siem-log-analysis

name	siem-log-analysis
description	Network-security-focused SIEM log analysis across Splunk, ELK, and QRadar platforms. Guides forensic timeline construction from network device syslog events — firewall denies, authentication failures, configuration changes, interface events, VPN tunnel state, and lateral movement indicators. Provides platform-independent diagnostic reasoning with platform-specific query syntax using [Splunk]/[ELK]/[QRadar] inline labels.
license	Apache-2.0
metadata	{"safety":"read-only","author":"network-security-skills-suite","version":"1.0.0","openclaw":"{\"emoji\":\"🚨\",\"safetyTier\":\"read-only\",\"requires\":{\"bins\":[\"ssh\"],\"env\":[]},\"tags\":[\"siem\",\"splunk\",\"elk\",\"logs\"],\"mcpDependencies\":[],\"egressEndpoints\":[]}"}

Network Security SIEM Log Analysis

Forensic timeline construction and threat detection from network device syslog events across SIEM platforms. This skill guides network-security-focused log analysis — it is not general SIEM administration, dashboard building, or data onboarding.

The diagnostic reasoning is platform-independent: what to look for, how to correlate, and what constitutes an anomaly applies regardless of SIEM platform. Only query syntax diverges. Platform-specific queries use [Splunk] (SPL), [ELK] (KQL/Lucene), and [QRadar] (AQL) inline labels. Reference references/query-reference.md for complete side-by-side query patterns covering seven network security use cases.

All investigation data sources are network device syslog events: firewall permit/deny logs, authentication messages, configuration change notifications, interface state changes, VPN tunnel events, and routing protocol messages. Endpoint logs, application logs, and cloud audit trails are out of scope.

When to Use

• Security incident investigation — build a forensic timeline from network device logs when a security event is detected or reported
• Threat hunting — proactively search for indicators of compromise in network event data (lateral movement, unusual destinations, auth anomalies)
• Alert triage — evaluate SIEM alerts from network device sources to determine true positive, false positive, or informational classification
• Compliance log review — verify that required log sources are active and retention policies are met (PCI-DSS 10.6, NIST 800-53 AU-6, ISO 27001 A.12.4)
• Anomalous behavior detection — identify deviations from baseline traffic patterns, event volumes, or connection profiles
• Post-incident timeline construction — reconstruct the sequence of network events surrounding a confirmed security incident for root cause analysis and lessons learned

Prerequisites

• SIEM platform access: Search-level privileges on Splunk (Search & Reporting), ELK (Kibana Discover + Dev Tools), or QRadar (Log Activity + Advanced Search). Read-only access is sufficient for all queries.
• Network device syslog forwarding: Target network devices must be forwarding syslog events to the SIEM. Use the commands in references/cli-reference.md to verify forwarding configuration.
• Time synchronization: All network devices and the SIEM platform must use NTP-synchronized time. Skewed timestamps corrupt correlation and timeline accuracy. Verify with [Cisco] show ntp status, [JunOS] show system ntp, [EOS] show ntp status.
• Log familiarity: Understanding of network device syslog message formats — Cisco %FACILITY-SEVERITY-MNEMONIC, Juniper structured syslog, Palo Alto CSV-format traffic/threat logs, Arista event format.
• Baseline data: At least 7 days of historical log data for statistical anomaly detection. Without baseline data, anomaly detection in Step 5 is limited to manual threshold comparison.

Procedure

Follow these six steps sequentially. The procedure builds a forensic timeline from raw syslog events through correlation, anomaly detection, and triage. Each step produces artifacts consumed by subsequent steps.

Step 1: Verify Syslog Sources

Before investigating, confirm that all relevant network devices are actively forwarding syslog events to the SIEM. Missing sources create blind spots that invalidate investigation conclusions.

Verify on each network device that syslog is configured and forwarding:

• [Cisco] — show logging confirms syslog destination IP, trap level, and facility code
• [JunOS] — show system syslog shows configured syslog hosts and facility/severity filters
• [EOS] — show logging displays syslog server address and logging level
• [PAN-OS] — show log-interface-setting confirms log forwarding interface
• [FortiGate] — get log setting shows syslog server and severity filter; diagnose log test generates a test event for receipt verification

Confirm SIEM-side receipt of events from each device:

[Splunk] — Run | metadata type=sources index=network and verify each device appears with a recent lastTime value. Gaps exceeding the device's expected log rate indicate forwarding failures.

