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vm-and-bytecode-reverse

Custom VM and bytecode reverse engineering playbook. Use when CTF challenges or protected software implement custom virtual machines with proprietary bytecode, dispatcher loops, or maze-style challenges.

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Kur1sulab/whitebox
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12. August 2026 um 15:17
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SKILL.md
Quellanweisungen · Schreibgeschützte Vorschau
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vm-and-bytecode-reverse
description
Custom VM and bytecode reverse engineering playbook. Use when CTF challenges or protected software implement custom virtual machines with proprietary bytecode, dispatcher loops, or maze-style challenges.
# SKILL: VM & Bytecode Reverse Engineering — Expert Analysis Playbook > **AI LOAD INSTRUCTION**: Expert techniques for reversing custom virtual machines and bytecode interpreters. Covers dispatcher identification, opcode mapping, custom ISA reconstruction, disassembler/decompiler writing, maze challenges, and real-world VM protector analysis. Base models often fail to recognize the fetch-decode-execute pattern or attempt to analyze VM bytecode as native code. ## 0. RELATED ROUTING - [code-obfuscation-deobfuscation](../hack-code-obfuscation-deobfuscation/SKILL.md) when the VM is a commercial protector (VMProtect/Themida) - [symbolic-execution-tools](../hack-symbolic-execution-tools/SKILL.md) when using angr to solve VM-based challenges - [anti-debugging-techniques](../hack-anti-debugging-techniques/SKILL.md) when the VM includes anti-debug checks ### Quick identification | Binary Pattern | Likely VM Type | Start With | |---|---|---| | `while(1) { switch(bytecode[pc]) }` | Switch-based dispatcher | Map each case to an operation | | Indirect jump via table `jmp [table + opcode*8]` | Table-based dispatcher | Dump jump table, analyze handlers | | Nested if-else chain on byte value | If-chain dispatcher | Same as switch, just different syntax | | Stack push/pop dominant operations | Stack-based VM | Identify push, pop, arithmetic ops | | `reg[X] = ...` array operations | Register-based VM | Map register indices to operations | | 2D grid + direction input | Maze challenge | Extract grid, apply BFS/DFS | --- ## 1. CUSTOM VM IDENTIFICATION ### 1.1 Structural Indicators ``` VM Architecture Components: ┌─────────────────────────────────┐ │ Bytecode Program (data section)│ ├─────────────────────────────────┤ │ Program Counter (pc/ip) │ │ Register File / Stack │ │ Memory / Data Area │ ├─────────────────────────────────┤ │ Dispatcher Loop │ │ ├─ Fetch: opcode = code[pc] │ │ ├─ Decode: lookup handler │ │ └─ Execute: run handler │ └─────────────────────────────────┘ ``` ### 1.2 IDA/Ghidra Signatures **Switch dispatcher** (most common in CTF): ```c while (running) { unsigned char op = bytecode[pc++]; switch (op) { case 0x00: /* nop */ break; case 0x01: /* push imm */ stack[sp++] = bytecode[pc++]; break; case 0x02: /* add */ stack[sp-2] += stack[sp-1]; sp--; break; // ... case 0xFF: /* halt */ running = 0; break; } } ``` **Table dispatcher** (more optimized): ```c typedef void (*handler_t)(vm_ctx_t*); handler_t handlers[256] = { handle_nop, handle_push, handle_add, ... }; while (running) { handlers[bytecode[pc++]](&ctx); } ``` --- ## 2. