Run harness adapters (Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode) INSIDE isolated sandboxes via defineSandbox + withSandbox + a provider (localProcessSandbox / dockerSandbox). Covers declarative provisioning: createSecrets + secret/bearer, skills (agentSkill/gitSkill/mcpSkill/ fileSkill), plugins, instructions → canonical AGENTS.md + symlinks projected per harness; shallow-clone default with depth opt-out; serial/parallel setup callback over a persistent shell; snapshot-after-setup default with snapshotMaxAge TTL. It also covers portable snapshots after a successful terminal run with withPersistence before withSandbox and memorySandboxSnapshots for local examples. It covers named saves with snapshots.save, selected-checkpoint forks with snapshots.fork, and authorized artifact reads with snapshots.readArtifact. See docs/sandbox/portable-snapshots.md. It covers defineWorkspace (git/setup/scripts/skills/secrets/ instructions/plugins), defineSandboxPolicy (allow/ask/deny), lifecycle/resume, the SandboxHandle (fs/git/process/po
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SKILL.md
Quellanweisungen · Schreibgeschützte Vorschau
name
ai-sandbox
description
Run harness adapters (Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode) INSIDE isolated sandboxes via defineSandbox + withSandbox + a provider (localProcessSandbox / dockerSandbox). Covers declarative provisioning: createSecrets + secret/bearer, skills (agentSkill/gitSkill/mcpSkill/ fileSkill), plugins, instructions → canonical AGENTS.md + symlinks projected per harness; shallow-clone default with depth opt-out; serial/parallel setup callback over a persistent shell; snapshot-after-setup default with snapshotMaxAge TTL. It also covers portable snapshots after a successful terminal run with withPersistence before withSandbox and memorySandboxSnapshots for local examples. It covers named saves with snapshots.save, selected-checkpoint forks with snapshots.fork, and authorized artifact reads with snapshots.readArtifact. See docs/sandbox/portable-snapshots.md. It covers defineWorkspace (git/setup/scripts/skills/secrets/ instructions/plugins), defineSandboxPolicy (allow/ask/deny), lifecycle/resume, the SandboxHandle (fs/git/process/ports), capability tokens, defineSandbox hooks (onFile/onFileCreate/onFileChange/onFileDelete/onReady/onError/ onDestroy) + fileEvents flag, chat middleware sandbox group (defineChatMiddleware sandbox hooks), the sandbox debug category, watchWorkspace as a low-level building block, the file.changed / sandbox.file / claude-code.session-id events, and the run journal (spawnNdjson journal option, runId uniqueness, follow vs bounded-poll reading, alignToStoredLog replay alignment, chunkFingerprint, createRunScopedIdGen), and takeover of detached runs (withSandbox runs+durability as one opt-in, detach vs cancel via requestRunCancel / RUN_CANCEL_REASON, sandboxRunDriver on the resume path, single-writer fencing of BOTH the event log and the run record, replay-from-zero with JournalReplayDivergedError, the distributed LockStore requirement). Use whenever a harness adapter needs a sandbox or when building sandbox providers.
Harness adapters declare requires: [SandboxCapability]. chat() errors unless
some middleware provides it — withSandbox(...) does. The adapter then runs the
agent CLI inside the sandbox and streams its events back.
import { createSecrets, bearer } from'@tanstack/ai-sandbox'const secrets = createSecrets({
GH: process.env.GH_TOKEN ?? '',
SENTRY: process.env.SENTRY_TOKEN ?? '',
})
// secrets.GH is a SecretRef — the underlying string is stored in a// non-enumerable symbol-keyed registry and never logged, snapshotted,// or written to the sandbox store.
Pass secrets to defineWorkspace({ secrets }) so skill and MCP projectors
can resolve them. Use secret: secrets.GH in gitSkill for private-repo auth
and secrets.GH / bearer(secrets.GH) in MCP header values:
secrets.GH — resolves to the raw token value.
bearer(secrets.GH) — resolves to "Bearer <value>".
import {
agentSkill,
gitSkill,
mcpSkill,
fileSkill,
bearer,
createSecrets,
defineWorkspace,
} from'@tanstack/ai-sandbox'const secrets = createSecrets({ GH: process.env.GH_TOKEN ?? '' })
defineWorkspace({
source: { type: 'git', url: 'https://github.com/owner/repo' },
secrets,
skills: [
agentSkill('tanstack'), // named skill (no-op with warning on CLIs that lack the concept)gitSkill({
repo: 'owner/private-skills',
secret: secrets.GH, // resolved at bootstrap time, never stored// into: '/abs/path/inside/sandbox' // optional; defaults to .tanstack-skills/<repo>
}),
mcpSkill('my-mcp', {
url: 'https://mcp.example.com',
headers: { Authorization: bearer(secrets.GH) },
}),
fileSkill({ path: '.hints.md', content: 'Prefer pnpm.' }),
],
plugins: ['@anthropic/plugin-foo'], // no-op with warning on CLIs without a plugin conceptinstructions: 'Always run `pnpm test` before proposing a change.',
})
Each skill type is projected per harness (Claude Code → .mcp.json; Codex →
.codex/config.toml; OpenCode → opencode.json).
instructions is written as AGENTS.md at the workspace root; CLAUDE.md and
GEMINI.md are created as symlinks (falling back to copies on symlink failure).
Skills/plugins that a CLI lacks emit a console.warn and are skipped.
gitSkillinto field: an absolute path inside the sandbox where the
repo is cloned. Defaults to <root>/.tanstack-skills/<repo-basename>.
