Reverse JavaScript-based custom DSL/VM interpreters, non-standard WASM-like runtimes, and risk-control engines. Use when analyzing IIFE or switch-based opcode dispatchers, extracting instruction tables, recovering bytecode semantics, capturing VM state at runtime, or reconstructing execution flow.
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Reverse JavaScript-based custom DSL/VM interpreters, non-standard WASM-like runtimes, and risk-control engines. Use when analyzing IIFE or switch-based opcode dispatchers, extracting instruction tables, recovering bytecode semantics, capturing VM state at runtime, or reconstructing execution flow.
Many hardened web applications do not run their anti-bot or risk-control logic
as plain JavaScript. Instead they compile it to a custom bytecode interpreted by
a hand-rolled virtual machine — an IIFE wrapping a switch-based opcode
dispatcher over a single-letter variable array (typically d[]), with a
constant table (typically C[9]). The dispatcher is usually named DG(),
W() or similar. Because the interpreter never appears in source maps and the
bytecode is stored as a numeric constant table, the logic is invisible to
standard static review and survives even after the surrounding JS is
beautified.
This skill is a repeatable, six-phase workflow for reversing such engines:
identify the VM, recover variable and opcode semantics, extract the constant
table, locate exported functions, and — when static analysis is not enough —
capture VM state at runtime. It targets the common AWSCInner family of
risk-control engines but generalizes to any IIFE/switch-based dispatcher.
Source: cherry-picked and translated from zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill
(skills/reverse-engineering/dsl-vm-reverse, MIT license).
When to Use
Trigger phrases:
"reverse a DSL VM"
"analyze risk-control engine bytecode"
"extract opcode table from obfuscated JS"
"recover VM semantics from an IIFE dispatcher"
"capture VM state at runtime"
"reconstruct execution flow of an anti-bot interpreter"
Use this skill when:
A page's behavior is driven by an interpreter whose switch dispatch handles
numeric opcodes rather than readable statements.
You need the meaning of opcodes, operands, or the constant table before you
can reason about what the code does.
Static beautified JS is not enough and you must capture interpreter state
(variables, return values, module exports) at runtime.
You are analyzing a WASM-like runtime that is not actual WebAssembly
(\x00asm magic absent) but a JS bytecode VM.
Prerequisites
Node.js 18+ for running reconstructed VM code and scripts.
A browser automation stack for runtime capture: Selenium with CDP access, or
Playwright (npm i playwright).
A JS beautifier (prettier, js-beautify) and a code editor with regex search.
Optional: Chrome DevTools Protocol knowledge for Input.dispatchMouseEvent.
Workflow
Phase 1: VM Identification (10-30 min)
Confirm the target is a custom DSL VM and not plain JS:
Check for a WASM payload: scan for the \x00asm magic bytes and compute the
zero-byte percentage of the script. A high zero-byte ratio with no \x00asm
header points to a custom bytecode blob, not WASM.
Look for the IIFE pattern var U=void 0; or equivalent single-letter
hoisting that precedes a switch (d[7]&31) style dispatcher.
Confirm the dispatcher signature: function DG(){...} reading and writing a
shared array d[], with a constant table C[9] referenced as C[9][n].
If none of these match, the target is ordinary obfuscated JS — use
js-reverse instead.
Phase 2: Variable Mapping (30-60 min)
Build a variable meaning table before touching opcodes:
Extract assignments: regex var\s+(\w+)\s*=\s*(\d+) over the first 2000
characters of the VM body.
Record the numeric literal bound to each single-letter variable. These
literals are array indices or opcode constants, not real values.
Map the dispatcher array: d[7] is typically the instruction pointer /
current opcode slot, d[4]/d[5] arithmetic registers, d[6] the operand
stack, d[8] a scratch register, d[9] a return/throw slot. Verify each
role from its usage across the switch body.
Phase 3: Opcode Extraction and Classification (1-2 hours)
Extract every case N: label from the dispatcher switch. Each case is one
opcode.
Classify each case by its statement shape (see the reference table below):
Statement shape
Classification
d[7]=... (no condition)
BRANCH
return ... / throw ...
RETURN
W(C[ ... ,null,function(){...})
CALL
new ...
ALLOC
try{...}catch(...){...}
EXCEPTION
d[x]=d[y][C[n]] / d[x]=d[y]<d[z]
ARITH / STORE
P[d[9]]=...
STORE (data handoff)
Record, for each opcode number, the classification and a one-line comment
describing its effect. Keep this table in your notes — it becomes the
instruction set reference for Phase 5.
Phase 4: Constant Table Analysis (30-60 min)
Grep the VM for references to the constant table: C\[9\]\[(\d+)\].
Collect the full set of referenced indices — this bounds how much bytecode
the interpreter can address.
For each referenced index, note the constant value and where it is consumed
(opcode operand, function index, string pool offset).
The constant table is the bytecode store: exported functions whose bodies
are not present as JS source are implemented as numeric sequences in
C[9].
Phase 5: Exported Function Tracing (1-2 hours)
Find the registration call, e.g. AWSCInner.register(name, moduleName, factory) or an equivalent register() invocation.
Resolve moduleName → the factory function → the object it returns.
If a function name does not exist in the JS source, it is stored as
bytecode in C[9] — note the index range.
Convert the traced bytecode range into the reconstructed semantics from
Phase 3 so you can read what the exported function actually computes.