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY ### Step 1: Find the Dispatcher Look for: - Large switch statement (many cases) in a loop - Array of function pointers indexed by a byte from a data buffer - Single function with high cyclomatic complexity - Cross-references to a data buffer read byte-by-byte ### Step 2: Map Opcodes to Operations For each case/handler, determine: | Property | How to Identify | |---|---| | Opcode value | Case number or table index | | Operation type | Register/stack modifications | | Operand count | How many bytes consumed after opcode | | Operand type | Immediate value, register index, or memory address | | Side effects | Output, memory write, flag modification | ### Step 3: Extract Bytecode Program ```python # Typical extraction from binary import struct with open('challenge', 'rb') as f: f.seek(bytecode_offset) bytecode = f.read(bytecode_length) # Or from IDA: # bytecode = idc.get_bytes(bytecode_addr, bytecode_len) ``` ### Step 4: Write Custom Disassembler ```python OPCODES = { 0x00: ("nop", 0), # (mnemonic, operand_bytes) 0x01: ("push", 1), # push immediate byte 0x02: ("pop", 0), 0x03: ("add", 0), 0x04: ("sub", 0), 0x05: ("xor", 0), 0x06: ("cmp", 0), 0x07: ("jmp", 2), # jump to 16-bit address 0x08: ("je", 2), 0x09: ("jne", 2), 0x0A: ("mov", 2), # mov reg, imm 0x0B: ("load", 1), # load from memory[operand] 0x0C: ("store",1), # store to memory[operand] 0x0D: ("print",0), 0x0E: ("read", 0), # read input 0xFF: ("halt", 0), } def disassemble(bytecode): pc = 0 while pc < len(bytecode): op = bytecode[pc] if op not in OPCODES: print(f" {pc:04x}: UNKNOWN {op:#04x}") pc += 1 continue mnemonic, operand_size = OPCODES[op] operands = bytecode[pc+1:pc+1+operand_size] operand_str = ' '.join(f'{b:#04x}' for b in operands) print(f" {pc:04x}: {mnemonic:8s} {operand_str}") pc += 1 + operand_size disassemble(bytecode) ``` ### Step 5: Analyze Disassembled Program With the custom disassembly, apply standard reverse engineering: - Identify input reading (read opcode) - Trace data flow from input to comparison - Determine success/failure conditions - Extract the check logic (often XOR/ADD transformations of input compared against constants) --- ## 3. COMMON VM PATTERNS IN CTF ### 3.1 Stack-Based VM Operations work on a stack (like JVM or Python bytecode). | Opcode | Operation | Stack Effect | |---|---|---| | PUSH imm | Push immediate value | [...] → [..., imm] | | POP | Discard top | [..., a] → [...] | | ADD | Add top two | [..., a, b] → [..., a+b] | | SUB | Subtract | [..., a, b] → [..., a-b] | | MUL | Multiply | [..., a, b] → [..., a*b] | | XOR | Bitwise XOR | [..., a, b] → [..., a^b] | | CMP | Compare | [..., a, b] → [..., (a==b)] | | JMP addr | Unconditional jump | no change | | JZ addr | Jump if top is zero | [..., a] → [...] | | PRINT | Output top as char | [..., a] → [...] | | READ | Read char to stack | [...] → [..., input] | | HALT | Stop execution | - | ### 3.2 Register-Based VM Operations use register indices (like x86, ARM). | Opcode | Format | Operation | |---|---|---| | MOV r, imm | `0x01 RR II II` | reg[R] = imm16 | | MOV r1, r2 | `0x02 R1 R2` | reg[R1] = reg[R2] | | ADD r1, r2 | `0x03 R1 R2` | reg[R1] += reg[R2] | | SUB r1, r2 | `0x04 R1 R2` | reg[R1] -= reg[R2] | | XOR r1, r2 | `0x05 R1 R2` | reg[R1] ^= reg[R2] | | CMP r1, r2 | `0x06 R1 R2` | flags = compare(r1, r2) | | JMP addr | `0x07 AA AA` | pc = addr | | JE addr | `0x08 AA AA` | if equal: pc = addr | | LOAD r, [addr] | `0x09 RR AA` | reg[R] = mem[addr] | | STORE [addr], r | `0x0A AA RR` | mem[addr] = reg[R] | | SYSCALL | `0x0B` | I/O operation based on reg[0] | | HALT | `0xFF` | stop | ### 3.3 Brainfuck-like / Esoteric VMs | BF Command | VM Equivalent | Description | |---|---|---| | `>` | INC ptr | Move data pointer right | | `<` | DEC ptr | Move data pointer left | | `+` | INC [ptr] | Increment byte at pointer | | `-` | DEC [ptr] | Decrement byte at pointer | | `.