generate-sandbox-policy

# Generate Sandbox Policy Generate YAML sandbox network policies and network middleware configuration from API documentation and natural-language user requirements. ## Overview This skill translates a user's plain-language policy intent into a valid sandbox policy. The amount of detail the user provides determines the granularity of the generated policy — from broad L4 or preset-based policies (just a host:port) up to fine-grained per-endpoint L7 rules (full API docs). The output is a `network_policies` YAML block, an optional `network_middlewares` block, and optionally a full policy file that conforms to the sandbox policy schema. ## Step 1: Gather Inputs ### Determine the Detail Tier The user's input falls into one of three tiers. Work with whatever the user provides — **do not require a higher tier than needed**. | Tier | User provides | What you can generate | |------|--------------|----------------------| | **Minimal** | Host(s) and plain-language intent | L4-only policies, or L7 with access presets (`read-only`, `read-write`, `full`) | | **Moderate** | Host(s) + some known URL paths or resources | L7 with targeted glob rules for known paths, presets for the rest | | **Full** | Complete API docs (OpenAPI, Swagger, markdown, URL) | Fine-grained per-endpoint L7 rules with specific method+path combinations | ### Minimal Tier (host + intent only) The user provides API endpoints and a broad intent. No API docs needed. Examples: - "Allow curl to hit api.github.com, read-only" - "Give claude full access to api.anthropic.com" - "Let /usr/bin/myapp talk to internal-svc:8080 but only for reading" This is sufficient for: - **L4-only** policies (host:port + binary checks, no method or path rules) - **Preset-based L7** policies (`read-only`, `read-write`, `full` on all paths) For this tier, default to: - `access: read-only` when the user says "read", "browse", "view", "query", "fetch" - `access: read-write` when the user says "read-write", "create", "update" (but not "delete") - `access: full` when the user says "full access", "everything", "unrestricted" - L4-only when the user says "just allow it", "pass through", or "no inspection". Omit `protocol` for explicit-proxy clients. Use `protocol: tcp` only when the workload must use native DNS and direct socket calls, the endpoint has a valid DNS hostname, and the selected runtime support (currently Docker and Podman). ### Moderate Tier (host + partial path knowledge) The user knows some API paths but doesn't have full docs. Examples: - "Allow GET on /api/v1/models and POST on /api/v1/completions at integrate.api.nvidia.com" - "Read-only on /repos/** at api.github.com, but also allow POST on /repos/*/issues" Generate explicit `rules` for the known paths. If the user also wants broader access beyond the specific paths, combine with a catch-all rule or suggest a preset instead. ### Full Tier (complete API docs) The user provides full API documentation. Accepted formats: | Format | How to consume | |--------|----------------| | **URL** | Fetch with the agent's web access and parse the endpoint list | | **File path** | Read the file (OpenAPI JSON/YAML, markdown, etc.) | | **Pasted text** | Parse inline from the conversation | | **OpenAPI/Swagger spec** | Extract `paths` object for all method+path combinations | From the API docs, build an **endpoint inventory** — a list of `(method, path, description)` tuples. Group them logically (e.g., by resource or tag). Then generate precise rules that allow only what the user's intent requires. ### Policy Intent Regardless of tier, extract (or infer) these from the user's description: | Aspect | What to identify | Required? | |--------|-----------------|-----------| | **Scope** | Which API host(s) and port(s) | Yes — always needed | | **Access level** | Broad intent: read-only, read-write, full, or custom | Yes — ask if unclear | | **Methods** | Specific HTTP methods to allow | Only for custom/fine-grained | | **Paths** | Specific URL paths or patterns | Only for custom/fine-grained | | **Enforcement** | `enforce` or `audit`? Default to `enforce`. | No — has a default | | **Binary** | Which binary/process should have access | Yes — ask if not stated | | **Middleware** | Whether admitted HTTP requests, final HTTP responses, or client WebSocket text messages need an ordered built-in or operator-run processing stage | No | If the host and access level are clear but binaries are not specified, ask the user which binary or process will be making the requests. Suggest common defaults like `/usr/bin/curl`, `/usr/local/bin/claude`, etc. ## Step 2: Refine Scope (Clarification Loop) Before generating the policy, **proactively ask clarifying questions** to help the user scope the policy down as narrowly as possible. The goal is the most restrictive policy that still satisfies the user's needs. ### Required Clarifications Always ask about these if the user hasn't already specified them: | Missing info | Question to ask | |-------------|----------------| | **Binary** not specified | "Which binary or process will make these requests? (e.g., `/usr/bin/curl`, `/usr/local/bin/claude`)" | | **Port** not specified | "Which port does this API use? (443 for HTTPS is typical)" | | **Enforcement** not stated | "Should policy violations be blocked (`enforce`) or just logged for review (`audit`)? I'll default to `enforce` if you're not sure." | ### Scoping-Down Questions Ask these when the user's intent is broad and more specificity is possible: | User says | Ask to narrow | |-----------|--------------| | "Full access" / "allow everything" | "Do you actually need DELETE access, or would read-write (everything except DELETE) be enough?" | | "Allow access to api.example.com" (no method/path detail) | "Do you know which specific API paths or operations you need? If so, I can lock the policy down to just those. Otherwise I'll use a broad preset." | | L4-only / "just pass it through" | "L4-only means the proxy applies no method or path rules — any method and path will be allowed. Are you sure you don't want at least read-only or read-write restriction?" | | Wildcard binary (`/usr/bin/*`) | "A wildcard binary pattern means any binary in that directory can use this policy. Can you narrow it to specific binaries?" | | Multiple hosts in one policy | "Do all of these hosts need the same access level? If some need tighter restrictions, I can split them into separate policies." | | `access: full` with `enforcement: audit` | "Full access in audit mode means nothing is actually restricted — all traffic flows through and violations are only logged. Is that intentional, or did you want to enforce restrictions?" | | `**` path glob on all rules | "Using `**` on all paths allows any URL path. Do you know the specific API path prefixes you need (e.g., `/api/v1/`)?" | | Private/internal IP destination | "Does this service resolve to a private IP (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)? An exact hostname can reach its private addresses without `allowed_ips`, but a wildcard or hostless endpoint needs it. Should I pin the endpoint to a specific CIDR range?" | ### Auto-Discovery of API Docs for Well-Known Services When the user mentions a recognizable API host but hasn't provided docs, and the current tier is **Minimal**, attempt to upgrade to **Full** by searching for the API documentation online. **When to trigger:** - The host is a well-known public API (e.g., `api.github.com`, `api.anthropic.com`, `api.openai.com`, `integrate.api.nvidia.com`, `api.stripe.com`, `api.slack.com`, `api.gitlab.com`) - The user has NOT already provided API docs - The user has NOT explicitly asked for a broad preset ("just read-only, nothing fancy") **How to do it:** 1. Tell the user: "I can look up the REST API docs for [service] to help generate a more precise policy. Want me to do that?" 2. If the user agrees (or hasn't declined), search for the docs: - Search the web with a query like `"[service name] REST API documentation endpoints"` or `"[service name] OpenAPI spec"` - Look for official documentation URLs in the results 3. Fetch the documentation page and extract the endpoint inventory (method + path pairs) 4. Use the discovered endpoints to offer tighter scoping: "I found [N] endpoints in the [service] API. Based on your intent, I can narrow the policy to just [subset]. Want me to do that, or keep the broader preset?" **When to skip:** - The user explicitly asked for a broad preset or said "don't bother with docs" - The API is internal, private, or not publicly documented - The host is not recognizable as a well-known service - A previous search attempt for this host returned no useful results **Graceful fallback:** If the search doesn't return usable API docs (results are irrelevant, docs are behind authentication, the page is too large to parse), fall back to the current tier without stalling. Say: "I couldn't find usable API docs for [host], so I'll generate the policy using a [preset/L4] approach. You can always provide docs later to tighten it." ### When the User Can't Narrow Further If the user confirms the policy must stay broad (they don't know the paths, need genuinely broad access, etc.), **accept it but flag the breadth**. Do not block policy generation — just make sure the warnings are visible in the output (see Step 6). ### Iteration You may need to go back and forth a few times. Keep the loop tight: 1. Ask one batch of clarifying questions (group related questions together) 2. Update your understanding based on the answer 3. If the answer reveals further scoping opportunities, ask a follow-up 4. Stop when the user confirms the scope or says to proceed **Do not over-interrogate.** If the user has given a clear, specific request, skip clarification and go straight to generation. Only ask when there is genuine ambiguity or an opportunity to meaningfully reduce the attack surface. ## Step 3: Read the Policy Schema Read the published [policy schema reference](https://docs.nvidia.com/openshell/latest/how-it-works/policies/schema) before generating or changing a policy. Published documentation is the authority for the current schema; do not infer fields from examples in this skill. Key sections to reference: - **Policy Schema Reference** — top-level structure - **`network_policies`** — rule structure - **`NetworkEndpoint`** fields — host, port, protocol, tls, enforcement, access, rules, allowed_ips - **`L7Rule` / `L7Allow`** — method + path matching - **Access Presets** — `read-only`, `read-write`, `full` - **Private IP Access via `allowed_ips`** — CIDR allowlist for private IP space - **Network Middleware** - top-level middleware configs, ordering, host selection, and failure behavior - **Validation Rules** — what combinations are valid/invalid When middleware is requested, also read the published [supervisor middleware guide](https://docs.nvidia.com/openshell/latest/extensibility/supervisor-middleware.md). For enforcement concepts and the shipped baseline, read [sandbox policies](https://docs.nvidia.com/openshell/latest/how-it-works/policies/overview) and