Phase 6: Runtime Injection (when static analysis is insufficient)
If pure static reconstruction stalls (unresolved jumps, dynamic table writes,
state-dependent branches), inject a minimal compatible environment and run the
VM:
// Minimal AWSC-compatible environmentconst fakeEnv = {
AWSCInner: {
_modules: {},
register(name, moduleName, factory) {
this._modules[moduleName] = factory();
}
}
};
// Execute the DSL VM code in this sandbox
dslVmCode.call(fakeEnv);
// Read exportsconst token = fakeEnv.AWSCInner._modules['fy'].getToken({});
Drive the real page when the VM needs live browser context (see Runtime
Capture below). In either case, log every d[] write at interesting opcodes to
produce a state trace for verification.
Opcode Reference (observed on AWSC-family engines)
Opcode
Type
Characteristic statement
0
BRANCH
d[7]=xxx unconditional jump
1
CALL
W(C[Y],null,function(){...}) embedded call
2
ARITH
d[4]=0, d[7]=72 register assignment
3
ARITH
d[0]=d[1][C[x]], d[5]=d[0]<d[3] compare
4
STORE
d[8]=d[5]in d[4] property/in check
5
ARITH
d[8]=d[4]-d[8] arithmetic
6
RETURN
return gV / throw
7
ALLOC
d[6]=[], d[6][C[8]](...) push
8
BRANCH
d[7]=d[k]?512:425 conditional jump
9
STRING
d[6][C[t]]=d[m], new fh(...) regex
10
ALLOC
argument prep, call-frame creation
11
STRING
new fh("\\s",d[5]) regex match
12
STORE
P[d[9]]=d[4][C[H]](d[3]) data handoff
13
CALL
C[9][113]=d[9] module init
14
STRING
d[8]=d[9]+d[m] string concat
15
RETURN
return EL;
16
ALLOC
var r,P,Z,B... local declarations
17
ALLOC
(Z=[])[C[8]](69,T,445) static array init
18
TABLE
function/type table init
19
EXCEPTION
try{for(var RK=x;... try-catch loop
20
DOM
Is[d[o]] DOM operation
21
STORE
safe global/object property fetch
22
STRING
new fh(r,v) string/regex handling
23
BRANCH
try-catch safe fetch + conditional jump
24
CALL
W(C[2],null,8,z,FL) multi-arg call
25
EXCEPTION
try{...}catch(C){...} catch + jump
Opcode bit layout (observed): 5-bit opcode | 5-bit sub-opcode | operand.
Decoded in JS as d[7]&31 (opcode), d[7]>>5&31 (sub-opcode). Verify the
layout per sample before relying on it.
const { chromium } = require('playwright');
(async () => {
const browser = await chromium.launch();
const page = await browser.newPage();
// Observe API traffic while the VM runsawait page.route('**/api/**', async route => { await route.continue_(); });
await page.goto('https://target-page.com');
// Wait until the DSL VM finished initializingawait page.waitForFunction(() => {
returnwindow.AWSCInner &&
window.AWSCInner._modules &&
window.AWSCInner._modules['fy'];
});
// Trigger the flow that runs the bytecodeawait page.mouse.move(500, 400);
await page.mouse.down();
// ... interaction sequence ...await page.mouse.up();
await browser.close();
})();
Option C: Pure protocol replay (very low success — avoid)
DSL VM tokens are usually bound to the browser context (TLS JA3 fingerprint,
IP, cookies, request headers). Replaying the captured token outside the browser
lets the server detect the context mismatch. Do not default to a pure
protocol approach.
Common Status Codes (AWSC-family)
Code
Meaning
Handling
0
Verification passed
Extract sessionId + sig
300
Risk-control blocked
Blocked; cannot pass
8778
Verification failed, retry
Retry the operation
8776
Action too fast, retry
Add delay, then retry
69634
Generic failure
Check request parameters
Verification
Run this self-check before claiming the reversal is complete:
Confirmed VM identification (IIFE + single-letter vars + DG()-style
dispatcher, no \x00asm magic).
Extracted the variable mapping table (var X=<number> literals decoded).
Extracted and classified the full opcode list from case N: labels.
Analyzed the C[9] constant table reference range.
Located the exported-function registration point and traced at least one
export to its bytecode range.
When static analysis was insufficient, attempted runtime injection and
recorded a state trace.
Reproduced one real output (token, signature, or computed value) and
compared it against a live page capture — the outputs must match.
Documented the opcode table and VM layout in the case notes for reuse.
When NOT to Use
The code is ordinary obfuscated JavaScript with no interpreter — use
js-reverse instead.
The target is real WebAssembly (has \x00asm magic) — WASM tooling applies.
You only need the request/response contract, not the VM semantics — protocol
analysis is faster and sufficient.
Anti-Rationalization Table
Rationalization
Reality
"The switch is too long; I'll only read the opcodes I hit first."
An incomplete opcode table misreads later bytecode. Classify all case N: labels before concluding semantics.
"I beautified the JS, so the logic is now readable."
Beautifying does not decode bytecode. The logic lives in the C[9] table + dispatcher, not the source formatting.
"I'll just replay the captured token with curl."
Tokens are context-bound (JA3, IP, cookies). Server-side context mismatch detection defeats pure protocol replay.
"The variable names are meaningless, so I can skip mapping them."
The numeric literals bound to those variables are the indices and constants the VM needs — skipping the map guarantees misreads.
"One captured output is enough evidence."
A single match can be luck. Verify against at least two independent captures before claiming correctness.
