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Ransomware has been detected executing or file encryption is actively occurring
Users report inability to open files with unfamiliar extensions appended
A ransom note is discovered on one or more systems
EDR detects mass file modification patterns consistent with encryption behavior
Threat intelligence warns of an imminent ransomware campaign targeting the organization
Do not use for general malware incidents that do not involve file encryption or extortion; use malware incident response procedures instead.
Common Misconfigurations & Verification
Backups inside the dwell-time window are poisoned: the most damaging recovery mistake is restoring from a backup created during the attacker's 12-day dwell — it contains their backdoors. Establish initial-access date via forensics first, then only trust restore points older than that. Verify the chosen point is clean by scanning the restored data (YARA/EDR) in an isolated network before reconnecting.
"Immutable" that isn't: confirm the repository is genuinely WORM/air-gapped (S3 Object Lock COMPLIANCE mode, Azure immutable blob, Veeam hardened repo) and that the ransomware didn't already delete shadow copies (vssadmin delete shadows) or reach the backup server with domain-admin creds. Validate by attempting a delete and confirming it's denied, not just by reading the config.
Powering off destroys keys: for some variants the symmetric key lives only in memory — pulling the network cable preserves it, a shutdown loses it. Keep at least one encrypted host live for memory forensics.
Pay-vs-restore is a legal/financial decision, not technical: never pay without OFAC sanctions screening and counsel review (paying a sanctioned group is itself a violation), and a decryptor is no guarantee — many are buggy or slow. Restore-from-backup is the default when a verified-clean copy exists.
Concrete verification recovery worked: rebuild DCs from clean media (not DC backups), reset all user/service/krbtgt credentials before rejoining anything, restore in dependency order (auth → DNS/DHCP → apps), reimage workstations rather than file-restore, and confirm no residual persistence and no exfil-channel activity before returning to production.
Prerequisites
Ransomware-specific incident response playbook reviewed and approved by executive leadership
Tested and verified offline backup strategy with air-gapped or immutable copies
Incident retainer with a specialized ransomware response firm (e.g., Mandiant, CrowdStrike Services, Kroll)
Legal counsel pre-engaged for OFAC sanctions screening and regulatory notification
Cyber insurance carrier contact information and policy coverage details
Bitcoin/cryptocurrency analysis capability or third-party engagement for payment tracing
Workflow
Step 1: Detect and Confirm Ransomware
Validate that the incident is ransomware and determine the variant:
Identify the ransomware by analyzing the ransom note filename, extension appended to encrypted files, and note content
Upload the ransom note and a sample encrypted file to ID Ransomware (id-ransomware.malwarehunterteam.com)
Check NoMoreRansom.org for available free decryptors
Determine the ransomware deployment method from EDR/SIEM logs
Identify the ransomware group (e.g., LockBit, BlackCat/ALPHV, Royal, Akira, Play)
Ransomware Identification:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Variant: LockBit 3.0 (Black)
Extension: .lockbit3
Ransom Note: README-LOCKBIT.txt
Tor Site: lockbit[redacted].onion
Deployment: Group Policy Object pushing ransomware.exe to all domain-joined systems
Initial Access: VPN credential compromise (no MFA)
Dwell Time: 12 days
Data Exfiltration: Yes - 47GB uploaded to MEGA via rclone prior to encryption
Step 2: Immediate Containment
Stop ransomware propagation before assessing damage:
Priority 1: Disconnect affected network segments from core infrastructure (pull the network cable, not shutdown)
Priority 2: Isolate all domain controllers immediately if GPO-based deployment is suspected
Priority 3: Disable the compromised accounts used for deployment
Implement network segmentation between workstation and server VLANs
Enable Protected Users security group for privileged accounts
Disable NTLM authentication where possible
Deploy LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution) for local admin accounts
Key Concepts
Term
Definition
Double Extortion
Ransomware tactic combining file encryption with data exfiltration and threat to publish stolen data
Immutable Backup
Backup storage that cannot be modified or deleted for a defined retention period, protecting against ransomware targeting backups
OFAC Sanctions
U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control restrictions that may prohibit ransom payments to sanctioned entities or jurisdictions
Dwell Time
Days the attacker was present before deploying ransomware; critical for determining which backups are clean
Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS)
Criminal business model where ransomware developers lease their malware to affiliates who conduct attacks
Rclone
Legitimate cloud sync tool commonly abused by ransomware operators for data exfiltration before encryption
3-2-1-1-0 Backup Rule
Backup strategy requiring 3 copies, 2 media types, 1 offsite, 1 immutable/air-gapped, and 0 errors in recovery testing
Tools & Systems
ID Ransomware: Online service to identify ransomware variant from ransom note or encrypted file sample
NoMoreRansom.org: Europol-backed project providing free decryption tools for certain ransomware families
Veeam / Commvault: Enterprise backup platforms with immutable repository and instant VM recovery capabilities
KAPE: Rapid forensic triage collection from encrypted systems to determine initial access and dwell time
Cado Response: Cloud-native forensics platform for investigating ransomware that affects cloud infrastructure
Common Scenarios
Scenario: LockBit 3.0 via Compromised VPN
Context: Attackers compromised VPN credentials (no MFA), spent 12 days performing reconnaissance, disabled antivirus via GPO, exfiltrated 47GB of data, and deployed LockBit 3.0 across the domain via GPO at 2:00 AM on a Sunday.
Approach:
Disconnect all network segments at the core switch level
Verify offline backup integrity (Veeam repository on immutable storage)
Preserve two encrypted servers powered on for memory forensics
Engage incident response retainer and cyber insurance carrier
Begin recovery in isolated network: rebuild DCs, reset all passwords, restore in priority order
Conduct forensic investigation in parallel to determine initial access and full adversary activity
Pitfalls:
Restoring from backups that were created during the 12-day dwell time (may contain backdoors)
Paying the ransom without OFAC screening and legal counsel review
Reconnecting recovered systems to the production network before full password reset
Not checking for data exfiltration, leaving the organization exposed to the extortion threat
Output Format
RANSOMWARE INCIDENT REPORT
===========================
Incident: INC-2025-1892
Ransomware Family: LockBit 3.0 (Black)
Date Detected: 2025-11-17T06:45:00Z
Initial Access: VPN credential compromise (no MFA)
Dwell Time: 12 days
IMPACT SUMMARY
Encrypted Systems: 187 endpoints, 12 servers
Business Impact: Full operations disruption
Data Exfiltrated: 47GB (finance, HR, legal documents)
Ransom Demand: $2.5M BTC (72-hour deadline)
Backup Status: Veeam immutable repository - CLEAN
RECOVERY APPROACH
Decision: Restore from backup (no ransom payment)
Recovery Start: 2025-11-17T10:00:00Z
DC Rebuild: Complete - 2025-11-17T18:00:00Z
Critical Systems: Restored - 2025-11-18T12:00:00Z
Full Recovery: Estimated 2025-11-21
CONTAINMENT TIMELINE
06:45 UTC - Ransomware detected by SOC analyst
07:00 UTC - Network segments disconnected
07:15 UTC - Incident commander activated IR plan
07:30 UTC - Backup integrity verification started
08:00 UTC - Memory forensics initiated on 2 live systems
10:00 UTC - Recovery operations commenced in clean room
POST-INCIDENT ACTIONS
1. MFA enforced on all VPN and remote access
2. 3-2-1-1-0 backup architecture implemented
3. Network segmentation between workstation/server VLANs
4. LAPS deployed for local administrator passwords
5. Regulatory notifications filed (GDPR 72-hour, state AG)