Fast init
Shallow clone (depth)
githubRepo / gitSource default to --depth 1 --single-branch. Override:
setup accepts a plain Array<string> (all serial) or a callback that records
serial and parallel groups over a persistent shell whose cwd/env carry over
between serial steps:
When the provider supports snapshots, bootstrap takes one automatically after
setup completes. Subsequent runs resume from the snapshot (skipping setup).
Override or add a TTL:
lifecycle: {
snapshot: 'after-setup', // default when provider.capabilities().snapshotssnapshotMaxAge: '24h', // re-create when the snapshot is older than this
}
Providers without snapshot support skip the step silently.
Portable sandbox snapshots
Portable snapshots keep completed workspace files in application persistence.
They are separate from provider-native bootstrap snapshots. Configure the
middleware in this order, with the same persistence value in both places:
Each successful terminal run saves regular files, empty directories, durable
conversation data, and persisted thread artifacts. A later run restores the
latest checkpoint only into a new private sandbox. A live resumed sandbox is
never overwritten. The default policy excludes .git, node_modules, and
.env* path segments at every depth. It excludes the exact projection marker
only at the workspace root. It also excludes root CLAUDE.md and GEMINI.md,
plus direct .claude/skills/<name>, .codex/skills/<name>, and
.grok/skills/<name> paths. These exclusions use paths even for regular files
or copies. If you pass only include or only redact, the default
exclusions stay in place. If you pass exclude, that function replaces
the default exclusions, except for exact projection-marker protection.
Copy defaultSandboxSnapshotPolicy() first when you write exclude.
Pass include and exclude functions on policy to store only some files,
including one file. There is no save({ files }) list. See
docs/sandbox/portable-snapshots-files.md. Resolved secrets are redacted before the data is stored. Symlinks,
executables, and special filesystem entries fail the capture or restore. Each
thread has one writer lease. Pause and detach release the lease without a
partial checkpoint. Blob retention is manual because there is no automatic
garbage collection yet.
Read these pages for the server-only setup:
docs/sandbox/portable-snapshots.md
docs/sandbox/portable-snapshots-configure.md
docs/sandbox/portable-snapshots-save.md
docs/sandbox/portable-snapshots-fork.md
docs/sandbox/portable-snapshots-artifacts.md
docs/sandbox/portable-snapshots-tools.md
docs/sandbox/portable-snapshots-files.md
docs/sandbox/portable-snapshots-safety.md
For a user-marked workspace state, call snapshots.save on the server. Bind
sandbox and instances at create time, or pass them on save. The call
needs threadId, runId, and a label. It requires a live reusable sandbox.
reuse: 'none' cannot save a named checkpoint.
To branch from a selected checkpoint, call snapshots.fork with the thread id,
checkpoint id, and destination thread id. The store must implement atomic
forkFromCheckpoint. The destination thread must be empty. A fork copies the
selected snapshot, not the latest snapshot.
To send a checkpoint artifact, call snapshots.readArtifact on the server.
First authorize the caller for the supplied thread. The method makes sure that
the checkpoint belongs to that thread, then returns its metadata and bytes. It
does not authorize a caller or create an HTTP response.
For a SQLite checkpoint store, use one transaction for a checkpoint write, its
head update, and every blob reference update. Use one transaction for a fork,
including its copied conversation. A partial transaction breaks snapshot
consistency.
Snapshot capture supports regular files and empty directories only. It excludes
.git, node_modules, and .env* path segments at every depth. It excludes
the exact projection marker only at the workspace root. It also excludes root
CLAUDE.md and GEMINI.md, plus direct .claude/skills/<name>,
.codex/skills/<name>, and .grok/skills/<name> paths. These exclusions use
paths even for regular files or copies. If you pass only include or only
redact, the default exclusions stay in place. If you pass exclude, that
function replaces the default exclusions, except for exact projection-marker
protection. It rejects symlinks, executable files, and special filesystem
entries. Restore verifies the manifest and blobs before
it changes a new private sandbox. It never writes into a live resumed sandbox.
Providers
localProcessSandbox() — runs on the host (no isolation; dev loop only).
daytonaSandbox({ apiKey, snapshot, autoStopInterval, ephemeral }) —
Daytona cloud sandbox; snapshots after setup; resume starts stopped or
archived sandboxes. /workspace maps to /home/daytona/workspace. Setup
that installs packages must use sudo -n (do not deny sudo *). See
docs/sandbox/providers.md for network and secret injection details.
All implement the same SandboxHandle: fs (read/write/list/mkdir/remove/
rename/exists), git (clone/status/add/commit/push/pull/branch), process
(exec + duplex spawn), ports.connect(port), env.set, optional
snapshot()/fork(), destroy(). Providers advertise support via
capabilities(); calling an unsupported optional method throws
UnsupportedCapabilityError.
Policy
import { defineSandboxPolicy } from'@tanstack/ai-sandbox'// Headless Grok Build / Codex: stay on auto-approve. Isolation is the// outer sandbox (Docker, Daytona, …), not commands.deny on this policy.const policy = defineSandboxPolicy({
default: 'allow',
})
// pass to defineSandbox({ policy }); harness adapters map it to native permissions
Claude Code can use default: 'ask' plus allow/ask/deny lists. Use Claude Code
when you need command-level deny. Provider privilege rules (non-root users,
network block at create) live in docs/sandbox/providers.md.
