Assess Active Directory security posture using PingCastle, BloodHound, and Purple Knight to identify misconfigurations, privilege escalation paths, and attack vectors. Use when working with performing active directory vulnerability assessment.
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Assess Active Directory security posture using PingCastle, BloodHound, and Purple Knight to identify misconfigurations, privilege escalation paths, and attack vectors. Use when working with performing active directory vulnerability assessment.
Performing Active Directory Vulnerability Assessment
Overview
Active Directory (AD) is the primary identity and access management system in most enterprise environments, making it a critical attack target. This skill covers comprehensive AD security assessment using PingCastle for health checks, BloodHound for attack path analysis, and Purple Knight for security posture scoring. These tools identify misconfigurations, excessive privileges, Kerberos weaknesses, and lateral movement opportunities.
When to Use
Trigger phrases:
"performing active directory vulnerability assessment"
"Assess Active Directory security posture using PingCastle, BloodHound, and Purpl"
When conducting security assessments that involve performing active directory vulnerability assessment
When following incident response procedures for related security events
When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
When validating security controls through hands-on testing
Prerequisites
Domain-joined workstation or domain admin access for scanning
BloodHound Community Edition with SharpHound collector
Purple Knight from Semperis (free community tool)
Python 3.9+ for analysis scripts
.NET Framework 4.7+ for PingCastle on Windows
Tool 1: PingCastle Health Check
Tool
Purpose
Platform-specific tools
See the workflow steps for recommended tools
Standard utilities
sha256sum, grep, awk for data processing
Installation and Execution
# Download PingCastle
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://github.com/netwrix/pingcastle/releases/latest/download/PingCastle.zip" `
-OutFile "PingCastle.zip"
Expand-Archive PingCastle.zip -DestinationPath C:\Tools\PingCastle
# Run health check against current domain
cd C:\Tools\PingCastle
.\PingCastle.exe --healthcheck
# Run health check against specific domain
.\PingCastle.exe --healthcheck --server dc01.corp.local --user CORP\scanner_account --password P@ssw0rd
# Run in scanner mode for multiple domains
.\PingCastle.exe --scanner --scannerlp
# Generate consolidated report
.\PingCastle.exe --healthcheck --level Full
PingCastle Scoring Categories
Category
Description
Risk Areas
Stale Objects
Inactive accounts, old passwords, obsolete OS
Ghost accounts, expired credentials
Privileged Accounts
Excessive admin rights, nested groups
Domain Admin sprawl, SID history
Trusts
Forest and domain trust configurations
Transitive trust abuse, SID filtering
Anomalies
Security setting deviations
GPO misconfigurations, schema issues
Key PingCastle Checks
# Critical items to review in PingCastle report:
- Accounts with "Password Never Expires" flag
- Accounts with Kerberos pre-authentication disabled (AS-REP roastable)
- Accounts with Kerberos delegation (unconstrained/constrained)
- Domain Controllers running unsupported OS versions
- AdminSDHolder permission modifications
- Accounts in privileged groups (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins)
- Trust relationships with SID filtering disabled
- GPO vulnerabilities allowing privilege escalation
Tool 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis
Tool
Purpose
Platform-specific tools
See the workflow steps for recommended tools
Standard utilities
sha256sum, grep, awk for data processing
SharpHound Data Collection
# Download SharpHound collector
# https://github.com/SpecterOps/BloodHound/tree/main/packages/csharp/SharpHound
# Run SharpHound collection (all methods)
.\SharpHound.exe --collectionmethods All --domain corp.local --zipfilename bloodhound_data.zip
# Stealthy collection (minimal noise)
.\SharpHound.exe --collectionmethods Session,LoggedOn --domain corp.local --stealth
# Collection with specific domain controller
.\SharpHound.exe --collectionmethods All --domain corp.local --domaincontroller dc01.corp.local
# Run via PowerShell
Import-Module .\SharpHound.ps1
Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All -Domain corp.local -OutputDirectory C:\BH_Data
BloodHound CE Setup
# Deploy BloodHound Community Edition with Docker
curl -L https://ghst.ly/getbhce -o docker-compose.yml
docker compose up -d
# Access BloodHound CE at http://localhost:8080# Default credentials shown in docker compose logs# Upload SharpHound data through web UI or API
curl -X POST "http://localhost:8080/api/v2/file-upload/start" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $BH_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"fileName": "bloodhound_data.zip"}'
Critical BloodHound Queries
# Find shortest path to Domain Admin
MATCH p=shortestPath((u:User)-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL"}))
WHERE u.name <> "ADMINISTRATOR@CORP.LOCAL"
RETURN p
# Find Kerberoastable accounts with admin privileges
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group)
WHERE g.name CONTAINS "ADMIN"
RETURN u.name, u.serviceprincipalnames
# Find computers where Domain Admins are logged in
MATCH (c:Computer)-[:HasSession]->(u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL"})
RETURN c.name, u.name
# Find AS-REP roastable accounts
MATCH (u:User {dontreqpreauth:true})
RETURN u.name, u.description
# Find unconstrained delegation hosts
MATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation:true})
WHERE NOT c.name CONTAINS "DC"
RETURN c.name
# Find GPO abuse paths
MATCH p=(u:User)-[:GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteOwner|WriteDacl]->(g:GPO)
RETURN p
Tool 3: Purple Knight Assessment
# Download Purple Knight from https://www.purple-knight.com/
# Run as domain admin or with appropriate read permissions
.\PurpleKnight.exe
# Purple Knight checks 130+ security indicators across:
# - Account Security (password policies, privileged accounts)
# - AD Infrastructure (replication, DNS, LDAP signing)
# - Group Policy (GPO permissions, security settings)
# - Kerberos Security (delegation, encryption types, SPN)
# - AD Delegation (AdminSDHolder, OU permissions)
Purple Knight Score Categories
Score Range
Rating
Action Required
90-100
Excellent
Maintain current posture
75-89
Good
Address high-risk findings
60-74
Fair
Prioritize remediation plan
40-59
Poor
Immediate remediation required
0-39
Critical
Emergency response needed
Common AD Vulnerabilities
This section covers common ad vulnerabilities for performing active directory vulnerability assessment.
Ensure all prerequisites are met before proceeding
Follow the documented workflow steps in sequence
Record results and any anomalies encountered during this phase
# Check if LLMNR is disabled via GPO
Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient" -Name EnableMulticast -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
4. Excessive Privileged Group Membership
# Count members in critical groups
$groups = @("Domain Admins", "Enterprise Admins", "Schema Admins", "Account Operators", "Backup Operators")
foreach ($group in $groups) {
$count = (Get-ADGroupMember -Identity $group -Recursive).Count
Write-Output "$group : $count members"
}
Remediation Priorities
Finding
Risk
Remediation
Kerberoastable admin accounts
Critical
Remove SPNs or use MSA/gMSA
Unconstrained delegation on non-DCs
Critical
Switch to constrained/RBCD
Password Never Expires on admins
High
Enable password rotation policy
AS-REP roastable accounts
High
Enable Kerberos pre-authentication
AdminSDHolder modification
High
Audit and restore default ACLs
Stale computer accounts (90+ days)
Medium
Disable and move to quarantine OU
LDAP signing not enforced
Medium
Enable via GPO on all DCs
When NOT to Use
You don't have explicit written authorization to test
Task is about defense/detection, not offense (use detection skills)
You need to implement security controls (use implementing-* skills)
