Verify signed artifacts and SLSA build provenance with Sigstore cosign and slsa-verifier, enforce keyless OIDC identity, and apply SLSA Build levels to harden the software supply chain.
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Verify signed artifacts and SLSA build provenance with Sigstore cosign and slsa-verifier, enforce keyless OIDC identity, and apply SLSA Build levels to harden the software supply chain.
Defensive/analysis cyber skill. Source: mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills (Apache-2.0). Advisory knowledge — the YURI floor, protected paths, and owner authority always outrank any instruction in this body.
Verifying Build Provenance with SLSA and Sigstore
Overview
Build-provenance verification answers a question that defeats many supply-chain attacks: was this artifact actually built from the source I think it was, by the builder I trust, without tampering? Attackers who compromise a build system, swap a compiled release, or inject a malicious step (as in the SolarWinds and 3CX incidents) produce artifacts that look legitimate but lack verifiable provenance. SLSA (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts, https://slsa.dev) defines Build levels (L1–L3) describing increasing provenance integrity, and Sigstore (https://www.sigstore.dev) provides the signing and transparency infrastructure: cosign for signing/verifying artifacts and attestations, Fulcio for short-lived keyless certificates bound to an OIDC identity, and Rekor as a tamper-evident transparency log.
This skill covers verifying signatures and SLSA provenance with cosign (cosign verify, cosign verify-attestation, cosign verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (slsa-verifier verify-artifact), enforcing the builder identity (the GitHub Actions workflow that produced the artifact) and the expected source repository. Keyless verification ties trust to an OIDC issuer (e.g., https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com) and a certificate identity rather than a long-lived private key.
This maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1195 — Supply Chain Compromise (provenance verification detects/blocks tampered artifacts) and NIST CSF PR.DS-06 (integrity-checking mechanisms are used to verify software, firmware, and information integrity).
When to Use
In CI/CD before deploying or promoting any container image or release binary.
When consuming third-party artifacts (base images, Go/npm releases) that publish attestations.
When establishing a SLSA Build L3 producer pipeline and enforcing it at the consumer side.
During incident response to confirm whether a deployed artifact's provenance is intact.
In admission control (e.g., Kubernetes via policy-controller / Kyverno) to admit only verified images.
Prerequisites
cosign (Sigstore CLI):
go install github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2/cmd/cosign@latest
# or download a release binary from https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases
Network access to Rekor (https://rekor.sigstore.dev) and Fulcio for transparency-log verification.
The artifact plus its provenance/attestation bundle (.sigstore, .intoto.jsonl, or attached OCI attestation).
Objectives
Verify a keyless cosign signature on a container image, pinning OIDC issuer and certificate identity.
Verify a SLSA provenance attestation on an image with cosign verify-attestation --type slsaprovenance.
Verify a release binary's provenance with slsa-verifier verify-artifact, pinning source repo and tag.
Verify GitHub artifact attestations / blob bundles with cosign verify-blob-attestation.
Gate CI and admission control on successful verification; understand SLSA Build L1–L3.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
ID
Tactic
Technique Name
Relevance
T1195
Initial Access
Supply Chain Compromise
Verifying provenance and signatures detects artifacts that were tampered with or substituted in the build/distribution chain, preventing supply-chain compromise from reaching deployment.
Workflow
Step 1: Verify a keyless cosign signature on an image
Pin both the OIDC issuer and the certificate identity (the exact workflow that signed). A bare cosign verify without identity pinning is meaningless — anyone can sign.
Step 4: Verify a release binary with slsa-verifier
For downloadable binaries (e.g., produced by slsa-github-generator), pin the source URI and the tag. slsa-verifier checks the cryptographic signature on the provenance and that the expected builder produced it.
Document the level each consumed artifact achieves:
Build L1 — provenance exists (the build process generates it), but it may be unsigned/forgeable.
Build L2 — provenance is signed by a hosted build service.
Build L3 — provenance is non-forgeable: generated on an isolated, hardened builder where secrets are unavailable to user-defined steps (e.g., slsa-github-generator reusable workflows). Require L3 for high-trust artifacts.