Lifecycle & resume
reuse: 'thread' resumes one sandbox per threadId; the compound key folds in
provider + workspace hash + tenant so changing the repo/setup/image starts
fresh. Ensure order: resume running → restore snapshot → create + bootstrap.
Instance durability (durable resume)
Resume bookkeeping defaults to in-memory (single-process). For cross-process /
multi-replica resume, implement a durable SandboxInstanceStore (BYO) and pass
it as withSandbox(sandbox, { instances }). Pair multi-replica with a
distributed lock: either withLocks from @tanstack/ai/locks (ordered
beforewithSandbox) or the locks option.
The store option takes precedence over an ambient SandboxInstanceStoreCapability
(provided by a platform layer via provideSandboxInstanceStore), which in turn
beats the in-memory fallback.
Chat transcript durability (withPersistence) is independent — compose both
when the app needs history and instance reuse. Prove adapters with
runSandboxInstanceStoreConformance from @tanstack/ai-sandbox/testkit.
Use defineSandboxInstanceStore({ get, upsert, delete }) for inline typing of a
BYO store (same pattern as defineLock / defineMessageStore).
File-event hooks
Watch the workspace for create/change/delete events. Provider-agnostic: native
fs.watch on local-process, a portable find poll on Docker/exec-only
providers (no extra deps or image changes).
Declare hooks on defineSandbox({ hooks }) (sandbox-scoped) or on any chat
middleware via the sandbox group (run-scoped):
import { defineSandbox, withSandbox } from'@tanstack/ai-sandbox'// `defineChatMiddleware` is core's, not this package's — `@tanstack/ai-sandbox`// consumes it too (see its own `src/middleware.ts`).import { defineChatMiddleware } from'@tanstack/ai'import { dockerSandbox } from'@tanstack/ai-sandbox-docker'// Sandbox-scoped hooks (all optional):const sandbox = defineSandbox({
id: 'repo-agent',
provider: dockerSandbox({ image: 'node:22' }),
hooks: {
onFile: (e) =>console.log(e.type, e.path), // catch-allonFileCreate: (e) =>console.log('created', e.path),
onFileChange: (e) =>console.log('changed', e.path),
onFileDelete: (e) =>console.log('deleted', e.path),
onReady: (handle) =>console.log('ready', handle.id),
onError: (err) =>console.error(err),
onDestroy: () =>console.log('destroyed'),
},
fileEvents: true, // default; set false to disable watching entirely
})
// Run-scoped hooks via chat middleware (ctx is ChatMiddlewareContext):const auditMiddleware = defineChatMiddleware({
name: 'audit',
sandbox: {
onFile: (ctx, e) =>console.log(ctx.runId, e.type, e.path),
onFileCreate: (ctx, e) => db.log({ run: ctx.runId, event: e }),
onFileChange: (ctx, e) => metrics.increment('file.change'),
onFileDelete: (ctx, e) =>console.warn('deleted', e.path),
},
})
// No extra middleware needed — sandbox.file CUSTOM events are emitted// automatically. Read them from the stream:forawait (const chunk of stream) {
if (chunk.type === 'CUSTOM' && chunk.name === 'sandbox.file') {
const value = chunk.valueif (
value !== null &&
typeof value === 'object' &&
'type'in value &&
'path'in value
) {
console.log('file event', value) // { type, path, timestamp }
}
}
}
watchWorkspace() is available as a low-level building block for watching
outside a chat() run:
Enable the sandbox debug category to log watcher start/stop, event dispatch,
and lifecycle transitions:
chat({ threadId, adapter, messages, debug: { sandbox: true } })
// or debug: true to enable all categories
Edge / serverless execution
A request-scoped Worker can't hold a multi-minute agent run open. The
serverless/edge model splits this: a trigger starts the run and returns
immediately, a durable orchestrator drives it, and clients tail from a
resumable cursor.
Core primitives (@tanstack/ai-sandbox, transport- and runtime-agnostic):
pipeToRunLog / RunController (the run driver), built on two of core's
(@tanstack/ai) durable seams: a RunStore for the run's lifecycle record
(the same store withPersistence uses for chat history) and a
StreamDurability for its event log (memoryStream or durableStream).
