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dependency-audit-stinger

Audit dependencies for the target repository's ecosystem: lockfiles, vulnerability triage, SBOM and provenance. Use for supply-chain or publish safety; Hivemind is a worked npm example.

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legioncodeinc/vibe-coding-tools
Letzte Quellaktivität
15. Oktober 2026 um 02:21
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Englisch
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SKILL.md
Quellanweisungen · Schreibgeschützte Vorschau
name
dependency-audit-stinger
description
Audit dependencies for the target repository's ecosystem: lockfiles, vulnerability triage, SBOM and provenance. Use for supply-chain or publish safety; Hivemind is a worked npm example.
license
AGPL-3.0-or-later
# dependency-audit Stinger Procedural arsenal for `dependency-audit-wasp-drone`. Start with the target repository's real ecosystem, package manager, lockfiles, dependency graph and publish boundary. The retained `@deeplake/hivemind` material is a worked npm case; its tree-sitter scripts, npm lockfile and OpenClaw publish guards are not requirements for other repositories. **First action when this stinger is loaded:** Read [Target repository audit](guides/05-target-repository-audit.md). Inventory current source and authorized scope before selecting ecosystem-specific methods. Then consult the retained guides only where their case facts match the target and verify any vendor/version claim against current primary documentation. ## Preserved Hivemind case facts (not target ground truth) `@deeplake/hivemind` is an ESM, TypeScript ^6, Node `>=22` npm package. The supply-chain facts that matter: - **Lockfile:** `package-lock.json` (npm - NOT pnpm or yarn). CI installs with `npm ci`. - **Runtime deps:** `deeplake`, `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk`, `@anthropic-ai/sdk`, `zod`, `js-yaml`, `just-bash`, `yargs-parser`. - **optionalDependencies + native ABI risk:** `@huggingface/transformers` plus the full tree-sitter grammar set (c/cpp/go/java/javascript/python/ruby/rust/typescript). Three grammars are version-pinned in `overrides` (`tree-sitter-c`, `tree-sitter-python`, `tree-sitter-rust`). The `postinstall` hook runs `scripts/ensure-tree-sitter.mjs`, which heals native ABI / arm64 build failures. This native-dependency surface is the single biggest supply-chain risk on this package - a compromised or broken grammar build runs install-time code on every consumer's machine. - **Publish guards:** `prepack` builds; the `files` allowlist controls what ships; `scripts/pack-check.mjs` (`npm run pack:check`) blocks publishing secrets; `scripts/audit-openclaw-bundle.mjs` (`npm run audit:openclaw`) replicates ClawHub's static scan of the OpenClaw bundle. - **CI:** `.github/workflows/` - `ci.yaml` runs a cross-node install; `codeql.yaml` scans `javascript-typescript`. CodeRabbit profile is `chill`. --- ## When this stinger applies Load this stinger when `dependency-audit-wasp-drone` is invoked. Typical triggers: - "Set up Renovate for Hivemind / Renovate vs Dependabot for this repo" - "Our dependency-update PRs are noisy" - "npm audit returns findings - help me triage" - "npm audit shows clean but I don't trust it" - "The tree-sitter postinstall is failing / is it safe?" - "We need an SBOM for the published package" - "Generate an SBOM and attest it in CI" - "Set up socket.dev to catch malicious packages" - "Should we publish with --provenance?" - "Is our npm publish safe? / what guards the published bundle?" - "package-lock.json keeps changing unexpectedly" - "Explain package.json and lockfiles to me" - "Which dependencies are direct or indirect?" - "Tie our SBOM to the exact release artifact" - "Upgrade this major dependency without hiding breaking changes" Do NOT load it for: - Application-code CVEs requiring code changes -> `security-wasp-drone` - Container image scanning -> `ci-release-wasp-drone` - License compatibility legal opinions -> legal counsel - CI/CD pipeline architecture beyond the dependency scanning step -> `ci-release-wasp-drone` --- ## Critical directives These are the non-negotiables. The full rationale lives in each guide. - **Never recommend ignoring a CVE without requiring an expiry date and a tracking issue link.** See `guides/01-vulnerability-triage.md`. - **Always differentiate direct vs transitive exposure before recommending an upgrade.** Most `npm audit` findings on this package are transitive and unreachable. See `guides/01-vulnerability-triage.md`. - **Identify the target's actual install-time execution risks.** In the Hivemind case, tree-sitter/optionalDependencies and `scripts/ensure-tree-sitter.mjs` were relevant; preserve those controls only if the inspected target actually has them. See `guides/01-vulnerability-triage.md` and `guides/03-lockfile-discipline.md`. - **Choose an update tool from the target's requirements.** The retained Hivemind case preferred Renovate; grouping alone does not rule out Dependabot, which also supports grouped updates. See `guides/00-scanner-decision-matrix.md`. - **Validate the target's actual lockfile and frozen-install procedure after a dependency change.** Use `package-lock.json`/`npm ci` only for an npm target; do not replace pnpm, Yarn, uv, Cargo or Go tooling with this example. See `guides/03-lockfile-discipline.md`. - **Do not gate CI on `low`/`moderate` `npm audit` findings.** Gate only on `high` and `critical`. See `guides/01-vulnerability-triage.md`. - **Preserve and check the target's existing publish guards.** The `files` allowlist, `pack-check.mjs`, and `audit:openclaw` belong to the retained Hivemind case; do not invent those scripts in another target. See `guides/04-provenance-verification.md`. - **Defer to `security-wasp-drone` for any CVE that requires patching application code, not just upgrading a package.