower-sessions, SessionManagerLayer, axum-login, AuthSession, login_required, AuthnBackend, AuthUser, cycle_id, session store, MemoryStore, HTTP Basic auth, TypedHeader Authorization Basic, oauth2 crate, authorization code flow, PKCE, CsrfToken, OAuth2 callback, Set-Cookie, session cookie, my sessions disappear after restart, logged out on deploy, cannot revoke a login, 404 redirects to login, login keeps failing, how do I add a login form, how do I do social login, what is session auth, session vs jwt, server-side session.
license
MIT
compatibility
Designed for Claude Code. Requires Axum 0.7,0.8.
metadata
{"author":"OpenAEC-Foundation","version":"1.0"}
axum-impl-auth-session
Overview
Session-based authentication stores NO user data in the cookie. The cookie
carries only an opaque, unguessable session ID; all real state (user id, roles,
CSRF token) lives server-side in a session store. This is the structural
opposite of JWT, where the token IS the state and the server holds nothing.
Axum ships no session machinery. This skill covers the four stateful and
delegated auth approaches and the crates that provide them:
Approach
Crate
Use for
Raw sessions
tower-sessions
session layer, no opinion on login
Full login system
axum-login (on tower-sessions)
typed user, login/logout, route guards
HTTP Basic
axum-extraTypedHeader
machine-to-machine over TLS
OAuth2
oauth2
delegated identity (Google, GitHub, SSO)
JWT (stateless bearer tokens) is a separate mechanism owned by the
axum-impl-auth-jwt skill.
Version Sensitivity
The four crates here are third-party and evolve faster than Axum. Builder method
names and macro argument shapes change across releases. The verified versions
for this skill are:
Crate
Verified version
tower-sessions
0.15.0
axum-login
0.18.0
oauth2
5.0.0
axum-extra
current (typed-header feature)
ALWAYS confirm every snippet below against the exact version pinned in your
Cargo.toml. Snippets are marked // version-sensitive where the API shape is
known to drift. The crates themselves are independent of the Axum 0.7 vs 0.8
split; the only Axum-version concern is that a custom extractor built around
them uses the 0.8 native-async trait form, no #[async_trait].
Authenticate a request. Pick ONE primary mechanism per route.
1. Is auth delegated to an external identity provider
(Google / GitHub / corporate SSO)?
YES -> OAuth2 (oauth2 crate, authorization-code + PKCE).
After the callback, establish a LOCAL session.
NO -> continue.
2. Is the caller a browser using a server-rendered app, OR do you
need instant revocation OR mutable server-side per-user state?
YES -> Session-based auth.
raw layer only -> tower-sessions
full login system -> axum-login on tower-sessions
NO -> continue.
3. Is the caller a machine / internal admin tool over TLS, and is a
username+password sent on every request acceptable?
YES -> HTTP Basic (axum-extra TypedHeader<Authorization<Basic>>).
TLS ONLY. Never the primary login for human browsers.
NO -> continue.
4. Is the caller a stateless API client (SPA, mobile, service) where
every request carries its own credential and tokens valid-until-exp
is acceptable?
YES -> JWT. See the axum-impl-auth-jwt skill.
Tie-breakers:
OAuth2 is an IDENTITY mechanism, not a session mechanism. After the callback
you still pick session OR JWT to carry the logged-in state. OAuth2 + session
is the normal browser combination.
Session vs JWT, the deciding question is revocation and state: need to kill a
login immediately or store mutable per-user data, choose session. Need zero
server state and horizontal scale with no shared store, choose JWT.
NEVER mix two primary mechanisms on one route. One route, one auth extractor.
Raw tower-sessions or full axum-login
Do you need a typed User, login/logout helpers, and route guards?
├── YES -> axum-login. It layers on tower-sessions and handles
│ session-key bookkeeping for you.
└── NO -> tower-sessions alone. Use it for CSRF tokens, flash
messages, wizard state, a cart: any server-side state
that is not a full authentication system.
Patterns
Pattern: tower-sessions setup and session state
// version-sensitive: tower-sessions 0.15use tower_sessions::{Expiry, MemoryStore, Session, SessionManagerLayer};
use time::Duration;
letstore = MemoryStore::default(); // dev only, NEVER productionletsession_layer = SessionManagerLayer::new(store)
.with_secure(true) // true behind TLS; false only for local HTTP
.with_expiry(Expiry::OnInactivity(Duration::seconds(600)));
letapp = Router::new().route("/", get(handler)).layer(session_layer);
// the Session extractor is FromRequestParts, so it is just a handler argumentasyncfnhandler(session: Session) {
letcount: i32 = session.get("count").await.unwrap().unwrap_or(0);
session.insert("count", count + 1).await.unwrap();
}
ALWAYS use a persistent SessionStore in production (tower-sessions-sqlx-store
or tower-sessions-redis-store). MemoryStore loses every session on restart
and is not shared across instances.