[ELK] — Query GET /network-*/_search?size=1&sort=@timestamp:desc&q=host.name:<device> for each device. Compare the returned timestamp against the current time.

[QRadar] — Navigate to Admin → Log Sources and verify each network device shows a non-zero event count and recent "Last Event" timestamp.

See references/cli-reference.md for the full syslog verification command reference including RFC 5424 severity and facility mapping.

Step 2: Normalize Events

Map raw syslog events to a common field taxonomy so that events from different vendors and platforms can be correlated. Key normalization fields:

Common Field	Description	Source Examples
timestamp	Event time (UTC)	syslog header timestamp
source_device	Originating device hostname	syslog host field
event_type	Normalized event category	auth, config, traffic, interface, vpn
source_ip	Source IP address	parsed from message body
dest_ip	Destination IP address	parsed from message body
dest_port	Destination port	parsed from message body
action	Outcome (permit/deny/info)	parsed from message body
user	Associated username	parsed from auth messages
severity	RFC 5424 severity (0–7)	syslog PRI field

[Splunk] — Source types (e.g., cisco:ios, juniper:junos, pan:firewall) provide automatic field extraction via Technology Add-ons (TAs). Verify field extraction accuracy with | fieldsummary on the relevant source type.

[ELK] — Ingest pipelines and Logstash filters perform field extraction. Verify parsed fields in Kibana Discover by expanding an event document. Missing fields indicate parsing pipeline issues.

[QRadar] — Device Support Modules (DSMs) provide automatic parsing. Check Log Source Extensions if standard DSMs do not extract required fields for a device type.

Step 3: Correlate Across Sources

Join events from multiple network devices by shared attributes — timestamp windows, IP addresses, session identifiers, or user accounts. Correlation transforms isolated events into investigation threads.

Correlation strategies:

1. IP-based correlation — join firewall deny events with authentication failure events sharing the same source IP within a time window
2. Time-window correlation — group events within ±60 seconds of a trigger event (e.g., interface down → routing change → traffic shift)
3. Session-based correlation — track VPN tunnel establishment through to teardown using tunnel/session identifiers
4. User-based correlation — follow a user's activity across devices (authentication → config change → logout)

[Splunk] — Use | transaction or | join commands to correlate events across source types. | transaction src_ip maxspan=5m groups events by source IP within 5-minute windows.

[ELK] — Use Elasticsearch aggregations with composite or terms buckets on shared fields. For complex correlation, use the EQL (Event Query Language) sequence queries in Security → Timelines.

[QRadar] — Offense rules automatically correlate related events. For manual correlation, use AQL JOIN syntax or the "Event Correlation" search to group events by shared properties.

Step 4: Build Timeline

Arrange correlated events chronologically to reconstruct the sequence of network activity. The timeline is the primary investigation artifact.

Timeline construction:

1. Select correlated events from Step 3
2. Sort by timestamp (ascending) — ensure UTC normalization
3. Annotate each event with: device, event type, source/dest, action
4. Identify phase transitions: reconnaissance → initial access → lateral movement → objectives
5. Mark decision points where the attacker or anomaly changed behavior

[Splunk] — | sort _time | table _time, host, event_type, src_ip, dest_ip, action produces a chronological event table. Use | streamstats to compute inter-event time deltas for pattern recognition.

[ELK] — Elastic Security → Timelines provides an interactive timeline builder. Drag correlated events into a timeline and annotate phases. Alternatively, use Discover sorted by @timestamp ascending.

[QRadar] — Within an Offense, the "Events" tab shows correlated events in chronological order. Export to CSV for external timeline tools.

Step 5: Identify Anomalies

Compare observed events against baselines to surface deviations that may indicate security threats. Anomalies include unusual event volume, new source/destination pairs, unexpected protocols, and off-hours activity.

Statistical anomaly detection:

[Splunk] — Use | eventstats to compute rolling averages and standard deviations, then flag events exceeding 2σ from baseline:

| timechart span=1h count | eventstats avg(count) as avg, stdev(count) as sd
| eval anomaly=if(count > avg + 2*sd, 1, 0)

[ELK] — Configure Kibana ML anomaly detection jobs on the network index with event_rate detectors partitioned by host.name. Review anomaly scores in the ML Explorer. Threshold rule alerts can flag volume spikes without ML.