the [default policy reference](https://docs.nvidia.com/openshell/latest/how-it-works/policies/default-policy). The default policy is built into the OpenShell runtime and applies when no explicit policy is supplied. Validate the intended provider combination as well as the authored policy. An image endpoint can become credentialed after provider composition and block startup with `ConfigurationInvalid`. Repair the complete policy or provider selection using the published policy workflow; do not add `allow_uninspected_credentials` merely to bypass a startup error. ## Step 4: Choose Policy Shape Follow this decision tree based on the detail tier and user intent: ``` Is L7 inspection needed? ├─ No (user wants pass-through / "just allow it") │ ├─ Explicit-proxy client → omit protocol │ └─ Native DNS/socket client with a DNS hostname on a supported runtime → protocol: tcp │ └─ Yes (user wants method/path control) │ ├─ Does a preset match the intent exactly? │ ├─ Read-only (GET, HEAD, OPTIONS) → access: read-only │ ├─ Read-write (no DELETE) → access: read-write │ └─ Everything → access: full │ └─ No preset fits (specific paths, mixed broad+narrow, exclude certain paths) └─ Build explicit rules list └─ Requires either known paths from the user or full API docs ``` **Principle**: always choose the simplest representation that satisfies the intent. A preset is preferable to explicit rules when it covers the use case. ### TLS Decision Omit `tls` on every endpoint, regardless of port: the proxy auto-detects TLS and terminates it for inspection. `skip` is the only accepted non-empty value, reserved for upstreams requiring client-certificate mTLS or a non-HTTP protocol. Do not "fix" a rejected value — including the removed `terminate` and `passthrough` spellings — by changing it to `skip`; remove the field instead. `skip` stops inspection, credential injection, and L7 rule enforcement for that endpoint, so it silently widens what the endpoint allows. ### Middleware Decision Add `network_middlewares` only when the user asks to inspect, transform, redact, or independently authorize admitted HTTP requests, final HTTP responses, or client WebSocket text messages. Request middleware runs after network and L7 policy admission and before provider credential injection. Response middleware runs on the matching final response before it returns to the sandbox. - Use `openshell/regex` without gateway registration for fixed-pattern redaction of UTF-8 HTTP request bodies or complete client-to-upstream WebSocket text messages. - Use an operator-owned middleware name only when it is already registered under `[[openshell.supervisor.middleware]]` and reachable from both the gateway and sandbox supervisors. - Confirm that the implementation advertises the requested binding: `HTTP_REQUEST/PRE_CREDENTIALS`, `HTTP_RESPONSE/PRE_RETURN`, or `WEBSOCKET_MESSAGE/PRE_CREDENTIALS`. A host match alone does not enable inspection. - WebSocket middleware inspects client text messages only, over both `ws://` and `wss://`. Binary and upstream-to-client messages pass without inspection, even with `fail_closed`. - `on_error` controls selected-stage failures. Explicit denials always block traffic. A failed WebSocket stage with `fail_open` can remain bypassed for the rest of the connection. - Default `on_error` to `fail_closed`. Use `fail_open` only when bypassing the stage preserves the user's stated security requirement. - Assign unique `order` values across the complete policy. Lower values run first, and at most 10 configs may be selected. - Match the narrowest destination hosts possible with `endpoints.include`; use `exclude` when a broad selector has trusted exceptions. - Do not select fail-closed middleware for `tls: skip` endpoints because the supervisor cannot inspect that traffic. ### Mapping Paths to Glob Patterns (when building explicit rules) Only needed for the **Moderate** and **Full** tiers. Translate API path parameters to glob patterns: | API path | Glob pattern | |----------|-------------| | `/repos/{owner}/{repo}` | `/repos/*/*` | | `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues` | `/repos/*/issues` | | `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{id}` | `/repos/*/issues/*` | | `/api/v1/models/{model_id}/versions/{version}` | `/api/v1/models/*/versions/*` | | All sub-paths under `/api/v1/` | `/api/v1/**` | Path matching uses the runtime `glob` engine. Both `*` and `**` may cross `/` boundaries; `?` matches one character, and bracket classes such as `[0-9]` and `[!0]` are supported. Prefer segment-shaped patterns such as `/repos/*/issues` for readability, but do not rely on `*` to stop at `/`. ### Building the Explicit Rules List For each allowed operation, create an `allow` entry: ```yaml rules: - allow: method: GET path: "/api/v1/models/*" - allow: method: POST path: "/api/v1/completions" ``` Use the most specific pattern that covers the intent. Prefer narrow globs over `**` when the API structure is known. ## Step 5: Generate the Policy ### Output Format Generate a complete `network_policies` entry. Use this template: ```yaml network_policies: <policy_key>: name: <policy_key> endpoints: - host: <api_host> port: <port> protocol: rest # Required for L7 inspection enforcement: enforce # or audit # Use ONE of: access OR rules (never both) access: <preset> # read-only | read-write | full # OR rules: - allow: method: <METHOD> path: "<glob_pattern>" # Optional: restrict resolved addresses (CIDR or exact IP). Required # for private IPs on wildcard or hostless endpoints.