pipeToRunLog(stream, { runs, durability, runId, threadId, signal, logger })
pumps a chat() stream into both and is total: every store/event-log
call is individually guarded, so it never throws and never rejects. A
thrown stream error becomes a terminal RUN_ERROR event plus the record's
error, so a detached client always observes failures, and a failing store
write or a failing durability close is recorded through the optional
logger (same logger?.errors(...) contract core uses) rather than
silently absorbed. threadId is required. RunController wraps a fixed
RunDeps = { runs, durability, logger? }, where durability is a per-run
factory (runId) => StreamDurability, not an instance:
import { InMemoryRunStore, memoryStream } from'@tanstack/ai'import { RunController } from'@tanstack/ai-sandbox'importtype { StreamChunk } from'@tanstack/ai'const runs = newInMemoryRunStore()
exportasyncfunctiondriveOne(request: Request,
runId: string,
threadId: string,
stream: AsyncIterable<StreamChunk>,
): Promise<void> {
const controller = newRunController({
runs,
// A per-run FACTORY. A `StreamDurability` is bound to ONE run, so the log// is resolved FROM the runId rather than handed in pre-bound. Whatever you// pass MUST return the same instance for the same runId within a process,// or `snapshot()` will not see this host's own appends. `memoryStream`// keys its log by the run the request names, so every call for one run// shares one log; swap in `durableStream(request, options)` in production.durability: () =>memoryStream(request),
})
const handle = controller.start({ runId, threadId, stream })
// handle.runId, handle.done (resolves with the terminal RunRecord)// `attach` takes the runId FIRST, because the log it reads is per-run.// fromOffset is an opaque string the durability adapter produced; for// memoryStream, '-1' replays from the start. The third `signal` argument is// optional and stops tailing when it aborts.forawait (const { offset, chunk } of controller.attach(runId, '-1')) {
console.log(offset, chunk.type)
}
await handle.doneawait controller.drain() // await every in-flight run, e.g. inside waitUntil
}
Terminal statuses are 'completed' | 'failed' | 'aborted' (core's
TerminalRunStatus); a run may also be 'running' or 'interrupted'
(RunStatus). Because the log is resolved from the runId, a
RunControlleris safe for concurrent runs: each run appends to its own
log and no run's close() terminalizes another's. Two failures that a
single pre-bound instance used to make reachable are now unrepresentable —
writing the lifecycle record under one id and the events under another, and
parallel runs interleaving chunks into one log. Do not hand back the same
StreamDurability for every runId to "simplify" the factory; that
reintroduces both.
For a production takeover, do not drive RunController /
pipeToRunLog by hand — use sandboxRunDriver (see
Takeover), which owns the
claim, the epoch fence, and the quiescence gate.
Transport-agnostic tool-bridge — createToolBridgeCore +
handleBridgeJsonRpc are the portable core; startHostToolBridge is the
node:http host transport. The ToolBridgeProvisioner capability injects the
transport, so an edge orchestrator serves the same core from its own fetch
handler (no raw TCP listener). Default = host transport.
Co-located host-tool seam — toolDescriptors / remoteToolStubs /
httpRemoteToolExecutor (container side) + executeHostTool (orchestrator
side): only chat()-tool EXECUTION crosses the container→orchestrator boundary,
not the whole MCP protocol.
SandboxCapabilities.writableStdin — false for providers (e.g.
Cloudflare) with no writable host→process stdin; stdin-fed harnesses then
deliver the prompt via a file + in-shell redirection (claude -p … < file).
createCloudflareSandboxAgent(config) → { Coordinator, Sandbox, worker } —
an app's worker.ts is one configured call plus the wrangler-required DO
re-exports. Two models via mode: do-drives (the DO runs chat()) and
colocated (harness + bridge run in-container; the DO is a thin coordinator,
pair with runInContainerHarness from /runner).
DurableObjectRunEventLog mirrors InMemoryRunEventLog (both live in
@tanstack/ai-sandbox-cloudflare, exported from its /agent entry) over DO
storage; timingSafeBearerEqualWeb is the Web-Crypto constant-time bearer
check. That package's own RunStatus, TerminalRunStatus, RunRecord, and
RunError describe its event-log vocabulary, which is deliberately distinct
from core's run-lifecycle types of the same names; the /agent entry
re-exports them under a Legacy prefix (LegacyRunStatus,
LegacyTerminalRunStatus, LegacyRunRecord, LegacyRunError) so an app can
import both this package's run driver and the Cloudflare event log without a
name collision. RunEventLog, RunEvent, and RunEventLogReadOptions have
no equivalent in core and keep their plain names.
Durable runs (the run journal)
A harness adapter's agent CLI (Claude Code, Codex, …) writes its NDJSON stdout
into a run journal instead of a pipe the host holds open: a shell redirect
appends every line to /tmp/tanstack-runs/<runId>.ndjson inside the sandbox
(stderr goes to a <runId>.err sidecar, never mixed in), so the host can
return without holding a live process handle, and a reader replays the same
file from byte 0 at any point, including after the original host has died.
import { spawnNdjson } from'@tanstack/ai-sandbox'forawait (const event ofspawnNdjson(sandbox, agentCommand, {
cwd,
journal: { runId }, // durability is opt-in: pass `journal` to route through it
})) {
// parsed NDJSON objects, translated by the harness adapter as usual
}
A runId MUST be unique per run. The journal is append-only by design (a
takeover needs the prefix a previous host already wrote to still be there), so
reusing a runId appends to the previous run's journal file. A reader stops at
the FIRST {"__exit":N} sentinel it encounters, which is the earlier run's, so
the new run appears to emit nothing, or to fail with the previous run's exit
code. Uniqueness is therefore the caller's job and is deliberately not
enforced — refusing to append would break the append-only property a takeover
depends on.
Absence, unlike reuse, IS enforced. Every harness adapter routes through
resolveDurableRunId(options.runId, { durable, adapter, fallback }), which
throws DurableRunIdRequiredError when sandbox durability is wired and no
runId was passed — a generated id is never minted for a durable run, not even
one that is discarded, because no successor host could recompute its journal
path. The fallback() to a generated id survives only for non-durable runs,
where several chat() paths legitimately pass runId as a conditional spread.
The journaling adapters are Claude Code, Codex, and Grok Build; ACP and
OpenCode do not journal and pass durable: false, so they keep the fallback
unconditionally today and inherit the enforcement automatically if either gains
journaling.