** --- ## Retained npm case toolchain (recheck current vendor behavior) | Tool | Role for this package | Limit | |---|---|---| | **npm audit** | CVE compliance baseline, zero-config, built into the `npm ci` toolchain | Does not catch supply-chain attacks without a CVE (axios-style account hijack, tree-sitter build tampering) | | **Renovate** | Grouped update PRs + `minimumReleaseAge` delay; right fit for this single-package npm repo | More config than Dependabot; needs a `renovate.json` | | **Dependabot** | GitHub-native update PRs with configurable groups | Compare the target's ecosystem, update-delay and grouping requirements against current documentation | | **socket.dev** | Behavioral threat intel for npm: typosquatting, malicious install scripts, account takeover - the control for the tree-sitter postinstall risk | Not a CVE scanner; complements npm audit, does not replace it | | **Snyk (optional)** | Richer CVE DB + reachability + IDE integration for npm | Paid tiers for some features; npm audit + socket.dev cover the baseline | | **Syft + CycloneDX** | SBOM for the published npm package in CycloneDX 1.6 JSON; CI-ready with Sigstore attestation | Does not scan vulnerabilities; pairs with Grype for that | | **npm `--provenance`** | Sigstore-backed provenance on publish; verifiable with `npm audit signatures` | Transport guarantee only - does not vouch for source-code trust | > **Key 2026 insight:** `npm audit` is a CVE compliance tool, not a supply-chain security tool. The March 2026 axios maintainer account hijack published a backdoor in 40 minutes with no CVE at time of attack - `npm audit` showed clean throughout. For this package the equivalent nightmare is a tampered tree-sitter grammar running install-time code via `postinstall`. socket.dev behavioral analysis and Renovate `minimumReleaseAge` are the controls that address this class. See `research/external/04-npm-provenance-sigstore-2026.md` (source-repository research, not shipped with the plugin). --- ## Guide map Read the guide matching your task: | Task | Guide | |---|---| | Identify target ecosystem, lockfiles, checks and permission boundaries | `guides/05-target-repository-audit.md` | | Explain actual manifests and lockfiles to a beginner | `guides/06-explain-manifest-and-lockfile.md` | | Pick tooling for a target that matches the retained npm case | `guides/00-scanner-decision-matrix.md` | | Triage an `npm audit` finding (noise vs real, native-dep risk) | `guides/01-vulnerability-triage.md` | | Qualify exact release artifact inventory and SBOM binding | `guides/07-bind-sbom-to-release-artifact.md` | | Prepare a bounded major upgrade with baseline/candidate contracts | `guides/08-upgrade-major-dependency-safely.md` | | Retained published-package SBOM case | `guides/02-sbom-workflow.md` | | Harden `package-lock.json` + tree-sitter discipline | `guides/03-lockfile-discipline.md` | | Verify npm provenance + the publish-time guards | `guides/04-provenance-verification.md` | --- ## Template map | Template | Use case | |---|---| | `templates/renovate-base-config.json` | Drop-in Renovate config for this npm repo: grouping, `minimumReleaseAge`, automerge for devDependencies, and a guarded rule for the pinned tree-sitter grammars | | `templates/github-actions-sbom-workflow.yml` | SBOM generation + Sigstore attestation for the published `@deeplake/hivemind` tarball on tag push | | `templates/release-artifact-evidence.md` | Artifact/graph coverage, schema, subject, signature and identity evidence | | `templates/major-upgrade-evidence.md` | Exact versions, consumer contracts, canary and rollback proof | | `templates/manifest-reading-ledger.md` | Preserve declarations, recorded graph edges and unproved runtime/security facts; see [worked fixture](examples/read-manifest-fixture.md) | | `templates/dependency-triage-report.md` | Markdown template for recording an `npm audit` triage pass on this package | --- ## Folder layout ```text dependency-audit-stinger/ +- SKILL.md (this file) +- README.md (one-page human overview) +- guides/ | +- 00-scanner-decision-matrix.md (Renovate vs Dependabot + npm audit + socket.dev for this package) | +- 01-vulnerability-triage.md (npm audit noise vs real, direct vs transitive, tree-sitter native-dep risk) | +- 02-sbom-workflow.md (Syft + CycloneDX 1.6 + Sigstore for the published tarball) | +- 03-lockfile-discipline.md (npm ci + package-lock.json + minimumReleaseAge + optionalDependencies pins) | +- 04-provenance-verification.md (npm --provenance + audit signatures + files allowlist / pack-check / audit-openclaw / CodeQL) +- examples/ | +- happy-path-node-scanner-setup.md (Renovate + npm audit + socket.dev for @deeplake/hivemind) | +- edge-case-critical-cve-triage.md (triaging a transitive CVE pulled through a Hivemind dependency) +- templates/ | +- renovate-base-config.json (ready-to-use Renovate config for this repo) | +- github-actions-sbom-workflow.yml (SBOM + attestation workflow) | +- dependency-triage-report.md (npm audit triage report template) +- reports/ | +- README.md (how audit reports accumulate) +- research/ (DO NOT MODIFY -- owned by scripture-historian) +- research-plan.md +- research-summary.md +- index.md +- internal/01-command-brief.md +- external/ (5 source files) ``` --- ## Pairing | Role | Artifact | |---|---| | This stinger | `.` | | Paired Drone | `../../agents/dependency-audit-wasp-drone.md` | --- *Forged by `stinger-forge`, retargeted to the `@deeplake/hivemind` npm package. Part of The Wasp Nest, curated by [Mario Aldayuz a.k.a @thenotoriousllama](https://github.com/thenotoriousllama).*
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