` | OUTPUT [ptr] | Output byte at pointer | | `,` | INPUT [ptr] | Input byte to pointer | | `[` | JZ forward | Jump past `]` if byte is zero | | `]` | JNZ back | Jump back to `[` if byte is nonzero | --- ## 4. MAZE CHALLENGES ### 4.1 Identification - Binary reads directional input (WASD, arrow keys, UDLR) - 2D array in data section (walls, paths, start, end) - Position tracking with x,y coordinates - Win condition at specific coordinates ### 4.2 Map Extraction ```python # Extract maze grid from binary data section MAZE_ADDR = 0x601060 WIDTH = 20 HEIGHT = 15 # From binary dump: maze = [] for row in range(HEIGHT): line = "" for col in range(WIDTH): cell = bytecode[MAZE_ADDR + row * WIDTH + col - base_addr] if cell == 0: line += "." # path elif cell == 1: line += "#" # wall elif cell == 2: line += "S" # start elif cell == 3: line += "E" # end else: line += "?" maze.append(line) print(line) ``` ### 4.3 Automated Solving ```python from collections import deque def solve_maze(maze, start, end): """BFS solver returns direction string.""" rows, cols = len(maze), len(maze[0]) directions = {'U': (-1, 0), 'D': (1, 0), 'L': (0, -1), 'R': (0, 1)} queue = deque([(start, "")]) visited = {start} while queue: (r, c), path = queue.popleft() if (r, c) == end: return path for name, (dr, dc) in directions.items(): nr, nc = r + dr, c + dc if (0 <= nr < rows and 0 <= nc < cols and maze[nr][nc] != '#' and (nr, nc) not in visited): visited.add((nr, nc)) queue.append(((nr, nc), path + name)) return None # Find start and end positions for r, row in enumerate(maze): for c, cell in enumerate(row): if cell == 'S': start = (r, c) if cell == 'E': end = (r, c) solution = solve_maze(maze, start, end) print(f"Path: {solution}") ``` ### 4.4 Direction Encoding Different challenges encode directions differently: | Encoding | Up | Down | Left | Right | |---|---|---|---|---| | WASD | W | S | A | D | | UDLR | U | D | L | R | | Arrow keys | ↑ (0x48) | ↓ (0x50) | ← (0x4B) | → (0x4D) | | Numbers | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | | Hex opcodes | 0x01 | 0x02 | 0x03 | 0x04 | --- ## 5. REAL-WORLD VM PROTECTORS ### 5.1 VMProtect Analysis Approach ``` 1. Find VM entry: search for pushad/pushfd sequence 2. Identify VM context structure (registers, flags, bytecode pointer) 3. Locate handler table (often obfuscated with opaque predicates) 4. For each handler: a. Remove junk code / opaque predicates b. Identify the core operation c. Document handler semantics 5. Trace bytecode execution (instruction-level trace) 6. Reconstruct original code from trace ``` ### 5.2 Tigress Obfuscator Academic VM obfuscator with configurable protection layers. | Feature | Approach | |---|---| | Single-dispatch VM | Standard handler extraction | | Split handlers | Handlers spread across multiple functions | | Nested VMs | Outer VM handler invokes inner VM | | Encrypted bytecode | Dynamic decryption before each fetch | | Polymorphic handlers | Different code for same operation on each build | ### 5.3 Common VM Protector Patterns | Protector | Dispatcher Style | Difficulty | |---|---|---| | VMProtect | Table + opaque predicates | High | | Themida (Code Virtualizer) | CISC-like, large handler set | High | | Tigress | Configurable, academic | Medium-High | | Custom CTF VM | Simple switch | Low-Medium | | Movfuscator | All-mov computation | Medium | --- ## 6. TOOLS | Tool | Purpose | Usage | |---|---|---| | IDA Pro | Identify dispatcher, reverse handlers | F5 decompile, xref analysis | | Ghidra | Free alternative with Sleigh processor modules | Write custom processor for VM ISA | | angr | Symbolic execution through VM | Treat entire VM as constraint system | | Pin / DynamoRIO | Dynamic instrumentation for tracing | Record opcode handler execution sequence | | REVEN | Full-system trace recording | Replay and analyze VM execution | | Unicorn | Emulate VM execution | Fast handler emulation | | Miasm | IR-based analysis | Lift VM handlers to IR for analysis | | Custom Python | Write disassembler/decompiler | Per-challenge custom tooling |
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