| name | security-review |
| description | Check code for the most common, high-risk security vulnerabilities (broken access control, tenant isolation, injection, secrets, SSRF, auth/session, unsafe file handling, mass assignment) before it ships. Use after editing any API controller, guard, or auth code (apps/api/src/auth/**), a Prisma schema/query, a file-upload/webhook handler, or before committing/pushing security-sensitive changes. |
Review code for high-risk security vulnerabilities and fix confirmed high-severity issues immediately. Complements CI (CodeQL/Dependabot/SBOM) by catching logic/design flaws those miss — do not re-flag dependency CVEs or generic lint.
1. Scope
- If
$ARGUMENTS names files/dirs, review those.
- Otherwise review the current change set:
git diff --name-only origin/main...HEAD (fall back to git diff --name-only for uncommitted work). Skip generated files, lockfiles, and *.spec.ts (unless the change is in a spec).
Review whenever the change touches a trust boundary or a resource — judge by behavior, not path. That includes: any controller or service (services are where IDOR, tenant-scoping, and mass-assignment bugs actually live), Next.js route handlers (app/api/**, route.ts), Trigger.dev jobs (apps/api/src/trigger/** — SSRF, elevated context), guards/auth (apps/api/src/auth/**, packages/auth/**), any Prisma query (especially lookups/updates/deletes by a client-supplied id → IDOR), middleware, file upload/storage, webhooks, outbound requests to a dynamic URL, crypto/token handling, and any frontend that renders user-supplied HTML or builds redirects from input.
Only if the change is genuinely non-security (pure presentation, types, copy, config with no secrets) — say so and stop, don't invent findings.
2. Review
Dispatch the security-reviewer agent on the scoped files. For a broad review (a full PR / many files), fan out parallel security-reviewer agents by dimension group so coverage is thorough:
- Access control & tenancy — guards,
@RequirePermission, API-key/service-token scope enforcement, authz-vs-attribution, IDOR, organizationId scoping.
- Injection, XSS & mass assignment — raw Prisma/SQL, command/path injection,
dangerouslySetInnerHTML/unsanitized HTML, ...dto spread into create/update.
- Secrets, SSRF, auth/session & file handling — hardcoded/logged secrets, outbound fetch to user URLs, session/cookie/attribution boundaries, S3/upload safety, DoS, info disclosure.
The agent's full checklist lives in .claude/agents/security-reviewer.md.
3. Verify (no false positives)
For each P1/P2 finding, adversarially verify before acting: dispatch one security-reviewer (or read the code yourself) prompted to refute it — trace the guard→controller→service→DB path. Drop anything that can't be confirmed. Attribution-only use of a resolved actor, org-scoped queries, and parameterized Prisma are NOT findings.
4. Fix & report
- Fix confirmed
P1/P2 issues immediately (mirror the surrounding code; add a regression test for auth/attribution changes).
- Report
P3s and anything needing a product decision, with severity · file:line · exploit/impact · fix.
- Run
bunx turbo run typecheck --filter=@trycompai/api --filter=@trycompai/app after fixes.
- End with a one-line verdict: clean, or the highest-priority action remaining.