ALWAYS call cycle_id() right after a successful login. Rotating the session ID
on a privilege change defeats session-fixation attacks. axum-login's login()
rotates the ID for you.
Pattern: axum-login full login system
axum-login needs an AuthnBackend implementation and the AuthUser trait on
your user type. The full backend implementation is in references/examples.md.
Wiring:
ALWAYS apply login_required! with .route_layer(...), NEVER .layer(...).
route_layer runs only on matched routes, so an unmatched-path 404 stays a 404
instead of becoming a login redirect. Routes added AFTER the route_layer call
are not protected by it: place guarded routes above it.
Pattern: HTTP Basic auth (TLS only)
// version-sensitive on the headers re-export pathuse axum_extra::TypedHeader;
use axum_extra::headers::{authorization::Basic, Authorization};
asyncfnadmin(
TypedHeader(auth): TypedHeader<Authorization<Basic>>,
) ->Result<&'staticstr, Response> {
if auth.username() == "admin" && verify_hash(auth.password()) {
Ok("ok")
} else {
// 401 + WWW-Authenticate so the browser re-prompts for credentialsErr((
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
[(header::WWW_AUTHENTICATE, "Basic realm=\"admin\"")],
).into_response())
}
}
TypedHeader requires the typed-header feature on axum-extra. Basic auth
sends the password base64-encoded, NOT encrypted. ALWAYS serve Basic-protected
endpoints over TLS only. ALWAYS compare the password with a constant-time check
against a hash (argon2), NEVER with == against a plaintext literal. Use
Basic only for machine-to-machine or internal admin endpoints, NEVER as the
primary login for a human-facing browser app.
Pattern: OAuth2 authorization-code flow
OAuth2 delegates auth to an external provider; your app needs exactly two
routes. The full two-route code is in references/examples.md. The shape:
// version-sensitive: oauth2 5.0// redirect route: build the provider URL, store csrf + pkce verifier in the sessionlet (pkce_challenge, pkce_verifier) = PkceCodeChallenge::new_random_sha256();
let (auth_url, csrf_token) = client
.authorize_url(CsrfToken::new_random)
.add_scope(Scope::new("read".to_string()))
.set_pkce_challenge(pkce_challenge)
.url();
// store csrf_token + pkce_verifier in the tower-session, then Redirect::to(auth_url)// callback route: verify state == stored csrf_token, THEN exchange the codelettoken = client
.exchange_code(AuthorizationCode::new(returned_code))
.set_pkce_verifier(pkce_verifier)
.request_async(&http_client)
.await?;
// then load/create the local user and establish a session
ALWAYS verify the returned state equals the stored CsrfToken BEFORE
exchanging the code; skipping it opens a login-CSRF hole. ALWAYS use PKCE, even
for confidential clients. NEVER hardcode client_secret; read it from the
environment and fail fast if absent.
Common Mistakes
Mistake
Result
Fix
MemoryStore in production
Sessions vanish on restart, not shared across instances
Persistent SessionStore (sqlx / Redis crate)
with_secure(false) in production
Session cookie sent over plain HTTP, sniffable
with_secure(true) behind TLS
No cycle_id() on login
Session-fixation hole
Rotate id after authentication
Basic auth over plain HTTP
Password effectively cleartext
TLS only
Skip OAuth2 state check
Login-CSRF hole
Verify state == CsrfToken before code exchange
login_required! on .layer()
A 404 becomes an auth redirect
Use .route_layer(...)
Hardcoded client_secret / signing key
Credential baked into binary and git history
Read from environment
Full anti-pattern analysis with WHY each fails: references/anti-patterns.md.
Reference Links
references/methods.md : complete API signatures for tower-sessions,
axum-login, axum-extraTypedHeader, and the oauth2 crate, with feature
flags and verified versions.
references/examples.md : full working code, including a complete
AuthnBackend implementation, the OAuth2 two-route flow, and Cargo.toml.
references/anti-patterns.md : the seven session-auth anti-patterns with
root-cause explanations and fixes.
Related skills:
axum-impl-auth-jwt : stateless bearer-token auth, the JWT branch of the
decision tree.
axum-impl-authorization : role and permission checks after authentication.
axum-syntax-responses : Redirect, status codes, and IntoResponse.