Reading strategy
readJournal (and spawnNdjson's journal path, via readJournalNdjson)
picks one of two strategies from the sandbox's advertised capabilities, never
from the provider's name:
follow (tail -f, started with handle.process.spawn), when
capabilities.backgroundProcesses && capabilities.killableProcesses are
both true. It streams with no polling cost and is stopped by killing the
tail when the consumer stops reading.
bounded poll (repeated bounded exec reads, DEFAULT_JOURNAL_POLL_MS,
250ms) otherwise. killableProcesses is false for a provider like
Cloudflare, whose kill() is a documented no-op and whose Workers RPC
cannot serialize an AbortSignal across the boundary, so a tail -f
started there could never be stopped and the poll path is used instead.
The bounded read (journalReadCommand) base64-frames its output, because
exec closes the encoder's stdin, which flushes it, so the whole frame
arrives as one complete result. The follow path (journalFollowCommand) does
not base64-frame its output: base64 fully buffers its stdout when that
stdout is not a tty, so tail -f file | base64 would emit nothing until the
libc stdio buffer fills or tail -f's stdin closes, and that stdin never
closes until the reader kills it, at which point the consumer has already
stopped waiting for bytes. Dropping the frame on the follow path is safe
because the journal is line-delimited JSON and every provider already decodes
stdout text on this path the same way it decodes an agent's own stdout.
Alignment: replaying without duplicating
alignToStoredLog reads a run's already-stored event log with
durability.snapshot() (a bounded, point-in-time read; never read(), which
tails and never resolves against a log a dead producer never closed),
compares each replayed chunk against the stored one by chunkFingerprint, and
forwards only the remainder past what is already stored. Downstream, that
remainder is always passed to append, never upsert: the journal path only
ever appends, because deciding the append point is exactly what alignment
does. A replayed chunk that does not match the stored chunk at the same index
throws JournalReplayDivergedError rather than forwarding data that might be
corrupt.
Message ids on the journaled path come from createRunScopedIdGen(runId),
a per-run counter (<runId>-0, <runId>-1, …) with no clock and no
randomness, wired as harness translators' genId, so re-translating the same
journal bytes twice reproduces the same ids. chunkFingerprint excludes only
the timestamp field (wall-clock, unreproducible) from the comparison;
everything else, including nested tool-call arguments, participates.
Determinism is translator-level only. On ai-claude-code and ai-codex,
mergeChunkStreams(translated, channel.stream) splices host-tool-bridge
events from a live tool execution into the middle of the stream; those events
do not occur again on replay. A run that used a bridged tool can still
diverge on replay for that reason: alignment guarantees reproducibility of
the translation step, not of everything that can happen during a run.
Cleanup
Once a run reaches its {"__exit":N} sentinel, both journal files are
deleted. A run that terminates while detached (no host reading its
journal) has no reader to observe the sentinel, so nothing deletes its
journal on the run's own path. pruneJournals bounds that: it walks the
journal directory, asks the run store about each runId it decodes, deletes
only the journals whose runs are terminal, and keeps everything it cannot
prove dead (non-terminal, undecodable, or too young to be an orphan). It runs
from a cron the application schedules, not from a run, so an abandoned journal
survives until that sweep — this journal, reader, and alignment primitive do
not clean it up themselves.
The journal, the reader, and alignToStoredLog are the primitives a takeover is
built from. sandboxRunDriver is what drives one — see the next section.
Takeover: detached runs and single-writer safety
A tab does not last ten minutes; a sandboxed coding agent does. Without
durability wired, withSandbox's abort path destroys the sandbox on every
abort, deliberately — closing the agent's IO stream does not kill the agent
process (a Docker exec survives its client), so destroying the container is
the only reliable way to stop it burning tokens. Correct for a cancel, ruinous
for a refresh.
Durability is ONE opt-in, not two
withSandbox(sandbox, { runs, durability }). A run is durable only when both
are present: a record with no event log cannot be replayed, and a log with no
record cannot be found, claimed, or reaped. There is no half-configured state —
pass one and you silently get exactly today's behavior, with no warning,
because you have not asked for durability. This is the single easiest way to
believe you shipped durable runs and have shipped nothing.
Pass the sameRunStore chat persistence uses (persistence.stores.runs),
and hand the sameStreamDurability instance to both withSandbox and the
transport, so one record and one log describe the run.
runId is also required for a durable run: chatStream throws
DurableRunIdRequiredError when none is passed, because the journal path and
the deterministic id generator are both derived from it and a successor host can
only resume a run whose runId it can recompute.
Detach vs cancel — intent NEVER comes from the disconnect
A user pressing Stop and a user closing the tab produce the identical
connection close. There is nothing in the disconnect to tell them apart, so
never try. Intent arrives out of band, and there are exactly two bands, either
of which is authoritative:
Durable — requestRunCancel(runs, runId) records cancelRequested on
the run record. This is the only channel that reaches a run being driven by a
different host than the one the cancel landed on, which is the normal
case for a detached run.
In-process — abort the run's own AbortController with
RUN_CANCEL_REASON. Core reads that reason back into AbortInfo, so
AbortInfo.cancelRequested is true for that abort and false for a plain
disconnect. Fast path only.