[QRadar] — QRadar's Anomaly Detection rules (Administrative Offense rules) identify behavioral deviations automatically. For manual analysis, query hourly event counts with AQL and compare against 7-day averages.

Key anomalies for network security:

• Event volume >2σ from hourly baseline (possible scanning or DDoS)
• New internal-to-internal destination IPs not seen in prior 30 days
• Connections on non-standard ports from internal sources (lateral movement)
• Authentication attempts from IP addresses not in known management ranges
• Configuration changes outside approved maintenance windows
• VPN tunnels established from unexpected source IPs or at unusual times

See references/query-reference.md for complete anomaly detection and lateral movement query patterns across all three platforms.

Step 6: Triage and Classify

Assign severity to findings, eliminate false positives, and determine escalation actions. This step transforms investigation results into actionable decisions.

Classification process:

1. Review each anomaly or correlated event chain from Steps 3–5
2. Compare against known benign patterns (scheduled maintenance, authorized scanning, expected VPN sources)
3. Assign severity using the Alert Severity Classification table
4. Determine disposition: true positive, false positive, or informational
5. Apply the triage decision tree (see Decision Trees section)

Threshold Tables

Alert Severity Classification

Severity	Criteria	Response
Critical	Confirmed active compromise, data exfiltration evidence, unauthorized admin access	Immediate IR engagement, executive notification
High	Lateral movement indicators, multiple auth failures + success, unauthorized config changes	Priority investigation within 1 hour, security team alert
Medium	Anomalous volume >2σ, new destination patterns, single unauthorized access attempt	Investigation within 4 hours, document and track
Low	Minor policy violations, single firewall deny from known scanner, informational anomaly	Review within 24 hours, tune rules if recurring
Info	Baseline deviation within normal variance, expected maintenance activity	Log for trending, no immediate action

Event Volume Anomaly Thresholds

Metric	Normal	Warning (>1σ)	Alert (>2σ)	Critical (>3σ)
Events per hour (per device)	Baseline ± 1σ	1–2σ above baseline	2–3σ above baseline	>3σ above baseline
Unique destination IPs (internal host)	≤20/hour	21–50/hour	51–100/hour	>100/hour
Failed auth attempts (per source IP)	≤3/hour	4–10/hour	11–50/hour	>50/hour
Firewall denies (per source IP)	≤50/hour	51–200/hour	201–1000/hour	>1000/hour
Config change events (per device)	≤2/day	3–5/day	6–10/day	>10/day

Correlation Confidence Scoring

Confidence	Criteria	Action
High (>0.8)	3+ correlated events across 2+ devices with matching IPs and tight time window (<5 min)	Treat as confirmed, escalate
Medium (0.5–0.8)	2 correlated events or single-device chain with circumstantial evidence	Investigate further before escalating
Low (<0.5)	Single event or loose time correlation (>30 min window)	Monitor, do not escalate without additional evidence

Decision Trees

Alert Triage Flow

Alert received from SIEM
├── Source device in scope (network infrastructure)?
│   ├── No → Route to appropriate team (endpoint, application, cloud)
│   └── Yes → Continue network security triage
│
├── Known benign pattern?
│   ├── Matches scheduled maintenance window → FALSE POSITIVE
│   │   └── Document, tune alert rule if recurring (>3 occurrences)
│   ├── Matches authorized scanning activity → FALSE POSITIVE
│   │   └── Add scanner IP to allowlist in correlation rule
│   └── No known benign match → Continue investigation
│
├── Correlation confidence (from Step 3)?
│   ├── High (>0.8) → TRUE POSITIVE — escalate
│   │   ├── Critical/High severity → Engage incident response
│   │   │   └── Preserve evidence, initiate IR playbook
│   │   └── Medium/Low severity → Assign to security analyst
│   ├── Medium (0.5–0.8) → PROBABLE — investigate further
│   │   └── Run additional queries from query-reference.md
│   │       └── Confidence increases → Reclassify as True Positive
│   │       └── No supporting evidence → INFORMATIONAL
│   └── Low (<0.5) → INFORMATIONAL
│       └── Document trend, monitor for recurrence
│
└── Disposition recorded?
    ├── Yes → Close alert with classification and notes
    └── No → Document before closing — all alerts require disposition

