hunting-for-registry-run-key-persistence

name	hunting-for-registry-run-key-persistence
description	Detect MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 registry Run key persistence by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 13 logs and registry queries to identify malicious auto-start entries. Use when detecting mitre att&ck t1547.001 registry run key persistence by analyzing.
domain	cybersecurity
subdomain	threat-hunting
tags	["persistence","registry-run-keys","t1547-001","sysmon","threat-hunting","windows-forensics","mitre-attack"]
version	1.0
author	oyi77
license	Apache-2.0
d3fend_techniques	["Executable Denylisting","Execution Isolation","File Metadata Consistency Validation","Content Format Conversion","File Content Analysis"]
nist_csf	["DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05"]

Hunting for Registry Run Key Persistence

Overview

Registry Run keys (T1547.001) are one of the most commonly used persistence mechanisms by adversaries. When a program is added to a Run key in the Windows registry, it executes automatically when a user logs in. Attackers abuse keys under HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and their RunOnce counterparts to maintain persistence. Sysmon Event ID 13 (RegistryEvent - Value Set) captures registry value modifications including the target object path, the process that made the change, and the new value. Detection involves monitoring these events for suspicious executables in temp directories, encoded PowerShell commands, LOLBin paths, and processes that do not normally create Run key entries. Chaining Event 13 with Event 1 (Process Creation) and Event 11 (FileCreate) strengthens detection by confirming payload creation and execution.

When to Use

Trigger phrases:

• "hunting for registry run key persistence"

• "Detect MITRE ATT&CK T1547"

• When investigating security incidents that require hunting for registry run key persistence

• When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain

• When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type

• When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

When NOT to Use

• When you lack proper authorization for testing
• For production systems without change management
• When the task requires legal or compliance expertise beyond technical scope

Prerequisites

• Windows systems with Sysmon installed and configured to log Event ID 13
• Sysmon config with RegistryEvent rules for Run/RunOnce keys
• Python 3.9+ with json, xml.etree.ElementTree, re modules
• SIEM or log aggregator collecting Sysmon logs (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
• Knowledge of legitimate auto-start programs for baseline comparison

Steps

# Example: IOC detection
import re

IOC_PATTERNS = {
    "ip": r"\b(?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}\b",
    "domain": r"\b[a-z0-9-]+\.[a-z]{2,}\b",
    : ,
    : ,
}

 () -> :
     {k: re.findall(v, text)  k, v  IOC_PATTERNS.items()}