A cancel endpoint should do both. requestRunCancel deliberately writes no
status: recording intent is not the same as the run having stopped, and only the
driver knows when the agent is dead and the sandbox is gone.
import { RUN_CANCEL_REASON, requestRunCancel } from'@tanstack/ai'importtype { RunStore } from'@tanstack/ai'/** Runs THIS process drives. A run driven by another replica is absent here. */const driving = newMap<string, AbortController>()
exportasyncfunctioncancelRun(runs: RunStore,
threadId: string,
): Promise<void> {
const active = await runs.findActiveRun(threadId)
if (!active) return// Band 1: durable, so a remote driver observes it on its next teardown.awaitrequestRunCancel(runs, active.runId)
// Band 2: in-process, so a co-located driver stops immediately.
driving.get(active.runId)?.abort(RUN_CANCEL_REASON)
}
On the client, chat.stop() alone is not a cancel. It aborts a local
AbortController and sends the server nothing, which on a durable run is
indistinguishable from a refresh — so the agent keeps running and keeps
spending tokens with nobody watching. Call a cancel endpoint too.
What each path writes: a disconnect on a durable run with detachOnDisconnect
on and no cancel recorded keeps the sandbox and writes detachedSince +
sandboxKey, while withPersistence writes nothing (the record stays
'running'). A cancel in either band destroys the sandbox regardless of
destroyOnComplete, and withPersistence writes 'aborted'. keepAlive /
destroyOnComplete: false govern successful completion only — they never keep
a sandbox alive through a cancel.
sandboxRunDriver — the supported way to drive a resumed run
Takeover happens in the GET handler that already serves resumes. Add a
driver and the same request that replays the log also claims the run and keeps
driving it. Do not hand-roll this.sandboxRunDriver owns the claim, the
epoch fencing, and the quiescence gate; a consumer wiring pipeToRunLog
directly is re-implementing exactly the seam that produced this phase's
duplicate-write and false-terminal-write bugs.
import { memoryStream, resumeServerSentEventsResponse } from'@tanstack/ai'import { sandboxRunDriver } from'@tanstack/ai-sandbox'importtype { RunStore, StreamChunk } from'@tanstack/ai'importtype { LockStore } from'@tanstack/ai/locks'/**
* The claim hands `drive` an `AbortSignal` that fires the moment this host loses
* ownership; `chat()` takes an `AbortController`. Mirror one onto the other, or
* a lost claim never stops the drive.
*/exportfunctioncontrollerFor(signal: AbortSignal): AbortController {
const controller = newAbortController()
const abort = (): void => controller.abort(signal.reason)
if (signal.aborted) abort()
else signal.addEventListener('abort', abort, { once: true })
return controller
}
exportfunctiontakeoverResponse(request: Request,
runs: RunStore,
locks: LockStore,
drive: (input: {
runId: string
threadId: string
signal: AbortSignal
}) => AsyncIterable<StreamChunk>,
): Response {
returnresumeServerSentEventsResponse({
adapter: memoryStream(request),
driver: sandboxRunDriver({
request,
runs,
locks,
// Per-run factory, same shape as `RunDeps.durability`.durability: () =>memoryStream(request),
drive,
// Serverless: pass `waitUntil: (p) => ctx.waitUntil(p)` to keep the// background drive alive. `fenceQuietMs` overrides the quiescence window.
}),
})
}
Inside drive, run chat() with abortController: controllerFor(input.signal)
and withSandbox(sandbox, { runs, durability: { adapter, attach: true } }).
attach: true is the whole difference — the harness tails the run's
EXISTING journal instead of starting a second agent. It belongs there and never
on chat() (core has no sandbox vocabulary), and it is set only by an attach
route, never by a POST handler. Load the thread from the message store: the
client sent no history because it is reconnecting, not asking a question — and
pass the run record's threadId. Forget it and the attach refuses up front
with DurableThreadIdRequiredError rather than failing mid-stream: every emitted
chunk carries threadId, so a generated one differs from the stored log in its
very first chunk. resolveDurableThreadId throws only in the durable-AND-
attaching quadrant — a durable fresh run legitimately mints its threadId,
since it is the run that establishes it. JournalReplayThreadIdMismatchError is
still what surfaces if a mismatched threadId reaches alignToStoredLog by some
other route; sandboxRunDriver itself forwards active.threadId into
drive({ runId, threadId, signal }), so the remaining gap is application drive
code that does not pass it on to chat().
The response is byte-identical whether or not you pass driver: it still
replays from the durability log. The drive runs beside it, appending to the
producer-side log, and the response tails what lands. Everything is total by
construction — no run id, no record, an already-terminal record, another host
holding the claim, or a throwing drive all resolve to "serve the log, drive
nothing", logged server-side.
Branchable failures, all barrel-exported:
import {
RunClaimLostError,
RunClaimNotAcquiredError,
RunDriverPipeOutsideClaimError,
} from'@tanstack/ai-sandbox'exportfunctiondescribeDriveFailure(error: unknown): string {
if (error instanceofRunClaimNotAcquiredError) {
// 'terminal' | 'unknown' | 'superseded' — an ordinary contended takeover.return`not driving ${error.runId}: ${error.reason}`
}
if (error instanceofRunClaimLostError) {
return`superseded mid-drive at epoch ${error.heldEpoch}`
}
if (error instanceofRunDriverPipeOutsideClaimError) {
// Programming error: the options object was taken apart and `pipe` called// outside `claim`, so there is no epoch to fence with.return`run ${error.runId}: pipe ran outside its claim`
}
throw error
}
The first two are normal outcomes of a contended takeover and
resumeServerSentEventsResponse already swallows both — expect them in logs,
not in responses.