Report Template

NETWORK SECURITY SIEM INVESTIGATION REPORT
=============================================
Investigation ID: [unique identifier]
Investigation Trigger: [alert ID / hunt hypothesis / compliance requirement]
Investigation Window: [start timestamp] — [end timestamp] (UTC)
SIEM Platform: [Splunk / ELK / QRadar]
Analyst: [name/identifier]

SUMMARY:
- Investigation type: [incident / hunt / compliance / triage]
- Severity classification: [Critical / High / Medium / Low / Info]
- Disposition: [True Positive / False Positive / Informational]
- Devices involved: [count and hostnames]

LOG SOURCE VERIFICATION (Step 1):
- Sources confirmed active: [count] / [total expected]
- Sources with gaps: [list any devices with missing or delayed logs]
- Time sync status: [all synchronized / issues noted]

TIMELINE OF EVENTS (Step 4):
| # | Timestamp (UTC) | Device | Event Type | Source IP | Dest IP | Action | Notes |
|---|-----------------|--------|------------|----------|---------|--------|-------|
| 1 | [time] | [host] | [type] | [src] | [dst] | [action] | [context] |

ANOMALIES DETECTED (Step 5):
- [description of anomaly, statistical basis, affected devices]

QUERY EVIDENCE:
- Platform: [Splunk/ELK/QRadar]
- Query used: [paste query]
- Results: [summary of what the query returned]
- Time range: [search window]

CORRELATION ANALYSIS (Step 3):
- Correlation method: [IP / time-window / session / user]
- Confidence score: [High / Medium / Low]
- Supporting evidence: [list of correlated events]

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. [immediate action — e.g., block IP, isolate device, engage IR]
2. [short-term — e.g., tune detection rule, add log source]
3. [long-term — e.g., improve baseline, add correlation rule]

NEXT STEPS:
- [ ] [action item with owner and deadline]

Troubleshooting

Missing Log Sources

Symptom: A network device that should be forwarding syslog shows no events in the SIEM for the investigation window.

Diagnosis: Verify syslog configuration on the device using commands from references/cli-reference.md. Check network connectivity between device and SIEM collector (firewall rules on UDP/TCP 514 or TLS 6514).

Resolution: Reconfigure syslog forwarding, verify receipt with a test event, and document the gap period in the investigation report. Findings during the gap are inconclusive for the affected device.

Time Synchronization Issues

Symptom: Correlated events have implausible timestamps — events that should be sequential appear out of order or with large gaps.

Diagnosis: Check NTP status on affected devices. Compare device clock with SIEM server clock. Look for daylight saving time or timezone offset errors (all timestamps should be UTC or consistently offset-adjusted).

Resolution: Fix NTP configuration, recalculate event timestamps with the known offset, and note the time correction in the investigation timeline. Events from desynchronized sources have reduced correlation confidence.

Log Parsing Failures

Symptom: Events arrive but key fields (source IP, destination IP, action) are not extracted — they appear only in the raw message body.

Diagnosis: Check SIEM-side parsing. [Splunk] — verify the correct Technology Add-on (TA) is installed. [ELK] — check ingest pipeline or Logstash filter for parsing errors. [QRadar] — verify the Device Support Module (DSM) mapping.

Resolution: Install or update parsing configuration for the affected source type. Reprocess raw events if the SIEM supports reindexing.

Query Performance Problems

Symptom: SIEM queries time out or return slowly, especially statistical queries over large time ranges.

Diagnosis: Check the search time range — broad ranges (>30 days) against non-accelerated data cause performance issues across all platforms.

Resolution: Narrow the time range to the investigation window. Use accelerated search methods: [Splunk] | tstats over accelerated data models instead of | search. [ELK] — use filtered aggregations instead of full-text queries. [QRadar] — use LAST N HOURS clauses and avoid SELECT * in AQL queries.

Incomplete Correlation

Symptom: Correlation in Step 3 produces few results despite evidence of related activity across multiple devices.

Diagnosis: Check field normalization from Step 2. Common issues: IP addresses in different formats (dotted decimal vs integer), timestamps in different timezones, hostname mismatches between syslog header and SIEM device name.

Resolution: Normalize the correlation fields before joining. Use CIDR matching instead of exact IP matching where appropriate. Widen the correlation time window if device clocks have minor drift.