| name | privacy-layer |
| description | Privacy-preserving operations for crypto agents. Covers ZK-SNARK private transfers via Railgun Protocol, shielded balances, network egress monitoring, and confidential transaction patterns. Use when asked about private transfers, shielded transactions, or agent privacy.
|
Privacy Layer
Privacy-preserving operations for AI agents handling sensitive financial data.
ZK-SNARK Private Transfers (Railgun Protocol)
Railgun enables fully private ERC-20 transfers using ZK-SNARKs on Ethereum. Three core operations:
Shield (Public → Private)
Move tokens from a public address into the Railgun privacy pool:
- Tokens become shielded — balance hidden from chain observers
- Agent receives a private note commitment
- On-chain: only the deposit amount and token are visible
Private Transfer (Private → Private)
Transfer tokens within the privacy pool:
- Sender and receiver are hidden on-chain
- Amount is hidden via ZK proof
- Only the proof validity is verifiable
Unshield (Private → Public)
Withdraw tokens from the privacy pool to a public address:
- Converts shielded balance back to standard ERC-20
- Receiver address becomes public
Railgun Contract Addresses
| Network | Contract | Address |
|---|
| Ethereum | Relay Adapt | 0xc3f2C8F9d5F0705De706b1302B7a039e1e11aC88 |
| Arbitrum | Relay Adapt | 0x5aD95C537b002770a39dea342c4bb2b68B1497aA |
| Polygon | Relay Adapt | 0xc7FfA542736321A3dd69246d73987566a5486968 |
| BSC | Relay Adapt | 0x19B620929f97b7b990801496c3b361CA5bbC8E71 |
Network Egress Monitoring
Monitor all outbound connections from the agent to detect data leaks:
- Track all RPC calls, HTTP requests, and WebSocket connections
- Classify targets as
external vs loopback
- Log destination hosts, ports, and protocols
- Alert on unexpected outbound connections
Agent Privacy Architecture
1. Secret Isolation
- Private keys never sent to LLM — all signing handled in isolated process
- Mnemonic stored with
0600 permissions (owner-only read)
- Config directory
0700 permissions
2. LLM Security Fence
- System prompt forbids revealing private keys, mnemonics, API keys
- Reduced tool surface — only expose necessary operations
- ClawWall DLP catches secrets before they reach the LLM
3. Private Inference
- Use Venice AI or local Ollama for zero-retention inference
- Sensitive data (portfolio values, strategies) processed without provider storage
- No training on agent queries
4. On-Chain Privacy
- Shield balances via Railgun before agent operations
- Private transfers between agent sub-wallets
- Unshield only when public settlement is needed
Privacy Checklist for Agents
| Risk | Mitigation |
|---|
| LLM sees private key | ClawWall DLP + system prompt fence |
| LLM provider stores queries | Venice (zero retention) or local Ollama |
| On-chain activity traced | Railgun shielded transfers |
| Network connections leak data | Egress monitoring + allowlist |
| Config files exposed | 0600/0700 permissions, fail-loud validation |
| Agent overshares in chat | Domain constraint — blockchain-only access |
Usage Tips
- Shield tokens before any sensitive agent operations
- Use private transfers for inter-agent payments
- Monitor network egress during development to catch unexpected leaks
- Always use Venice or local models for strategy-sensitive reasoning
- Never expose raw portfolio data to third-party APIs without shielding