Single-writer safety: BOTH seams are fenced
Only one host may write a run. The client has no safety net below its offset
de-dup: if two hosts each snapshot the log, compute a "remainder", and append
it, the same logical chunk lands twice under two different offsets, looks new,
and the stream processor applies text and tool-argument deltas unconditionally
— doubled prose and {"a":1}{"a":1} tool arguments. Takeover is by definition
two hosts wanting one run, so the exclusion has to be real. Three layers, all
wired by sandboxRunDriver: a per-run lease (LockStore.withLock around
the whole drive), an epoch (RunRecord.driverEpoch, bumped by each
successful claim and re-read before appends), and quiescence (the successor
waits for the stored log to stop growing before its first append;
DEFAULT_FENCE_QUIET_MS = 5s, override with fenceQuietMs).
A run's facts live in two places, and both are fenced. This is the part a
reader gets half-right and then builds a broken poller on:
The event log. A superseded driver's append is refused, and the
first refusal latches the fence permanently shut.
The run record. A terminal-status update from a lost claim is
suppressed — it resolves without writing. Non-terminal writes still pass
through (a stale detachedSince / sandboxKey cannot make a live run look
finished, and the successor overwrites them anyway).
Fencing only the log would not remove the harm, it would relocate it:
pipeToRunLog answers a refused append by writing a terminal record, so a dead
host would mark the successor's healthy run 'failed', and every consumer that
branches on terminal status (isTerminalRunStatus, findActiveRun, a status
poller, a reaper) would believe a live run died on the authority of a host that
no longer owns it. Because both seams are closed, a terminal status on the
record is trustworthy and a status poller may believe it.
close() is outside both fences, deliberately: it runs on every teardown path
including the teardown caused by losing the claim, and a fenced close would
wedge the record at 'running' with every live tailer parked forever — a
durability read only ends when the log closes.
This is not airtight fencing. A predecessor paused (GC, VM suspend) longer
than the quiescence window between its last fence check and its append landing
can still write one batch; closing that needs a compare-and-set
StreamDurability.append does not offer. Mitigate at deployment level: a
lease-backed distributed LockStore, and fenceQuietMs above the lease renewal
interval.
Replay from zero, and JournalReplayDivergedError
A takeover does not resume the journal where the dead host stopped. It
re-reads the journal from byte zero, re-translates it, and alignment makes
that safe: the stored log is read once with snapshot(), the replay is verified
against it by chunkFingerprint, the matching prefix is suppressed, and only
the remainder is appended and delivered. The log is the checkpoint, so no
checkpoint can disagree with it.
If the replay produces a different chunk than the log holds at that index,
JournalReplayDivergedError is thrown with the index and both fingerprints:
import {
JournalReplayDivergedError,
JournalReplayThreadIdMismatchError,
} from'@tanstack/ai-sandbox'exportfunctionreport(error: unknown): string {
// Check the subclass FIRST — it separates a config mistake from a real// determinism bug in one check.if (error instanceofJournalReplayThreadIdMismatchError) {
return'the attach route drove the run without the record threadId'
}
if (error instanceofJournalReplayDivergedError) {
return`diverged at ${error.index}: stored ${error.stored}, replayed ${error.replayed}`
}
throw error
}
Read it plainly: translation stopped being deterministic. Realistic causes
are a genId that is not run-scoped, a translator that consults the clock, or a
journal that was rewritten (usually a reused runId). Treat it as a bug to
fix, not a condition to recover from. Do not catch it and continue: the log is
authoritative and already went to the client, so forwarding past a mismatch
delivers a stream whose prefix and suffix disagree about message identity. Log
the index and both fingerprints, let the run fail, and check runId uniqueness
first.
One tolerance exists: on adapters that splice host-tool-bridge events into
their output (@tanstack/ai-claude-code, @tanstack/ai-codex), the log holds
CUSTOM chunks fired by live tool execution that a replay runs no tools to
reproduce. Alignment skips those as out-of-band, up to
DEFAULT_MAX_OUT_OF_BAND_SKIP (64) consecutive entries. The bound is what keeps
this a tolerance rather than a forward search for any fingerprint that happens
to match.
A real LockStore is required
InMemoryLockStorecannot coordinate across hosts: it serializes claims
within one process, and the signal it hands out is a fresh
AbortController().signal that is never aborted, so the lease can never report
a loss. Two replicas then drive one run and duplicate its log. withSandbox
emits a warning when durability is wired over an in-memory lock — including
when no lock is wired at all, because defineSandbox's ensure falls back to
a process-lifetime InMemoryLockStore, which is the most in-memory case, not an
exempt one. Wire a distributed store with withLocks from @tanstack/ai/locks
(ordered beforewithSandbox) or the locks option.
Also required: a RunStore whose update round-trips status, finishedAt,
error, usage, sandboxKey, detachedSince, cancelRequested, and
driverEpoch. The last four are what a hand-written backend tends to omit, and
each omission breaks one mechanism: no driverEpoch → no fencing; no
cancelRequested → Stop cannot reach a remote driver; no
detachedSince/sandboxKey → nothing can reclaim the sandbox. findActiveRun
and listReclaimable are optional (feature-detect them), but you need the first
to rejoin by thread and the second for reapDetachedRuns to have anything to
sweep — a store without it cannot be reaped at all.
The reaper ships as a function, not a scheduler
reapDetachedRuns (with sandboxReclaimer for the sandbox teardown and
pruneJournals for the journal directory) is what closes out a detached run, but
nothing in the framework calls it: the application must, from its own cron route,
queue consumer, Durable Object alarm(), or waitUntil. Wiring durability and
never scheduling it leaves detached delivery logs open forever — every attached
tailer parks, the TTL is inert, and sandboxes bill indefinitely.
hasFinished is a REQUIRED option, not a nicety. The sweep must never drive a
run to find out whether it finished: pipeToRunLog is total, so it always writes a
terminal status and always calls close(), which on a live run means a false
transcript, every tailer's stream ended, and a record that has left
listReclaimable forever (so the sandbox can never be reclaimed). So the sentinel
is detected out of band, and neither the delivery log (frozen at the last
delivered chunk once the viewer left) nor this package (SandboxInstanceStore has
no list) can answer it. probeRunExit is the shipped implementation; only your
application can map a sandboxKey to a live handle for it. Anything it cannot
answer must be unknown, never finished:
import {
probeRunExit,
reapDetachedRuns,
sandboxReclaimer,
} from'@tanstack/ai-sandbox'importtype { RunRecord } from'@tanstack/ai'importtype { ReapResult, RunExitProbe } from'@tanstack/ai-sandbox'asyncfunctionhasFinished(record: RunRecord): Promise<RunExitProbe> {
if (record.sandboxKey === undefined) return { state: 'unknown' }
try {
const instance = await instances.get(record.sandboxKey)
if (instance === null) return { state: 'unknown' }
const handle = await sandbox.provider.resume({
id: instance.providerSandboxId,
})
if (handle === null) return { state: 'unknown' }
returnawaitprobeRunExit({ handle, runId: record.runId })
} catch (error) {
return { state: 'unknown', error }
}
}
exportfunctionsweepDetachedRuns(): Promise<ReapResult> {
returnreapDetachedRuns({
runs, // the SAME RunStore the chat routes use
locks, // the same distributed LockStore withSandbox getsdurability: durabilityFor, // per-run factory resolving the SAME log
hasFinished,
drive: driveRun, // the same `drive` the attach route passes sandboxRunDrivernow: Date.now(),
detachedRunTtlMs: 30 * 60 * 1000,
reclaim: sandboxReclaimer({ provider: sandbox.provider, instances }),
})
}
reapDetachedRuns resolves rather than rejects; read its outcomes tally. Note
that 'producing', 'unknown', and 'not-claimed' mean the run was left
untouched, whereas 'budget-exceeded' is the opposite — the record IS terminal,
the log IS closed, and reclaim fired; it flags a run the probe said had finished
that would not replay in time, i.e. a misbehaving journal read, translation, or
log. 'reclaim-failed' means the transcript saved but the sandbox is still up, and
no later sweep will retry it — the shipped sandboxReclaimerrejects (with
SandboxReclaimFailedError) when the provider's destroy throws, which is what
makes that outcome reachable at all, so a custom reclaim must reject too rather
than logging and resolving. It overwrites 'budget-exceeded' when a run hit both;
ReapRunEntry.terminalizedAnyway is set if and only if the budget anomaly
happened and is what keeps that second diagnostic on the entry.
ReapOptions.detachedRunTtlMs is the ONLY detached-run TTL. It is required,
passed directly to reapDetachedRuns, and nothing derives it from withSandbox
— there is no TTL option on durability, and no other config to keep it in sync
with.
Full reaper wiring — every outcome, pruneJournals' keep/delete table, and the
scheduling shapes — is in docs/sandbox/reaping.md. The attach/takeover half,
including the client joinRun side, is in docs/sandbox/takeover.md.
Events
claude-code.session-id (CUSTOM) — resumable session id → pass back via
modelOptions.sessionId.
file.changed (CUSTOM) — { path, diff } working-tree diff after the run.
sandbox.file (CUSTOM) — { type, path, timestamp } per file create/change/
delete, emitted automatically when a sandbox is active.
Critical rules
Harness adapters require a sandbox. Always include withSandbox(...) in
middleware — without it chat() throws a missing-capability error.
Secrets (workspace.secrets) are injected into the sandbox env. Their
raw values are never persisted in snapshots, the sandbox store, or the event
log. Always create them with createSecrets(...) so the values stay hidden
behind SecretRef tokens. The agent binary (claude) must exist in the
sandbox image (install it in setup or bake it into the image).
Secret-bearing projected files (e.g. MCP config with resolved header
values) can be included by default capture. Capture replaces resolved secret
bytes with zero bytes before it hashes or writes snapshot blobs. Restore runs
before projection, so projection writes current secret values after restore.
chat()-provided tools are bridged into the in-sandbox agent over a
host-side MCP tool-proxy: the agent calls them as mcp__tanstack__<tool> and
each call is proxied back to the host where the tool's execute() runs (with
its closures / DB / secrets). The agent also has its own native tools
(Bash/Edit/Read/…). The host bridge binds on the host; the sandbox reaches it
(localhost, or host.docker.internal for Docker), gated by a per-run bearer
token.
Durable runs are one opt-in.withSandbox(sandbox, { runs, durability })
needs BOTH; pass one and you silently get today's non-durable behavior. Drive
a resumed run with sandboxRunDriver, never by hand-wiring pipeToRunLog —
it owns the claim, the epoch fence (over the log and the run record), and
the quiescence gate. A durable deploy needs a distributed LockStore;
InMemoryLockStore (or no lock at all) warns and cannot fence.
Use localProcessSandbox() only in trusted/dev contexts (no isolation).
Skills/plugins that a CLI lacks (e.g. agentSkill on Codex, plugins on
Codex) warn and skip — they do not throw.
